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What Do We Know 
about Warfare on 
the Great Plains?
Douglas B. Bamforth
The archaeology of the Great Plains provides some of 
the clearest and most dramatic archaeological docu-
mentation of warfare anywhere in the world: there has 
been violence on the grasslands for millennia, and there 
is no doubt that this affected many aspects of human 
lives in the region. This volume brings together work 
on major aspects of Plains warfare that have important 
implications for studies of warfare in general. The topics 
we consider here include artistic evidence of the role of 
war in the lives of indigenous hunter-gatherers on the 
Plains prior to and during the period of Euroamerican 
expansion, archaeological discussions of fortification 
design and its implications, and archaeological and 
other information on the larger implications of war in 
human history on the Plains. My goal here is to offer a 
bird’s-eye view of warfare on the Plains as a frame for 
the chapters that follow.
What Is War and Why does It Matter?
LeBlanc (2003) has argued that war is essentially a 
constant in human history: it is always present in some 
form. This is likely true, at least in the sense that human 
groups always are, and always were, capable of choos-
ing to go to war. But it is also true that human groups 
do not always make this choice, and seeing where in 
human history they did and did not make it is impor-
tant. Anthropology in general, and archaeology in par-
ticular, has paid varying amounts of attention to social DOI: 10.5876/9781607326700.c001
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conflict. Keeley (1996), for example, argues that archaeologists have often paci-
fied the past, creating romanticized views of idyllic periods in human history; 
widespread denials that war existed in Neolithic Europe and in North America 
prior to European contact are particularly well known. As we have become 
more willing to grapple with the reality of war, we also encounter the trap of 
assuming that all societies are equally warlike and engage in war in more or 
less the same ways. Should we worry about this? Or, more precisely, do either 
of these equally false perspectives compromise our ability to see the past accu-
rately, in North America, Neolithic Europe, or elsewhere? It is difficult to argue 
they do not. Archaeology’s value lies in its potential for telling human history 
as it really happened, not as we wish it happened. As Keeley (1996) notes, “the 
weight of the evidence” has a literal meaning in our field that requires us to 
attend to that evidence, and war can leave dramatic traces that demand our 
attention if we are to approach a truthful account of the human past.
In part, understanding human choices about war and peace depends on 
what we mean by “war.” Formal war in the modern sense—organized violence 
sanctioned by explicit government decisions and involving combat between 
standing armies—reflects the organization of modern state societies and thus 
does not necessarily help us to understand organized social violence in other 
times and places. If we use a definition like this, we can simply define war 
out of existence for many past societies, despite the fact that these societies 
manifestly bore the immense costs of violence. Beyond an aversion to seeing 
war in the past, the major issue underlying the problem of defining war is the 
absence of formal decision-making hierarchies in many ancient and modern 
social groups. Furthermore, a view of war focused on such hierarchies misrep-
resents the variety even of modern patterns of social violence, which increas-
ingly involve smaller-scale combat by non-state actors.
If we define war more broadly as community-level violence sanctioned by 
whatever recognized social or political units exist in a particular time and place, 
it is clear that it takes a variety of forms in non-state societies like those on the 
indigenous Great Plains. This variety includes raids by small groups (seeking 
captives or other specific targets, to avenge individual affronts, or in search of 
glory and status), largely ceremonial and low-casualty confrontations between 
more or less equally matched forces, and full-scale assaults by massed attack-
ers that can result in the total destruction of large communities. Used in this 
way, the term “war” subsumes a continuum of violence and a range of relatively 
distinct kinds of conflict with differing logistic, social, and other implications 
and requirements. But it does not subsume all violence, and this is especially 
important in an archaeological context (as I discuss in more detail below).
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All of these forms of war are and were important in the lives of people today 
and in the past. Observations of war in a range of recent societies leave no 
doubt that it shaped those lives in fundamental ways that we do not always 
take account of in our discussions of the human past (Allen 2008; Arkush 2011; 
Cameron 2008, 2011; Keeley 1996; LeBlanc 1999; McCabe 2004; Roscoe 2008). 
Conflicts that produce small numbers of deaths in any single engagement can 
have serious aggregate demographic effects in small social groups; construc-
tion of even simple defenses takes time, resources, and labor that have signifi-
cant opportunity costs; and the natural and constructed features that prevent 
attackers from entering settlements (and from escaping if they do enter and 
are discovered) are also inconvenient for the people who live in those settle-
ments. Archaeologists typically consider human use of the landscape entirely 
or almost entirely in terms of the distribution of favorable settlement loca-
tions and needed resources, but proximity to enemies can keep residential 
groups from using even the best land that they might otherwise have access to. 
Aggregating into larger groups for defense also requires access to larger food 
supplies, demands longer travel to important locations (such as agricultural 
fields), and depends on social mechanisms for maintaining order that small 
social groups do not need. Such aggregations also often bring together previ-
ously geographically dispersed kin groups who, when dispersed, might have 
been able to share geographically dispersed resources in hard times. Fortified 
aggregations have larger social implications as well: independent defended 
communities are often isolated from one another, potentially inhibiting the 
formation of larger regional social groups, and effective fortifications make it 
possible for such communities to resist the formation of such groups if they 
choose to do so. Defeats in conflict, whether due to a series of cumulative 
small losses or to a single massive loss, can also result in the loss of social iden-
tity, as survivors integrate into other communities or subservient social groups, 
and the involuntary movement of captives among groups changes labor and 
other relations and can introduce new ideas and skills.
But war also has benefits and creates opportunities. Groups who are vic-
torious in war can claim land, resources, and control of trade and labor; suc-
cessful individual warriors can raise their prestige and enhance their political, 
economic, and reproductive success. War can also benefit groups who are not 
themselves principals in a particular conflict. To take just one particularly rel-
evant example, LeBlanc (1999) argues that there was a shift around ad 1300 
in the Southwest from self-bows to more powerful compound recurved bows. 
Arrows fired from such bows penetrate wicker shields easily, but cannot pen-
etrate bison-hide shields. Access to the Great Plains, and the bison on them, 
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thus became much more important with increasing violence and new weap-
onry in the Southwest, offering a market for specific products to Plains groups 
willing to invest in shield production.
Social violence—war—thus often has effects that can drive important 
aspects of social, demographic, cultural, and economic change over time. Any 
process that can do this is a process that has been important in human history.
hoW do We see War?
Despite this, though, archaeological evidence of war can be ambiguous, and 
this is important: if telling truthful history means that we need to attend 
to conflict, it also means that we need to know what conflict looks like in 
the archaeological record. This is not always easy. The most direct evidence of 
social violence takes the form of defensive features in settlements and battle 
wounds visible on human skeletons, but we cannot always assume that we will 
see either of these. It is unlikely that there were more warlike social groups 
in native North America than the Lakota or the Comanche during the 1700s 
and 1800s. However, evidence of this can be difficult to find: these tribes built 
no fortified communities (although they destroyed them) and they disposed 
of their dead in ways that are archaeologically largely invisible, making combat 
wounds hard to see. Seeing combat wounds in cemeteries also requires that 
victims of violence were buried, and we know in many cases that they were 
not. This is because not all societies dispose of their dead in archaeologically 
visible ways and because circumstances, particularly defeats, often result in the 
bodies of combat victims being left behind on the battlefield (see Hollinger 
[2005:118], Riley [1973], and Greer and Greer’s [chapter 2, this volume] quote 
from Zenas Leonard’s observation of a battle between the Crow and the 
Blackfoot for examples of this). This can leave evidence even of large-scale 
attacks on permanent settlements difficult or impossible to detect (Hoffecker 
et al. [2012] note an Inuit example of this).
Absence of evidence for war is thus not necessarily evidence of absence, 
especially in the case of mobile hunter-gatherers. In contrast, settled farmers 
create durable communities that are archaeologically visible today and that 
would have been visible and immobile targets during times of conflict in the 
past. Horticultural communities also often built fortifications to keep attack-
ers out, or located themselves on landforms that are difficult to get access to 
(“defensible” locations). These communities also often interred their dead in 
formal cemeteries, increasing the potential visibility of combat wounds. There 
is thus an inherent difference in the archaeological visibility of social violence 
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between farmers and hunter-gatherers that we need to keep in mind. This dif-
ference is not absolute, as we will see below and in subsequent chapters (also 
see Allen and Jones 2014), but it is real. Other kinds of evidence, particularly 
rock art, can help with this problem, but this evidence is not always available 
and can be ambiguous when it is available.
As these issues might suggest, archaeologists generally focus on two kinds 
of evidence for social violence: direct osteological evidence of attacks on indi-
vidual people and evidence for the construction of defenses against attack or 
of construction of settlements in naturally defensible locations (e.g., Golitko 
and Keeley 2007; Keeley et al. 2007; Lambert 2002; Milner 1999; Walker 2001). 
We can infer war on other grounds in some cases—for example, houses aban-
doned and burned with their contents intact, unusual patterns in the age dis-
tribution of burials, or artistic depictions of warriors or of combat—but these 
two indicators are both the most common basis for inferring war and the 
strongest evidence that is usually available. But strong evidence and perfect 
evidence are not the same: people damaged their skeletons in more than one 
way and dug ditches for more than one reason.
As graphic as osteological evidence for violence can be, it is important to 
distinguish three kinds of evidence. Hand-to-hand combat can result in bro-
ken bones and fractures to the skull, but other activities can produce these 
injuries as well, and so can interpersonal violence outside of any context that 
we might call war (Walker 2001). For example, victims of violence can break 
their forearms warding off a blow from above (“parry factures”), but any num-
ber of accidents can break a forearm as well. Similarly, both socially sanctioned 
hand-to-hand combat and drunken Saturday night bar fights can result in 
broken facial bones. Not all violence is war, under our definition or any other 
reasonable definition, and making sense of ambiguous data of this kind often 
depends on contextual evidence: unusually high frequencies of forearm frac-
tures among young men, for example, might imply organized combat.
In contrast, attacks with projectile weapons can leave undoubted marks on 
skeletons, most spectacularly embedded points, and these are difficult to inter-
pret as anything except evidence of violence. Projectile points embedded in 
the bone, though, are one thing; points associated with a bone are something 
else. Milner (2005) discusses this on the basis of medical reports on projectile 
injuries and notes that stone points often fragment within a victim’s body and 
remain inside it even when the shaft of the projectile is removed; he argues 
that discoveries of such fragments associated with a skeleton, particularly in 
the abdominal area, are often good evidence for an attack. Milner also empha-
sizes a critical matter in addressing the implications of osteological evidence 
8 DOUGLAS B. BAMFORTH
of violence: many—in fact, most—victims of violence do not bear evidence of 
the way they died on their skeletons. His data indicate that rates of embedded 
projectile points are likely to underrepresent the number of projectile wounds 
in a population by as much as two-thirds. As Keeley (1996) and Walker (2001) 
also note, this indicates that even low levels of direct evidence for violent 
death in archaeological data imply significant levels of conflict.
A third category of osteological evidence consists of marks on bones caused 
not by the way a person died but by how their body was treated by their 
attacker(s). These include cutmarks on the skull resulting from scalping and 
cut or blow marks documenting mutilation of the head or body, often while 
taking trophies. Deterioration of the surface of the skull due to infection when 
individuals were scalped but not killed unambiguously indicates non-lethal 
violence. Marks like these are evidence of war, but they often also imply an 
ideological or ritual component to war that goes beyond the simple documen-
tation of organized and socially sanctioned combat.
And practical issues impact our ability to grapple with the ambiguity inherent 
in even osteological data. For example, data gathered over many years in dif-
ferent research settings are often not perfectly comparable, and reexaminations 
of collections have sometimes documented evidence of violence that earlier 
examinations did not identify (e.g., compare Bass and Berryman [1976] with 
Hollimon and Owsley [1994]). More specific to this volume, and more disturb-
ing, many important collections on the Plains remain unpublished decades after 
they were excavated and, apparently, studied: the Plains literature refers infor-
mally to data from a number of important sites that are nowhere reported publi-
cally or systematically (e.g., Blakeslee 1999; Hollinger 2005; Pringle 1998). In an 
era when archaeological objections to the reburial of human skeletal material 
depend substantially on how much we can learn from that material, the volume 
of analyzed but unpublished material from the Great Plains is shocking.
In addition to direct evidence of violence obtained from human skeletons, 
archaeologists generally take the presence of fortifications as evidence for war, 
often suggesting that the presence of defensive works implies active warfare 
while its absence suggests peace. Most commonly, archaeologically visible for-
tifications include palisades and ditches, often (but not always) built to enclose 
a residential area. Keeley et al. (2007) point out, though, that people build walls 
and dig ditches for a variety of reasons other than defense and that even overtly 
defensive features can serve a variety of other purposes. As in the case of many 
osteological patterns, archaeologists need to make the case that ancient people 
built particular potentially defensive features for protection. Keeley et al. (2007) 
argue that the presence of bastions and baffle gates are unambiguous evidence 
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of defensive architecture and that ditches with V-shaped cross-sections are 
likely evidence as well, especially when they are backed by a palisade. All of 
these are present on the Plains: for example, palisades, ditch forms, and bas-
tions are well documented for any number of sites in the Middle Missouri; Kay 
(1995:figure 39) documents a simple baffle gate at the Helb site in northern 
South Dakota, and Anderson (1985:figure 4) shows a more complex causeway 
and controlled entrance at the Wittrock site in northwestern Iowa.
a note on Chronology
My goal here is to present a broad-brush view of warfare in human his-
tory on the Plains, emphasizing the major kinds of evidence (combat wounds, 
mutilation, and fortifications) that I have just discussed. I do this in terms of 
a fairly small number of purely chronological periods: Paleoindian/Archaic 
(from the peopling of the Plains to 500 bc), Woodland (Early Woodland: 
500 bc–ad 1; Middle Woodland: ad 1–400; Late Woodland: ad 400–1000), 
Plains Village (ad 1000–1600), and Contact (ad 1600–1890). Plains archaeol-
ogists do not all organize the past using these periods; instead, local chronolo-
gies and research traditions have produced an array of regional chronological 
frameworks. Furthermore, Plains archaeologists often synthesize our data in 
terms of culture-historical constructs that combine time, space, and archaeo-
logical patterns into single taxonomic units. My discussion focuses on chro-
nology in the interests of simplicity and brevity, but also in order to highlight 
large-scale regional patterns that other frameworks can obscure.
In general, the periods I use here are easy to accommodate to regional 
chronological sequences. However, local chronologies in two areas of the 
Plains (the Late Prehistoric I period, ad 500–1100/1200, on the southwest-
ern Plains [Boyd 1997] and the Woodland/Late Prehistoric interval on the 
northwestern Plains [Scheiber 2008]) span the transition from what I am 
calling Late Woodland to what I am calling early Plains Village times. For 
sites in these intervals with radiocarbon dates there is no great difficulty with 
my organization, but sites placed into this period on the basis of diagnostic 
artifacts are inevitably chronologically slightly ambiguous. Presently available 
data offer no solution to this.
What Is the general Course of War on the PlaIns?
Caution in dealing with osteological evidence matters on the Plains because, 
although there is possible evidence for violence fairly early on the Plains, it is 
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not certain that we are looking at war. None of the very few individuals known 
from Paleoindian burials on the Plains appears to have died violently, but one 
adult woman from the Early Archaic Gore Pit site in southwestern Oklahoma 
shows evidence of blunt-force trauma to the right side of her skull that likely 
caused her death (ca. 6000–5000 bc; Hammatt 1976; Keith and Snow 1976). It 
is not clear, though, how this woman sustained her injury. With this possible 
exception, there is close to no evidence for any form of war on the Plains prior 
to about ad 1, during Middle Woodland times. Most areas of the Plains have 
produced very small numbers of burials dated prior to this time, so the absence 
of evidence for violence could be due to inadequate data. However, in the one 
case where we can see a substantial number of individuals that are clearly 
dated to this period—the Middle Archaic Gray Burial site in Saskatchewan—
evidence for violent death is also absent (Millar 1978), although one adult 
male in a burial in southern Manitoba dated to approximately 1800 bc bears a 
point embedded in his femur, fired from behind (Hoppa et al. 2005). The early 
occupants of North America certainly tried to kill each other at times—like 
the individual from Manitoba, Kennewick man carried a spear point embed-
ded in his hip when he died some 9,000 years ago (Chatters 2000)—but it is 
difficult to argue for extensive conflict on the Plains from Paleoindian through 
Early Woodland times.
This pattern changed over the last 2,000 years, though. Fortified sites are 
unknown on the Plains until later, but Middle- and Late Woodland–period 
osteological data suggest increasing conflict. Initially, this does not appear to 
have been widespread: substantial samples of excavated Middle Woodland 
burials from mounds and ossuaries on the central Plains and along the 
Missouri River in the Dakotas show no unambiguous cases of battle trauma 
(Neuman 1975; Phenice 1969). However, this may be misleading; there are 
hints of violence in Sonota-complex mortuary samples along the Missouri 
River. Bass and Phenice (1975; also see Olsen and Shipman 1994) note that 
the vast majority of marks on this material relate to the preparation of bodies 
for burial, but they also record at least two healed cranial wounds, an example 
of apparent decapitation, and a green-bone ulna fracture (possibly a parry 
fracture) on an adult male. One adult male in the Truman Mounds, asso-
ciated with pottery that is of either Middle or Late Woodland age, had a 
broken projectile point in his rib cage (Neuman 1960). Neuman (1975) also 
describes a series of worked human mandible and maxilla fragments from 
Boundary Mound that are effectively identical to objects in Hopewell sites 
to the east, and Seeman (1988) makes a strong case that these eastern objects 
are trophies taken from defeated enemies. Scalping marks on crania from the 
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Hanging Valley site in western Iowa indicate fairly unambiguously that the 
Middle Woodland Great Plains were not universally peaceful (Tiffany et al. 
1988). More dramatically, a Middle Woodland–age burial of three individuals 
in a single pit at the Sullivan-Carpenter site in western Oklahoma includes 
one individual who was decapitated and two others killed by dart points that 
remained embedded in their bodies (Boyd 1997:255).
It is difficult to be sure that this represents a real change in patterns of con-
flict on the Plains: as just noted, samples of human skeletal material are rare 
in most parts of the region prior to the Middle Woodland and persistent low 
levels of violence might simply have become visible around ad 1 because of 
a substantial increase in the number of known burials. But the available data 
suggest, at least, that small-scale raiding occurred on the northeastern edge 
and southern portion of the Plains by the Middle Woodland and that this 
raiding involved trophy-taking, at least in the form of scalping and possibly 
also in the taking of heads or portions of skulls.
If changes in warfare are sometimes ambiguous across the transition to 
Middle Woodland times, though, they are not at the transition from Middle 
to Late Woodland. This period has produced a smaller sample of buri-
als but dramatically higher frequencies of violent death: interpersonal vio-
lence became much more widespread and much more common after about 
ad 400, during Late Woodland and transitional (or possibly early) Plains 
Village times. In some areas, violence may have developed gradually. On the 
northwestern Plains, burials dated to the earlier part of the interval (primarily 
Scheiber’s [2008; Scheiber and Gill 1997] Woodland burials) bear few marks 
of combat. Two adult male burials at the Benick Ranch site in Wyoming (with 
calibrated radiocarbon ages between ad 400 and 700) show evidence of vio-
lence, including a V-shaped cut on the right frontal of one and two depressed 
cranial fractures on the other (Davis and Miller 2008). However, 17 per-
cent of burials later in this period (the earlier group of Scheiber’s [2008] Late 
Prehistoric burials) have embedded points, most spectacularly one burial in 
Wyoming with 14. The only Avonlea burial known in Canada, the Bethune 
burial (Dawson and Walker 1988), is an adult male who sustained and recov-
ered from a serious fracture to the area of his left eye, the area of the head most 
often struck by right-handed attackers. On the northeastern Plains, the Bahm, 
Blasky, and Fordville mounds produced evidence of scalping, and a woman in 
the Jamestown mounds has a projectile point in her lower back (Owsley 1994; 
Snortland 1994; Williams 1994).
Arrow wounds are very common in burials of this age in Texas and adjacent 
areas (Boyd 1997), including in the Loeve-Fox site, an Austin-phase cemetery 
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in central Texas where 6 of 24 individuals were killed by arrows, all of them shot 
in the back (Prewitt 1974) and a mass burial at the McCutchan-McLaughlin 
site in eastern Oklahoma (Powell and Rogers 1980). Chronologically ambigu-
ous burials that are likely, but not certainly, of this age in central Texas also 
show removal of the hands and feet, embedded projectile points, and missing 
mandibles, these last apparently taken as trophies and sometimes apparently 
worn as pendants (Boyd 1997:280–281). Milner’s (2005) observation that the 
frequencies of arrow wounds substantially underrepresent rates of combat 
mortality implies that these data indicate extraordinarily high rates of vio-
lence in at least some parts of the Plains, and the McCutchan-McLaughlin 
burial suggests that the scale of this violence may have increased from small-
scale raiding to somewhat larger-scale attacks, at least in the south.
The appearance of Ceremonial-tradition rock art in the region from west-
ern Kansas and eastern Colorado northward well into Alberta underscores 
this shift. Ceremonial-tradition art is fairly diverse, but it commonly depicts 
human beings holding large, decorated, circular shields and, often, weapons 
(Keyser 2004a:58–61, 81, 93–97; Keyser and Klassen 2001:191–221; Ray 2007). 
Rock art is always difficult to date, but Ceremonial-tradition art includes at 
least one depiction of an individual with a shield, atlatl, and darts. People on 
the northern and northwestern Plains used dart points (e.g., Besant points) 
well into Late Woodland times, and this image could be of that age or older. 
Bows are far more common in this art, though, implying that most of it dates 
from the Late Woodland through Euroamerican contact; the most recent 
shield-bearing warriors depicted using the artistic canons of this tradition 
carry flintlock muskets and ride horses. Most of the weapons that artists 
depicted in this art—for example, spears, bows, and clubs—could have been 
as useful in hunting as they were in war, leaving interpretations of them in 
non-combat scenes potentially ambiguous. However, shields have no use other 
than protection in combat, and Sahkomaupee’s account of pre-horse/pre-gun 
warfare on the northern Plains documents this use unambiguously (Keyser 
recounts his story [chapter 3,this volume; also see Keyser 2004a:9–10], which 
Sahkomaupee originally told to David Thompson in 1787).
In the aggregate, images of shield-bearing warriors on the Plains document 
offensive and defensive weaponry (bows and arrows, lances, clubs, and maces 
for attack; body-sized shields for defense) and battle formations (lines of war-
riors protected by shields, for example), and they sometimes show warriors in 
the midst of combat (see Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this volume; Keyser, chap-
ter 3,this volume). However, two aspects of this imagery take us beyond simple 
description. The first is the undoubted evidence that warfare was socially and 
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ideologically important to western and northwestern Plains hunter-gatherers. 
Organized shield lines suggest some kind of organized approach to combat, 
and recurrent associations among specific shield heraldry and other depictions 
may imply the relatively ancient existence of warrior societies similar to those 
known on the Plains during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Keyser 
and Kaiser 2014; Keyser and Poetschat 2014; Ray 2007). Depictions of pre-
Contact warriors counting coup suggest that this component of male status 
has pre-Contact roots as well. Similarly, Ceremonial-tradition art appears to 
show warriors seeking spiritual power and calling on it through their shields 
in combat, power that is likely symbolized in the images on their shields.
Second, though, Ceremonial-tradition art likely has its roots in Woodland 
times, but it clearly persists throughout the subsequent Plains Village period 
and into the earliest years of Euroamerican contact, and it changes over this 
interval (especially see Keyser, chapter 3, this volume). Ceremonial-style art 
appears to have become much more common after about ad 1000 or 1100, 
at the same time that settled farming spread onto the Plains. Furthermore, 
after the mid-1400s, when farmers along the Missouri River and elsewhere 
aggregated into large and fairly heavily fortified towns (see below), the people 
who created Ceremonial art began increasingly to show warriors armed with 
shock weapons such as clubs and lances rather than bows, and increasingly 
depicted these warriors in group battle formations. Scenes of actual combat 
appear to date late in the period leading up to the appearance of Europeans 
on the Plains.
These changes mirror shifts in evidence for social violence in other parts 
of the Great Plains. The least ambiguous evidence for warfare on the Plains 
appears in sedentary horticultural sites, as it does in many parts of the world. 
This may not mark a real increase in violence, for reasons of archaeological vis-
ibility that I noted earlier, and as the remarkable rate of arrow wounds in Late 
Woodland contexts in some areas indicates. Nevertheless, settled horticultural 
communities (Plains Village communities) appeared throughout the eastern 
portions of the Plains and, in many cases, visible mortuary practices make it 
possible to assess variation in levels of violence among Plains farmers more 
accurately than among Plains hunter-gatherers.
Measured by fortifications and osteology, the earliest horticulturalists on 
the Plains (Great Oasis groups in northwestern Iowa and adjacent areas; 
Lensink and Tiffany 2005) were relatively peaceful: their communities were 
open and unfortified and the burial samples studied to date show only a tiny 
handful of individuals with evidence of violence (Schermer 2003; Tiffany and 
Alex 2001). However, this changed dramatically along the Middle Missouri 
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and the lower James River in South Dakota and along the Missouri and Little 
Sioux Rivers in northwestern Iowa (Mill Creek sites), during the twelfth cen-
tury, with the appearance of large, compact, fortified communities. Between 
roughly ad 1100 and ad 1300, farmers in these areas came together to form 
much larger and more compact or densely packed communities than in earlier 
times, and often fortified these communities with varying combinations of 
palisades, ditches, and steep natural topographic features (archaeologists refer 
to these communities collectively as “Initial Middle Missouri” and, after ad 
1200 in more northern areas, “Extended Middle Missouri”; see Johnson 2007a; 
Mitchell 2013). At least some of their Late Woodland neighbors who had not 
yet taken up farming fortified themselves as well (Ahler 2007). Excavations at 
one Initial Middle Missouri site—the Fay Tolton site in South Dakota—pro-
duced graphic and unambiguous evidence of a massacre that appears to have 
terminated occupation at the site; certainly, the victims of this massacre were 
never formally buried and occupation of the site seems to have been very short 
(Hollimon and Owsley 1994; Wood 1976). There are reports of a similar pat-
tern at the thirteenth-century Tony Glas site (Howard 1959; Johnson 2007a; 
Pringle 1998), but osteological evidence of this remains unpublished. Apparent 
trophy skulls in at least one Mill Creek site (Hollinger 2005; Miller 1994) also 
suggest violence.
In contrast, horticultural communities were small, scattered, open, and 
unfortified on the central Plains of Kansas and Nebraska during the eleventh 
through thirteenth centuries, and archaeologists have generally seen peace 
in this area during this time. However, Blakeslee (1999) has compiled osteo-
logical data, much of it from excavations early in the twentieth century, that 
suggest widespread violence, albeit probably low-level violence, most clearly 
indicated by evidence of scalping. However, he also notes unpublished, and 
unspecified, evidence that at least one structure near Omaha that was exca-
vated in the early twentieth century contained the cannibalized remains of an 
uncertain number of individuals, as Gilder (1913) suggested long ago (also see 
Hollinger 2005). There are few examples of curated human remains from the 
Plains that highlight more clearly than this one the immense gap between the 
argument that research on such remains offers important insights into human 
history and the meager insights that have actually found their way into the 
published literature. South of Kansas onto the southern Plains, horticultural 
communities of this age show a pattern similar to that on the central Plains, 
with occasional examples of violent death (Brooks 1994; Brues 1957), and some 
of the Late Prehistoric I hunter-gatherer casualties on the southern Plains 
noted earlier probably date to this period.
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After ad 1300, and especially after ad 1450, violence in at least some parts 
of the Plains appears to intensify. In the Middle Missouri, many sites of this 
age are large, compact, and heavily fortified. Bastioned defenses are common, 
the Helb site (Kay 1995) shows an entry through overlapping wall segments 
that appears to be a simple baffle gate like those at some Mississippian sites 
(e.g., Birmingham and Goldstein 2005), and encircling ditches are typically 
V-shaped (see, for example, Caldwell 1966; Kivett and Jensen 1976; Wood 
1967). The people who built these features piled the fill from the fortifica-
tion ditches on the inside of the ditch, as expected in a fortification, and at 
Arzberger (Spaulding 1956) and Huff (Wood 1967) also used the fill to raise 
the level of the ground surface within the bastions, perhaps to make it easier to 
fire from the bastion at attackers along the walls. Early in this interval, farmers 
abandoned northwestern Iowa and much of southeastern South Dakota (e.g., 
the lower James River valley) and there is evidence of substantial movements 
of people, including movements of central Plains groups into the Middle 
Missouri (the Coalescent tradition in archaeological terms) and movements 
of Oneota groups into western Iowa and southeastern Nebraska from adjacent 
areas of the Midwest (Pugh 2010; Ritterbush 2007).
Away from the Middle Missouri, though, fortifications are absent, with war 
implied by such evidence as scalping at the Sargent Ossuary and in Nebraska-
phase and St. Helena sites in northeastern Nebraska, embedded arrow points 
in skeletons at Andrews Lake in western Texas, dismembered bodies and tro-
phy skulls at the Footprint site northwest of Amarillo, five beheaded and oth-
erwise dismembered bodies in a single grave at the Dillard site in Texas, and 
arrow wounds in a handful of skeletons in Plains Village sites in Oklahoma 
(Bovee and Owsley 1994; Collins 1968; Lintz 1986; Martin 1994; Miller 1994; 
O’Shea and Bridges 1989; Owsley et al. 1994). Embedded points are partic-
ularly common in later Late Prehistoric burials on the northwestern Plains 
(Scheiber 2008; Scheiber and Gill 1997). At least one Puebloan community 
(Bloom Mound) near Roswell, New Mexico, which apparently served as a mid-
dle point in trade in bison between the Plains and the Southwest, was burned 
at this time. Excavations there have revealed unburied bodies as well as delib-
erate interments of noncombatants (including infants) with clear evidence of 
violent death and mutilation (Speth 2005; Speth and Newlander 2012).
The Crow Creek site in central South Dakota overshadows every other 
site of this age on the Plains in this context. Farmers left a complex record 
of occupation at Crow Creek spanning centuries (Bamforth and Nepstad-
Thornberry 2007a; Kivett and Jensen1976). Initial Middle Missouri farmers 
founded what was probably a large community at the site during the eleventh 
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century, although we know relatively little about this early settlement because 
subsequent occupation buried it under as much as 2 m of midden. By the 
1300s, a Coalescent group occupied Crow Creek, initially founding an unfor-
tified town but later enclosing it with multiple bastioned fortification lines. 
Excavation in one of these revealed the skeletons of roughly 500 men, women, 
and children, apparently the victims of a massacre that took the lives of virtu-
ally everyone who lived at the site (Willey 1990). I return to this event below, 
but for present purposes it highlights both the real danger of violence on the 
Plains and the scale of the combat that could occur in at least some parts of 
the Plains within the last millennium.
Where we have sufficiently fine-grained chronological evidence to look, 
these data imply that the frequency of fortifications and combat victims varied 
in space and in time: violence was widespread but not constant. By the mid-
1400s and later, though, horticultural communities in at least some regions 
(particularly the Middle Missouri) were fortified extremely frequently, as were 
some hunter-gatherer sites on the northeastern edge of the Plains (Michlovic 
2008). On the central and northern Plains, this continued into the Contact 
period, but most recent horticultural sites in the south were generally open and 
unfortified until after Euroamerican contact. The principal exception to this is 
in the westernmost group of Great Bend (ancestral Wichita) communities in 
Kansas and in related communities south and west into the Texas Panhandle. 
Features called “Council Circles” in fifteenth- and sixteenth- century Great 
Bend sites are identical to fortifications built by the colonial-period Wichita 
(Drass et al., chapter 8, this volume) and likely served similar purposes (not 
always successfully, as dismembered bodies in one of them suggests; Baugh 
2007; Wedel 1967). To the south, large circular enclosures built at the same 
time suggest a similar sense of danger (Baugh 2007). The geographic distri-
bution of these suggests danger from the west, most likely from Apachean 
bison hunters on the western Plains. Coronado’s conversations with the occu-
pants of Pecos pueblo in 1540 indicate that Plains groups were quite willing 
to attack their southwestern neighbors (Hammond and Rey 1940) and we 
should assume they were equally willing to attack other Plains groups, but 
archaeological evidence of this is not obvious. Pueblo groups, well organized 
for conflict after some 300 years of intensive war (LeBlanc 1999), generally 
repelled these attacks but remained wary of their Plains neighbors.
The appearance on the Plains of Europeans like Coronado had two par-
ticular effects for our purposes. As the Pecos case illustrates, it provides writ-
ten documentation of direct observations of conflict that can underscore the 
limitations on purely archaeological data. For example, Obregon’s Historia 
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observed in 1584 that Pecos “is enclosed and surrounded by a palisade, large 
houses, and by rows of walks which open out to the country. Here they keep 
their offensive and defensive arms, bows, arrows, shields, lances, and clubs” 
(Hammond and Rey 1928: 18). This suggests that warriors at Pecos left their 
weapons in a constant state of readiness and easy access, as if they might be 
needed at any time. This habit is consistent with a more or less constant state 
of danger but would almost certainly be invisible in the archaeological data.
Second, though, the appearance of Europeans (and, later, Americans) 
changed the conditions of life on the Plains. Europeans brought war with 
them—often, particularly in the case of the Spanish, utterly unprovoked and 
spectacularly brutal war—and written histories from the sixteenth through 
the nineteenth centuries offer a well-documented litany of conflict between 
indigenous people and in-migrating whites. But whites also altered the rela-
tions among indigenous groups, by creating differential access to technology 
that shifted previous military balances of power, by introducing new and val-
ued trade goods to the region and thus fostering competition for access to 
these goods, and by actively recruiting particular groups to fight against those 
groups’ traditional enemies (Lewis 1942; O’Shea and Ludwickson 1992; Secoy 
1953). The slaughter in 1873 of some 70 Pawnees in a surprise attack by Brule 
and Oglala warriors at Massacre Canyon in southwestern Nebraska is among 
the best-known examples of interethnic violence linked to processes like this, 
but it was simply one of many such attacks by many groups (Riley [1973] 
recounts this event and the pervasive smaller-scale violence immediately pre-
ceding it). Movements of social groups from their traditional territories into 
the territories of their neighbors as the American frontier moved west also 
fostered conflict: many groups entered the Plains essentially as refugees flee-
ing attacks that have been recorded by both documentary and archaeological 
evidence (e.g., Wood 1971).
Euroamerican contact also altered the role that warfare played in indig-
enous society on the Plains. Plains anthropologists have long recognized the 
importance of small-scale raids to get horses once these were widely available 
and the accompanying strengthened connections between valor in combat and 
male status (Ewers 1975; Keyser 1979). Northern and northwestern Plains rock 
art offers a particularly graphic record of this process of change (Greer and 
Greer, chapter 2, this volume; Keyser 2004a, chapter 3 in this volume; Keyser 
and Klassen 2001). Raids for horses often resulted in violence, although raid-
ers worked hard to take horses without being detected. However, direct links 
to important aspects of the Euroamerican economy also drove violence on the 
Plains, and in some cases did so directly and inevitably. Some of this violence 
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involved competition for access to the fur trade, especially after traders moved 
out of native communities and established their own trading centers (Fenn 
[2014] discusses the effects of changes like these on the Mandan). This must 
also have led to competition among tribes for beaver and for bison-hunting 
territories, the latter important both because of the economic importance of 
the trade in hide and meat and because of its direct subsistence importance, as 
Newcomb (1950) argued long ago.
But if this component of postcontact economic activity contributed to war, 
other components required it. Plains groups—especially, but not only, the 
Comanche of the southern Plains—forged economic relations with their 
white neighbors by the eighteenth century that moved large numbers of slaves 
and stolen domesticated animals, the former captured both from Mexico and 
from other native Plains communities. Furthermore, increased involvement in 
trade with the Spanish, French, and Americans in meat and hides and greater 
dependence on large horse herds greatly increased labor demands among 
groups like the Comanche, demands that they met by taking slaves for them-
selves as well as for trade (Brooks 2002; Hamalainen 2009). And there may be 
a much deeper history of this on the southern Plains and perhaps elsewhere. 
Habicht-Mauche (2000, 2008) suggests that fifteenth- through seventeenth-
century pottery in west Texas and eastern Oklahoma that is made from local 
clays but in styles linked to Pueblo groups in the Southwest and Caddoan 
groups to the east was likely produced by captive women from those areas. 
Perhaps more intriguingly, bone-chemistry data from women in thirteenth- 
and fourteenth-century Antelope Creek sites in roughly the same region doc-
ument variation in diet consistent with the possibility that some individuals 
were outsiders (Habicht-Mauche et al. 1994): slavery, or at least captive-taking, 
may have a deep history on the Plains.
There is an archaeology of postcontact war, and it tells us both how much 
archaeological data can show us even about well-known events and also how 
often we lack those data. Fortifications around eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century towns on the Middle Missouri reflected the need for defense, and doc-
umentary evidence leaves little doubt that this need arose especially, although 
not exclusively, from attacks by the Lakota. We know of one such attack in 
stark detail: the Larson site, an Arikara town in South Dakota, appears to have 
been overrun and its inhabitants killed and mutilated during the late 1700s 
(Owsley et al. 1977; also see Sundstrom, chapter 4, this volume). An increase in 
the frequency of evidence for scalping in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Arikara skeletons relative to earlier periods also implies increased violence 
against this group (Olsen and Shipman 1994; Owsley 1994). Archaeological 
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work on known battlefields related to Indian/white conflict has brought inter-
pretations of specific events more in line with the reality of those events (Fox 
1997; Scott et al. 1989, 2011; McDonald et al. 1991). Field investigations support 
Cheyenne, not military, accounts of the route Dull Knife’s Cheyenne band 
took in their escape from captivity at Fort Robinson in 1879 and suggest that 
both Indians and cavalry distorted events in fighting along the North Platte 
River in 1865. Most spectacularly, archaeological data strip away all vestiges of 
a glorious or romantic “last stand” at the battle of the Little Big Horn, leaving 
a story of terror and slaughter.
There is thus structured spatial and temporal variation in war on the Plains. 
Data on very early periods of occupation are too few to say much, but, at least 
within the last 2,000 years, the aggregate evidence for war concentrates first in 
the southern and northwestern Plains and, slightly later and more spectacu-
larly, in the Middle Missouri area. Problems of archaeological visibility make 
it difficult to compare mobile and sedentary groups, but the history of seden-
tary communities suggests that violence was most pervasive and destructive in 
the north and that communities in many areas defended themselves more and 
more frequently over time, particularly after the mid-1400s. Warrior imag-
ery in hunter-gatherer art likely shows a similar pattern of change, with its 
post–fifteenth century emphasis on shock weapons and compact shield lines 
suggesting fairly large-scale battles, perhaps with their horticultural neighbors, 
perhaps with each other, and perhaps with both of these.
We can also see some of the organization and effects of war on the Plains. 
The scattered evidence of combat injuries in hunter-gatherer graves suggests a 
pattern of intermittent small-scale warfare, perhaps like the one that Lekson 
(2002) refers to as “raiding and feuding” in the early Puebloan Southwest; 
arrow wounds in the back particularly indicate this. Patterns of horticultural 
site fortifications, though, imply larger scale combat. But these patterns also 
imply variation in this among regions and over time. Definite fortifications 
are relatively rare on the southern Plains until recent times, as are densely 
nucleated communities. Instead, sites in the parts of the southern Plains with 
the clearest evidence for violence—the Antelope Creek area and Puebloan 
sites like Bloom Mound—are almost all fairly small, with some larger sites 
located in difficult-to-access locations like Landergin Mesa, although Lintz 
(2001) suggests that Landergin Mesa may have been a temporary refuge used 
in times of danger rather than a real residential center. Antelope Creek popu-
lations, then, spent most of their time in very vulnerable settings, as did other 
horticultural groups on the southern Plains, perhaps suggesting a relatively 
low probability of being attacked at any given moment; Solometo (2004) 
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argues that communities do not build defenses unless they expect more or less 
annual attacks.
This stands in stark contrast to the Middle Missouri, where obviously per-
manent communities defended themselves with fortifications ranging from a 
ditch and palisade across the neck of a steep promontory into the floodplain to 
elaborate bastioned walls incorporating chevaux-de-frise. The labor invested in 
these defenses in some cases is astonishing: the bastioned ditch and palisade 
at the Arzberger site are 2.5 km (1.5 mi.) long (Spaulding 1956). But the design 
of these fortifications developed over time, with more elaborate defenses, par-
ticularly bastioned perimeters, more common after ad 1300, contemporary 
with a substantial influx of migrant farmers from the central Plains. This pat-
tern of change in fortifications implies a change in the kind of warfare in that 
region, perhaps particularly in the size of attacking groups: bastioned defenses 
are designed to prevent massed attacks from breaking down or setting fire to 
palisades (Keeley et al. 2007; Mitchell 2007), and the absence of such fortifi-
cations in earlier times suggests a different kind of attack, perhaps by smaller 
groups. Sites like Fay Tolton (Wood 1976; Hollimon and Owsley 1994) tell us 
that these were no less deadly than those in later periods, but this difference 
in scale suggests a different organizational basis for combat: it is one thing to 
mobilize 30 warriors, and quite another to mobilize 300.
Why War?
Comanches embraced battle and built vast hinterlands for raiding because their 
nation needed pasturelands, buffer zones, slaves, commodities, and commerce, 
but they did so also because their young men needed to prove their worth as 
providers and husbands. (Hamalainen 2009:269)
Understanding why people go to war is difficult even in recent conflicts, 
let alone in conflicts where we do not have direct access to the thoughts and 
motivations of the participants. This is particularly true because specific con-
flicts often arise out of specific local events, often personal events (insults, theft, 
etc.; Diamond 2008; Keeley 1996) that are invisible in archaeological con-
texts and also because war interrelates so complexly with so many aspects of 
human ways of life. Anthropologists specifically interested in Plains warfare 
have argued for a wide range of causes for social violence there (e.g., Albers 
1993; Biolsi 1984; Bamforth 2006; Ewers 1975; Hamalainen 2009; Jablow 1951; 
Lowie 1963; Mitchell 2007; Newcomb 1950; Secoy 1953), focusing on such fac-
tors as unpredictable access to important resources resulting from historical 
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and environmental processes, the drive for male status, revenge, cultural atti-
tudes toward outsiders, and competition for control over trade.
Anthropological debates over many topics often have much in common 
with the argument among the blind men who were each convinced that the 
particular part of the elephant they encountered could stand for the whole 
animal. Academic blindness in contexts like this tends not to distinguish 
between the variety of factors essential to making sense of human affairs 
and the particular research interests and experiences of individual scholars, 
and often confuses explaining something about things with explaining things. 
As this might suggest, the essential point is not that one or another of the 
“explanations” of Plains warfare is right and the others are wrong; it is that 
war is extraordinarily complex and that different explanations of it tend to 
be partial and context dependent. Different perspectives examine different 
parts of the elephant that is war, but none of them by itself accounts for the 
elephant as a whole.
And the elephant likely was not a static creature: the causes, organiza-
tion, and consequences of social violence on the Plains shifted over time 
and in space. For example, Euroamerican expansion onto the Plains severely 
impacted bison herds, certainly exacerbating existing conflicts over access to 
hunting grounds. Similarly, Mitchell (2007, chapter 11 in this volume) notes 
that warfare in the Middle Missouri—the most spectacularly violent area of 
the precontact Great Plains—likely resulted from different processes at dif-
ferent times, perhaps reflecting competition for control of economic networks 
during the earlier and later periods of horticultural occupation and compe-
tition for land and other resources when new populations moved into the 
region during the fourteenth century. Furthermore, as the Comanche example 
above illustrates, specific material causes must constantly have interacted with 
social issues, ideology, and status, and these latter forces may sometimes by 
themselves have been enough to precipitate violence.
We can begin to grapple with this complexity by asking targeted questions 
about warfare on the Plains instead of trying to “explain” it as a single phe-
nomenon. The strongest pattern in the data on Plains warfare is undoubtedly 
its increase over time and its apparent spike in frequency and scale in the last 
1,000 years. There was violence on the Plains for millennia, but it increased, 
first, after ad 500 in the south and west and, second, after ad 1100 throughout 
essentially the entire region, especially in the Dakotas. What might account 
for this? This overall pattern parallels another long-term trend on the Plains: 
intensification of subsistence production (Bamforth 2013, n.d.). Plains hunter-
gatherers first intensified subsistence production after 8000 bc in the south 
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and southwest by turning to hot-rock cooking of plants and after 3000 bc in 
the northwest by increasing labor investments in bison hunting (Bamforth 
2011; Thoms 2009). Limited horticulture appeared on the eastern edges of the 
Plains after ad 100 and incorporated small amounts of maize in that area after 
ad 500, with settled maize agriculture appearing adjacent to the Plains after 
ad 1000 and spreading over large parts of the Plains after ad 1100.
The similarities in these trends suggest that they are related, and that one 
underlying material cause for collective violence on the grasslands is competi-
tion for resources, perhaps driven by long-term increases in human population. 
Population/resource imbalances are often manifest most clearly in bioarchae-
ological data on human health. However, as is true for osteological data on 
warfare, despite years of collection and analysis, there has been virtually no 
synthesis of bioarchaeological research on the Plains. However, the limited 
published information hints at increasing material stresses among hunter-
gatherers in the south and west during the Late Woodland, consistent with a 
link between population/resource imbalance and violence: skeletal indicators 
of stress increased in the south at that time (M. Taylor 2001) and mean age at 
death dropped precipitously in the northwest (Scheiber and Gill 1997).
If this is correct, it underscores the importance of material forces in more 
specific conflicts on the Plains over shorter periods of time. Scholars have often 
argued that access to either stores of food or potentially productive pieces of 
the landscape controlled by other groups was important in Plains warfare as a 
result of unpredictable local access to critical resources caused by drought or the 
movements of bison herds. This argument fits well with Ember and Ember’s 
(1992) classic analysis of cross-cultural data that linked warfare, at least in part, 
to unpredictable resource shortages. The fairly detailed record from the Middle 
Missouri over the last 1,000 years speaks most clearly to this. In this region, 
there is evidence that violence can be linked to droughts on a decade-to-decade 
scale: between ad 1000 and 1650, Middle Missouri sites appear to have been 
fortified during large-scale or extended periods of drought and unfortified in 
other times (Bamforth 2006). Stuart et al. (1981) make a similar argument for 
conflict between southern Plains groups and Spanish and Pueblo communities 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, arraying written records of 
attacks against droughts identified in tree-ring sequences.
The details of analyses like these are subject to the precision of our available 
chronologies and the adequacy of our paleoenvironmental data, though, and 
the Crow Creek example illustrates both of these issues. There are two radio-
carbon dates on the Coalescent levels at the site, one on charcoal associated 
with the massacre victims (610 ± 55) and one on a burned post from a house 
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within the innermost fortification line (560 ± 75). Bamforth and Nepstad-
Thornberry (2007a) incorrectly suggested that the charcoal from the first of 
these could have come from burned debris that was older than the massacre; 
in fact, it came from a hearth burned on the layer of clay that capped the bone 
bed. Regardless, though, these dates are statistically indistinguishable, and the 
standard errors for both of them fall directly on a plateau in the radiocarbon 
calibration curve that runs from roughly ad 1300 to ad 1400. Even their cali-
brated one-sigma ranges thus span fairly long periods of time. The two dates 
are statistically identical (t = 0.29, df = 2, p > 0.5), and their average spans a 
similar time range. The individual dates calibrate to a one-sigma interval of 
calendar years between ad 1305 and ad 1427 and a two-sigma interval from 
ad 1280 to ad 1452; their mean calibrates to a one-sigma interval from ad 1305 
to ad 1403 and a two-sigma interval from ad 1293 to ad 1417 (Bamforth and 
Nepstad-Thornberry 2007a:table 1).
Osteological evidence for the nutritional status of the Crow Creek vic-
tims leaves no doubt that they had been malnourished for some time (Gregg 
and Zimmerman 1987), suggesting that they were killed during a drought 
(Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007a:155). However, the paleoenviron-
mental data we relied on (Fritz et al.’s [2000] detailed analysis of lake sedi-
ments from North Dakota) showed evidence of major droughts in the late 
1200s/early 1300s and the mid-1400s, within the two-sigma ranges of the indi-
vidual and average dates. The archaeology of the Coalescent levels at Crow 
Creek is too complex to fit an attack in the first of these, and we suggested that 
the massacre is more likely to have occurred in the later of them. More recent 
work based on continent-wide data on tree rings (Stahle et al. 2007; Cook et 
al. 2010), though, documents a severe drought in the Middle Missouri in the 
late 1300s, comfortably within the one-sigma range of both dates, and this 
may perhaps be a more likely date for the massacre. The inherent ambiguity 
of radiocarbon dates that fall onto the fourteenth-century calibration plateau 
means that we need other kinds of chronological information if we are ever 
to obtain a precise estimate of the date of the Crow Creek massacre, although 
improved paleoenvironmental information can at least help to plausibly nar-
row the window around its likely date. In a larger context, though, the chrono-
logical ambiguity of the Crow Creek case exemplifies a problem for all analyses 
of Plains warfare that depend on precise control over chronology: in many 
cases, radiocarbon by itself simply cannot provide such control, and we have 
precious few well-developed alternative chronological tools at our disposal.
Changing settlement distributions in the Middle Missouri and adjacent 
areas also suggest that war in the north may have been linked to competition 
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for land: violence played a role in how communities gained and lost territory 
in at least some times and places. In South Dakota, in-migration of population 
from the central Plains after ad 1300 may have displaced indigenous horti-
cultural groups, although this is not certain. This migration may have resulted 
from the combination of widespread regional drought during the late 1200s 
and the movement of substantial Oneota populations into parts of the central 
Plains from the adjacent Midwest at about the same time (Hollinger 2005, 
chapter 10 in this volume; Pugh 2010; Ritterbush 2006, 2007). Most recently, 
there is no doubt that hunter-gatherer groups on the Plains, most spectacu-
larly the Lakota and the Comanche, drove other groups out of their traditional 
lands by force of arms during the Contact period and possibly earlier.
Furthermore, communities throughout the Plains relied on each other to 
provide the material basis for their existence just as they relied on themselves; 
especially in the Middle Missouri, but also elsewhere, settled communities 
served as critical nodes in economic networks that moved large amounts of 
goods over long distances (Brosowske 2005; Jablow 1951; Wood 1980). Mitchell 
(2007, chapter 11 in this volume) argues that competition for control of trade 
was important at several times in human history of the Plains, and there is little 
doubt that it drove violence there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
However, we know that material conditions are only one of the important 
forces that drive collective violence: war has ideological as well as material 
links. Ideology is difficult to see archaeologically, particularly in the archaeol-
ogy of a region like the Plains, where societies were small-scale and obvious 
iconography is relatively rare outside of rock art. But there are telling hints of 
what we might be able to see if we look. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Plains warriors took scalps and other body parts from combat victims both as 
a way of achieving status and as a way of marking their victims in the after-
life. Mutilations at the Crow Creek site—scalping and removal of hands and 
feet, for example (Willey 1990)—anticipate in detail the kinds of mutilations 
known from more recent times, suggesting similar links between status, ideol-
ogy, and war as early as the 1300s or 1400s, and I have noted above that scalping 
on the Plains extends at least as far back as the Middle Woodland. Keyser’s 
(1979, 2004a; Keyser and Klassen 2001) analysis of rock art suggests that the 
link between war and male status may have developed especially in the centu-
ries just prior to white contact and accelerated after that, although this art does 
unambiguously depict precontact hunter-gatherer combat (also see Keyser 
2004a, chapter 3 in this volume; Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this volume).
But war and status may have been linked strongly among farmers before 
they were similarly linked among hunter-gatherers (also suggested by trophy 
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skulls at a Mill Creek village). It is interesting, though, that there is somewhat 
less evidence of mutilation on the Fay Tolton victims than at Crow Creek: 
the recent emphasis on taking these kinds of trophies and the quite formal 
relations between such trophies and male status may have developed as war 
became more common. With this in mind, the occasional recovery of isolated 
human bones in Central Plains-tradition sites is suggestive. We know that 
Plains warriors took body parts and displayed them in the short term (and, in 
the case of scalps, in the longer term). But we do not know much about how 
they disposed of those body parts when they were done with them (but see 
Owsley et al. 2007).
The clearest ancient archaeological linkages among war and male status 
that have implications for the Plains are evident in falcon-warrior imagery 
at the Caddoan Mississipian site of Spiro in eastern Oklahoma. Like other 
Mississippian elites, the elite at Spiro displayed symbols of warriorship promi-
nently, implying that they were themselves warriors, or wanted to be seen as 
warriors. An engraved-shell depiction from Spiro of what looks very much 
like a Morning Star sacrifice (Hall 1997) also suggests a motive for at least a 
low level of raiding of neighbors. This makes it surprising that there is so little 
evidence of violence in Spiroan sites: although virtually all other Mississippian 
centers are fortified, Spiro is not, nor are other Caddoan Mississippian sites, 
and combat victims are rare or unknown in Spiroan cemeteries, also in con-
trast to many other Mississippian cemeteries (see, for example, Brown 1996).
Climate, subsistence, and ideology, of course, do not by themselves cause 
war or peace, although they often tip the scales in favor of one or the other of 
these. Patterns of socialization are essential to creating a heritage or ideology 
of war, and people go to war against someone. Violence can erupt in many 
contexts, but war requires a socially defined enemy. As we turn to these topics, 
we enter a domain where it is harder to say what we know and easier to say 
what we are not sure of.
Who Was the eneMy?
The Spiroan data raise any number of interesting questions, but they par-
ticularly turn us to the problem of “the Other.” If the Spiroan elite defined 
themselves as warriors, who did they go to war with, and what groups else-
where were responsible for the mayhem that is so visible in so many other 
times and places on the Plains?
Plains archaeologists have traditionally answered questions like this in 
terms of conflicts between archaeologically defined culture-historical taxa: 
26 DOUGLAS B. BAMFORTH
Antelope Creek people fought against Washita River people, Coalescent peo-
ple fought against Middle Missouri people, and Oneota people fought against 
everyone. Like the widespread recognition of a link between Plains violence 
and resource shortages, this answer fits well with Ember and Ember’s (1992) 
analysis, which also highlighted the importance of socialization for mistrust 
of outsiders. Violence across ethnic or cultural boundaries is well documented 
in North America, perhaps most spectacularly, and sometimes horrifically, 
between Inuit groups and their interior Athapaskan neighbors (e.g., Hoffecker 
et al. 2012:147; Melbye and Fairgrieve 1994). But this kind of inference on the 
Plains assumes a social reality to archaeological culture-historical units that 
we know is often unwarranted. The unit designated “Post-Contact Coalescent” 
in the Middle Missouri region, for example, certainly includes sites occupied 
by multiple social or ethnic groups who were at least intermittently hostile 
toward one another (Lehmer 1971) and the huge geographic extent and long 
temporal span of the occupations we subsume under the term “Oneota” sug-
gest a similar pattern. Furthermore, inferring conflict between the kinds of 
groups that may be represented by archaeological traditions implies decision-
making at a level somewhere above that of the individual community, suggest-
ing a kind of pan-tribal organization for which we have no evidence.
Despite this, though, there are at least some large-scale patterns on the 
Plains that make sense in terms of well-known culture-historical units. Most 
clearly, Boyd (1997) notes a general concentration of victims of violence dur-
ing Late Woodland and early Plains Village times along the area of contact 
between groups in the southwestern Texas and their neighbors to the north and 
east. These Texas groups show clear ceramic links to the Puebloan Southwest 
and not to the Plains, while their neighbors show the opposite, and this area 
may have been a border of some kind between mutually hostile groups. The 
absence of skulls and mandibles in central Texas burials of about this age (see, 
for example, Krieger 1946) also parallels the burial of isolated skulls and man-
dibles in some Caddoan centers in adjacent areas of the Southeast, perhaps 
indicating a similar pattern (Barnes 1992; Dial and Creel 2012). Indeed, skulls 
and mandibles at the Crenshaw site in Arkansas do appear to have been taken 
from nonlocal individuals (Schambach 2014).
However, the history of warfare in the Middle Missouri illustrates how com-
plicated this issue can be. Defenses appear there by the eleventh or twelfth 
century and are scattered throughout the distribution of horticultural sites. In 
addition, sites just north of these early farmers, like Menoken (Ahler 2007; 
Krause 2007), occupied by hunters and gatherers, but with pottery clearly influ-
enced by farmers, were also fortified. If the distribution of fortifications tells us 
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something about who was in danger, this suggests that anyone could be in dan-
ger anywhere along the river, possibly implying that these communities may 
sometimes have gone to war against each other. During the 1300s, though, out-
siders moved into the Middle Missouri, and at least some sites shifted toward 
larger sizes and more complex fortifications. This is widely taken as evidence 
for conflict between indigenous groups and newcomers. However, the Oneota 
were also newly arrived on the eastern Plains at about this time, and Oneota 
sites show no known evidence of fortification, although some of them were 
very large and other evidence suggests that the western Oneota were as war 
prone as other Oneota groups (Hollinger 2005; Pugh 2010; Ritterbush 2006).
By the early 1400s, newly established horticultural sites in the Middle 
Missouri were open and unfortified, and patterns of ceramic variation sug-
gest that there was substantial interaction among neighboring communities 
regardless of their ethnic identification (Ahler 1993; Bamforth and Nepstad-
Thornberry 2007b). This changed again during the mid- to late 1400s, when 
many communities in the region aggregated into large, fortified towns, and 
some elements of ceramic design imply a significant reduction in interaction 
(Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007b). At this time, along the Missouri 
itself, a cluster of sites in South Dakota corresponds to the distribution of 
the Caddoan-speaking Arikara observed by Europeans a century or two later. 
An empty area—perhaps a buffer zone—separates this cluster from a second 
cluster that corresponds to the Contact-period distribution of the Siouan-
speaking Mandan and, later, the Hidatsa ( Johnson 2007a; Mitchell 2013). This 
kind of site distribution and postcontact records of Siouan/Caddoan hostilities 
have suggested ethnic warfare between these two tribes. However, at exactly 
the same time, fortified hunter-gatherer sites like the Shea site appear on the 
northeastern edge of the Plains, possibly marking occupations by the ances-
tors of the Lakota (Michlovic 2008). We know that there were other hunter-
gatherer groups to the west and north, in and around the Black Hills and 
northward into Canada, and it seems likely that these groups were intimately 
involved with the hostilities we can see to the east, as they certainly were dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As I discuss above, Ceremonial 
art leaves no doubt that northwestern Plains hunter-gatherer groups went 
to war, and Walde (2006) argues that military resistance by northern Plains 
hunter-gatherers limited the northward expansion of Middle Missouri farm-
ers, although there is little direct evidence for this.
But we might also wonder about alliances among social or residential groups 
including mobile hunters and gatherers. There is no doubt that cultural, adap-
tive, and linguistic differences did not prevent groups from joining together 
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to attack other groups on the Plains: to take only one example, European 
observers reported an assault on a Mandan town in 1796 by a combined force 
of Lakota and Arikara warriors; Hidatsa fighters came to the town’s rescue 
(Lehmer 1971:177). Changes in the organization of violence over time would 
also have altered the social basis for constituting combat units: small-scale 
raiding and feuding, which may have been common over much of the Plains 
and which may have been more prevalent in earlier periods in the Middle 
Missouri, does not require the same number of attackers as massed attacks on 
strongly fortified towns with large populations.
Going beyond these possibilities can be difficult, but there are concrete lines 
of evidence that can be useful. To take only one, projectile-point styles and 
raw materials might provide some insights into who attacked whom in some 
cases. For example, the projectiles found in bodies in a mass grave at the Late 
Woodland–period McCutchan-McLaughlin site in southeastern Oklahoma 
were made from material that outcrops north and east of the site, material 
that is otherwise not present in the stone-tool assemblage there, suggesting 
that the victims were killed by attackers from that area (Powell and Rogers 
1980). Similarly, projectile-point style and material suggest that the people who 
killed some of the Puebloan victims at Bloom Mound came from central Texas 
(Speth and Newlander 2012) and a scalped male at the thirteenth-century 
Nagle site in Oklahoma, apparently a member of a group from the east, had 
four arrow points in his abdomen, all made from Alibates agate, found to the 
west, in styles that are common to the west (Brooks 1994:319–320; Brues 1957).
the Present VoluMe
There are thus strong patterns in evidence for warfare on the Plains in time 
and space and much still to learn about the ways it developed and impacted 
human societies there. The chapters here help with this second effort at the 
same time that they often force us to look more closely at what we already 
know, or hope that we know. These essays fall into three general categories. 
The first examines records of warfare made by the people engaged in it, includ-
ing nineteenth-century ledger art and pecked and painted rock art. The sec-
ond examines fortifications, and the third considers the place of war in the 
larger social history of people on the Plains.
Triggers of specific attacks, particularly personal/emic triggers, are rarely 
evident in archaeological data, although active malnutrition of the victims at 
Crow Creek suggests that conflict at that site was linked to subsistence prob-
lems. However, the chapters here by the Greers (chapter 2), Keyser (chapter 
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3), and Sundstrom (chapter 4) on rock art and on records kept by northern 
Plains people in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries offer insights into 
some of these issues. Continuity in the conventions and meaning of art on 
the northern Plains into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries makes it pos-
sible to interpret much of this art very specifically, as Sundstrom discusses, 
although these authors do not all agree with one another in all aspects of their 
interpretations. Regardless of these disagreements, these chapters document 
important temporal changes in patterns of violence (including weaponry, tac-
tics, and the size of fighting units, all topics that Bleed and Scott [chapter 14, 
this volume] help to understand) at the same time that they give us critical 
insights into the reasons why Plains groups chose conflict over peace.
However, patterns in the emic evidence also highlight the difficulties of 
using self-representation to understand real human actions. The Greers address 
this specifically, pointing out that some aspects of war—capturing women, for 
example—are much less frequent in rock art than the events depicted in that 
art likely were in the past, and this kind of observation is probably true for 
more ancient patterns of conflict as well. For example, Ceremonial-tradition 
rock art (Keyser 2004a:58–61; Keyser and Klassen 2001:191–223) does not 
appear to focus on actual events—specific battles, for example, or captive-
taking—despite the fact that such events must have taken place. In this case, 
warfare entered into the domain of life in which people produced rock art, but 
its depiction in that art reflects something other than, or in addition to, efforts 
to celebrate or record particular actions.
The distinction between what people did from day to day and what they 
chose to represent in ideologically charged art also implies that we need to 
temper inferences about preferred weapons and typical combat formations 
that depend on those artistic or ideological choices. Chapters here note that 
northwestern Plains rock art often emphasizes shock weapons like clubs 
and lances and, particularly in earlier periods, often depicts combat between 
massed warriors. We can see the outcome of combat like this at the Crow 
Creek site, where the majority of the massacre victims were killed by blows to 
the head (sometimes many more blows than would have been necessary to kill 
them). As I discuss above, though, archaeological data from the northwestern 
Plains, presumably linked to the same societies that produced this art, tell us 
that remarkable numbers of people died violently from arrow wounds, often 
wounds that were likely received in ambush. Locations where communities 
fought in large, massed groups may be poorly preserved in the archaeological 
record, but mortuary data leave no doubt that people died from other kinds of 
violence at rates that must have had serious demographic implications. Public, 
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presumably ritual, art does not celebrate this kind of violence, but osteologi-
cal data leave no doubt that it must have been a major factor in people’s lives.
Fortifications loom large in the essays in this volume, which raise central 
issues about how archaeologists have used this line of evidence in the past and 
what we can learn from it in the future. Most fundamentally, as LeBeau (chap-
ter 6) discusses, we cannot assume that every ditch people dug on the Plains 
(or anywhere else) was a fortification. The long-standing debate over “council 
circles” (Wedel 1967) on the southern Plains illustrates this unambiguously (as 
Drass et al., chapter 8, point out here), but this is true in all times and places. 
This is particularly important here because both Drass et al. and Schroeder 
(chapter 9) document variation in fortification design that goes beyond the 
range that most archaeologists expect to see. The strong cross-cultural simi-
larities that Keeley et al. (2007) document for defensive architecture suggest 
that there ought to be a limited array of ways to build effective fortifications, 
but the data from these chapters challenge this in some ways. It is not clear 
whether this variation reflects the time or materials available, specific defen-
sive tactics, experimentation with defensive architecture, or some other factors, 
but the simple fact that it exists underscores LeBeau’s basic point.
Dye (chapter 5, this volume) and Vehik (chapter 7, this volume) also push 
our approaches to fortified sites in important new directions. We often note 
that fortifications are costly to build, but we rarely focus on the ongoing costs 
of maintaining them. Dye’s discussion of this has obvious implications for 
resource use on the wood-poor Great Plains, and the need for ongoing main-
tenance of ditches and palisades has social implications as well. Assessing 
the condition of palisades and other defensive works and organizing labor to 
repair them offer opportunities to aspiring leaders and help to make concrete 
the links we often hypothesize between warfare and the development of social 
differentiation. Perhaps most important, though, Dye’s contribution should 
focus us on the implications of the enduring presence of fortifications once 
they are built. We should remember that the simple existence of defensive 
architecture provides a constant reminder of the possibility of future violence. 
This, in turn, underscores the experiences and memories of individuals who 
participated in past violence at the same time that it requires a continuing 
labor investment. In long-lived communities, walls may stand for decades 
even in the absence of attacks, with people refurbishing them when needed. At 
Cahokia, people refurbished their defenses during drought intervals (Benson 
et al. 2009), apparently taking care to be sure that they remained effective 
while repairs were in progress, as Dye discusses. In contrast, the occupants 
of the Crow Creek site allowed their ditch to fill with trash and may have 
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substantially dismantled their palisade in the course of building new defenses, 
and this may have played a role in their defeat.
In this context, Vehik’s chapter challenges us most of all. Most fundamen-
tally, her arguments from the literature on military theory make it clear that 
the absence of archaeologically visible fortifications, often taken as evidence 
for peace (e.g., Bamforth 2006), does not by itself tell us that communities felt 
no danger of attack. In some cases it certainly does mean this, but, as Vehik 
shows, in others it simply means that these communities did not believe that 
they were in danger of an attack by overwhelming numbers, with “overwhelm-
ing” perhaps implying a ratio of attackers to defenders of 3 to 1 or higher. But 
this is not a simple cautionary tale about problems with the way we see war: 
when we have other evidence for collective violence, the absence of fortifica-
tions tells us about the scale of combat. To take a single example, we see clear 
fortifications in horticultural sites on the southern Plains very late in time, 
but there is undoubted evidence of combat in burials centuries earlier, and 
some sites (e.g., Landergin Mesa) may have served as local refuges. Overall, 
this pattern suggests a real risk of attack, but not necessarily of an attack by a 
large force. As Mitchell (2007, chapter 11 in this volume) notes in reference to 
fortification design, arguments like Vehik’s help us to delve more deeply into 
the organization and logistics of collective violence.
The final group of chapters shifts focus from the details of studying war 
to larger issues of how and why Plains groups and their neighbors fought 
and how fighting affected people’s lives. Both Hollinger’s (chapter 10) and 
Clark’s (chapter 12) essays emphasize regional rather than site-specific analy-
ses, conceiving the “region” at very different scales but showing at both scales 
how war was woven into both the distributions of human settlements and the 
social relations among them. Clark’s analysis requires contemporaneity among 
sites in his time periods that, as he notes, may not always be exact. However, 
his results suggest alliances both within and between linguistic groups, and 
his data on the shifting locations of fortifications within his study area have 
important implications for understanding patterns of conflict and coopera-
tion. Hollinger’s history of Oneota expansion and contraction documents how 
central warfare can be in the long-term history of a social group. We need to 
remember the blind men and the elephant—a variety of social, ideological, 
and material factors conditioned the choices that Oneota communities made 
(Theler and Boszhardt 2006). However, Hollinger’s argument that collective 
violence was an integral part of the long-term development of Oneota society 
emphasizes again why our analyses of the human past need to attend to war as 
often as they attend to subsistence, political development, and religion.
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Mitchell’s arguments in chapter 11 about the underlying causes of war in the 
Middle Missouri area have similar implications. On one hand, they focus us on 
the diversity of these causes: as alluring as explanations for violence that focus 
specifically on subsistence factors are to many of us, we all know that the world 
is too complex to suppose that such factors offer a “complete” explanation. But 
the elephant matters here as well. Mitchell’s discussion focuses on the general 
cultural context within which we see evidence for war in the Middle Missouri, 
and there is little doubt that, at the chronological level of his analysis, it is 
closely associated with the development of large-scale trade networks. In fact, 
the evidence for this may be stronger than he asserts. He notes the strong link 
between trade and evidence of war in Initial Middle Missouri communities 
in northwestern Iowa and adjacent areas of South Dakota. However, exactly 
contemporary communities in eastern Nebraska, southwestern Iowa, and the 
Kansas City area (Central Plains–tradition Glenwood, Nebraska phase, and 
Steed-Kisker sites) show undoubted eastern (Cahokian) ceramic links but 
little other evidence of exchange, and these sites are small, dispersed, and 
unfortified. Vehik’s chapter implies that this does not guarantee that these 
groups never fought and I note osteological evidence of violence in these 
sites above. However, this pattern indicates at least that Central Plains–tradi-
tion communities did not worry about the kind of massed attacks by large 
numbers of warriors indicated by Initial Middle Missouri–tradition defenses. 
But I noted earlier that fortifications stand whether a community is under 
attack or not; being prepared for war is not the same as actually going to war. 
Intercommunity violence linked to control of trade networks may always be 
imminent, but the timing of actual attacks was likely triggered by some com-
bination of personal factors (see Diamond 2008) and/or material forces like 
subsistence stress. And Kendall’s chapter (chapter 13) on scalping patterns at 
the Crow Creek site offers an important reminder of the complexity of human 
motivations and actions in the context of war. We often note the presence of 
osteological evidence for post- or peri-mortem mutilation, but we do not often 
consider in detail what it tells us. Kendall’s careful analysis documents subtle 
age- and gender-linked patterns of scalping that force us to consider in more 
detail issues of status and belief, albeit issues that are difficult to address in detail.
Understanding how communities went to war has important implica-
tions for the integration of warfare into Plains history and society, although 
archaeologists rarely discuss combat tactics and strategies in detail (Scott 
and McFeaters 2011). However, like Vehik, Bleed and Scott (chapter 14) turn 
to military theorists to show how the systematic analysis of the practice of 
war illuminates two closely related battles between the Cheyenne and the 
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US Cavalry for which we have both written and archaeological documenta-
tion. Their focus is specifically on battlefield archaeology and they use mili-
tary perspectives to make sense of patterns visible in that particular context. 
Identifying battlefields that we cannot document in the written record is dif-
ficult, and many battles in the Plains past (although certainly not all of them) 
appear to have been fought in and around settled communities. The evidence 
from these fights that we might make sense of in Bleed and Scott’s framework 
in many cases therefore will be commingled with the remains of everyday life 
and may thus be difficult to see. But the conceptual basis of their analysis is 
widely relevant nevertheless. To take just one example, they note that differ-
ent kinds of weapons select for different kinds of battle formations, implying 
that we can better understand the organizational implications of persistent 
warfare by considering both the kinds of defenses people built, as archaeolo-
gists have observed, and also the kinds of weaponry used by combatants. This 
has important implications for understanding the implications of the kinds 
of evidence documented by the chapters in sections 2 and 3 of this volume. 
Finally, studying war on the Plains, or anywhere else, matters because of what 
it tells us about war and peace in human societies in general. The chapters here 
have implications for this larger discussion and for the practice of archaeology 
on the Plains. Chapter 15 closes the volume by considering these larger issues.
ConClusIons
What, then, do we know? Warfare has deep roots on the Plains, although it 
is not clear exactly how deep. But, if it was always possible for Plains people 
to go to war, we know that they did not always do so, and we know that, when 
they did, they did so in different ways in different times and places. Issues of 
archaeological visibility put limits on some of what we can say, but, even so, 
combat victims appear to be more common in the southern and northwestern 
Plains than elsewhere during Woodland times and evidence for large-scale vio-
lence is clearest and most pervasive in the northeast during Plains Village times. 
Furthermore, there may have been variable links among social standing, ideol-
ogy, and violence over time and space, but there is evidence that, whatever these 
links might have been, violence often erupted during times of material stress.
Archaeological attention to warfare is trendy. For decades, archaeologists 
substantially ignored and downplayed the existence of organized violence in 
all but the most obvious cases. However, since the publication of Keeley’s 
War before Civilization in 1996, we have discussed it more and more. Plains 
archaeology, though, is notoriously resistant to ephemeral intellectual trends; 
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our tribe has always understood that war was important. Plains warfare cost 
lives, sometimes many, many lives, and it cost effort, sometimes immense 
effort, to try to keep from paying that cost. We know that in very recent times 
Plains warfare was bound up with society in many ways. Although we need 
to be careful of assuming the social reality of our culture-historical taxa, it is 
true that there is evidence that conflict may be linked to in-migration of new 
groups and to patterns of extraregional economics and other interactions, as 
well as to fluctuations in material conditions. Many of the socially distinct 
horticultural groups recognized on the Plains at Contact, including those 
along the Middle Missouri and groups like the Pawnee, appear to have taken 
on something like their Contact-period form in the late 1400s, at the same 
time that fortifications became most elaborate and particularly widespread. 
War thus appears to have been part, and perhaps a very important part, of the 
process of ethnogenesis that helped to define these groups. War, and the pos-
sibility of war, mattered in the lives of the people we study, and looking at it in 
detail ought to matter to us as well.
Part 2
Emic Views





Contact-Era Warfare as 
Reflected in Ethnohistory 




Plains rock art has long been recognized as a record 
of warfare, especially in the northwestern part of the 
region (e.g., Keyser 1977a; Keyser et al. 2006; Keyser 
and Klassen 2001; Sundstrom 2004). Numerous images 
of shields, weapons, armor, and fighting postures sup-
port the perception that warfare was ubiquitous across 
the region, at least in later times. Previous studies have 
focused on how to read rock art panels based on iden-
tified images in historic art, which has led to interpre-
tations of battles and skirmishes as well as attempts 
at ethnic identity of the scenes’ participants based on 
such elements as shield designs and horse accoutre-
ments (Greene 1985; Keyser 1975, 1987a, 1996; Keyser 
and Poetschat 2009; Loendorf 2012; McCleary 2008a; 
Sundstrom and Keyser 1998). The role of women 
in warfare has gained attention also, and evidence 
has been examined in the use of the supernatural to 
obtain victory in war based on the power of images 
(e.g., Greer and Keyser 2008; Keyser et al. 2006; Keyser 
and Cowdrey 2008). Ethnographic information has 
been critical to previous rock art studies in the region 
to help understand Contact-period rock art scenes, 
and these documents include early anthropological 
studies; drawings on hides, clothing, ledgers, and tipis 
that have associated collector explanations; and some 
historical first-person accounts by early visitors, such 
as the painter Karl Bodmer and the explorer Prince 
Maximilian. Our interest focuses on ethnohistori-
cal interpretations based on documents provided by 
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non-Native people who lived with Indians long term, who were not just visi-
tors but traded and traveled with the natives, and who witnessed and/or par-
ticipated in their battles. Using these records we consider whether rock art is 
a good indicator of which groups are involved in warfare and what these early 
traders and trappers offer to identify warfare imagery beyond what can be 
gained from other sources, recognizing that these records do not always con-
cur with Native accounts (Medicine Crow 1992; Stands in Timber and Liberty 
1967). We also consider whether Contact-period warfare as seen in rock art is a 
reflection of warfare as seen in historical documents or if these sources provide 
different views of these conflict interactions. Although we use examples from 
rock art throughout the region, most of our attention is on the Musselshell 
River of central Montana (figure 2.1). This central portion of the northwestern 
Plains was chosen because, through historical documents, we know it was an 
area for warfare at least from the time of initial European contact to the time 
of settlement on reservations by the tribes of this region, and there is abundant 
rock art here from the Contact period.
Contact-period rock art for this area can date as early as the 1700s, although 
there are only a few documented cases of Euroamericans in the region dur-
ing this century. By the 1800s the area is being infused with trappers, traders, 
hunters, the United States military, and even tourists. By the 1860s, written 
diaries, narratives by adventurers, and newspaper articles are available for the 
area. Contact- or Historic-period rock art is readily identifiable from the con-
text of figures or icons shown in the art. The presence of horses is one of the 
most common Contact-period indicators: excavated horse remains from the 
late 1600s in southwestern Wyoming are the earliest evidence for horses in the 
region (Eckles et al. 1994:64–65). However, the horse did not become widely 
used throughout the northwestern Plains until about 1730, when it was first 
reported in use by the Blackfeet, Flathead, and Crow (Ewers 1955a:17). In the 
1760s fur traders were increasing across the region and with them came many 
guns (Secoy 1953:4). Horse and body armor and other forms of European dress 
(especially hats) also date rock art images and panels to after contact. Likewise, 
the presence of the bow and arrow indicates a date after ad 500 when the 
onset of the Late Prehistoric period was marked by the coming of the bow for 
this region. In addition to context, the kind of paint used can also help with 
dating pictographs to the Contact period since aboriginal crayon drawings do 
not occur until this period, as shown by seriation studies (Greer 1995:227–290). 
Aboriginal crayon paint can be a stick of unmodified charcoal, but it is more 
commonly a stick or ball of prepared paint mixture containing a red ochre 
pigment and binder (presumably mainly animal fat).
Figure 2.1. The Musselshell River area (rectangle) of rock art concentration and other 
sites and locations discussed on the northwestern Plains. 
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defInItIon of Warfare and Its syMbolIsM
Within this volume warfare is broadly considered as a complex mix of rit-
ual warfare, territorial disputes, plunder, and captive-taking for trade and for 
rebuilding local populations following epidemics (Clark and Sundstrom 2010). 
The dictionary considers a wide range of definitions for “warfare,” but the 
common denominator is intergroup conflict or struggle of any kind. Nowhere 
do dictionary definitions specify the number of people involved, kinds of 
weapons, kinds of captives, or length or intensity of the conflict.
Anthropological studies of warfare focus on why people go to war, benefits 
to the group, how the group is organized, and what weapons and military 
tactics are employed (Otterbein 2009:4). Warfare is viewed as group action 
rather than as individual action, with the target being group members rather 
than particular individuals. Otterbein identifies the goals for uncentralized 
political systems engaging in war as “defense-revenge, plunder, and prestige” 
(Otterbein 2009:4). Thus, the wide variety of physical conflicts recorded in 
historical documents for the northwestern Plains, most of which involve small 
groups attacking other small groups, all fall within the generalized “warfare” 
classification. The goals of such skirmishes during the Contact period include 
all of those identified by Otterbein, although not all for any one battle.
Warfare images in rock art are assumed to be representational and eas-
ily recognizable, so we complacently believe we know which images portray 
warfare and can consider individual figures and scenes within variable cul-
tural contexts. But this is not always the case. It has been pointed out by 
Chippendale (2009) that before deciding if rock art portrays warfare we must 
separate warfare from other kinds of physical or spiritual conflict, especially 
on a personal or interpersonal level. Examples are ritual reenactment (espe-
cially in dance), copying conflict postures in social dance or exercise (such as 
karate or capoeira), competitive games, and even hunting. All functions can 
be portrayed in similar ways, so the researcher must look for indirect evi-
dence of warfare since physical posture alone may be misleading. Chippendale 
advocates identifying defensive weapons (e.g., shields, fending sticks) rather 
than offensive weapons (such as bows, arrows, spears, lances, clubs, hatchets, 
swords, and guns) as important in deciding whether warfare is being portrayed. 
Candace Greene’s (1985) recognition that there are rules for reading a warfare 
scene provides another contextual evidence check. Although not every draw-
ing follows the rule that a conflict scene is read right to left (subject-action-
object or in warfare terms—hero, what he did with what weapon, enemy), 
starting with this concept can help determine whether or not the function of 
the panel is to relate warfare activity.
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When discussing warfare on the northwestern Plains, the distinction 
between actual fighting and rituals associated with fighting is blurred because 
of the cultural context of these activities; and since the distinction was not 
made in the lives of those people, warfare on the Plains usually considers 
actual fighting and ritual portrayal as the same, as they are viewed here. Rituals, 
whether portrayed as occurring before or after a fight or as associated with 
fighting, such as the Sun Dance, are not the same as fighting, although they 
can sometimes substitute. Likewise, portraying activities such as counting 
coup (striking an enemy either living or dead with a stick, quirt, bow, or simi-
lar object during battle), preparing for a battle by drawing a shield image on 
a rock wall for power, or drawing one on the wall after the battle to record 
one’s success, may not be a distinction that is needed by the people in societ-
ies where warfare and ritual are intertwined or by researchers attempting to 
understand how warfare changed through time. However, we do not know 
for certain that actual and ritual warfare were closely related through time, so 
separating the two concepts should be attempted whenever possible for the 
best understanding of how warfare was portrayed in rock art and by whom. 
On the northwestern Plains there are a few examples of rock art that previ-
ous researchers have identified as showing fighting postures and portraying 
social dance, and in some cases these social dances are directly associated with 
warfare. The most obvious example of a scene with this function is at the Joliet 
site (24CB402), with a portrayal of the Grass or Hot Dance conducted by 
the Hidatsa and their northwestern Plains relatives, the Crow (Keyser and 
Cowdrey 2008; McCleary 2008a:44–45). At this panel three dancing warriors 
are carrying a gun, a bow and arrow, and a feather-decorated coup stick as 
part of a ritual battle (figure 2.2). On this same panel is a woman interpreted 
recently by Crow informants as having been stolen from another tribe and 
then thrown away as part of this dance ceremony, representing another aspect 
of warfare (McCleary 2008a:45).
On the southwestern periphery of the northwestern Plains, at the La Barge 
Bluffs site (48LN1640) in southwestern Wyoming, two scenes have been inter-
preted as rituals associated with warfare. Keyser and Poetschat (2005:67–68) 
hypothesize, based on ethnographic accounts of Northern Shoshone by Lowie, 
that one scene portrays coup on a captured woman in front of a line of people 
as she is adopted into the capturing group, thus portraying a war-related activ-
ity but not actually showing warfare (figure 2.3a). A second scene at that site 
shows a warrior brandishing a pistol and riding in front of a group of people in 
what the authors consider a celebration of warfare, but again not actually por-
traying war (figure 2.3b). The audience in both rituals is interpreted either as 
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participants (dancers, celebrants) or simply as observers. These cases support 
the fact that the context of a single image, including details of its depiction, 
or the context of a complete scene is critical in determining whether warfare 
is the theme.
Common symbols that depict warfare are weapons (figure 2.4a–b), shields 
(figure 2.4c), armor, fighting posture(figure 2.4c), and people in dominant posi-
tions facing opponents in subservient positions. Nothing is more conclusive 
than scenes showing attacks (figure 2.5a–b) or other warrior activities, such as 
horse stealing. However, although often considered characteristic of regional 
Figure 2.2. Warfare dance and capture scene at the Joliet Site (24CB402) in Montana. 
Drawing by James D. Keyser, from Keyser and Cowdrey 2008:26 [figure 7]. 
Figure 2.3. Ritual warfare at the La Barge Bluffs site (48LN1640) in Wyoming. (a) 
Counting coup on a captured woman (bottom right) in front of a group. (b) Mounted 
warrior riding with a pistol in front of a group. 
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Figure 2.4. Common rock art depictions of warfare: (a) shield-bearing warrior 
(Carboni site, 24CB404); (b) person stuck with arrow (Recognition Rock, 24RB165); 
and (c) battle scene (No Water Petroglyphs, 48WA2066). 
rock art, the occurrence of action-showing battle scenes is limited relative to 
static portraits of humans that represent warriors. When shields are portrayed 
with weapons, they are usually considered conclusively warfare related, but 
when a person (usually male) is shown with a weapon and no shield, unless he 
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Figure 2.5. General rock art battle scenes with horse-mounted warriors fighting 
pedestrians: (a) at White Mountain Petroglyphs (48SW302), and (b) at the Gumby site 
(24GV139). Some images highlighted with Adobe Illustrator. 
is portrayed in a battle scene, there is no reason to prefer warfare over hunting, 
indication of status, or some other message. Shields in non-combat scenes, or 
even static poses without weapons, are usually assumed to be warfare related, 
such as those at Bear Gulch discussed by Keyser (chapter 3, this volume). But 
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there are examples in northwestern Plains rock art in which the shield appears 
to have no association with warfare and may instead portray medicine shields, 
as symbolic weaponry. We have previously suggested, based on panel context, 
that the shield may be a personal identifier or have a spiritual connotation, 
such as assisting in safe passage into the next world (Greer and Greer 2003). 
Other indicators of warfare include warriors holding severed heads, mounted 
warriors taking pedestrian captives, and armored people and horses. We also 
believe that people pierced with spears and arrows, usually interpreted as rep-
resenting personal injuries through fighting, especially in earlier pre-Contact 
cases, may not represent fighting but instead may be stylized representations 
of a different but as-yet unidentified function. Thus, when spears and arrows 
(from Archaic to Historic) are shown recurringly penetrating specific parts of 
the body, such as the neck (at an angle), waist (figure 2.4b), knees, and ankles, 
or even lining the torso, they may not be referring to actual wounding by 
another individual.
Handprints are found throughout world rock art and are especially com-
mon in central Montana (Greer and Greer 1999). There are many explana-
tions for their existence, but the prints (whether positive stamps or negative 
stencils) generally are not considered directly associated with warfare on the 
northern Plains. Historical documents, however, suggest that single hands or 
hands associated with warfare scenes may have a different meaning:
[Diary of C. W. Lee, February 22, 1870] Some of the Crow Indians brought in 
some scalps and a hand of some Indians they had killed this morning on Crooked 
Creek. Seven of them, Flatheads and Ponderays [Pend d’Oreilles] undertook to 
steal a lot of horses from the Crows this morning a little before day. The Crows 
turned out and followed them. Aided by the snow, they soon overhauled them 
and made short work of them, killing all of them. (Hampton 2011:66)
In all cases, it is again context that indicates whether warfare is the theme 
associated with the images. Associated dress, accoutrements, and posture are 
important to the warfare function interpretation, especially on non-scene, 
static figures. We have the added benefit that Contact-period warfare on the 
northwestern Plains has a rich historical record written by people living in the 
midst of that cultural change.
WeaPons In roCk art
Weapons are important in evaluating depictions of warfare, and we have 
previously quantified weapons recorded in Montana and Wyoming rock art 
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for types of weaponry relative to function (Greer and Greer 2008a, 2008b). 
Our analysis (updated in 2013) focused first on weapons in Montana, dis-
tribution of weapon types, and likely function relative to the overall scene. 
Unexpectedly, the rock art mostly suggested changing use of environmental 
settings through time by different populations. We then expanded analysis to 
Wyoming, focusing on the northern and eastern parts of the state, that is, the 
northwestern Plains and Rocky Mountain geographical areas, and exclud-
ing the southwestern area with stronger Great Basin cultural associations and 
Great Basin environment. Based on a sample of nearly 1,000 sites (654 in 
Montana and 337 in Wyoming) it was found that recorders more frequently 
recognized—or focused their attention on—weapons than on distinctions in 
other images, at least to the level of general class, such as bow and arrow, lance, 
or gun (table 2.1). During our review of these sites we were able to identify 511 
weapons (382 in Montana and 129 in Wyoming, or 75% and 25%, respectively).
Shields are usually easily identified, and shield-bearing warriors are often 
portrayed with active weapons such as oblong rounded-end clubs, pointed elk-
tine clubs, and lances (figure 2.6). Bows are shown alone and with arrows, and 
arrows are depicted with triangular arrowheads and feather fletching, or with 
fletching only and no point. Arrows are sometimes in the hands of humans and 
not accompanied by a bow, some are in quivers on people’s backs, some are in 
flight, and others are shown sticking into shields, animals, or humans. Other 
weapons include hatchets, guns, lances or spears, and the extremely rare atlatl.
In Montana and Wyoming bows are most frequently shown in hunting and 
warfare scenes, thus indicating what we recognize as a progressive increase 
in weapon images and probably a gradual change in importance from hunt-
ing portrayal to interpersonal conflict from the Late Prehistoric (ca. ad 500) 
to the Historic (ca. ad 1700) periods. The bow and arrow usually are not in 
ceremonial rock art scenes, which may be both a temporal and functional dis-
tinction. However, Francis and Loendorf (2002:117) discuss ceremonial uses of 
the bow as portrayed in some Dinwoody sites in western Wyoming to indicate 
power and association with evil activities, such as shooting people with invis-
ible arrows to cause illness. Thus, like the shield, weapons may not be depicting 
warfare and instead may have a completely different referent.
Armored horses occur in rock art across both states, with the greatest con-
centration along the Musselshell River in central Montana (figure 2.7). Of 
three recorded armored horses on the Wyoming plains, two are pierced with 
arrows or lances. Of nine recorded in Montana, only one (at the Nordstrom 
Bowen site, 24YL419) is pierced, and it is the most attacked armored horse 
on the Northern Plains from Alberta to Colorado. Five of the 12 armored 
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Table 2.1. Weapons in Montana and Wyoming rock art. These reflect sites in the State 
Historic Preservation Records as of 2013.
Kinds of Weapons
Number of Images of 
Weapon in Montana
Number of Images of 
Weapon in Wyoming Total
Armored horses (no arrows or lances) 4 1 5
Armored horses (with arrows or lances) 5 2 7
Armored pedestrian with shield 1 0 1
Arrows (human holding) 6 1 7
Arrows (inserted into human) 21 4 25
Arrows (no attached bow or human) 83 47 130
Arrows or Spear (inserted into animal) 30 8 38
Atlatl 1 2 3
Bow (human holding) 28 18 46
Bow (no attached human) 2 1 3
Gun 76 14 90
Hatchet 9 0 9
Lance/Spear 14 2 16
Shield with associated elk-tine club 19 0 19
Shield with associated rounded-end 
club 28 0 28
Shield with inserted arrows 3 8 11
Shield with lance 52 21 73
Totals 382 129 511
horsemen have associated lances or spears. Even though horse armor may have 
been designed principally for battle protection, only just over half the images 
are associated with weapons, suggesting armor may have had other functions 
on the Plains, such as environmental protection from brush (or thorny plants 
in the south) but more likely from cold temperatures by allowing retention of 
body heat. Only one known figure—a pedestrian—is in full body armor (fig-
ure 2.8), and he is engaged in conflict with a person on an armored horse, on a 
site along the Musselshell River.
Musselshell roCk art
The Musselshell River in central Montana was one of the last places tribes 
could continue their cultural practices of hunting and warfare. The valley lies 
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Figure 2.6. Shield warriors 
with weapons at the Bear Gulch 
site (24FR2): (a) oblong rounded-
end club, (b) elk-tine club, and 
(c) lance. 
between the Missouri River to the north and the Yellowstone River to the 
south (figure 2.1). In 1875, Yellowstone Kelly described the area as “a veritable 
hunters’ paradise for game of all kinds, including elk, deer, and mountain 
sheep, and cinnamon, black, and brown bear . . . [and] a good country to run 
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Figure 2.7. Five of seven 
armored horses reported from the 
Musselshell River area. Sketches 
by John and Mavis Greer 
and James D. Keyser. 
into war parties of the Sioux, Crow, and Blackfeet tribes” (Quaife 1973:117). 
However, these three cultural groups were not alone. At the mouth of the 
Musselshell, C. W. Lee, a young man trained in gun repair who lived at 
the confluence of the Musselshell and Missouri rivers, observed the fol-
lowing tribes between 1868 and 1872 (Hampton 2011): Arapaho, Assiniboine, 
Blackfeet, Crow, Flathead, Gros Ventre, Pend d’Oreille, Piegan, and Sioux 
(Santee, Teton, and Yankton). Of these tribes, those most mentioned were 
Arapaho, Crow, Gros Ventre, and Sioux. In 1878 and 1879 Andrew Garcia 
reports encountering Assiniboine, Blackfeet (mainly Piegan, but also Blood 
and Blackfoot), Cree, Crow, Gros Ventre, Nez Perce, Pend d’Oreille, Sioux, 
and Spokane (Garcia 1967). He wrote that the Musselshell country drew 
western as well as northern tribes because bad weather in Alberta drove the 
buffalo south to winter there and provided an ample supply of food for the 
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many visiting groups. This popular wintering location provided opportuni-
ties for intertribal conflict but also complicates assigning cultural affiliation 
to rock art in the valley.
Sites along the Musselshell mostly contain Contact-period rock art, but 
only about a third appear to be associated with warfare. There has been little 
archaeological survey here, but 16 rock art sites have been recorded overlook-
ing the Musselshell River, and 31 for the entire drainage, undoubtedly a small 
percentage of sites actually along the sandstone-rimmed valley. Of the 16, 
eight have scenes that portray warfare.
The Gumby Site (24GV139) is one of the smallest with a battle scene. A 
single rider on a horse appears to be leading two riderless horses and shooting 
a gun toward a pedestrian shown only from the torso up and carrying a bow 
(figure 2.5b). Other images at the site are of red paint, and based on our prior 
studies of central Montana chronology (Greer 1995) probably date much ear-
lier than the Contact period but are too deteriorated to be identified.
The Five Guys Petroglyph (24ML394) has two horseback riders carrying 
long lances, possibly coup sticks, following five humans. One rider has flow-
ing long hair, which differs from the round heads of the rectangular-bodied 
pedestrians, who have no arms. No other figures have been noted here.
Figure 2.8. Pedestrian warrior and armored horse with rider (Goffena site, 24ML408).  
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The Rockshelter Shield site (24ML507), the Horned Headgear site 
(24ML508), and the Musselshell site (24ML1049) have recently been recorded 
in detail and found to have warfare imagery (Loendorf 2012). The Rockshelter 
Shield site has several static-pose, shield-bearing warriors, although only one 
has a clear weapon. The Horned Headgear site has an action battle scene, which 
is typical of those found at Writing-on-Stone in Alberta. The Musselshell site 
has several shield-bearing warriors but no active battle scenes.
The other three sites with battle scenes all have armored horses (figure 2.7), 
although not all are within conflict compositions. The Goffena site (24ML408) 
has a painted armored horse confronting an armored pedestrian (figure 2.8). 
The scene is not only unique among armored-horse depictions along the 
Musselshell, it is also unlike any others on the northern and central Plains and 
not just because it is a painting rather than a petroglyph. The Goffena horse 
has a scalplock hanging from the bridle bit, and a rayed headdress, which 
is referred to as a horse bonnet (Keyser 2012), and neither of these occurs 
on other known armored horses. The shielded warrior riding the horse has a 
horned headdress, carries a flagged lance, and has what appears to be a thrust-
ing spear pointed at the pedestrian warrior. The body-armored pedestrian has 
a horned headdress, carries what may be a flagged coup stick with an attached 
scalp, and is protected by a large shield in addition to the armor.
The West Ryegate (24GV191) armored horses are all easily recognizable, but 
no two are exactly alike (figure 2.7). They are spaced along a quarter-mile of 
bluff, with no two images together, suggesting they were drawn by different 
people. Horse 1 (AH1) is flanked by a shield bearer to the right and another 
to the left. The horse armor is a typical triangular skirt with a curved bottom, 
and a collar to cover the horse’s neck. The horse’s head has been lost to cal-
cium carbonate deposits, but a group of lines just out from the collar suggests 
a decorative bridle. The shield-covered rider at the top opening of the armor 
is not detailed. However, there is a deliberate slash across the face (the recur-
ring scar-face motif ), one arm and hand, and a suggestion of reins. In front of 
the rider is a long, vertical lance with a tassel extending from the top, perhaps 
representing a scalp. Far to the right (not shown in figure 2.7) is a pedestrian 
warrior, and closer to the left is another warrior facing left away from the 
horse. This scene does not clearly depict the armored horse interacting with 
the pedestrians as it does at other sites.
The second armored horse (AH2) at West Ryegate is very large relative to 
others of this kind. Although dense carbonate deposits surround the incised 
figure and cover part of the rider, it is still possible to see that the horse armor 
has broad slightly expanding stripes that form a pattern similar to those at 
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Goffena. There is a tassel off the end of the nose, perhaps a scalp or ring bit 
chains (or coscojos). Reins end at a lance extending frontward from the shield-
bearing rider. Attached near the front of the lance are what may be feathers or 
a scalp. The warrior has a wide neck and what appears to be a single feather or 
ponytail extending from the oval head. Protruding from his shield, above the 
lance, is a plain arrow or another lance.
Horse 3 (AH3) at West Ryegate has typical triangular-shaped armor with 
an opening in the top for the rider and a collar to protect the horse’s neck. 
Triangular designs on the armor body may be highly stylized feathers or a 
pattern in the leather indicating construction. A column of five large dots 
decorates the front of the armor. This decoration is not on any other recorded 
armored horse. The pointed-head rider is mostly outside the horse armor 
but is protected by a personal shield. Lines extending out from the shield 
on the edge opposite the reins may be from a weapon now not discernible. 
Superpositioning of the scratches shows that the large shield to the right of 
the rider and at the top of the armor was engraved before the horse; so pre-
sumably the order of engraving was the shield first, followed by the horse 
armor and horse, and finally the human rider.
Armored horse 4 (AH4) at West Ryegate is on a busy panel also contain-
ing at least one horse without armor and rider. Based on superpositioning, the 
armored horse was not the first of the figures to be incised. The armor is with-
out decoration, apparently to allow the underlying unarmored horse and rider 
to show through—that is, the engraving order is the unarmored horse and rider, 
and then the armored horse and rider. The armored rider lacks detail, but the 
generally rounded body suggests a shield, while a distinctive lance with dan-
gling feathers or scalp protrudes from the back of the armor. The rider of an 
underlying armorless horse also carries a lance with a possible scalp or feathers.
Although none of the West Ryegate horses is in a definite battle scene, all 
are associated with weapons or war trophies (i.e., scalps) suggesting they all 
represent warfare-associated activities. This long bluff also has two other small 
scenes possibly associated with conflict. One may depict a horse-stealing 
event—a horse with a down-turned head is partially superimposed onto a 
conical tipi, and the two are covered with horse prints. The other panel has a 
well-executed horse with a shielded rider holding a lance or coup stick and 
being bombarded with arrows from an unseen source.
Two armored horses have been identified at the Twenty-one Guns site 
(24ML398). Like West Ryegate, this is a large site with several weapons 
depicted, mostly guns. Also here are several unarmored horses and some 
shield-bearing humans (one with guns). Neither horse has associated figures, 
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weapons, or rider. There are no indications that the two horses were made by 
the same person or by any of the artists of the other five armored horses along 
the Musselshell.
The Musselshell sites contain several hundred elements of Contact-period 
rock art, and about a third may be associated with warfare. Ethnographies 
show that tribes in this area had a social structure with status dependent on 
military achievement (Lowie 1963:114–123), but historical documents often 
provide a different view of conflict. In the 1800s horse stealing was still the 
main way to increase status within most northwestern Plains tribes, and his-
torical documents cite this as the main reason for warfare in the Musselshell 
area (e.g., Garcia 1967; Hampton 2011; Quaife 1973). However, squeezing so 
many tribes into the small valley because of diminishing buffalo herds, increas-
ing Euroamerican settlements in surrounding areas, and constant pressure 
from the US military was causing increased skirmishes between small parties 
(McGinnis 1990). These conflicts arose from too many people using a more 
constricted space for activities that previously encompassed massive areas.
ethnohIstorIC Warfare: What WIll We see In roCk art?
By the mid- to late 1800s, traders and trappers, such as Andrew Garcia, a 
trader from the border area of Texas in the late 1870s, were living with and 
marrying into tribes that lived in the valley, and some, like Garcia, were writing 
extensively and in detail about their time on the Musselshell. The Musselshell 
valley was not only a place for many tribes to winter, hunt bison, and inter-
act, both in conflict situations and at social events that centered on gambling 
(Garcia 1967:170, 185), but also for white traders and trappers to intermingle 
with the Indians or to enter the area as part of the US military, and in some 
cases both (Quaife 1973). From Garcia we see the same tribes that often skir-
mished would get together for social parties that lasted for days. While liv-
ing in a camp of Pend d’Oreille and planning to marry a Nez Perce woman 
living among them, he witnessed such a party in 1878. Tribes came to gamble 
at the Pend d’Oreille camp: “Assiniboines and Crees, Bloods, Gros Ventres 
and Piegans” (Garcia 1967:185). However, peaceful interactions are not com-
mon topics in historical documents for the Musselshell area, whereas warfare 
between the tribes, and later between the tribes and the US military, are much 
more popular subjects. We also learn from individuals who integrated them-
selves into the tribes, that Indian groups, even when there was no formal social 
event, were generally composites from different tribes. Although they recog-
nized tribal distinction among themselves, affiliation would not be obvious to 
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a casual outside observer. For example, Garcia wrote about one camp, “some 
Spokanes were with them, but most of the band were Pend d’Oreilles from 
the Kalispell Valley [over 200 mi to the west]. They were camped about three 
miles from where I was . . . They had come over the year before and had hunted 
buffalo in the Musselshell country the previous winter” (Garcia 1967:113). He 
also noted that Indians from west of the mountains generally stayed two or 
three years before returning home.
Among the conflicts described, those associated with horse stealing are most 
common. By the late 1870s, stealing horses not only brought prestige within the 
tribe but increased tribal assets for trade. Horse stealing between tribes and from 
Euroamericans in the area was a constant in the region (Hampton 2011; Robison 
2013). Garcia speaks particularly of Crow and Piegan war parties stealing horses 
back and forth (Garcia 1967:31, 49, 66). Because of the abundance of horses, 
Garcia was usually not interested in trading for horses, but he noted that other 
whites in the area were. Those in the small settlement of Fort Musselshell at the 
confluence of the Musselshell River with the Missouri fueled horse stealing by 
offering whiskey in trade: [December 27, 1869] “The Grovents are still here and 
doing considerable trading: horses and robes for whiskey, although there is a 
heavy penalty against it, there are plenty that will trade it to them” (Hampton 
2011:63). Horse stealing is portrayed in rock art throughout the northern Plains, 
so to find only one horse stealing scene in the rock art of the Musselshell is sur-
prising, considering its numerous references in the historical record. If cases of 
horse stealing have the same proportions in rock art elsewhere in the northern 
Plains, it seems that this was not a war exploit that was commemorated with a 
frequency relative to how much it was occurring.
Capturing or stealing women during conflict was widespread across the 
region, but historical references to this for the Musselshell area are few. Keyser, 
Sundstrom, and Poetschat (2006) reported on the occurrence of women in 
war and noted only 24 rock art scenes at 16 sites on the entire northwestern 
Plains that depicted women being captured (figure 2.9). Subsequently, at the 
Bear Gulch site (24FR2) in central Montana, at least five women were found 
to be in coup-count scenes and tallies (Greer and Keyser 2008:97–98; Keyser, 
chapter 3, this volume). In 2009, a woman-capture scene was recorded at the 
No Water site (48WA2066) in northwestern Wyoming (Keyser and Poetschat 
2009:13, 83–91). However, even with the addition of the new panels, capturing 
or stealing women does not appear to be a popular topic for rock art.
No woman-capture scenes have been found in the Musselshell drainage, 
but there also are almost no indicators of gender. Even historical references 
to stealing woman for the Musselshell are few. There is a general comment 
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that the Blackfeet steal robes in raids, like they do horses and women (Garcia 
1967:163), and a specific instance regarding a Blackfeet raid states that
We could see that they [Blackfeet warriors] had gotten quite a bunch of horses 
from their raid on the Crows. They also had eight or nine young Crow squaws 
that they picked up in the raid. The Crows did not seem any too sorry. They 
knew that they would be traded back soon to their people for the Blackfeet 
women the Crows had. (Garcia 1967:66)
Full-time residents of Fort Musselshell at the mouth of the river were few 
in number (in April 1870 there were 13 men, 4 women, and 2 children), but 
there were always many visitors, among them captive women.
[C. W. Lee’s Diary, September 7, 1870] A large party of Indians came in to 
Musselshell today: Grosvents and Rappahoes [Arapahos] . . . They arrived a 
little after noon and toward evening they moved in among the Col.’s building 
timber below his house and made themselves some barricades for themselves 
and horses. They have a Piegan squaw among [them] that the Grovents took 
Figure 2.9. Woman-capture scene (with armored horse) at 38HN210, South Dakota. 
NORTHWESTERN PLAINS CONTACT-ERA WARFARE 57
prisoner a short time ago killing 7 bucks and taking 3 squaws prisoner at the 
time. (Hampton 2011:102)
Seldom are women specifically identifiable in rock art battle scenes. Even if 
drawn genderless, figures in a warfare scene are assumed by most researchers 
to be men. However, Garcia reflected on women fighting: “There was also a 
hatred between the women of one tribe and the women of a different tribe. 
Many times a despised Indian squaw was known to stand and fight to the 
death by the side of her man, sometimes even against her own people” (Garcia 
1967:56). In 1841, near present-day Baggs, Wyoming, in the south-central part 
of the state near the Colorado state line, Jim Baker observed a battle that 
involved a woman in a prominent position,
The trappers were no doubt startled as they looked out upon a horde of about 
700 redskins, comprising the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe tribes. The Indians 
were covered with war paint, armed both with bows and arrows and with flint-
lock muskets. The attack was led by an Arapahoe princess who was decked in 
her war dress, which was embellished with the barbarous emblems of her tribe. 
She made a heroic figure leading the Indians in their murderous design; chant-
ing a weird war song, with gestures she urged them on. The Indians demanded 
that the trappers give them their horses, which numbered fifty. The white men, 
relying upon their advantageous position, after holding council, decided not to 
accede to their wishes without a fight. (Mumey 1972: 24, 28)
C. W. Lee reported Crow women acting as lookouts for possible attacking 
Sioux in 1868 (Hampton 2011:40), and Healy told about a Gros Ventre war 
party along the Missouri River between Fort Benton and Fort Musselshell (ca. 
1862) where the male “Chief, followed by his squaw mounted on a war horse, 
was in the lead and a long distance ahead of his nearest followers” (Robison 
2013:117). Thus, in rock art, women may be among the men in those genderless 
scenes, and it may not necessarily be the case that they are of the same tribe.
Zenas Leonard (Quaife 1978) observed warfare throughout the northwest-
ern Plains and beyond in the 1830s and understood that it was important for 
people to retain their social status within the tribe. He commented on tribal 
competiveness that
each one [was] trying to excel the other in merit, whilst engaged in some dan-
gerous adventure.—Their predatory wars afford them every opportunity for this, 
as they are at liberty and sometimes compelled to engage in the battle’s strife as 
soon as they are able to bend the bow or wield the tomahawk. (Quaife 1978:232)
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This need to be successful for status in one’s society is behind McClintock’s 
observation that “the painted War Tipi of Running Rabbit was of an entirely 
different character, being covered with picture records of tribal victories.” He 
notes that “it is an interesting fact that Indians never make records of their 
defeats” (McClintock 1992:220–221), and today almost no rock art panels are 
interpreted as showing defeats. Keyser and Klassen (2001:255) provide an 
example from a battle scene at Writing-on-Stone that has been interpreted as 
the record of “Retreat up the Hill” based on 1924 information from Bird Rattle, 
a Piegan elder. However, there are no indications of recorded battles lost so far 
in Musselshell rock art.
While in the Musselshell area, Kelly spent much time staying in and 
describing conical wickiup war lodges. In 1869 he wrote:
When we arrived at the Musselshell River we found that the snow had fallen 
during our absence and there were many old footprints made by Indians around 
our camp. On looking around we found a newly constructed war house in the 
pines, a great green tepee covered very cleverly with pine boughs. We were 
certainly fortunate to have missed the party that built it, for it was a large one. 
(Quaife 1973:134)
He discussed another war lodge in the Bear Paw Mountains, northwest of 
the Musselshell and north of the Missouri River:
War houses in that region were built according to the material at hand. If slabs 
and poles were available the structure was made in the shape of a conical tepee, 
thick enough for shelter and protection, with the open entrance overlapping 
and the loose top affording an exit for smoke. A similar shelter was sometimes 
built in the shape of an unfinished Mandan wigwam. The one we had come 
upon was conical and shapely, and showed signs of having been occupied 
recently by Indians. (Quaife 1973:110)
Yellowstone Kelly, while in the Musselshell area in 1875, wrote that “we came 
upon a substantial war house and concluded to camp for the night. This war 
house was well put up, roomy and comfortable, and had probably held twenty-
five” (Quaife 1973:110). Lee also reported on pole lodges in the Musselshell area: 
[February 5, 1871] “up Squaw Creek about 3 miles and found where the Indians 
[Crow] camped . . . [They] built a lodge of dry poles . . . From the size of the lodge 
there could not have been over 25 Indians at the most” (Hampton 2011:1260).
Rock art representations of tipis and conical lodges occur throughout the 
northwestern Plains. Some rock art drawings of a single conical lodge, or 
occasionally multiple lodges, are made of several converging lines or many 
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poles making up the body (figure 2.10). Such pole lodge figures do not have 
smoke flaps, doorways, exterior decoration, or details present on other tipi 
representations. Also pole lodges are usually not associated with other figures, 
while eagle-catching lodges are (Sundstrom 2004:124). Although structural 
difference may reflect individual artistic style, it is likely that isolated pole 
lodges shown without other interior detail or associated images depict expe-
dient pole war lodges and not a skin-covered family residence or lodge of 
another function. The lack of associated context becomes the important ele-
ment in functional identification of these depictions.
Long, feathered staffs in rock art are often thought to be coup sticks, and 
counting coup is considered a non-invasive part of warfare (e.g., Keyser 1977a, 
Figure 2.10. Conical pole lodge petroglyph at Deer Medicine 
Rocks (24RB401). 
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1987a; Keyser and Cowdrey 2008; McCleary 2008a). In Musselshell rock art 
we identify several people shown with coup sticks. Coup sticks were often 
decorated with scalps (Garcia 1967:121), indicators of violence in warfare on 
a tool supposedly used for nonviolent contact. Yellowstone Kelly discussed a 
coup-counting situation in which
twenty-three Crows had started on a horse-stealing raid against the Sioux on 
the Yellowstone. They discovered two large camps of the enemy in the bad lands 
before reaching the Yellowstone, and succeeded in rounding up and driving off, 
unperceived, a number of horses . . . The Sioux discovered their presence and pur-
sued them . . . [and] harassed them with fire from every rock, bush, and hollow in 
the vicinity, and when the Crows were reduced to five or six in number a charge 
was made by the young and untrained warriors of the camp, to whom was pre-
sented a grand opportunity of winning the aboriginal spurs and counting a first 
coup under the eyes and encouragement of their own people. (Quaife 1973:89)
However, coup sticks could do damage. A Blackfoot warrior hit a Nez Perce 
woman on the side of her face with “his coup stick with such force as to 
bulge the eye from its socket, leaving it completely exposed on her cheek” 
(Garcia 1967:363).
Scalping was a major part of northwestern Plains warfare and is often men-
tioned in ethnohistorical studies. Dangling multiple lines from horse bridle 
bits and lances in rock art are often identified as scalps (figure 2.8). All fight-
ers in the region, including Euroamericans, scalped their enemies. Scalping 
is generally thought of as being done on dead bodies only, but it occasionally 
occurred on someone who lived. The only Euroamerican woman living at Fort 
Musselshell was scalped while out with two Crow women when they were 
attached by a party of Sioux warriors. One of the Crow women was shot 
through the leg, and the white woman was shot through the neck. Thinking 
she was dead, the Sioux warrior scalped her, but she survived (Hampton 
2011:50–51). She subsequently covered her scalped head with a wig made from 
red rope, suggesting another option for unusual head dresses shown in rock art.
Depictions of severed heads are not common in northern Plains rock art 
sites (Greer and Greer 2002). A life-sized warrior at the Daly Petroglyphs 
(48CA58) in northeastern Wyoming is the only one we know of on the north-
ern Plains actually to hold a severed human head (figure 2.11). In his bent right 
arm he holds a bow, while his bent left arm holds the head, and he has at least 
one arrow entering his lower leg. The head may be held at the neck, with a 
feather coming out of a headdress hanging down, or the warrior is holding 
the top of the head by the hair with blood trickling out of the wide neck. The 
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severed head is different from those of the warrior and other large humans 
next to him, presumably indicating membership of a different group. Two 
life-sized humans next to the warrior also hold bows and arrows, and one has 
a breastplate. These attributes suggest that this integrated panel portrays the 
results of a conflict situation.
At least two inverted heads, seemingly severed and suspended as tro-
phies, are at the Hewlett South site (48CK1544) in extreme northeastern 
Wyoming, and at least two others are at Medicine Creek Cave (48CK48), 
also in extreme northeastern Wyoming. These are alternatively interpreted 
as representing Spring Boy and Lodge Boy in Hidatsa-Crow and Kiowa 
mythology (discussion in Sundstrom et al. 2001:18–24, figure 11), but the 
heads are clearly detached.
Another possible decapitation panel is at the Manuel Lisa site (24YL82) 
in southeastern Montana near the mouth of the Bighorn River, where it 
enters the Yellowstone. Here at least five non-inverted heads are attached 
to a generally horizontal line by secondary cords (or perhaps weapons) to 
the tops of the heads (figure 2.12). Like the heads at the Daly Petroglyphs, 
these have distinctive hairstyles. Three have a single braid coming out of 
the top of the head, while two have several tassels coming out of the head. 
Figure 2.11. Warrior panel at Daly Petroglyphs (48CA58). Person on far right holds a 
severed head. Images highlighted with Adobe Illustrator. 
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In 2002 we suggested these multiple heads may be trophies, and instead 
of literal decapitation may represent coup counts (Greer and Greer 2002; 
Keyser 2006a:62–63). Later, in 2008, McCleary, working with modern Crow 
and their interpretive system, suggests that the panel may be a Crow draw-
ing of “a series of heads of enemy men and women he [the warrior on the 
horse above the heads] dispatched throughout his career. The first four he 
killed with a diamond-shaped French trade axe known as a spontoon which 
was favored by the Crow, and the last he speared” (McCleary 2008a:37–38). 
McCleary’s modern informant prefers that these are heads of dead peo-
ple and not people on whom coup was counted and lived to tell about it. 
Although the heads at the Daly Petroglyphs and Manuel Lisa site do not 
have lines from the severed neck that represent blood dripping down, nei-
ther do they have attached bodies, which indicates that the person mak-
ing the drawing deliberately wanted to show that the head was separated. 
Although we do not know if the artist was simply indicating that the people 
are dead, or if their heads were actually removed from their bodies at the 
time of death, in a battle between Crow and Blackfeet in the Big Horn 
Basin of western Wyoming in 1834, Zenas Leonard, who was traveling with 
the Crow, witnessed a decapitation associated with a battle:
After they had finished tormenting the living, which was not done until there 
was no more to kill, they commenced cutting off the heads of the mangled bod-
ies, which were hoisted on the ends of poles and carried about, and afterwards 
dashed them against trees, rock, &c. leaving them on the plain to be devoured 
by wild beasts. (Quaife 1978:246)
Figure 2.12. Heads (previously chalked) at the Manuel Lisa Site (24YL82). The 1905 date 
is engraved over the image. 
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ConClusIons
Ethnohistorical interpretations for the northwestern Plains show groups 
were composed of people from different tribes who would party together and 
then battle one another. At the time of contact many groups were using the 
Musselshell River drainage area, and it is highly probable that all these differ-
ent groups were making rock art in the area. Ethnographies, histories written 
by short-term visitors, and drawings in later robe and ledger art provide infor-
mation useful for image identification and inventory lists of tribes present in 
the area. But due to the changing cultural complexity of the region and the 
intensive cultural mixing, which is best described for the Musselshell country, 
confidence wanes when trying to link the majority of images, panels, or recur-
ring artistic attributes with specific tribes. For instance, the seven armored 
horses along the Musselshell show seven different styles and are separated 
on the landscape, suggesting all were made by different people. Although we 
know the Shoshoni used horse armor as late as 1805, as observed by Lewis 
and Clark (Coues 1987:561), they were not the only tribe to use it (Secoy 1953). 
The Musselshell horses could have been put on the wall anytime from the 
late 1600s to the early 1800s and could have been placed there by people who 
owned the armor or people who observed others using it. When people of this 
region began drawing on robes and ledgers, it was easier to depict more detail 
so drawings found on these portable objects could clearly portray their tribe’s 
particular item of clothing (leggings, moccasins, breechcloth, or necklace) or 
hairstyle (hair extensions, braids, roach, etc.), but that was more difficult to 
do on rock and often was not included, although there are exceptions. At the 
Horned Headgear site on the Musselshell, a horse and rider were drawn in 
such detail that when Loendorf compared them with a Catlin painting he felt 
confident in assigning a Crow affiliation to the image, although he suggests 
the artist was an Assiniboine based on the detailed headdress and clothing 
of the person counting coup on the horse and rider, whom he believes is the 
artist’s self-portrait (Loendorf 2012:11–13). Thus, in order to determine tribal 
affiliation, style differences of costume, hair, accoutrements, and other details 
are needed (Keyser and Klassen 2003; Loendorf 2012). Without these clues, 
either because the author never included them (as such information was per-
ceived to be artistically unnecessary), or (less likely) because details have not 
survived weathering of the panel, it is difficult to assign images an ethnic 
identity in an area where there is so much interaction and mixing of groups, as 
there was along the Musselshell from contact to reservation times.
Rock art evidence indicates that prior to the introduction of the bow about 
ad 500, weapons are scarce in northwestern Plains rock art. Before that date 
64 MAVIS GREER AND JOHN GREER
just as much rock art was being made (based on the number of sites recorded), 
but weapons portrayal was not important—atlatl figures (and even clubs) were 
not a topic of interest, although common in the Southwest and Great Basin. 
In addition, there are no identified portrayals of Archaic warfare, and the lack 
of intensive warfare during that time period is generally supported by skeletal 
evidence. After the introduction of the bow, burial sites show increased vio-
lent deaths, and weapons become prevalent in rock art. After the widespread 
dissemination of horses and guns in the 1700s, there is an obvious increase 
in warfare reflected in rock art in Wyoming and Montana, with such images 
as warfare scenes, interpersonal conflict, armored horses, shield-bearing war-
riors with weapons, and people pierced with spears and arrows. By the 1800s 
when traders, trappers, and the military begin recording everyday Indian life 
in the region, warfare was popular and familiar. However, counts of weap-
ons and warfare images in rock art, and supported by direct observation by 
people living on a daily basis together with Indians (such as Andrew Garcia, 
Zenas Leonard, C. W. Lee, and Jim Baker), show that conflict occurred here 
mainly in Plains settings and in pine and juniper parklands. Warfare imagery 
and by extension native warfare seldom occur in mountain settings of high 
elevations, limestone caves, deep snow, and denser forests (Greer and Greer 
2008a, 2008b). The main impetus for change was almost certainly the infusion 
of new groups with different practices and beliefs, and the introduction of 
deadlier weapons most efficient in open environments. Limestone mountains 
did not lose their emotional appeal as ceremonial or story-telling centers, but 
the sandstone-dominated plains became the main focus for rock art and its 
portrayal of the growing cultural importance of weapons aimed at other peo-
ple. Warfare was fought by several tribes in this area to defend their territory 
(especially from the large groups of incoming Sioux), as revenge for killing 
and mutilating their fellow tribal members, to obtain goods they could not 
afford through trade, and for prestige, which for these groups meant eleva-
tion of status mainly through horse acquisition and coup counting. Although 
most battles involved small war parties of fewer than 50 people, and there was 
a quest for individual status, the overall view of the group being attacked was 
that of defending their people and preserving the honor of their tribe. Thus, 
the skirmishes, although small, reflected on the group as a whole, and victory 
benefited them all.
In conclusion, although tribal differences become harder to discern in rock 
art after European contact, historical documents by those living their daily 
life year after year with the Indians and marrying into their families provide 
insight into rock art interpretation different from documents produced by 
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formal ethnographers and visitors, both of which by the 1800s viewed Indians 
as living museums and curiosities. Historical documents written by long-term 
residents come closer to providing an emic view of tribal societies making 
the rock art, and their reports on what was actually happening keep us from 
becoming too confident in assigning an explanation to a rock art panel with-
out considering other alternatives. The diaries and narratives of area residents 
show that most warfare-themed rock art of Montana and Wyoming cannot 
be identified to a particular tribe involved in the activity because (1) there are 
far too many tribes in the area at the time of contact, and (2) most of the rock 
art dealing with warfare is too generic in how it portrays individuals, horses, 
and war-related activities. However, for rock art images with more detail, the 
descriptions and drawings by visitors and ethnographers that noted the par-
ticulars of hair, clothing, and accoutrements of the people they encountered 
are invaluable when attempting to make a tribal identification of these pic-
tographs and petroglyphs. Likewise, records of early traders and trappers can 
offer suggestions for more broad-spectrum explanations for warfare imagery, 
such as that the person leading warriors into battle may not necessarily be 
a man when no gender is shown for the people depicted on the panel. Our 
consideration of whether Contact-period warfare as inferred from rock art is 
a reflection of warfare as portrayed in historical documents shows that these 
sources provide different views of conflict interactions and taken together can 
provide a more complete understanding of life at that time. Thus, we must 
continue to reevaluate our field observations of rock art panels of warfare rela-
tive to eyewitness accounts by people who lived during those times because 
the combined record increases our knowledge about how and why warfare was 
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Until recently, our knowledge of pre-1750 northern 
Plains Indian warriors’ armaments, accoutrements, 
and tactics was limited to the recollections of Sahko-
maupee, the journals of Verendrye, and bits of data 
from fortified Middle Missouri villages and a few 
northern Plains burials (Burpee 1927; Kendell, chap-
ter 13, this volume; Lehmer 1971:107–128; McGinnis 
1990; Owsley et al. 1977; Scheiber 2008; Thompson 
1962; Wood 1976; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993; 
Zimmerman and Whitten 1980). Yet, spanning a 
period of about 300 years, from ad 1450 to 1750, the 
northern Plains rock art record is replete with illus-
trations of warriors, their equipment, and their battles 
(Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this volume), and it is 
from these that we are beginning to understand much 
more about how and why these warriors fought one 
another and with what they were armed.
Northwestern Plains rock art scholars have been 
interested in the shield-bearing and V-neck warrior 
motifs (figure 3.1), as hallmarks of northwestern Plains 
warrior art, for more than 50 years (Conner 1962a, 
1962b, 1984; Conner and Conner 1971; Dewdney 1964; 
Ewers 1975:399; Gebhard 1966; Keyser 1975, 1977a, 1984, 
2004a; Keyser and Klassen 2001:191–221; Loendorf 
1990, 2009; Loendorf and White 2010; Magne and 
Klassen 1991; Mulloy 1958; Ray 2008). Frequently 
shown with weapons, headdresses, heraldic shield 
designs, and other battle accoutrements, these are the 
two most common motifs in the Ceremonial-tradition 
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art that dominated the Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period northwestern 
Plains rock art record (Keyser 2004a:58–66; Keyser and Klassen 2001:190–256). 
Surprisingly, however, as of yet only a few studies (Greer and Greer, chapter 
2, this volume; Greer et al. 2010; Keyser 1979; Keyser et al. 2006; Loendorf 
and Porsche 1985:78–85) have been oriented primarily toward elucidating what 
rock art motifs and compositions are actually trying to tell us about how the 
artists viewed warfare and why they participated in it.
Figure 3.1. Shield-bearing and V-neck warriors from various northern Plains sites. 
Note weaponry, accoutrements, and heraldic shield designs. (a) Hilej; (b) Decker; (c–d, 
k) Writing-on-Stone; (e–h, m–o) Bear Gulch (n and o are composed in a combat scene); 
(i) Castle Gardens; (j) Bighorn County. (See figure 3.2 for site locations.) Scales are 5 cm. 
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Fortunately, recent recording of the Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon rock 
art sites in central Montana has allowed our research team to expand an initial 
interest in this subject, and we find ourselves in the enviable position of having 
sufficient quantity and detail of data about this particular period to provide 
fodder for many such discussions. Although these have just recently begun (e.g., 
Kaiser et al. 2010; Keyser 2004b, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Keyser and 
Kaiser 2010; Keyser et al. 2012) additional research will likely continue for decades. 
Coupled with renewed interest in the indications of warfare evidenced in Plains 
skeletal populations (e.g., Gill and Weathermon 2008; Owsley and Bruwelheide 
2008; Scheiber 2008) and the focus on warfare provided by the chapters in this 
volume, these newly acquired Plains rock art data offer an unparalleled oppor-
tunity to increase our understanding of the genesis and evolution of the Plains 
warfare complex and many of its various components. This would come as wel-
come news to those pioneering anthropologists who laid the groundwork for 
the topic in the years before and just after World War II (Ewers 1975; Grinnell 
1910; Lewis 1942; Mishkin 1940; Newcomb 1950; Secoy 1953; Smith 1938, 1951).
the sItes
Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon (figure 3.2) are the two most extensive 
Plains rock art site complexes yet discovered and recorded, containing, respec-
tively, more than 5,000 and 1,000 distinct elements (Keyser et al. 2012). In 
number of images and complexity both Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon 
are larger than any other single northwestern Plains rock art site and both 
are nearly equal to or larger than rock art site complexes at Writing-on-Stone, 
Verdigris Coulee, and the North Cave Hills, each of which contain from 10 to 
50 individual sites (Keyser 1977b, 1984; Klassen 1995; Sundstrom 2004).1
The primary motif at both sites is the shield-bearing warrior, with 856 
at Bear Gulch and 168 at Atherton Canyon. This total of 1,024 is more 
than three times greater than all other known shield-bearing warriors so 
far recorded on the northwestern Plains (Keyser 2006b).2 Of these 1,024 
images, more than 960 are part of the formally defined Bear Gulch–style 
shield-bearing warrior that represents a recognizable cultural type (Kaiser 
et al. 2010). A handful of armed, rectilinear, or stick-figure humans without 
shields are directly associated with these Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing 
warriors and are included in this research.
In addition to the Bear Gulch–style shield figures and associated humans, 
nearly 30 V-neck humans and five unique shield-bearing warriors belonging to 
an identifiable Blackfoot style (Keyser 2011; Keyser et al. 2012) are also drawn 
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at Bear Gulch. These are frequently armed and often depicted as engaged in 
various war-related activities.
Both sites also contain many freestanding weapons and shields, and when it 
can reasonably be inferred that these war-related items are associated with the 
other Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric imagery at the site, they are included 
Figure 3.2. Northwestern Plains showing locations of sites referred to 
in text. (1) Williams Coulee; (2) Verdigris Coulee; (3) Writing-on-Stone; 
(4) Bear Gulch; (5) Atherton Canyon; (6) Nordstrom-Bowen; (7) Castle 
Butte; (8) Hilej; (9) Recognition Rock; (10), Ellison’s Rock; (11) Bighorn 
County; (12) Decker; (13) North Cave Hills; (14) No Water; (15) Castle 
Gardens; (16) Red Canyon; (17) La Barge Bluffs; (18) South Piney; (19) 
Names Hill; (20) Gateway; (21) Pine Canyon; (22) McKee Spring. 
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in this discussion. The few scenes of horse-and-gun-period combat3 that occur 
at both sites have been described and discussed in considerable detail else-
where (Keyser 2006a; Keyser et al. 2011, 2012) and are included here only as 
comparative material.
All Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors and the few associated 
humans and most V-neck humans at these sites are relatively securely dated 
to the last two centuries of the Late Prehistoric period (ad 1450–1650) and 
the century-long Protohistoric period, which spans ad 1650 to 1750 (Keyser 
et al. 2011, 2012). Dating evidence at these sites includes radiocarbon dates on 
charcoal pictographs and a wooden stake associated with other rock art, radio-
carbon-dated occupation levels at Bear Gulch, and information in the rock 
art subject matter itself, such as the size of shields and the presence of metal 
projectile points illustrated in the absence of horses and guns (Keyser 2010, 
2011; Keyser and Kaiser 2010; Keyser et al. 2011). In addition, detailed superim-
position sequences allow us to relatively date both particular styles and many 
individual images within this 300-year span (Kaiser et al. 2010; Keyser et al. 
2011, 2012). Essentially the evidence from these sites provides an almost ideal 
data set for discussing warfare in the period immediately before the introduc-
tion of the horse and gun into the northwestern Plains.
WarrIor art and Warfare: bear 
gulCh and atherton Canyon
Warriors represented by shield bearers and V-neck humans at Bear Gulch 
and Atherton Canyon provide a rich record for the study of arms and accou-
trements, battle tactics, and the motives for warfare in the Late Prehistoric and 
Protohistoric periods in Central Montana. In order to describe such a wealth 
of information this discussion is divided into two major sections: “Arms and 
Accoutrements” and “Battle Compositions and Tactics.” Then, using the clas-
sic “direct historical approach” (e.g., Deetz 1965; Strong 1935; Wedel 1938, 1961; 
Wood 1967, 1969) components of each of these are compared to the rich Plains 
Indian ethnographic record of the horse-and-gun period to help construct a 
summary of what warfare was like during the 300 years immediately preced-
ing European contact with Plains Indian cultures.
Arms and Accoutrements
Warriors at these sites are well armed with detailed representations of five 
basic weapons, and they wear a variety of headdresses, hairstyles, and face 
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paint. In addition to weaponry and headgear, their shields are decorated with a 
limited suite of heraldic designs and many are further elaborated with feather 
bustles or medicine bundles. Several men wear animal tails attached to their 
moccasins or animal pelts slung over their shoulder. In addition to these 
accoutrements of dress, warriors’ weapons are often elaborately decorated—
much more than can be explained by simple function as killing tools. Each of 
these categories is discussed below.
Offensive Weaponry
Not surprisingly offensive weapons characteristic of our period of inter-
est at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon are those typical of close combat, 
shock-troop warfare. The bow and arrow is the only long-range weapon por-
trayed, and bows are relatively much more common in the earliest subset of 
Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors—solidly-colored, Solid variety war-
riors (figure 3.3a)—most of whom are arranged in ranks of men portrayed as 
marching off to war (Keyser et al. 2012). These bows are long, single-curve 
weapons, and most bowmen are equipped with several arrows. Combined with 
their large, full-body-size shields we can readily assume that these bowmen’s 
role would likely have been analogous to that of medieval archers who rained 
arrows down on enemy troops massed in an opposing phalanx formation.
This sort of battle formation and such tactics are clearly described by 
Sahkomaupee for some of the latest battles in pre-horse/pre-gun times 
(Lewis 1942:47–48; Secoy 1992:34–37). However, the paucity of bowmen in 
Bear Gulch–style compositions, where bows account for only 38 of the nearly 
660 shield-bearing warriors’ weapons (6%), suggests that archers were some-
what specialized soldiers.4 Furthermore, their much greater occurrence in the 
earliest Bear Gulch–style imagery suggests that, contrary to Sahkomaupee’s 
recollections, this weapon was falling out of favor in the latest decades of the 
Late Prehistoric period and the Protohistoric period, at least for the tribal 
Figure 3.3. Bowmen at Bear Gulch (a, b, d–f ) and Atherton Canyon (c, g). (a) is a 
phalanx of 13 similarly armed, solid-variety warriors. Note that parts of warriors at left 
are reconstructed. Scale bars are 5 cm except for a, which is 20 cm. 
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groups responsible for drawing Bear Gulch–style imagery. Interestingly, only 
occasional shield-bearing warriors armed with clubs and lances accompany 
the early groups of archers, but these weapons become much more popular 
for later warriors.
The primary Bear Gulch–style weapons, accounting for more than 90 per-
cent of the armed shield-bearing warriors, are lances, maces, and clubs, in 
that order of popularity. Lances or spears (figure 3.4) are by far the most com-
mon offensive weapon for Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric combatants at 
these two sites, with 441 warriors so armed. An additional 87 lances, all por-
trayed with a characteristic point and often a weapon flag identical to those on 
shield-bearing warriors’ weapons, are drawn as freestanding examples. About 
30 percent of spears have a large triangular or lanceolate point, 34 of which 
(figure 3.4d, e, j, k, o, p, r) are identified as metal blades (Keyser and Kaiser 
2010). Nearly 100 other lances have tips indicated by a simple crosspiece drawn 
perpendicular to the spear shaft or a small “brush-like” attachment at the tip 
composed of three to a dozen forward-pointing lines. Exactly what type of 
killing tip was meant by these latter two depictions is not clear, but some of 
the brush-like tips could have been a multiple-pointed leister type weapon 
(though there are neither archaeological nor ethnographic examples of such 
weapons on the Plains). Some lances are the most detailed, finely drawn 
examples in Plains rock art, complete with carefully drawn points and attach-
ments of exquisitely detailed feather flags and fluffs (figures 3.1h, 3.4j).
Other than guns, which were obviously a Historic-period introduction, 
lances are the most common weapon in both Late Prehistoric– and Historic-
period rock art (Keyser 1977a:40–41, 1984:16; Keyser and Klassen 2001; Keyser 
and Poetschat 2005:26) and also in robe and ledger art from the Historic 
period (Afton et al. 1997; Bates et al. 2003). In Protohistoric-period rock art, 
lances are by far the most common weapons depicted (Keyser 2010:91–92), 
and they are the weapon of choice for more than 40 percent of all armed 
shield-bearing warriors from other Plains sites (Keyser 2006b). The general 
observation that lances were more common than bows and arrows for both 
Late Prehistoric– and Protohistoric-period warriors, as evidenced in rock art 
all across the northwestern Plains, is likewise at variance with the empha-
sis given the bow and arrow in Sahkomaupee’s account, suggesting that his 
experiences were either slightly anomalous compared to a broader regional 
pattern, or that the emphasis was more a factor of Thompson’s reporting than 
the actual situation.
The second-most-common weapon at these sites is the spike mace—a 
club-like halberd-type implement whose shaft is studded near its upper, 
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occasionally slightly bulbous, end with one or two long curved spikes, pre-
sumably elk- or deer-antler tines (figure 3.5). Ninety such weapons are split 
evenly between single- and double-spike varieties, and 84 of these are carried 
by shield- bearing warriors or other associated humans. Often the spike or 
spikes show a marked downward curve, but others project nearly straight out 
from the shaft. Some maces are drawn about the length of the clubs com-
monly carried by other shield-bearing warriors at these sites, but others are 
significantly longer, approaching almost 2 m in length (as estimated relative 
to the anatomical height of the warrior), similar to the size of a lance. Six 
Figure 3.4. Shield-bearing warriors armed with lances: (a–f, i, j, n, p–r) Bear 
Gulch; (g, h, k, m, o) Atherton Canyon. Scale bars are 5 cm. Note bundles worn by 
a, o; bustles by c, e, i, j, k, n, p; and wolf hats by a, c, f, j, m, n, q, r. 
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examples have a tassel or fringed tab pendant from their bottom (figure 3.5e, 
f ), and one has a clearly drawn knob on its lower end (figure 3.1e).
Most maces are brandished by shield-bearing warriors, but one of the most 
carefully drawn examples is embedded in the head of a vanquished enemy 
(figure 3.5g). In one phalanx of 14 warriors (12 of whom carry shields), eight 
men brandish such maces, while the only other armed members of the party 
are two lancers and a third man with a club (figure 3.6b).
Figure 3.5. Spike maces are a common Late Prehistoric- and Protohistoric-period 
weapon: (a–g) Bear Gulch; (h–i) North Cave Hills; (j) Red Canyon. Note tabs or 
tassels on e and f, while g shows a floating weapon counting coup by striking the 
head of a warrior armed with spear and bow. Scale bars are 5 cm except e. 
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Spike maces are occasionally illustrated in other Late Prehistoric– and 
Protohistoric-period rock art, usually wielded by shield-bearing warriors 
(e.g., Francis and Loendorf 2002:149; Fredlund 1993:43; Keyser 1977a:figure 
13b, d, 14a; 1984:figure 3a,c; 2004a:21; 2006b; Keyser and Klassen 2001:196, 
199, 246; Keyser and Poetschat 2008:46, 59; Mulloy 1958:figure 42, numbers 1, 
Figure 3.6. Ranks of warriors grouped and ready for battle are common in 
the Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric-period rock art at Bear Gulch. Note the 
variety of weapons and headdresses. Labels a and b show single phalanxes, while 
c–e show warriors more in a cluster. Note that each phalanx has at least three 
different weapons. Warriors indicated by capital letters (A–E in c and A in e) are 
combination figures consisting of the original warrior and a second warrior drawn 
as a direct conjoined overlay. Scale bars are 10 cm. 
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5, 7). Most are single-spike weapons, but several are clearly two-spike maces 
(figures 3.5a–b, 3.6b). They are not illustrated in ledger drawings or on buf-
falo robes, but they do occur in ethnographic and archaeological collections. 
The best-documented example is a club (figure 3.7c) illustrated by Bodmer 
that has a decorated wooden handle and an elk-antler spike carved in the 
form of a bird’s head (Hunt et al. 1984:334).5 An archaeological specimen, 
a 70-cm-long proximal end of an elk-antler main beam with a sharpened 
bez tine (the second tine above the skull), was found in the vicinity of sev-
eral high-altitude bighorn-sheep traps and was likely a mountain sheep– 
killing club (Frison 2004:161; Kornfeld et al. 2010:309). Prince Maximilian 
also noted elk-antler war clubs used by the Gros Ventre Indians (Hunt et al. 
1984:334) and somewhat similarly shaped war clubs with metal spikes were 
made and used later in the historic period (Taylor 1994:163). Although it is 
possible that some of those illustrated at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon 
had metal spikes, the curvature of most spikes suggests that they were deer- 
or elk-antler tines.
Clubs, carried by 71 shield-bearing warriors and another associated human 
occur as two primary types. Most common are baseball bat–shaped weapons, 
which account for nearly half of the illustrated examples (figure 3.6a, 3.8c–f ). 
These are shown either projecting out at an angle from behind the warrior’s 
shield or held vertically in his hand just outside the shield perimeter. Some are 
quite elaborate, with a knob on the handle (figures 3.6a, 3.8f ), a tassel or feath-
ers at the top, and decorative lines drawn along the weapon’s barrel. Broad, 
blade-like, triangular clubs (figures 3.6a, 3.8a) are also quite common. These 
show a distinct triangular shape, sometimes with a round knob at the bottom 
and lines decorating the club’s blade (figure 3.8a). A few other clubs—primar-
ily the pogamoggan type with a small stone head bound at the end of a flexible 
shaft—are carried by fewer than 10 shield-bearing warriors (figure 3.8b).
War clubs of various sizes and shapes were common among Historic-period 
Plains Indians (Catlin 1973 [1844]:V.1:figures 99, 101; Hunt et al. 1984:334–338; 
Penney 1992:228–229; C. Taylor 2001:14–23; Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:20). 
Those drawn at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon indicate clearly that their 
origins extend back into the Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric periods. The 
clearly illustrated baseball bat–type is much more common among these rock 
art warriors than in later Historic-period paintings or ethnographic collec-
tions, but at least three archaeological specimens (e.g., figure 3.9) found near 
bighorn sheep traps in Wyoming and identified as a mountain sheep–killing 
clubs (Frison 2004:161; Kornfeld et al. 2010:309) are a nearly perfect match for 
several illustrated rock art clubs (cf. Figures 3.6a, 3.8f ).
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Figure 3.7. Shields and clubs from 
the Upper Missouri River region 
drawn by Karl Bodmer (a, c) and 
George Catlin (b). Note: (a) erected 
buffalo bull ’s tail bustle (light gray-
colored rectangular objects around 
margin of shield are flaps of red cloth 
or red-stained hide); (b) feather bustle 
pendant from a shield; and (c) one-
spike mace made of wooden handle 
with an elk-antler tine spike. Images 
redrawn from Bodmer (Hunt et al. 
1984) and Catlin (1973 [1844]). 
The only other notable weapons used by these Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–
period warriors are the bow-spear (figure 3.10a, b) and crook-neck coup-
stick (figure 3.10c-e). Held by two shield bearers and shown four times in 
one detailed Protohistoric-period tally of a warrior’s coups, bow-spears are 
long, elaborately decorated, single-curve weapons with large triangular points 
affixed to one end and a feathered tab or trailer pendant from the other. Four 
examples of a single bow-spear drawn touching three shield-bearing warriors 
78 JAMES D. KEYSER
Figure 3.8. Clubs are also 
a common weapon for Late 
Prehistoric–period warriors 
at Bear Gulch (b–f ) and 
Atherton Canyon (a). Note three 
types of club: triangular (a), 
pogamoggan (b), and baseball 
bat–shaped (c–f ). 
and floating over the heads of two V-neck women in the coup-count tally 
(Keyser 2008b:68; 2011) each have fluffs of feathers and additional streamers 
attached to the bow stave above and below the handgrip. A distinct quillon 
barb at one basal corner of the illustrated lance point demonstrates it was 
a metal blade (Keyser and Kaiser 2010). The bow-spear portrayal is a clas-
sic example of the floating weapon convention in the Biographic art lexicon 
(Keyser 1987a; 2006a; 2008b:69–71).
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Rock art bow-spears are illustrated at only six other Plains sites from 
Writing-on-Stone, Alberta, to the Texas Panhandle (Keyser 2008b).6 The 
floating bow-spears in the Bear Gulch coup-count tally are nearly iden-
tical to three at Writing-on-Stone; and all have been identified as part of 
a Protohistoric-period Blackfoot tribal style (Brownstone 2001a:260–261; 
Keyser 2006a:71; 2008b:71; 2011; Keyser and Cowdrey 2008:21–23). In Historic 
times the bow-spear was thought to have potent supernatural power, and ver-
sions of the weapon served as emblems of leadership in various military societ-
ies of several Plains tribes (Keyser 2008b).
Four “crooked lance” coup sticks (figure 3.10c–e) are associated with Bear 
Gulch–style shield bearers—three carried by warriors and a fourth drawn as 
a floating weapon counting coup on another warrior. All are clearly depicted 
crook-neck staffs, commonly shown in Historic-period northwestern Plains 
robe and ledger art (Afton et al. 1997:219; Berlo 1996:103, 166, 201; Horse 
Capture et al. 1993:105; Maurer 1992:189, 223, 226, 235, 241, 253) and occasionally 
in rock art (Keyser and Cowdrey 2008:28; Keyser and Mitchell 2000:27, 30). 
Contrary to most of those drawn in Historic-period art, none of these four is 
decorated in any fashion.
Defensive Weaponry: The Shield
The only defensive weapon shown in the rock art under consideration at 
these sites is the full-body-size shield, carried by 1,024 shield-bearing warriors 
(figures 3.1, 3.3, 3.4–3.6, 3.8, 3.11a–f ) and drawn as another 146 freestanding 
images. When the size of these round shields can be assessed against the 
height of the warriors carrying them, they measure between 80 and 140 cm 
(30–55 in) in diameter (Keyser 2010). More than 750 of these show heraldic 
designs, including both geometric and representational images. Simple counts 
Figure 3.9. Wooden club from Wyoming found associated with a mountain sheep trap. 
Note shape and knob on handle that resemble clubs used by Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing 
warriors. Photograph courtesy of George Frison. 
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of basic meaningful units (cf. Nagy 1994) show that shield heraldry among 
the group(s) that drew these figures was based primarily on geometric forms 
(Keyser and Kaiser 2014). Sometimes this is simply a division of the shield’s 
circular field, but more often it is a distinctive geometric element drawn to 
span the face of the shield. The cross is the most common such element, com-
prising 30 percent of all geometric designs, and has the most variations.
Representational images comprise only about 17 percent of heraldic designs 
and occur as five basic meaningful units, including various animals or birds, 
eyes, teeth, and the Hand of God motif. Bears are the most common recog-
nizable animal design and occur in two forms—the Bear Coming Out and 
the Standing Bear motifs (figures 3.3d, 3.5d)—both of which are common in 
Historic-period shield heraldry (Keyser 2004b; Keyser and Kaiser 2014). The 
Hand of God motif (figure 3.5f ) shows a human-like arm and hand reaching 
Figure 3.10. Bow-spears and coup sticks, although uncommon, do occur as Late 
Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period weaponry. Note that a is a coup-count tally with four 
examples of the same bow-spear counting coup on enemy warriors and capturing two 
enemy women (at far right). The male warrior between the last shield figure and the two 
women is coup-struck on his upper arm by a large, very detailed arrow or spear with 
outsized fletching. Scale bars are 5 cm except a and e. 
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out from the darker half of the shield into its lighter half to symbolize the 
intervention of a being reaching out from the supernatural realm to influ-
ence the secular world and assist the shield owner in vanquishing his enemies 
(Keyser and Kaiser 2014).7
Figure 3.11. Face paint is a common accoutrement for Bear Gulch (a–c, 
e–f ) and Atherton Canyon (d) shield-bearing warriors. Tear streaks on 
shield-bearing warrior in North Cave Hills (g) is the only type of facial 
marking drawn on shield-bearing warriors elsewhere in Plains rock 
art. All types of face paint at Atherton Canyon and Bear Gulch can be 
duplicated in robe art (h) and ledger art (i–n). Scale bars are 5 cm. 
82 JAMES D. KEYSER
These full-body shields are rarely fringed, but 190 examples have a feather 
bustle extending out horizontally or drooping downward from one lower 
quadrant of the shield (figure 3.1e, g, h). An additional 15 shields have a small 
weasel- to fox-sized animal-skin medicine bundle attached in lieu of a bustle 
(figure 3.4a, o).
Accoutrements of Dress
Five categories of ritual dress characterize Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon 
shield-bearing warriors (table 3.1), but only one of these—headdresses and 
hair styles—is shared with V-neck humans. In addition to head gear, other 
items include—in order of their relative frequency—feather bustles, face paint, 
animal-skin medicine bundles, and animal tails attached to the heels of moc-
casins or to garters worn at the knees.
Headdresses and Hairstyles
More than 635 human figures, including both women and men and V-neck 
humans and shield-bearing warriors, wear headdresses or hairstyles. Multiple 
examples of six distinctive headdresses are recorded and eight different hair-
styles can be distinguished. Headdresses illustrated multiple times include 
feathers in many different configurations, bison-horn war bonnet, wolf hat, 
“sheep horns,” and a tall bishop’s mitre–type hat. Recognizable hairstyles 
include roach, scalplock, bear’s ears, hair extensions, pompadour, long hair, 
mullet, and a sun-ray hairdo that appears to represent “disheveled hair” used 
to indicate women. In fact, some of these, such as the roach or bear’s ears could 
represent either a headdress or a hairstyle, depending on whether the headgear 
was a separate attachment or simply a way of cutting or wearing the hair. Of 
these, the roach, wolf hat, scalplock, and feather headdress of various types are 
worn by more than 50 warriors each.
Most common at these sites is the roach, worn in three different ways by 
nearly 225 warriors (figures 3.4h–i; 3.11a–b); usually as a series of short, similar 
length, evenly spaced, curved lines crowning the top of the warrior’s head and 
often arching down over one side nearly to the neck as if illustrated in side pro-
file. Other roaches consist of either short, straight, evenly spaced rays atop the 
head and arching down around one quadrant, or a “flat top” hairstyle shown as 
a series of relatively evenly spaced, short, straight, vertical lines standing only 
atop the head. This roach motif could represent either a “Mohawk” hairstyle 
where the shaved sides of the head leave only a crest of hair standing from 
the forehead back to the neck, or a roach headdress in the form of a crest 
made of stiff animal hair worn as a cap or hair attachment. Both the hairstyle 
Table 3.1. Accoutrements of Dress and Weapon Decorations.
Accoutrements of Dress Bear Gulch Atherton Canyon
Headdresses/Hairstyles
Hair roach 192 32
Wolf hat 124 24
Feathers 92 12
Scalplock 39 8
Scalplock with tassel 15
Roach & scalplock 5 1
Bear’s ears/Scalplock 2
Bear’s ears 20 2
Disheveled/Sun-ray 4
Bison-horn bonnet 11 1









Face Paint 86 17
Bundles and Pelts
Animal bundle 13 4
Bird bundle 2
Animal pelt 5
Moccasin Tails 14 1
Knee Tails 5 1
Weapon Decorations
Weapon flag 316 58
Weapon fluff 65 6
Weapon tab 23 4
84 JAMES D. KEYSER
and headdress were common in Historic times (Bates et al. 2003:157; Keyser 
2004a:103; Mails 1973:300; Maurer 1992:144).
The roach is occasionally illustrated in Plains rock art; most often worn 
by shield-bearing warriors (Keyser 2006b; Keyser and Klassen 2001:233, 240; 
Keyser and Poetschat 2009:11, 34). At Writing-on-Stone it is worn by two 
shield-bearing horsemen that date—like much Bear Gulch and Atherton 
Canyon imagery—to the early Protohistoric period (Keyser 2010:91).
Nearly 150 warriors at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon wear a distinc-
tive wolf-hat headdress (figures 3.1e-f, 3.4, 3.5), so far positively identified 
only at these two sites (Keyser 2007a). This characteristic headdress shows a 
prominent long, thin nose in combination with two ears and a cluster of lines 
extending behind the head that represents the wolf-skin cape hanging down 
the warrior’s back (Keyser 2007a; Keyser et al. 2012). On 66 examples a short 
crosspiece is painted or scratched near the end of the nose essentially per-
pendicular to its long axis. Although there is a good ethnographic reference 
for the wolf-hat headdress (e.g., Blish and Bad Heart Bull 1967:172, 174, 177; 
Densmore 1918:380–381, Plates 57, 58, 66b; Ewers 1997:198; Keyser 2007a), there 
is no clue as to what this crosspiece might actually represent.
Just more than 100 warriors wear feather headdresses of various sorts (figures 
3.1h, 3.3c, 3.4d-e), ranging from “stand-up” eagle-feather bonnets, much like those 
typically worn by Historic-period Blackfeet warriors (Keyser 2004a:6), to single 
or double feathers worn upright in their hair, to a feather worn horizontally in 
the hair atop the warrior’s head. This wide variety of arrangements corresponds 
to other Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period rock art imagery (Keyser and 
Klassen 2001) and closely mimics the almost limitless ways in which Historic 
Plains warriors wore feathers, either as formal headdresses or simply tied into 
various places in their hair (e.g., Mails 1973; Taylor 1975; Thomas and Ronnefeldt 
1976). Interestingly, the stereotypical Plains feathered war bonnet with feathered 
trailer is not present in the precontact rock art at either site.
A scalplock, shown as a single line extending up and back from the top of the 
warrior’s head and then drooping down toward the ground, is worn by 64 shield-
bearing warriors and 5 other humans at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon (fig-
ures 3.3a, f–g, 3.6b). This almost certainly represents a braid, and one special-
ized variety terminates in a tassel of short lines that represents either unbraided 
hair or feathers or streamers attached at the braid’s end. The scalplock hairstyle 
shows a statistically significant association with the earliest, solidly painted Bear 
Gulch–style shield figures and serves, in part, to identify one particular cluster 
of these figures (Young 2010). Elsewhere on the Plains, fewer than half a dozen 
scalplocks are drawn in Late Prehistoric–period rock art (Keyser and Klassen 
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2001; Keyser 2006b), but they are much more frequent in Historic-period rock 
art and robe and ledger art, where they are one of the most common hairstyles 
(Afton et al. 1997; Bates et al. 2003; Berlo 1996; Conner and Conner 1971:figures 
14, 18; Keyser 1977a:68, 71; 1996:36, 42; 2000; Keyser and Klassen 2001:197, 220, 
240, 248, 252, 259, 266, 275; Keyser and Poetschat 2005:41, 98, 107, 2009:36).
At least seven other kinds of headgear are worn by multiple humans. The 
two most important are the bear’s ears headdress and a distinctive “sun-ray” 
hairstyle composed of short lines coming out all around the head.
The bear’s ears headdress (figures 3.1g, 3.4k), which is represented as a pair 
of short, round or squared ear-like knobs arising singly from each side at the 
top of a warrior’s head, could represent either a pair of real bear’s ears tied 
into the warrior’s hair, or his own hair knotted and tied up on each side of 
the head to mimic this shape. In several Plains tribes, warriors who possessed 
bear power wore either real bear’s ears or this knotted hair style (Ewers 1955b; 
Mails 1973:352–354; Rockwell 1991:101), and this headdress is worn in rock art 
by shield-bearing warriors and a few other humans across the northwestern 
Plains (Francis 2007:219; Keyser 2004a:112; Mulloy 1958:126, 130).
The sun-ray hairstyle (figures 3.10, 3.12d) at Bear Gulch represents dishev-
eled hair used frequently in later Plains Indian art to represent women (Greer 
and Keyser 2008; Horse Capture et al. 1993:85; McCleary 2008b:141–142, 248). 
In every Bear Gulch example it is associated with a human figure identifiable 
as female by the depiction of breasts and hips and/or a vulva.
Several other hairstyles drawn much less frequently at these sites are similar 
to later Historic-period examples. These include very long hair (sometimes 
combined with an upswept forehead pompadour), and hair extensions shown 
either as a hairnet-like attachment or dots painted along the length of a war-
rior’s flowing tresses.
Feather Bustles
Feather bustles are drawn as a central line with multiple short lines branch-
ing from it, representing a cord or leather strip to which multiple feathers 
are attached. Such bustles embellish five freestanding shields and 185 shield-
bearing warriors (figures 3.1, 3.3–3.5). Bustles are drawn either as single-sided 
examples with feathers attached only to the lower side of the main stem, or 
double-sided bustles that have feathers extending from both sides. One par-
ticular single-sided example (figure 3.13c) obviously represents a stiffened, 
erected buffalo bull’s tail with feathers suspended below it, since it has exactly 
the same configuration as the erected tail (e.g., figure 3.8a) seen on early 
Historic-period Mandan shields (Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:212, 217).
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Figure 3.12. The disembodied capture hand is a specialized convention used 
to show the taking of war trophies and war captives in Biographic art. Note 
women in a, b, and d. Scale bars are 5 cm. 
Feather bustles were a common accoutrement among Historic Indian tribes 
from the Southwest to the upper Missouri (Flint and Flint 2005:191; Thomas 
and Ronnefeldt 1976:212, 217) and were often illustrated on decorated robes and 
war shirts (Keyser and Brady 1993:figure 1; Maurer 1992:186; Taylor 1998:63). 
Rock art examples are much less common, occurring at only two other sites 
(Gebhard et al. 1987:figure 20; Keyser and Poetschat 2009:14, 37), but the Castle 
Gardens example (figure 3.1i) also appears to be an erected buffalo-bull’s tail. 
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Figure 3.13. Streamers, probably made from animal tails or other 
parts, are worn by these Bear Gulch shield-bearing warriors at the heels 
of their moccasins (a, b, d) and at their knees (c). Note erect buffalo-bull 
tail bustle on c and Hand of God shield design on b. Scale bars are 5 cm. 
Although sometimes illustrated as hanging from near a man’s waist (Catlin 
1973 [1844]:figures 223, 289; Keyser and Poetschat 2009:14), all Bear Gulch 
and Atherton Canyon examples are attached directly to a shield, as was more 
frequently illustrated (figure 3.8a, b) by Catlin (1973 [1844]:figures 172, 287; 
C. Taylor 2001:10) and Bodmer (Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:217).
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Face Paint
Just more than 100 humans (including 88 shield-bearing warriors) at these 
two sites wear nine repeated face paint or tattoo designs (figure 3.11). All are 
simple geometric line patterns carefully drawn across the head, or sections 
of the head filled in solidly with pigment or scratches. The most common 
show the warrior’s head decorated with a series of deliberately spaced vertical 
lines or bisected by a vertical line, but other warriors wear a cross centered on 
the head (figure 3.11a) or have half their head (either vertical or horizontal) 
solidly colored (figure 3.11 d–f ). All of these patterns are duplicated in both 
ledger and robe art (Berlo 1996; Taylor 1994:191; 1998:13, 48–49, 62; Maurer 
1992:191, 195), but face paint is not commonly illustrated elsewhere in rock art. 
Among other known Plains shield-bearing warriors only 16 have facial lines 
that might be paint or tattoos and only the tear-streak motif (figure 3.11g)—
repeated on seven different warriors—is found multiple times (Keyser 2006b).
Animal-Skin Medicine Bundles
There are 24 personal medicine bundles (figures 3.3d; 3.4a, o; 3.14a, d) 
illustrated at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon, including the skins of 17 
small weasel- to fox-sized animals, five fox or wolf pelts slung over a war-
rior’s shoulder, and two bird bundles, one tied in a warrior’s hair and another 
attached to a spear. Most small-animal-skin bundles are attached to a war-
rior’s shield, but one is suspended from the waist of a rectangular-body 
human and another is freestanding.
Pelts worn by shield-bearing warriors sometimes obscure the warrior’s head, 
and one clearly arches up overhead and extends behind (figure 3.14a). But 
given the well-documented and characteristic lack of Western perspective in 
Plains-warrior art (Ewers 1968:8–13), these were clearly intended to show ani-
mal skins slung over the shoulder as they were worn in Historic times (Keyser 
2007a:65; 2008a:67–68). One bird bundle (figure 3.14d) tied in a shield-bearer’s 
hair is an elongated, cigar shape with short stubby wings and a short line 
extending further back with small “knots” tied in it. This bundle is paired with 
the warrior’s hawk-beak mask and face paint indicated by a solidly scratched 
lower half of his face.
Medicine bundles and animal pelts are only rarely illustrated in other 
rock art (Keyser 2008a:64; Keyser and Klassen 2001:71; 2003; Keyser and 
Poetschat 2008:43, 62), but bird bundles worn in a warrior’s hair and fox or 
wolf pelts are quite common in robe art and ledger art (Barbeau 1960:147, 
figure 99; Bates et al. 2003:290–295, 301; Berlo 1996:93, 103, 114, 166, 208–209, 
215; Brownstone 1993:19; Horse Capture et al. 1993:103; Keyser 2004a:69–71, 
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Figure 3.14. Medicine bundles and animal-skin pelts are worn by more than a dozen 
Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors. Note pelt overhead on a, animal bundle attached 
to shield of d, and bird bundle tied in hair and bird-beak mask on head of d. Both b and 
c are ledger drawings showing wolf pelts worn over a warrior’s shoulder. Scale bars are 5 cm.
117; Keyser and Klassen 2003:13–15; Maurer 1992:194–195; Miles and Lovett 
1994:51–52; Taylor 1998:62–63).
Moccasin Tails
Fifteen shield-bearing warriors wear streamers attached to the heel of 
both moccasins. Extending out to the side or straight down from the heel, 
these range from simple straight lines, to fan-like groups of two or three 
straight lines, to long lines with a knot tied near each end (figure 3.13a, b, d). 
Similar but unelaborated pendant streamers are also illustrated hanging at 
an oblique angle from one or both knees of six other shield-bearing warriors 
(figure 3.13c). Such streamers attached to a warrior’s moccasins or to garter 
belts at his knees are commonly portrayed in robe and ledger art (Afton et al. 
1997:66–67; Berlo 1996:78–79, 85, 98, 149, 153, 155, 169, 175, 183, 197, 221; Stirling 
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1938:27–33; Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:221) and they are shown in rock art 
at Writing-on-Stone and Joliet (Keyser 2004a:100; 2008b:63, 68; Keyser and 
Klassen 2001:22, 230).
Weapon Decorations
Rock art weapons at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon are often elabo-
rately decorated (table 3.1), primarily with feather flags, but also with smaller 
feather or hair “fluffs” and elaborate tabs or tassels.
Feather Flags and Fluffs
Almost 370 lances and a single bow-spear are embellished with a distinc-
tive feather flag in one of four basic patterns: oval, maple leaf, spade, and split 
spade in order of frequency (Fossati et al. 2010). Attached to the forward third 
of a spear’s wooden shaft between the point and handgrip, these flags (figures 
3.1, 3.4, 3.11, 3.13) are often augmented with a small “fluff ” drawn as a more-or-
less matched set of short, upward-pointing, oblique lines placed on each side 
of the spear shaft in a “point down” chevron design. Many fluffs are found just 
below the feather flag, but others occur just behind the spear point. They could 
represent the downy barbs commonly found on the quill at the base of the 
feather’s vane, smaller eagle plumes like those attached at the base or tips of 
eagle feathers that were used in Historic-period headdresses and other ritual 
items, or decorations of stiffened animal hair.
Frequently the flag itself is further decorated with various combinations of 
vertical or horizontal lines and solid colored areas drawn within its outline. A 
limited set of decorative patterns common to all types of flags suggests that 
these symbolically indicated the performance of different sorts of brave deeds 
and/or the attainment of special status or position within a military hierarchy 
(Fossati et al. 2010).
Oval flags are far more common than any other, making up just more than 
70 percent of all recorded examples (Fossati et al. 2010). All flag types decorate 
the weapons of shield-bearing warriors and other humans, and a few also 
elaborate freestanding spears. Elsewhere in Plains rock art similar weapon 
flags are uncommon, though more than half a dozen oval and spade flags are 
drawn at Writing-on-Stone (Keyser 1977a:figure 14b; 1977b:31, 44, 49; Keyser 
and Klassen 2001:199, 229, 247) and single examples are carved at other sites 
in Montana and Wyoming (Fredlund 1991:4; Fossati et al. 2010; Keyser and 
Klassen 2001:246).
Bodmer illustrated somewhat similar feather flags and hair fluffs attached 
to the butt end of Mandan warriors’ spears (Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:172, 
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212, 217), but nothing similar is drawn in robe or ledger art. Feather or hair 
fluffs also adorn each of the four drawings of a single bow-spear in the elabo-
rate Bear Gulch coup-count tally (figure 3.10). Positioned on the bow stave 
both above and below the handgrip, these fluffs are paired with longer stream-
ers in two instances. Similar decorative elements are common on most robe 
and ledger art bow-spears (Keyser 2008b).
Tabs
Roughly triangular tabs or tassels, drawn most commonly as a cluster of 
two to six short lines, but also shown as a clearly triangular attachment, adorn 
the ends of 27 weapons, including maces, clubs, a knife, a lance, and three 
bow-spears (figures 3.5e, f; 3.10a, b). One distinctly triangular tab on the lower 
end of a bow-spear also has a pendant feather. These items represent either 
clusters of feathers, streamer tassels, or quilled or beaded pennants hang-
ing from the bottoms of these weapons. Similar decorative elements (figure 
3.15) are commonly illustrated on various rock art weapons (Keyser 1977a:76; 
2008b:66; 2008c:3–4; 2010:89; Keyser and Cowdrey 2008:28–30; Keyser and 
Klassen 2001:225, 229, 236; McCleary 2008b:265–266; Parsons 1987:260) and 
frequently adorn hatchets (figure 3.16) and bow-spears in robe and ledger 
drawings (Barbeau 1960:148, 170, 171; Brownstone 2001b:80; Greene 2006:83; 
Keyser 2008b:64; Keyser and Cowdrey 2008:29). Beaded tabs are common on 
ethnographic specimens and in Historic photographs where they hang from 
hatchets and pipe stems (C. Taylor 1994:77, 200; 2001:8).
Battle Compositions and Tactics
In several cases Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric warriors at Bear Gulch 
and Atherton Canyon are arranged in compositions that tell us a great deal 
about how pre-horse/pre-gun warfare was conducted and how it was viewed 
by participants. Foremost among these compositions are at least 19 instances 
where groups of 5 to 14 warriors occur in a horizontally oriented row or pha-
lanx of men posed as if marching off to war or standing ready for battle (figures 
3.3, 3.6). Most ranks are exclusively shield-bearing warriors, but four rows also 
include one or more other combatants. Likewise each phalanx contains several 
individuals who appear to have been drawn by the same hand, suggesting that 
most of these compositions are the work of single artists. Individual warriors 
in rank often wear quite elaborate headdresses and other regalia, including 
moccasin tails and bustles, and carry highly detailed weapons and decorated 
shields. A few ranks, identified by superimposition sequences as the earliest 
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examples of the Bear Gulch style, are composed exclusively of warriors with 
solid-colored shields and almost identical arms and accoutrements, but most 
ranks are composed of warriors whose shields have elaborate heraldic designs 
and who carry various weapons. In one rank of 12 shield bearers and two other 
men, nine warriors carry plain shields, two men have decorated shields, and 
one carries a solid shield.
Despite the fact that many of these compositions appear to be drawings by 
single artists, in nine instances obvious ranks of warriors have been modified 
by later artists who superimposed from one to seven of the original figures 
with a second shield-bearing warrior drawn directly over the original image, 
Figure 3.15. Tabs and tassels are commonly drawn in Historic-
period rock art, especially decorating tomahawks. (a, d) Writing-on-
Stone; (b) McKee Spring; (c) Nordstrom-Bowen. 
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using the existing figure as a template (figure 3.17). Such carefully crafted 
superimpositions are termed “direct conjoined overlays” (Kaiser and Keyser 
2008). The most complex of these shows an original rank of nine painted solid 
and decorated variety shield-bearing warriors that was later modified by an 
artist(s) who scratched directly conjoined shield figures on at least seven of 
the original warriors (figure 3.6c). Another complex composition shows a later 
rank of warriors superimposed on an original phalanx and clearly related to 
it by a three-part conjoined overlay (Keyser et al. 2012). In some cases (e.g., 
figure 3.6d, e) it appears that a later artist also added warriors to the original 
composition (sometimes to accompany the direct conjoined overlay). Often 
these are smaller warriors placed on the periphery of the original group.
Thus, the Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon artists obviously intended to 
show groups of men prepared for—or actually marching off to—war; and such 
depictions were drawn during both the Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric 
periods. That these ranks of warriors were a crucially important motif is docu-
mented by the careful effort often expended to reuse them through the means 
of direct conjoined overlays and added warriors.
Notably rare among these shield-bearing warriors, however, are scenes of 
combat showing two or more warriors actually fighting one another. Among 
the more than 1,000 shield-bearing warriors, only 17 pairs of opposing figures 
Figure 3.16. This extremely complex tab decorating the handle of a tomahawk shown 
counting coup is illustrated on a bison robe in the Deutsches Ledermuseum, Offenbach, 
Germany. Photograph by the author. 
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and one pair of warriors fighting a third enemy are engaged in what might 
represent hand-to-hand combat (figure 3.18). This is less than 4 percent of the 
total shield bearers at the site. Furthermore, several of these combat “scenes” 
are drawn in such an extremely sketchy manner (e.g., warriors lacking shield 
heraldry and using the simplest of weapons) that they appear almost as an 
afterthought, unlike the carefully detailed ranks of standing warriors that 
characterize these sites (e.g., figure 3.18d, f, g).
In contrast to the relative paucity of shield-bearing warriors fighting each 
other, however, Bear Gulch V-neck warriors show at least five identifiable 
combat compositions (four of which are quite detailed), involving 10 of the 33 
humans. Thus, more than 30 percent of V-neck figures are illustrated in the 
act of fighting.
Likewise, among all Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors only two 
are shown with floating weapons counting coup on them, and 25 more are 
wounded by an arrow. In contrast, there are more than a dozen examples of 
Figure 3.17. Ranks of shield-bearing warriors often show multiple examples of direct 
conjoined overlays, indicating reuse of the specific imagery. At Bear Gulch (a), two 
warriors (middle) are conjoined on an original group of six (bottom row); top row shows 
rank of warriors as it appears today. At Atherton Canyon (b), two warriors (middle) are 
conjoined on original group of four warriors (bottom row); top row shows rank of warriors 
as it appears today. Note that the light gray lines in b indicate parts of the original figure 
incorporated into the overlaid figure. Scale bars are 10 cm. 
Figure 3.18. Evidence of conflict in Late Prehistoric–period rock art includes occasional 
combat scenes (a–g) and warriors wounded with arrows (e, h–j). (a) Writing-on-Stone; 
(b, d–f, h–j) Bear Gulch; (c, g) Atherton Canyon. Note how sketchy appearance of scenes d, f, 
and g, and the floating bow counting coup on the larger shield-bearing warrior in e. Scale 
bars represent 5 cm except f. 
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this convention involving other types of Protohistoric-period warriors at these 
sites. These include three unique shield-bearing warriors and three V-neck 
humans in a coup-count lineup. In addition, capture hands8 touch three other 
V-neck figures. In all, more than 60 percent of V-neck humans are engaged in 
individual fighting actions, while fewer than 5 percent of shield-bearing war-
riors give any indication of individual combat.
Instead, shield-bearing warriors are illustrated as corporate groups, and 
when the artists wanted to show their destruction they sometimes defaced 
these figures using “rub outs” created by scratching so heavily across the origi-
nal figure that it is all but obliterated. More than two dozen shield-bearing 
warriors and a row of several other Late Prehistoric–period humans are 
rubbed out in this manner. While some rub outs may have been scratched 
by later Historic-period artists not responsible for the original Bear Gulch–
style figures, others almost certainly were done by Bear Gulch–style artists. 
Whether this signified victory over enemies or the loss of one’s own military 
comrades cannot be determined.
Strategy, Tactics, and Motives
Given the weaponry and battle compositions documented in the Late 
Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period rock art imagery at Bear Gulch and Atherton 
Canyon, what does this imagery tell us about strategy and tactics used by these 
warriors and the possible motives that caused them to fight? In fact, we can 
infer some specific details about the use of certain weapons and the function of 
particular examples, and also the warriors’ psychological motivation for warfare.
The Efficacy of Precontact Weaponry
From the types of weapons that dominate Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon 
rock art and those carried by shield-bearing warriors at other northwestern 
Plains sites (see Keyser 2006b), it is clear that precontact warfare was fought 
primarily at close quarters with “brute force” implements. Bows and arrows, 
which strike an enemy from a relatively safe distance, were used by fewer than 
6 percent of the armed Bear Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors; and only an 
additional 25 examples (fewer than 3% of the more than 1,000 individuals) have 
enemy arrows sticking in them. Interestingly, these percentages are about the 
same for shield-bearing warriors at all other published northwestern Plains sites, 
where 8 of 180 (4.4%) of the armed, Late Prehistoric shield-bearers use bows 
and arrows (Keyser 2006b), and only 7 (2%) of all shield bearers are shot with 
arrows. Instead, throughout the northern Plains, armed shield-bearing warriors 
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overwhelmingly favored lances, clubs, and spike maces (table 3.2) for warfare;9 
all weapons that required killing and combat to be at no more than arm’s length.
Furthermore, two of these weapons—clubs and maces—would have been 
truly effective only when used to disarm an opponent and beat him to death 
with multiple blows. Imagine the mayhem caused by wielding the equivalent 
of a baseball bat or an axe handle studded with one or two 10–15 cm (4–6 
in) long antler spikes. But spike maces may have had an even broader func-
tion. Larry Loendorf (2009) has suggested that these weapons could also have 
served to hook an opponent’s shield and pull it away from his body so that 
other warriors would have had a better opportunity for a close-quarters kill. In 
either case, killing like this would have been face to face; up close and personal.
The fact that so many Bear Gulch–style lances are tipped with what appear 
to be some of the earliest metal blades in Plains rock art (Keyser and Kaiser 
2010) is also suggestive of close-quarters combat. Given the hand-to-hand war-
fare suggested by clubs and maces, a lancer armed only with a spear tipped 
with a several-inch-long, very fragile chipped-stone point would have been at 
a distinct disadvantage against a club-wielding opponent who could parry a 
thrust and shatter the killing point with one well-placed blow. Conversely, metal 
points are certainly less fragile and are more likely to have remained intact even 
after multiple thrusts and parries. Hence, they must have been seen as extremely 
more potent and more valuable weapons, and thus were quickly adopted.
Some limited evidence suggests that bow-spears may be an exception 
to the brute force nature of these battles. Carried by one Bear Gulch–style 
shield-bearing warrior and shown in use counting coup in the Blackfoot-style 
Table 3.2. Weaponry for Plains Shield-Bearing Warriors
Weapon Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon Other Northwestern Plains Sites*
Bow/Arrow 38 4% 8 3%
Spear 441 43% 79 26%
Bow-spear 2 < 1% 5 2%
Spike mace 82 8% 29 10%
Club 71 7% 20 7%
Other 9 1% 44 15%
None 385 38% 113 38%
Total warriors† 1,024 100% 300 100%
* Data taken from Keyser (2006b).
†  Columns numbers do not total warriors because a few individuals are armed with multiple 
weapons.
98 JAMES D. KEYSER
coup-count tally, these weapons are decorated very similarly to the most elab-
orate of their Historic-period counterparts (Keyser 2008b), and tipped with 
long lethal metal points. However, of the four bow-spears shown counting 
coup, only one strikes a blow (touching the enemy’s headdress) that could 
possibly have been immediately fatal, and even this may not have caused a 
fatal wound. Others hit the shield of one warrior and the legs of another, and 
a third bow-spear arches above two female captives.
Such non-lethal blows, and the symbolism showing captives under control 
of this powerful weapon, are exactly the same for bow-spears depicted in led-
ger art, where they rarely strike a fatal blow but instead record a counted coup 
or are shown being brandished to exercise their power. This is also consistent 
with ethnographic reports where special “thunder bow” bow-spears were not 
used to kill enemies, but rather to count coup by striking the foe with the 
flat of the lance point and to magically strike at or control enemies from a 
distance (Grinnell 1972:Vol. 2:83–84; Keyser 2008b:62; Powell 2002a:63–68; 
2002b:56–57). In short, it appears that the bow-spear in the coup-count tally 
was portrayed more as a magically imbued weapon used to count coup and 
control enemies than a close-quarters killing tool.
Finally, many warrior artists obviously took great care to elaborate their 
weapon, far beyond any functional necessity. Lances and bow-spears are 
adorned with a feather flag and/or eagle plume or animal-hair fluffs; bow-
spears have a tab or tassel at the proximal end; and clubs and maces sometimes 
have a tab or streamers attached to their handle end, and the barrel is carved 
or painted with lines and geometric elements. The only purposes such things 
could have served were as decoration, personal aggrandizement, or possibly 
the infusion of the weapon with supernatural power. In none of these cases do 
these elements improve the weapon’s function, but they do show a high value 
placed on such elaborations by their owners.
The Psychology of Precontact Warfare
V-neck warriors at Bear Gulch, which are dated within the same Late 
Prehistoric and Protohistoric timespan as the Bear Gulch–style shield- bearing 
warriors (Keyser et al. 2011, 2012), provide even more detailed information 
about how at least one precontact group viewed warfare. Apparently drawn by 
early Blackfeet intruders into this area of central Montana (Keyser 2006a:71; 
2011; Keyser et al. 2012),10 these particular V-neck warriors are in compositions 
that typically show direct hand-to-hand combat and emphasize counting of 
several different coups. Involving the fewer than 30 Blackfoot-style V-neck 
warriors at the site are at least 16 different coup-count episodes, including 
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multiple instances of hand-to-hand combat, braving an opponent’s fusillade 
of fire, touching (but not killing) an enemy, revenge killing, and capturing 
enemy women and children (Greer and Keyser 2008:94–95; Keyser 2006a, 
2011; Keyser et al. 2012). Another shield taken by a capture hand documents 
the capture of war booty in the same part of the site as most of these combat 
scenes, but unfortunately this image cannot be securely associated with nearby 
Protohistoric-period Blackfoot-style petroglyphs, and may instead be a later 
Historic-period coup count.
Likewise, six V-neck war captives, including four women, a prepubescent 
female, and one child, indicate that women and children were “fair game” 
in the Protohistoric period, exactly as they were in Historic-period warfare. 
Possibly more important, however, these figures suggest that even at such an 
early date women and children were a commodity worth capturing, either for 
the slave trade or to bear children that would replace warriors fallen in battle. 
While these practices are well documented in the Historic record (Keyser et al. 
2006) and inferred for Protohistoric times (Lewis 1942:49), this is the first rock 
art demonstration that they commonly existed in precontact warfare.
Finally, one coup-count tally, identified as a Blackfoot artist’s drawing (Keyser 
2006a:71; 2008a:71; 2011), shows several obvious coups, including touching of 
enemies, revenge killing, and capture of women (figure 3.10). Dated to the 
pre-horse/pre-gun Protohistoric period, the image is a striking demonstration 
that the concept of coup counting and advertisement of such honors at sacred 
sites existed in pre-horse Plains warfare.
With this marked emphasis on coup counting by V-neck warriors, we 
can infer that deeds of bravery similar to those central to Historic Plains 
warfare (Grinnell 1910) were also a key element of Late Prehistoric and/or 
Protohistoric-period warfare—at least to the Montana Blackfeet. Similarly, 
other evidence also suggests that war honors were the basis for warfare actions 
undertaken by the artists responsible for drawing Bear Gulch–style imagery. 
In Historic-period Plains cultures, moccasin tails are so strongly associated 
with the performance of specific deeds of bravery (Lowie 1956:217; Mallery 
1972:436; Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:251) that it seems almost certain that 
those illustrated at Bear Gulch are similarly honorific. But not just moccasin 
tails support the assertion that a system of ranked war honors was in place on 
the central Montana plains prior to the horse. Elsewhere, Keyser (Fossati et 
al. 2010:119–121) has argued that the various forms and relative proportions of 
different weapon flags “represent various earned honors such as the accom-
plishment of specific deeds of bravery in warfare or the attainment of ‘officer’ 
positions within a pan-tribal military organization” (Fossati et al. 2010:120). 
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In addition, a strong case has been made that wolf-hat headdresses and ani-
mal pelts worn by several warriors likely represent attainment of the honor-
ific “scout” position, as did similar wolf symbolism in Historic times (Keyser 
2007a:67–68; 2008a:67–68).
In addition to counting coup (as evidenced by the above-described imagery 
and insignia), precontact Plains warfare also apparently had a strong super-
natural component. Several heraldic designs common on Bear Gulch–style 
shields suggest that in addition to their defensive utility, shields also played an 
important psychological role in offensive warfare. Two repeated Bear Gulch 
shield designs show a bear painted so that it appears to be coming out of the 
shield to directly confront the owner’s enemy (Keyser 2004b; Kaiser et al. 2010; 
Keyser and Kaiser 2014). These designs are quite similar to Historic-period 
heraldry used by several tribes for exactly such psychological “shock” value 
(Keyser 2004b). Likewise, designs incorporating eyes and teeth, and another 
with a human arm and hand reaching out from a darkened half of the shield, 
have also been interpreted as representing supernatural power in a way that 
was intended to frighten or confuse an attacking enemy (Keyser and Kaiser 
2014; Schaafsma 2000:113).
Other items, such as medicine bundles and bustles also provide an indica-
tion of the supernatural basis for precontact Plains warfare. In Historic times, 
medicine bundles were derived from visionary imagery in which a spirit helper 
instructed the supplicant to acquire protective amulets. The presence of such 
bundles at both Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon is strong indication that 
one major premise of precontact warfare was that a man was better off with 
supernatural assistance. Likewise, Prince Maximilian noted that many war-
riors wore “an appendage of feathers, intended to represent the [buffalo] bull’s 
tail, hanging down their backs” (Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:202). These 
bustles, along with the erected buffalo-bull tail bustles incorporated as part 
of the shield were widely understood to symbolize a buffalo bull’s aggres-
sive behavior (Maurer 1992:125),11 something that a warrior would be only too 
happy to embody and advertise.
A Transition from Corporate Combat to Individual Honors
Viewing the phalanxes at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon as fighting 
units, a few observations can be made about the structure of combat-ready 
groups in the Late Prehistoric–period culture responsible for drawing Bear 
Gulch–style shield-bearing warriors. Chronologically, the earliest phalanxes 
(and related single warriors) favored the bow and arrow as the weapon of 
choice and a solidly colored, otherwise undecorated, shield for protection. A 
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warrior’s headdress was uniformly a tasseled scalplock or a roach. Another 
phalanx of similar size and age, shows a slight change in preferred weaponry 
to very long spike maces and lances, but the warriors’ shields remain undeco-
rated, shown as plain circles without either pigment or scratches for infilling. 
Headdresses are tasseled scalplocks, roaches, or bison-horn bonnets.
Then, very rapidly over the course of a few generations (150–200 years), pha-
lanxes diversified markedly. In this period, each phalanx is typified by a variety 
of shield designs, several different weapons (often with unique weapon flags 
for decoration), and multiple types of headdresses. Among the warriors com-
posing these groups bows are very rarely the preferred weapon.
What this tentatively suggests for the ethnic group drawing these figures is 
a transition from a fighting unit with a more corporate identity (limited shield 
designs, weapon types, and headdress styles) in which individuals intentionally 
did not stand out, to a fighting unit more obviously composed of individuals, 
where many (if not all) of the participants were readily identifiable. This change, 
combined with the more close-up and personal nature of combat (as indicated 
by shortened spike maces and clubs, and lances with large killing points), implies 
an increased emphasis on personal deeds and individual self- aggrandizement. 
What we appear to be seeing in this transition is the beginning of the Historic-
period focus on the accomplishment of individual war honors.
ChangIng Warfare Patterns on 
the northWestern PlaIns
So what do Plains rock art warfare compositions indicate about the origin 
and evolution of the Plains warfare complex? To address this, one must first 
summarize the model of Plains warfare as reconstructed from ethnohistoric, 
ethnographic, and historic sources and then compare and contrast that to 
the first-person rock art record of Plains warfare to evaluate how closely the 
two correspond.
Fortunately, we have one good ethnohistoric account that provides a rea-
sonable sketch of Protohistoric-period warfare (and even a glimpse of precon-
tact warfare actions), at least through the eyes of one man, Sahkomaupee, an 
aged Cree living with the Blackfeet in 1787 (Lewis 1942:46–52; Secoy 1992:34–
37). Several other early accounts provide additional sketchy data about war-
fare immediately after the earliest contacts with Euroamericans (e.g., Lewis 
1942:45, 50, 54–55; Loendorf and Porsche 1985:80–85). Then the later Historic-
period warfare complex is so widely described and well known (e.g., Grinnell 
1910; McGinnis 1990; Mishkin 1940; Smith 1938) that it became a cultural icon 
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by the turn of the twentieth century with “Wild West” shows, “dime novels,” 
and paintings by Russell and Remington, and it has been celebrated ever since 
in books, art, movies, and television.
The only detailed account of how northwestern Plains war was fought 
before the widespread use of horses and guns is the one Sahkomaupee pro-
vided when he told David Thompson in 1787 about how and why warfare was 
conducted during his young adulthood (Lewis 1942; Secoy 1992; Thompson 
1962). Summarizing Sahkomaupee’s lengthy account, Secoy described pre-
horse/pre-gun warfare as:
taking two forms. Both put a premium on numerical strength. The first one, 
usually preferred, was for a large war party [sometimes as large as several hun-
dred warriors] to locate a small, isolated enemy camp . . . and make a surprise 
attack at dawn, slaughtering the inhabitants. The second was used when the 
enemy was too vigilant to allow a successful surprise attack [because their 
scouts were out patrolling], or when both sides were nearly equal in num-
bers. . . . Under these conditions the battle was drawn between two opposing 
lines of infantry, armed with bows, spears, clubs, and very large leather shields, 
the men separated by about three-foot intervals [but not all warriors had 
shields and sometimes two men sheltered behind a single shield]. The battle 
began when the lines had advanced to a point within archery range of each 
other, at which time the warriors, protecting themselves with their shields, sat 
on the ground and subjected the opposing line to archery fire for a varying 
period. The next stage of the battle arrived when one side decided to substitute 
shock for fire. A chief would then lead the . . . charge. . . . The ensuing hand-to-
hand struggle would usually be brief and bloody, and the issue quickly decided. 
The defeated side would either flee in a complete rout and be hotly pursued 
by the enemy warriors until the latter halted to struggle among themselves for 
loot, trophies, and scalps, or, if the defeat were not so severe they [the defeated 
party] would retreat in a fair state of organization, maintaining the line forma-
tion and carrying off their dead and wounded. (Secoy 1992:34, summarizing 
Sahkomaupee’s account in Tyrell 1916)
Hidatsa oral history shows the corporate nature of such warfare. Describing 
a battle that took place about ad 1740, when there were a few horses but no 
guns, Bear’s Arm told of separate ranks of shield bearers and bowmen working 
together to assault an enemy group taking refuge atop a butte:
The men with shields were told to go ahead and all the others would follow 
closely behind them in a compact group. Each man, using his bow and arrows, 
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was supported by a shield carrier who walked in front to deflect the [enemy] 
arrows with his shield, thus protecting the man in back of him. (Bowers 1965:351, 
as summarized by Loendorf and Porsche 1985:81)
As author of one of the most specific discussions of Plains warfare history, 
Lewis has combined Sahkomaupee’s account with other historic sources to 
provide a slightly more in-depth model. Lewis argues that pre-horse-period 
warfare was largely a corporate action involving hierarchically organized mili-
tary forces fighting to expand and/or defend hunting territory and capture 
women, whose importance was “to strengthen the tribe, both by their own 
numbers and as child bearers” (Lewis 1942:49). Various bits of ethnohistoric 
evidence from several sources further suggest that truly effective fighting dur-
ing pre-horse times was at close quarters with shock troopers’ weapons, and 
effort was focused primarily on amassing superior forces to overrun and anni-
hilate small, band-level enemy villages (Lewis 1942:52; McGinnis 1990:4, 6; 
Secoy 1992:34). Otherwise, battles between relatively equally matched groups 
were apparently hours-long “standoff-type” conflicts where few were wounded 
and warriors were rarely killed. Nevertheless, in this system, coups were, in fact, 
counted, women were captured, and multiple casualties occasionally occurred. 
However, usually this happened only when the victorious force was able to 
rout the other, due either to their numerical superiority, or—as these new, 
game-changing “weapons” arrived in the region—the presence of the horse or 
gun (Lewis 1942:47–48; Secoy 1992:36–37).
Following the initial introduction of horses, when a few became available 
to warriors, these animals afforded equestrian groups a distinct advantage. 
Combined with leather armor and military tactics diffused from the Spanish 
Southwest, horses were first heavily armored and typically used somewhat like 
“tanks” to crash through enemy defenses and rout opposing pedestrian forces 
(Secoy 1992:36–37). Sahkomaupee reported that “the Snake Indians . . . had 
Misstutim (Big Dogs, that is Horses) on which they rode, swift as the Deer, 
on which they dashed at the [Piegans], and with their stone Pukamoggan 
knocked them on the head, and they [the Piegans] had thus lost several of 
their best men” (Secoy 1992:36).
In a few years, however, the arrival of guns obviated the horse’s advantage 
as a tank, but the rapidly expanding horse herds increased the animals’ value 
for nearly every aspect of everyday life, from baggage hauling to hunting and 
warfare, and the increased supply of horses changed warfare into a series of 
quick-hitting surprise attacks and horse raids that relied primarily on stealth 
and light cavalry tactics. This sort of warfare was undertaken not by a large 
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force led by a war chief and his various officers, whose intent was to smash an 
enemy village or opposing military force, but instead by a highly motivated 
individual who handpicked a small cadre of accomplished warriors and kins-
men to accompany him in his personal quest to steal horses and acquire war 
honors; for it was these horses and coups that embodied a man’s wealth and 
gave him status (Lewis 1942:53–59; McGinnis 1990). This horse-and-gun war-
fare has been described in intimate historical detail (McGinnis 1990; Mishkin 
1940; Smith 1938), often including first-person recollections of famous war-
riors who fought both in well-documented battles and in hundreds of other, 
nearly anonymous, horse raids (Ewers 1985:171–215; Linderman 1962; Miles 
and Lovett 1994, 1995).
So, how does the rock art record correspond to this ethnohistoric/ethno-
graphic reconstruction? The topic has been previously addressed, albeit with 
a much more limited data set that included only the then newly recorded 
imagery from Writing-on-Stone and Verdigris Coulee (Keyser 1979). Keyser 
(1979:44–48) originally suggested that Plains rock art compositions illustrated 
a notable change in both strategy and tactics from Prehistoric- to Historic-
period Plains Indian warfare. He contrasted the paucity of individual combat 
scenes in Late Prehistoric–period rock art to the commonly depicted scenes 
of individual actions that characterize Historic-period rock art, and suggested 
that the rock art showed that prehistoric warfare was primarily a large group 
activity conducted by shock troops whose motives were essentially economic 
(the acquisition and protection of hunting territory), while Historic Plains 
warfare focused instead on the individual and his actions—termed coups—
which were done primarily for purposes of self-aggrandizement and subse-
quently recorded as rock art to validate a warrior’s status.12 As part of his 
argument Keyser (1979:45) asserted that “no example of a Prehistoric period 
combat or battle scene explicitly depicts a warrior counting coup or acquiring 
any war honor,” and in the next paragraph he indicated that the same was true 
in Writing-on-Stone’s few Protohistoric-period scenes.
More than three decades later we have considerably more information, and 
we can modify parts of those conclusions, confirm some, and augment others. 
Initially, recording and study of dozens more rock art sites from Canada to Texas 
(e.g., Conner 1980; Keyser 1984, 2006a, 2010; Keyser and Klassen 2001; Klassen 
1995; Parsons 1987) has identified many more Protohistoric-period images so 
that we now have large samples from all three periods for comparison to one 
another and to the ethnohistoric record. Furthermore, comparison of these and 
other rock art images to Biographic art drawn on robes, war shirts, and in ledger 
books (e.g., Brownstone 1993, 2001a, 2001b; Keyser 1987a, 1996, 2000; Keyser 
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and Brady 1993; Keyser and Klassen 2001, 2003; Petersen 1971) has led to the 
recognition of readily identifiable coup counts in Protohistoric-period rock art 
(Keyser 2006a; 2010:92, 96–98; Keyser and Klassen 2001:224–253; Keyser and 
Poetschat 2005:137–155; 2009:83–84; Klassen 1998:55–57) and also even a few in 
Late Prehistoric–period imagery (Keyser 2006a; Keyser and Poetschat 2009:84). 
Though illustrated in a typically more static, less fluid style than later Historic-
period images, these Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period coup counts (e.g., 
figure 3.19) show a variety of Biographic conventions, including weapon cap-
ture, loser’s posture, the capture hand, floating weapons, capture of women, and 
the fusillade of fire that are among the most common in the Biographic art 
lexicon (Keyser 1987a, 2006a, 2010; Keyser and Poetschat 2005:153; 2009:84). 
These scenes prove unequivocally that coups were counted and documented in 
Figure 3.19. Prehistoric- (e) and Protohistoric-period (a–d) coup counts 
occur occasionally in Plains rock art: (a–d) weapon capture; (e) capture of 
woman. (a) Ellison’s Rock; (b) Red Canyon; (c, d) Verdigris Coulee; (e) No 
Water. Note tear streaks decorating faces in a and b. 
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precontact warfare, even though fighting was primarily conducted with shock 
troops who fought in close-quarters combat with clubs and maces and pro-
tected themselves with oversized buffalo-hide shields and, later, their mounts 
with leather horse armor. This evidence for coup counting corresponds well to 
Sahkomaupee’s description of the aftermath of one such rout:
The War Chief . . . rushed on their line and in an instant the whole of us fol-
lowed him, the greater part of the enemy took to flight. . . . Part of us pursued 
and killed a few, but the chase had soon to be given over, for at the body of every 
Snake Indian killed, there were five or six of us trying to get his scalp, or part of 
his clothing, his weapons, or something as a trophy of the battle. (Secoy 1992:37)
What do rock art warfare compositions indicate about the size of precon-
tact war parties and whether these actually became smaller through time? 
Late Prehistoric–period rock art warfare compositions are usually war parties 
portrayed as ranks of five to more than a dozen warriors (table 3.3). In several 
examples these men are shown fighting as interacting groups of four to seven 
combatants (figure 3.20). Certainly there are instances where two men square 
off one-on-one (e.g., figure 3.18), but these individual combat scenes are pro-
portionately far less common in both Late Prehistoric– and Protohistoric-
period imagery than they are in Historic-period rock art (table 3.4).
But do illustrated rock art forces document the actual sizes of the fighting 
forces in these battles? This seems unlikely since Plains Biographic rock art 
is renowned for its use of synecdoche, where a drawing of a single weapon 
or person or a part of a person or horse can stand for multiple actual persons 
or animals. Thus, a hoofprint may stand for a horse, a human footprint for a 
warrior, a tipi for a village, or a group of stacked freestanding weapons for a 
force of combatants (Fredlund 1990; Keyser 1977a:70; 2000:38, 50–52; 2005:35). 
Likewise, in such a system, a group of horses, weapons, or even humans often 
indicates the relative size of the force in a fight rather than an actual count of 
participants. Essentially, then, a structured group of things often simply indi-
cates the concept of “many.”
However, given the continuity of structure, context, and content demon-
strated for Plains Indian warrior art from the Late Prehistoric, Protohistoric, 
and Historic periods (Keyser 1987a, 1996, 2000; Keyser and Klassen 2001; 
Keyser and Poetschat 2005:137–169; Klassen 1995, 1998; Magne and Klassen 
1991), we can compare the relative size of forces depicted at various times 
as an indicator of relative war party size (table 3.3). Across the northwest-
ern Plains, almost exactly one-third of Late Prehistoric–period warfare 
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Figure 3.20. Shield-bearing warriors are more often shown fighting in larger groups 
with an apparent corporate structure, in contrast to Historic-period combat compositions: 
(a) Writing-on-Stone; (b) Williams Coulee; (c) Gateway. 
Prehistoric–period warriors obviously prepared for battle at Bear Gulch 
and Atherton Canyon include five to 14 men (table 3.3); all equipped more 
or less the same. Several other northwestern Plains sites show similar size 
forces (Keyser 1977a:69; 1979:43; Keyser and Klassen 2001:238–240; Keyser and 
Poetschat 2005:115, 147; Schuster 1987:32). In addition, when actually shown 
fighting, these larger forces are bunched together and appear to be interacting 
as organized opposing groups (figure 3.20). Direct combat between two Late 
Prehistoric–period individuals (figure 3.18; see also Keyser 1977a:68, figure 13a) 
is shown far less frequently than in Historic-period rock art.
As depicted in rock art, Protohistoric-period warfare is very similar to that 
from the Late Prehistoric period (table 3.3). Across the northwestern Plains 
about one-third of Protohistoric-period warfare scenes involve five or more 
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men, and at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon these are often ranks of war-
riors drawn as if awaiting combat. Protohistoric-period combat at other sites 
includes smaller fights involving only two or three men (Keyser 1977a:69, 
1984:49; Keyser and Poetschat 2005:126–127) and larger ones showing groups 
with as many as three or four combatants on each side (figure 3.21). In the 
post-horse Protohistoric period these fights often include horsemen, and there 
seem to be more examples of hand-to-hand combat between pairs of warriors 
(e.g., Keyser 1977a:64, 68; 2010:89, 92; Keyser and Poetschat 2005:141–151).
Historic-period warfare is markedly different. By far the great majority of 
warriors—70 percent of the 70 warfare scenes—show a single warrior either 
fighting a single enemy, stealing horses, taking a weapon, or counting coup on a 
structure (figure 3.22, table 3.3). Considering the size of specific fighting forces, 
the trend is even more notable, with more than 93 percent of Historic-period 
imagery showing single warriors or war parties of two to four combatants, com-
pared to only 77 percent of Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period forces with 
that few people (table 3.4). Thus, while the two biggest battle scenes—one 
involving more than 100 people at DgOv–81 at Writing-on-Stone (Keyser 
1977a:70; 2004a:84–85) and the other showing 26 combatants at La Barge Bluffs 
(Keyser and Poetschat 2005:36)—are far larger than any other rock art compo-
sitions, they are a distinct anomaly in all Plains rock art combat images.13 But 
synecdoche rules even these large scenes, since the fight reportedly portrayed by 
DgOv-81 actually involved hundreds of warriors and resulted in more than 300 
reported casualties (Dempsey 2007:29; Keyser and Klassen 2001:254–256).
Therefore, acknowledging the significantly synecdochical character of Plains 
warrior art we can understand that many if not most of these warfare images 
represent more warriors than are portrayed. But the fact that there is such a 
greater proportion of Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period scenes composed 
of relatively large groups of warriors (table 3.4) indicates that war parties in 
Prehistoric times were, in fact, actually significantly larger than those common 
in Historic times, at least as portrayed in rock art. This fits well with what we 
know from Sahkomaupee’s report and the many other sources for late Historic-
period warfare. This is also consistent with the existence of bastioned fortifica-
tions designed to withstand massed attacks that dominate the Late Prehistoric/
Protohistoric–period Missouri River villages (Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume).
The earliest northwestern Plains rock art horses, usually drawn as boat-
form animals (Dewdney 1964; Keyser 1977a:34; Keyser and Poetschat 2009; 
Keyser and Klassen 2001:19; Keyser et al. 2005), also tell us quite a bit about 
Protohistoric-period warfare and enable us to evaluate how well it corresponds 
to the ethnohistoric model. Found in very limited numbers throughout the 
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region (Greer et al. 2010; Keyser 1977a; 1984:49; Keyser et al. 2005), these early 
rock art horses frequently wear protective leather armor and are often shown 
in combat with pedestrian shield-bearing warriors (Greer et al. 2010; Keyser 
1977a:69; 1984:49; Keyser and Poetschat 2005:126–127; Keyser et al. 2005). These 
animals are illustrated, however, not racing into or out of combat—with rider 
leaning forward, quirting his mount, and reaching out to strike an enemy, as 
is typical of Historic-period horse-warfare scenes (figure 3.22h)—but instead 
typically as one to three animals with their riders often carrying shields (or 
sometimes wearing their own body armor), and somewhat ponderously engag-
ing pedestrian opponents. The visual effect of these compositions is to show the 
horse as a sort of armored tank whose superiority in such shock-troop warfare 
is evident in several compositions by the ineffectual spears or arrows attacking 
but not killing the animal (occasionally arrows are stuck in the armor), the 
relatively exaggerated size of the horses themselves, or the clearly illustrated 
Table 3.4. Relative Size of Individual Forces in Rock Art Warfare Scenes*
Period
Late Prehistoric Period Protohistoric Period Historic Period
Warriors 1 2–4 5–10 11+ 1 2–4 5–10 11+ 1 2–4 5–10 11+
Writing-
on-Stone
4 5 5 2 1 39 8 2 2
Verdigris 2 3 3 8 1
No Water 2 7 1
North 
Cave Hills










Bear Gulch 35 17 12 3 1 9 4 1 1
Atherton 
Canyon
4 6 4 2 1 3 1
Total 51 33 23 3 10 23 7 1 87 24 6 3
Percentage 47% 30% 21% 3% 24% 56% 17% 2% 73% 20% 5% 3%
*  N in table heading = number of warriors per combat force; N in table columns = number of 
opposing forces illustrated. Each opposing force entered separately.
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Figure 3.21. Protohistoric-period combat includes both corporate group type 
compositions (a, d, e) and individual fights (b, c): (a) Verdigris Coulee; (b) 
Writing-on-Stone; (c, d) South Piney; (e) North Cave Hills. Note armored horses 
in a and e, and boat-form horses in a, c, and d. 
loser’s posture of several pedestrian opponents (Greer et al. 2010). In fact, in 
the nine known Protohistoric-period equestrian combat scenes only three 
show the pedestrian warrior(s) as winning or even holding their own, and two 
of these also feature the armor or rider’s shield warding off an otherwise fatal 
wound (Greer et al. 2010; McCleary 2008b:266). Likewise, there is no example 
that clearly shows a man having dismounted from one of these early horses 
WARRIORS AND WEAPONS 113
to forfeit his advantage specifically to increase the daring associated with the 
coup count, yet such images are quite common in Historic-period Biographic 
art (figure 3.23; see also Afton et al. 1997:124–125, 142–143, 188–189, 278–279; 
Keyser 1987a:68; 2004a:97).14 In summary, Protohistoric-period warfare rock 
Figure 3.22. Historic-period combat primarily focuses on individual’s actions, 
especially (a–c) stealing horses, (f–k, n–r) counting coup, and (d, e, m, n) capturing 
weapons. a–c, e, f, h, i, q, Writing-on-Stone; d, g, r, Verdigris Coulee; j, Castle Butte; 
k, La Barge Bluffs; m, Pine Canyon; n, No Water; o, Recognition Rock; p, Names Hill. 
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art adds significantly to our understanding of northwestern Plains warfare in 
the transitional period from pedestrian to fully equestrian conflict.
Finally, Historic-period rock art is replete with images showing individu-
als fighting, stealing horses, capturing war booty, and counting coup (Keyser 
1977a:68, 73, 1987a, 2007b; Keyser and Poetschat 2005, 2009). Although the 
largest known rock art battle compositions occur in Historic-period imagery 
(Keyser 1977a:70; 2004a:84–85; Keyser and Klassen 2001:254–255; Keyser and 
Poetschat 2005:36, 90), the art is overwhelmingly dominated by illustrations 
of individual actions oriented toward earning war honors, with more than 93 
percent of warfare scenes involving four or fewer combatants (table 3.4). This 
rock art correlates almost exactly with the warfare strategy and tactics so well 
documented in historic and ethnographic records.
ConClusIons
Comparisons among Late Prehistoric–, Protohistoric-, and Historic-period 
rock art warfare illustrations show that these correspond quite closely to the 
Figure 3.23. This Historic-period combat scene at Castle Butte shows that the winning 
warrior at right has dismounted (note quirt and footsteps leading to fight) to forfeit the 
advantage provided by his horse. 
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changing pattern of northern Plains warfare posited from the ethnohistoric 
and ethnographic record (Lewis 1942:46–59; McGinnis 1990:1–48; Secoy 
1992:33–77). But rock art images also add significant information not avail-
able from ethnohistory. Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon provide the richest 
record yet available for arms, accoutrements, and battle tactics from precontact 
times, and even highlight major psychological motives for how and why war 
was fought on the northern Plains of central Montana during the pre-horse/
pre-gun Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric periods. With these incredibly 
detailed images as a basis, we finally have a first-person account of how and 
why war was fought during that time.
Data from Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon, when combined with evi-
dence from other sites across the region, provide both strong support and 
some corrections and elaborations for Sahkomaupee’s account. In terms of 
weaponry, Sahkomaupee’s and Bear’s Arm’s experiences reflect more bow-
men—at least in Protohistoric-period conflict—than we see in rock art, and 
thus more archery action than is apparent from the data for all Plains shield-
bearing warriors. This may reflect a real difference, or it may simply be due to 
rock art artists’ desire to portray themselves with the weapons that put them 
in close contact with the enemy. It must be noted, however, that of the four 
known battle scenes in Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period rock art (fig-
ures 3.20b, 3.21e), only two show a single bowman each (Keyser and Klassen 
2001:229, 240, 247). Correspondingly, we have no battle formations that show 
different ranks of shield carriers and bowmen without shields bringing up 
the rear, as was reported by Bear’s Arm. The only indication we have of sig-
nificant bow-and-arrow warfare is the one shield bearer in the Protohistoric-
period coup-count tally who is facing 22 arrows. Whether this is an enemy 
killed by overwhelming firepower or the artist/author of this tally braving an 
enemy fusillade of fire, it clearly shows that some battles featured intensive 
bow-and-arrow fire.
Likewise, Sahkomaupee does not specifically mention spike maces even 
though they are quite common in the Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period 
imagery at many northwestern Plains sites, including Bear Gulch, Atherton 
Canyon, Writing-on-Stone, Verdigris Coulee, Pictograph Cave, the North 
Cave Hills, and Red Canyon (Francis and Loendorf 2002:149; Keyser 1977a:68, 
69; 1984:32; 2004a:21; Keyser and Klassen 2001:196, 199, 246; Mulloy 1958:126). 
For this weapon it seems likely that Sahkomaupee simply included them in 
his reported “clubs.”
Sahkomaupee’s account also mentions scouts, taking scalps, capturing war 
trophies, and the fact that forces lined up in ranks often with some warriors 
116 JAMES D. KEYSER
who fought without shields. If we consider the taking of scalps and war tro-
phies in precontact warfare as equivalent to how these same acts were treated 
as coups in Historic times, it suggests that other coups were almost certainly 
also counted by Prehistoric/Protohistoric–period combatants. Hence, exam-
ples of all of Sahkomaupee’s observations can be found in the rock art data.
But what of taking women and children as captives? Although Sahkomaupee 
was apparently silent on this subject, Secoy (1992:38) notes that at least as early 
as Protohistoric times, war captives quickly became a valuable trade com-
modity in the effort to obtain Euroamerican trade goods, and he cites several 
examples of large-scale capture of women and children on the eastern margins 
of the Plains in the 1600s (Secoy 1992:41). The occurrence of several capture 
scenes at Bear Gulch, coupled with the fact that by the late 1700s north-
western Plains tribes were regularly capturing women and children to replace 
fallen warriors and to augment groups hard hit by early smallpox epidemics 
(Ewers 1997:194; Keyser et al. 2006:65), strongly suggests that war captives 
must also have been important in precontact warfare.
Rock art data also provide significant information about the spiritual 
aspects of warfare that was not reported by Sahkomaupee. By reference to 
Historic Plains Indian cultural practices, we can make some particularly 
detailed conclusions about Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric-period warfare. For 
instance, shield heraldry includes both anthropomorphic and zoomorphic 
symbolism and compositional structures like those prevalent on Historic-
period shields. By using analogy, we discover that these indicate that warriors 
routinely obtained strong supernatural power to assist them in their warfare 
actions. Furthermore, the structure of several heraldic designs suggests that in 
part they were emblazoned on their shields specifically for the shock value of 
frightening enemies. Finally, supernatural power was also embodied in medi-
cine bundles, various headdresses, and even feather bustles that symbolized 
aggressive behavior as a warrior’s desired quality. These are all directly analo-
gous to similar items used in Historic times.
Thus, the rock art record confirms and expands Sahkomaupee’s observations 
of many aspects of Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric-period warfare. Finally, if one 
carefully considers rock art warfare compositions and their structure in light of 
the synecdoche characteristic of Plains Indian warrior art, it is clear that the rock 
art data do, indeed, indicate larger military forces in Late Prehistoric times, fol-
lowed by a transition to smaller war parties in the Historic period.
So what light does this shed on the likely motivations for warriors in various 
periods of Plains warfare? Historic-period Biographic art images are primar-
ily concerned with recording an individual’s actual personal honors—achieved 
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in horse raids and combat defending one’s own herds from enemies. One-on-
one fights where the protagonist touches or kills his enemy or takes his weapon 
or another war trophy are more than half again as common in Historic-period 
rock art as in the combined Late Prehistoric/Protohistoric-period imagery 
(tables 3.3, 3.4). In contrast, Late Prehistoric and many Protohistoric-period 
warfare-related scenes are better characterized as corporate images, where 
cooperating groups of warriors are shown in a battle-ready state, and when 
they are fighting it is as a more or less organized group. This is exactly the 
difference illustrated between Sahkomaupee’s report of Protohistoric-period 
fighting and the fighting that is so well documented in most Historic-period 
warfare. Of course Sahkomaupee reports that group cohesion broke down on 
both sides during a routed enemy’s disorganized retreat, and ultimately—as 
the Protohistoric-period scenes of V-neck humans at Bear Gulch so strongly 
attest—warriors were out to earn honors by taking scalps and war trophies. 
However, it was not until the horse provided a ready source of a relatively eas-
ily captured commodity, and a mechanism for increasing the fluidity of war 
parties and their effective range of influence, that small-scale, personal actions 
became paramount in Plains warfare illustrations.
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notes
 1. See Keyser et al. (2012) for a discussion of how elements, motifs, and images differ 
and how this affects comparison of tabulated imagery between sites. In this regard, the 
same relative size ranking would be true if we tallied images or motifs for Bear Gulch 
and Atherton Canyon versus other large Plains sites or site complexes. It should also 
be noted that Bear Gulch is spatially smaller—and Atherton Canyon only modestly 
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larger—than DgOv-2, by far the largest individual site in the Writing-on-Stone site 
complex. In summary, by any measure both Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon are as 
large and complex as any other concentration of northwestern Plains rock art.
 2. For imagery to compare to the Bear Gulch/Atherton Canyon shield-bearing 
warriors, I originally used a database of shield-bearing warriors that (as of 2006) 
included all known published shield-bearing warrior images. Throughout the chap-
ter, when making comparative statements, it is this sample of warriors to which I 
am referring. Certainly, there are many other shield bearers known at rock art sites 
across the region that were not yet published when this chapter was written, but these 
could not be considered here because they were unavailable to me. A shield-bearing 
warrior compendium, completed long after this chapter was finalized, has since been 
published (Keyser and Poetschat 2014) and contains data on more than 600 northern 
Plains shield-bearing warriors at sites other than Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon. 
This was the entire sample of this motif—published and unpublished—known at the 
time of publication. Superficial comparison of the results reported here with the data 
in that compendium shows no significant discrepancies between the sample used from 
the 2006 database and that in the compendium.
 3. Throughout this discussion I use Secoy’s (1992) warfare patterns since his is still 
the best summary of how the expanding frontiers of European firearms and horses 
influenced Plains warfare.
 4. Elsewhere on the northern Plains, bows are also rarely depicted as the shield-
bearing warrior’s weapon of choice. Possibly this is due to the difficulty of using a bow 
while burdened with the large shield, but the number of early Bear Gulch–style bow-
men at Bear Gulch indicates that for some engagements it predominated. The number 
of bowmen at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon who do not carry shields is also quite 
small (15 of the 208 humans other than shield bearers). While this percentage is not 
quite double the number of shield bearers who are bowmen, 6 of the 15 other humans 
with bows are shown in hunting scenes. Hence, the number of bowmen who are shown 
as warriors is almost exactly the same among both shield bearers and other humans.
 5. The same drawing of this weapon is erroneously identified as a goad in another 
publication on Bodmer’s art (Thomas and Ronnefeldt 1976:60), but that identification 
was not made with access to the actual artifact in Bodmer’s collection. The form of this 
piece unequivocally indicates that it was a war club.
 6. Since publication of that 2008 article the bow-spear painted at the sixth site in 
Big Coulee, Montana, has been called to my attention (Keyser et al. 2012:123).
 7. “Hand of God” is used here not to imply that Plains Indians had a monotheistic 
view of a single personified God. However, this depiction is undeniably a human arm 
and hand. Elsewhere, Keyser and Kaiser (2014) suggest that the being whose hand and 
arm is represented may be something similar to Long Arm, a popular mythological 
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being who “lives in the sky, where you cannot get at him; but he can hurt you, for his 
arm is so long that it reaches from the heavens to the earth” (Matthews 1877:69). Ver-
sions of Long Arm are found among the Mandan, Hidatsa, Lakota, and Crow, and 
long arms, apparently interceding from the heavens to the world of mortals are drawn 
at several northern Plains rock art sites.
 8. The capture hand is a Plains Biographic art convention used to show several 
things including touching an enemy to count coup and capturing an enemy woman or 
a war trophy (Keyser and Poetschat 2012:40–44).
 9. See note 2.
 10. The V-neck warriors at Bear Gulch and Atherton Canyon have been identified 
as belonging to a Blackfoot style of this image based on extensive analysis of both rock 
art and early painted bison robes and war shirts (Brownstone 2001a; Keyser 2006a, 2011; 
Keyser et al. 2012:233–237, 349–350). Characteristic size and shape (including the occa-
sional V-neck hourglass body shape), features such as heartlines and kidneys, types of 
associated figures, and characteristic accoutrements (such as weapons and ceremonial 
feather fans) are the basis on which such an identification is made. Certainly there are 
other V-neck figures in Plains rock art that are the product of other tribal artists.
 11. Maurer (1992:125) actually notes that the buffalo bull’s urination, which is 
shown on several Crow shields, is “an observed detail of natural behavior that is 
associated with mating, aggression, and the marking of territory.” It must be noted, 
however, that the posture of an aggressive buffalo bull also always shows a raised tail 
(Maurer 1992:125–126, 248), and thus, this attribute is equally indicative of the bull’s 
aggressive attitude.
 12. Certainly some of the motive was economic (e.g., the capture of horses), but the 
point made in the 1979 article is worth making again—that is, if the primary motive 
for Historic-period Plains warfare were economic, it would make no sense to rank 
stealing a picketed horse from in front of an enemy’s tipi higher than running off his 
entire herd, nor would touching an enemy be ranked higher than killing him.
 13. It should be noted that this analysis does not consider Biographic tally com-
positions from any period. Such tallies found in both the Protohistoric and Historic 
periods contain from 10 to more than 100 human figures and/or weapons.
 14. Keyser (2010:96) has suggested, based on the relative sizes of the shields, that 
one Writing-on-Stone scene shows such a pedestrian fight between one warrior 
equipped with a large, pedestrian-sized shield and a second unmounted equestrian 
combatant, who carries a smaller shield, but unlike many Historic-period art scenes 
there is no indication (e.g., quirt, footprints leading to the fight, a horse standing by) 
that the motivation of the warrior with the smaller, post-horse-period shield was to 
forfeit his equestrian advantage. Very likely, he simply was engaged in this combat in 
the absence of his horse.
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Coup Counts and 
Corn Caches




Plains Indian records such as rock art, winter counts, 
ledger-book drawings, and hide paintings document 
a wide range of motives, tactics, and outcomes for 
intergroup fighting. Plains Indians made such records 
generally for their own use to supplement oral histo-
ries. These records thus provide an emic view of armed 
conflict on the Great Plains from the last few centu-
ries before European weaponry and horses reached 
the area up until the end of the Indian Wars. These 
native records chronicle different kinds of conflict: 
large-scale attacks on horticultural villages; small-
scale raids for horses, captives, and scalps; sustained 
campaigns to keep enemies (including non-Indians) 
out of hunting territories; defensive actions; and at 
least one captive-rescue operation.
Sometimes these documents reinforce archaeologi-
cal findings; for example, the battle locations known 
as the Larson and Leavenworth archaeological sites 
appear in the Lakota winter counts (Sundstrom 1996). 
Both sites were Arikara earthlodge villages: one 
raided by a Lakota war party and the other attacked 
by a US military force that included a large contin-
gent of Lakota warriors. In other cases, the indigenous 
documents record or detail conflicts not visible in the 
archaeological record, such as skirmishes between 
small war parties or battles fought far from settle-
ments. While the archaeological record highlights 
the larger battles and attacks on villages, the picto-
graphic records and associated oral narratives suggest 
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that sites like Crow Creek are more anomalous than representative of Plains 
Indian lifeways in the precontact era.
eMIC Versus etIC reCords
Euroamerican documents such as newspapers, military reports, and his-
tory books frequently misrepresent armed conflicts. Because of the high 
stakes involved, each side tends to demonize the enemy, minimize its own 
failures, and exaggerate its own successes. The saying “the first casualty of war 
is truth” is often repeated in journalism schools; its more general version is 
that the winners get to write the history books.1 Today, many people won-
der why 23 Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded to US soldiers for 
the Wounded Knee massacre, but at the time many people viewed the event 
as a hard-won victory against a fierce enemy. In an article for the Nebraska 
State Journal about the burial of US soldiers killed at Wounded Knee, reporter 
William Fitch Kelley (1971:206) wrote: “Gallant soldiers, you fought the foe 
most nobly; you wavered not in the hour of danger, when the treacherous 
Indian, without warning, shot you down upon Wounded Knee.” Kelley’s sto-
ries omitted the fact that these noble men had mostly died from their own 
side’s “circular firing squad” at a conflict in which they took the lives of an 
estimated 200 unarmed women, children, and infants. That might still be the 
story in the history books, had not photographs such as that in figure 4.1 and 
the accounts of Lakota survivors collected by Charles and Mary Eastman 
(1945) and James Mooney (1896) eventually come to light.
This is just one example of why it is important to seek out multiple accounts. 
The winners might write history, but they typically do not write the whole, 
unvarnished truth.
kInds of PlaIns IndIan reCords
Warriors created painted hides and ledger-book drawings to publicize indi-
vidual deeds or coups. These Contact-era works have been a key to interpreting 
late-period Indian rock art throughout the Great Plains (Keyser 1979, 1987b, 
1996, 2000; McCleary 2008b; Rodee 1965; Sundstrom 1990:316–321; 2004:99–
113; Sundstrom and Keyser 1998). Because ledger-book drawings, hide paint-
ings, and Biographic rock art together form a single narrative art tradition, 
interpretations from art in one medium can be applied to another. In the words 
of Father Pierre-Jean DeSmet, “They have . . . still more remarkable modes of 
communicating thought. The large figures displayed on their buffalo robes are 
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hieroglyphics, as easily understood by an intelligent Indian as written words 
are by ourselves; and they often contain the narrative of some important event” 
(Chittendon and Richardson 1905:681). Those creating these records retained 
the same or similar pictographic conventions for showing the protagonist, 
enemy/victim, capture of weapons or horses, and the like as the media shifted 
from painted hides to pencil drawings on paper (Greene 1985) (figure 4.2).
Like the ledger-book drawings and hide paintings (Afton et al. 1997; Berlo 
1996; Greene 1985; Keyser 2000; Mallery 1972; Maurer 1992; Szabo 1994), the 
vast majority of the narrative rock art in the northern Plains depicts battle 
scenes, horse raids, or other warrior activities. The art tradition includes few 
scenes of everyday activities or ceremonies, although some artists created 
such drawings on paper to sell to non-Indians during the early reserva-
tion period (Berlo 1996:18, 35; Ewers et al. 1985:8–10; Maurer 1992; Szabo 
1994:27). Many petroglyphs can be interpreted within the larger narrative 
warrior-art tradition of the northern Plains, including hide paintings and 
ledger-book drawings, which are in turn interpreted based on the recorded 
Figure 4.1. Wounded Knee battlefield: Big Foot’s camp three weeks after the Wounded 
Knee Massacre. (Digital file from original item. Digital ID: ppmsca 15849 Library of 
Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, DC 20540 USA http://www.loc 
.gov/rr/print/.) 
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statements of the people who created them (Keyser 1996, 2000; Mallery 1886, 
1972; McCleary 2008b).
Winter counts are lists of year-names representing the most significant 
events in the life of the individual or band for each of the years included in the 
count (Calloway 1996:31–33; Greene and Thornton 2007; Howard 1960, 1976; 
Mallery 1886, 1972; McCoy 1983; Sundstrom 1997, 2003, 2006). Originally, these 
lists comprised pictographs, but later many were recorded as Lakota, Dakota, 
or English text. The vast majority of winter counts available for study are 
from the Lakota, but a few Yanktonai Dakota, Mandan, Kiowa, and Blackfoot 
winter counts also exist. Each year’s name was something like a headline for 
a specific event, the details of which the winter count keeper had committed 
to memory, and that event in turn evoked everything else important that had 
happened that year (figure 4.3).
Most of the scholarly literature on winter counts treats them as items of 
material culture, rather than sources of historical data (e.g., Maurer 1992). Few 
scholars have brought winter counts and other indigenous documents to bear 
as primary sources on historic research. One exception is George Hyde, who 
used Lakota winter counts in his accounts of Oglala history (Hyde 1957, 1961). 
James Howard’s study of Yankton ethnohistory also treats winter counts as 
historical documents (Howard 1976). Ron McCoy analyzed winter counts as a 
Figure 4.2. Pre-horse-era hide painting from Musée del Homme, Paris, (left) and two 
pages from Running Antelope’s pictographic autobiography (right). 
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source for pre-1800 Lakota history (McCoy 1983). Other studies using winter 
counts have focused not on history per se, but on epidemics, migrations, and 
astronomy (Chamberlain 1984; Henning 1982; Sundstrom 1997).
The neglect of these sources has several explanations. The first is either 
a lack of awareness that they exist or a lack of understanding of how to 
interpret them. As mnemonics for more detailed oral narratives, the pictures 
themselves provide limited information. With winter counts, the picture 
refers to an event, which in turn refers to all the important events of that 
year; thus, the picture itself is only a tag for the historical events linked to it. 
Drawings on hide or paper provide a more complete narrative of a war event 
or deed, but the researcher must learn how to interpret the narrative from the 
pictures (e.g., Greene 1985).
Figure 4.3. The Thin Elk-Steamboat Winter Count, Buechel Lakota Museum, St. 
Francis Mission, St. Francis, South Dakota. Drawing by author. 
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A second problem is distrust of the accuracy of the indigenous accounts. 
This springs from Western culture’s privileging of the written word and from 
an ethnocentric view that oral history is necessarily less accurate than writ-
ten history (Lowie 1915). Because our culture does not train us to hear and 
memorize narratives with accuracy, we assume that this skill is either difficult 
to acquire or not present in other cultures. But even literate cultures use rote 
memorization to implant information such as the Koran, Bible verses, addi-
tion and multiplication tables, nursery rhymes, and poems. Clearly, people 
can learn to recite long narratives with near-perfect accuracy. A related, third 
problem is researchers’ assumption that such records are too biased to be of 
value. While it is true that the system of recording and publicizing war deeds 
so central to Plains Indian life was likely to omit or minimize unsuccessful 
expeditions, it also demanded detail and accuracy in the records and their 
interpretation. A warrior who falsely claimed credit for a coup faced ridicule 
and punishment. The omission of defeats is less a problem in the winter counts, 
in which unsuccessful military actions are as likely to be recorded as success-
ful ones. A fourth impediment to use of indigenous documents is simply one 
of cultural chauvinism, whereby researchers privilege the familiar forms of 
European documents over the less familiar and more esoteric non-European 
forms or lump together all forms of oral tradition as mythological (DeMallie 
and Parks 2001:1062; Goldenweiser 1915; Wolf 1997).
While indigenous records have limitations, pictographic narratives from the 
contact and late precontact era on the Great Plains, properly interpreted, can fill 
in the blanks left by archaeological data and can help to correct the biases inher-
ent in the history that archaeological studies produce for this time and place.
WeaPonry and taCtICs
Scenes of conflict are rare in early Plains Indian rock art. Although rock art 
is notoriously difficult to date, best current data indicate that so-called warrior 
art is limited to the last 1,500 or so years before European contact. The earli-
est conflict-related Plains rock art consists of pictures of shields and shield-
bearing warriors. The weapons complex here consists of large body-shields 
and bows, spears, antler-tine pikes, and clubs (Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this 
volume; Keyser, chapter 3, this volume). Most of this early warrior art focuses 
on showing the details of shields, weapons, and other accoutrements, includ-
ing items indicating membership in warrior societies, such as the bow-spear. 
Early warrior art that shows action often depicts the shield-bearing warrior 
spearing or counting coup on a hapless individual lacking shield or weapons. 
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The observation that women as well as men are depicted as such unarmed 
victims suggests that, as in later times, warriors could gain status by slaying 
any enemy, not just men or other warriors (Keyser et al. 2006). Some women 
did go to war in later times (Ewers 1994; Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this 
volume; Keyser et al. 2006), but the extent to which this happened before the 
contact era is unknown. It is frequently impossible to tell the sex of warriors 
in the early warrior art, because the warrior’s body is concealed behind the 
large shield; those that do show sex are male. An exception is a rock art panel 
depicting a woman—or a person in a dress, at least—engaged in combat with 
a warrior on horseback (McCleary 2008b:266, figure 78).
Some early warrior art includes depictions of severed heads or scalps, indi-
cating that scalp-taking was practiced at this time; however, whether the prac-
tice had a religious function as in later times cannot be construed from either 
the rock art or other archaeological remains (figure 4.4). The first definite ref-
erence to scalp-taking in the winter counts is for the year 1749, although one 
can speculate that reports of small, wide-ranging war parties first mentioned 
in 1711 also refer to scalp-taking expeditions.
The early days of equestrian warfare are poorly recorded in the winter 
counts. This is because most winter counts available for study today do not 
extend back before the early 1800s: too late to record initial encounters with 
horses, which must have taken place before 1700. A few winter counts are 
older (McCoy 1983), but it appears that the extent of any given winter count 
was limited, as the earliest years were forgotten or generalized and dropped off 
the winter counts over time. For example, the winter count of Battiste Good 
generalizes early history into one pictograph for every 70-year period (Mallery 
1972:287–328). This series of legendary events records early encounters with 
horses for the periods ad 1141–1210 and 1421–1490, both of which are obvi-
ously not historically accurate. The same winter count refers to using horses for 
bison hunting sometime between 1631 and 1700, which is reasonable for the 
northern Great Plains. At 1700, the Battiste Good winter count begins a year-
by-year record of Lakota history, with horses referred to routinely throughout 
the subsequent record. We do not know when northern Plains warriors began 
to employ horses in battle, but the Battiste Good winter count records eques-
trian warfare for 1714 and 1715, and horse raids for 1708, 1709, 1717, and 1718.
Turning instead to rock art, the earliest pictures of equestrian warfare in the 
Great Plains show warriors carrying shields atop horses with leather armor (fig-
ure 4.5; also see Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this volume, and Keyser, chapter 
3, this volume). These warriors carry lances and are most often shown attack-
ing unarmed and unmounted enemies. Horse armor had a short tenure on the 
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Plains, probably because it impeded the great advantage of horse warfare, the 
speed and agility of a well-trained mount. After the larger shield and horse 
armor were cast off, the weapons of choice were the bow and arrow and the lance, 
with a much smaller shield, if any. Rock art and ledger art of this later period 
of equestrian warfare typically show mounted warriors overcoming pedestrians, 
including women (figure 4.6). On the northern Great Plains, guns are first men-
tioned in the winter counts later than horses, circa 1800. According to the winter 
counts, the bow and arrow retained its place as the primary combat weapon 
until the mid-1800s and continued in use well after guns were widely available.
Figure 4.4. Rock art and ledger drawing of severed heads or scalps. Upper left and 
upper right, rock art, North Cave Hills, South Dakota; lower left, rock art, southern 
Black Hills, South Dakota; lower right, Amos Bad Heart Bull drawing of Lakota 
Victory Dance, date unknown (pre-1918 book of drawings), showing women with 
scalps attached to coup sticks (Amos Bad Heart Bull Ledger, Plate 39b, No. 85. View the 
complete book at plainsledgerart.org). 
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Figure 4.5. Rock art depicting horse armor. Upper left, Bruner Ranch, eastern Montana; 
upper right, North Cave Hills, South Dakota; lower, Wilson Creek, Kansas. 
t yPe, sCale, and geograPhIC range of arMed ConflICt
Regarding types of conflict, the indigenous sources considered here are 
consistent in indicating that the vast majority of armed conflict during the 
contact era was limited in scale. Because winter counts list only one event per 
year, battles that involved large numbers of combatants, prolonged engage-
ments, or mass casualties should be well represented. Nevertheless, a sample 
of Yanktonai Dakota, Sicanju Lakota, Oglala Lakota, northern Lakota, and 
Peigan Blackfoot winter counts2 mentions small war parties and opportunistic 
attacks twice as often as large battles (Appendix 4.A). This sample included 
26 mentions of large-scale battles, meaning battles involving more than 30 
warriors per side. By comparison, the sample included 29 mentions each of 
small war parties (a few to as many as 30 warriors) and opportunistic attacks 
on hunters, wood gatherers, eagle trappers, women gathering prairie tur-
nips, families camping away from the main group, and the like. Another 43 
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events recorded in the winter counts are individual battle casualties, of which 
most if not all took place in skirmishes between enemy war parties. Only 
22 multiple-casualty events appear in the winter counts. Of these, 12 report 
between two and 12 deaths, and presumably refer to battles between war par-
ties, as opposed to attacks on villages. Events involving more than 30 deaths 
or simply recorded as “many killed” include three attacks on Middle Missouri 
earthlodge villages and one on a Skiri Pawnee village. Two others refer to the 
annihilation of entire bands, but it is not clear whether this took place at a 
village or encampment or in some other circumstance. Four of the 10 high-
casualty (more than 30 killed) events were losses suffered by forces attacking 
encampments or settlements. In these cases, an enemy attack on a camp or 
village was suppressed at high cost to the attacking force. Three others refer 
to fights against non-Indian forces: the Villasur fight, the Grattan fight, and 
the Fetterman fight.
Figure 4.6. Warrior on branded (US Cavalry?) horse counting coup on pedestrian 
warrior, North Cave Hills, South Dakota. Drawing by James D. Keyser. 
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While the scope of warfare was limited and many conflicts unplanned, 
the Lakota winter counts also show that the geographic range of war par-
ties was wide and gradually shifted toward the west over the period covered 
by these records. Conflicts sometimes broke out between widely separated 
groups, such as the Ho-Chunk and Lakota, or the Lakota and Utes (figure 
4.7). Because these groups were not fighting for commonly claimed territory, it 
would appear that such conflicts were the result of chance encounters between 
Figure 4.7. Enemies mentioned in Dakota/Lakota winter counts, 1685–1875; specific 
incidents (black) and timespan (gray). Ho-Chunk, ??; Mand, Mandan; Shosh, Shoshone. 
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war parties. At the same time, the locations of battles recorded in the Lakota 
winter counts indicate a shift toward the west (figure 4.8). This presumably 
reflects the increased power and territory of the Lakota alliance as it expanded 
westward across the Missouri and into the Black Hills, Powder River, and 
Little Missouri country.
MotIVes for Warfare
As noted, scalp-taking was an important motive for small-scale armed 
conflict in the contact era and the late precontact Great Plains. Acquiring 
a scalp to assist the soul of a deceased comrade or relative along the way 
to the afterlife was a regular part of mourning and is best understood in 
this religious context, rather than as trophy-taking (Sundstrom 2015). Such 
events most often occur in the winter counts not as records of the scalp raid 
itself, but as records of the ceremony in which the deceased person’s loved 
ones impelled his comrades to pledge themselves to getting a scalp when the 
season for battle next came around. In the 200 conflict-related events in the 
winter counts, scalping is explicitly mentioned only four times, although the 
Figure 4.8. Geographic locations of battle mentioned in Dakota/Lakota winter counts.  
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pictographic winter counts frequently depict a forehead wound on warriors 
killed in battle.
Horse raids are mentioned only four times in the sample of winter counts 
used in this study. This apparently is a result of underreporting, because horse 
raids are shown frequently in ledger-book drawings and in rock art. Unless a 
new breed of horse, an especially fine warhorse or racehorse, or a very large 
herd was taken, horse-raiding events were likely overshadowed in the winter 
counts by more significant or unusual events. By contrast, records of horse 
raids are common in northern Plains rock art (figure 4.9).
Counting coup was undoubtedly a strong motivator for offensive warfare. 
This is less evident in the winter counts than in the innumerable ledger-
book drawings and rock art panels depicting individual coups. But even in 
the winter counts, which were not created explicitly to record or publicize 
coups, 12 of 200 conflict events recount unusual or especially impressive 
coups. Only a small percentage of coups would have been recorded as year 
names in winter counts, because they record only the most memorable or 
important event of each year.
Winter counts indicate that several attacks on hunting parties, as well as 
many of the large battles, were attempts to take over or defend good buffalo-
hunting grounds. A Blackfoot winter count mentions a large battle with the 
Salish over a bison hunting territory, while another mentions Blackfoot fight-
ing Kutenai who came to hunt bison in the Alberta foothills. The latter may 
have been during a time when the herds were decreasing, but the former event 
in 1811 is not likely to reflect reduction of the herds. The numerous clashes 
between Lakota and Pawnee, and Lakota and Crow, were motivated in large 
part by Lakota attempts to take over bison grounds on the North Platte and 
in the Powder River Basin (McGinnis 1990:109–128). An event recorded in 
Lakota winter counts not included in the sample used here records a fierce 
Figure 4.9. Three horse-raid scenes in rock art from the North Cave Hills, South Dakota: 
(left) remnant of horse with tether rope; (center) horse raider with quirt in back hand; 
(right) capture of a horse carrying a travois. 
COUP COUNTS AND CORN CACHES 133
battle with a group of Metís who had come south to hunt bison in territory 
claimed by the northern Lakota tribes.
Luc Bouchet-Bert (1999) proposed that some warrior art was made to warn 
away enemy intruders. This idea is given credence by ethnographic accounts 
of war parties leaving behind pictographic notices when they killed enemies 
(Grinnell 1926:31–34; Hans 1981:50; Hyde 1968:54; King 1880:84), and by the 
observation that warrior art appears to be relatively uncommon in areas held 
as neutral zones, such as the Black Hills, Pipestone (Minnesota), and the 
Sweetgrass Hills. By depicting well-armed, powerful warriors and scenes of 
victory, warrior art that was placed permanently within the landscape in the 
form of rock art served notice to any trespassers. If correct, this use of rock 
art supports the concept of warriors defending hunting territories. The winter 
counts, as well as other oral histories, clearly demonstrate that warriors moved 
within vast territories, occasionally encountering and often confronting their 
counterparts from tribes living hundreds of miles away. This degree of mobil-
ity very likely created opportunities to exploit new territories and increased 
the conflict between groups as core territories shifted and expanded or con-
tracted. The warrior set could keep their own villages and camps safe and scout 
out promising hunting grounds by engaging in such long-distance expeditions. 
In this way, warriors could effectively defend and expand their territories while 
protecting their villages from direct attack.
Finally, the Lakota and US Cavalry attack on the Arikara village known 
archaeologically as the Leavenworth site (Krause 1972) is recorded in the win-
ter counts primarily as a plunder event. The invading Lakota force raided the 
Arikara corn fields and corn caches, but not much fighting ensued because the 
Arikara abandoned the village when they saw the combined force approaching. 
The year name is “much spoiled corn” or “much dried corn,” in reference to the 
raid on the Arikara fields and cache pits. It seems unlikely that the Lakota 
were induced to join the US force by the possibility of plundering the corn 
stores, but this is mentioned here as a possible secondary motive for attacking 
the horticultural village.
While precontact and early Contact-era rock art depicts both men and 
women as victims of enemy attack, a trend emerges in the later records of 
taking women and children captive rather than killing them (Keyser et al. 
2006). The Yanktonai winter count records that in an attack on the Nuptadi 
Mandan village in 1780 many women and children were taken captive to 
boost the population of the Yanktonai. This presents a striking contrast to 
the Crow Creek and Larson archaeological sites, at which large numbers 
of women and children were among those killed in attacks on earthlodge 
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Figure 4.10. This rock art panel from 
the North Cave Hills, South Dakota, 
shows a warrior touching a woman’s 
genitals, indicating that he is claiming 
her as a wife. 
villages. By the late 1700s, epidemic disease introduced from Europe had 
taken a heavy toll on native populations; thus, enemy women were increas-
ingly seen as more valuable as potential wives and mothers than as sources of 
scalps. Although the attacks on the Larson site and Nuptadi were only nine 
years apart, the attack on Nuptadi corresponded with, or closely followed, a 
very widespread smallpox epidemic that may have both weakened the vil-
lage’s defenses and made its potential captives an attractive target for attack-
ers. In 1838, a Skiri Pawnee war party attacked a Lakota family and carried off 
a young girl to be sacrificed in the Morning Star Ceremony, which they were 
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performing in hopes of abating an especially deadly smallpox epidemic. A 
Lakota war party avenged her death soon thereafter, but brought the deadly 
virus back with them to their own camps.
It is not clear whether warfare on the northern Great Plains was motivated 
by a slave trade. The winter counts mention captive women and children, but 
not slaves for trade. Pictographic records such as rock art and ledger-book 
drawings clearly show capture of enemy women (Keyser, chapter 3, this vol-
ume), but these lack clear evidence of taking captives as chattel, as opposed 
to adopting women and children into the captors’ group (figure 4.10). This 
contrasts with some ethnographic accounts of Plains Indians trading captive 
women to other groups (Greer and Greer, chapter 2, this volume).
ConClusIon
In conclusion, records made by Plains Indians reveal several things about 
warfare. First, they show that motives behind warfare were many and overlap-
ping, but that principal among them were scalp-taking, acquiring war honors, 
and defending or expanding hunting territories. Horse raiding was an activity 
that might be accomplished without fighting; however, many such raids pre-
cipitated defensive or retaliatory action from the enemy. Both acquiring the 
horses themselves and gaining the honor of bravely capturing them belong 
in the list of motivations for warfare. Most hostile encounters were either 
between wandering groups of warriors or between war parties and civilians 
caught off guard while away from their camps or villages. Large-scale attacks 
on villages that led to mass casualties, such as those recorded archaeologi-
cally at the Crow Creek and Larson village sites, were relatively rare and not 
always successful. Finally, tactics and motives changed over time as horses 
and European-manufactured weapons became available and as population 
declines due to waves of imported epidemic disease promoted taking women 
and children as captives to be adopted into the captor society.
aPPendIx 4.a
200 Armed Conflict Events, 1682–1876, from Yanktonai Dakota, Sicangu 
Lakota, Oglala Lakota, Northern Lakota, and Blackfoot Winter Counts
Large Battles
1682 Dakota v Cree
1685 Santee v Omaha
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1704 Entire Yankton tribe went on the warpath
1783 Battle at Big Woods
1787 Battle between Dakota and Arikara
1790 Took 8 Cree tipis in battle
1798 They fought six days in the foothills
1803 Battle at Heart River (Yankton)
1810 All the Yanktonai went on a war expedition to Stone Hill
1811 Large battle between Salish and Peigan over bison grounds; killed 
7 Peigan and 5 Salish
1811 Blackfoot fought the Cree
1814 Peigan were in a great battle
1816 Peigan attacked Pend d’Oreilles who were moving camp
1818 Yantonai battle with the Winnebago
1823 They attacked with the whites (Leavenworth–Arikara village)
1824 Yanktonai report a big battle
1828 Peigan lost the battle
1831 What started as a skirmish turned into a large battle (Yankton)
1835 Lakota and Pawnee fought across the ice
1836 Wood Striker Yanktonai fought with Arikara
1845 Sioux attacked Peigan who were moving camp
1859 Peigan fought the Kutenai in the Alberta foothills when they 
came to hunt bison
1863 Sioux Uprising
1870 Blackfoot beat the Crees at Lethbridge
1875 They fought Bear Coat Miles
1876 Little Big Horn
Expeditions of Small War Parties
1711 A few Dakota went on a war party
1726 Dakota war party went to the Big Horns
1743 White Warbonnet went to war
1749 They returned from a raid with many scalps
1755 They fought the Winnebago
1758 A few Dakota went on the warpath
1764 War party of nine Arikara or Pawnee came (Yanktonai)
1768 Feather Shirt passed the pipe
1771 Two war leaders were killed
1775 A woman killed an enemy and came back
1776 A fight with the Assiniboin
1781 Holy Elk won a battle
1796 Bear Paw wore an eagle bonnet and was wounded
1797 Arikara killed a Lakota water boy
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1808 A small war party killed an enemy
1815 They fought in the thin brush
1825 Brave Man went to war
1827 Blue Feather was wounded
1828 Peigans fought with Elk in states
1834 Blackfoot fought Crow at Yellowstone River
1835 Peigan beat the Sioux in battle
1840 The starve to death war party
1841 Bloody Hand killed enemies and returned
1843 Shaves Forehead was wounded
1844 Blackfeet fought Assinboin at Belly River
1846 They came back without Two Herds
1847 They abandoned Good Heron’s younger brother
1859 Yellow Robe was killed
1860 Big Crow was killed by a bullet
Horse Raids
1805 They killed a horse thief
1813 A Crow was cut up coming into camp
1848 A great horse raid
1873 Bear Paw killed a Crow horse raider
Opportunistic Attack
1688 They attacked hunters
1693 Man attacked but made it back safely
1698 Enemy attacked and killed Good Hunter
1719 Buffalo hunter killed by enemies
1761 Eagle hunters were killed
1772 Enemies killed three wood gatherers
1775 Killed two scouts
1779 A hunter and his family were killed while hunting
1788 Cheyenne killed Shade’s father
1789 They killed two Mandan
1791 Man watching a steamboat was killed
1793 Killed a Crow in his lodge
1795 A woman fetching water was killed
1796 Arikara attacked Yankton when they were out hunting buffalo
1797 Woman digging tipsin was killed
1806 An eagle catcher was killed
1808 Eagle hunters were killed together
1810 Pawnee killed Blue Blanket’s father
1814 Big Road’s father was killed by Pawnee
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1814 They killed a Kiowa envoy
1829 They killed a Crow in winter
1835 Lodge was killed while skinning a buffalo
1838 Pawnee attacked family in their lodge, killed men, and took the 
daughter as a Morning Star sacrifice
1839 They killed a man in his lodge at night
1838 They killed three Assiniboin boys
1840 Calf Falling was killed in his lodge
1859 They surrounded the red tipi
1863 They scalped a boy
1874 They killed someone while moving camp
Other Records of Individual Casualties
1727 Yankton Good Cedar Woman shot and killed
1737 They returned and killed Running Bull
1751 Enemy came and killed Red Bull
1752 Bird was killed in battle
1753 Grouse was killed in battle
1754 Charging Bull was killed in battle
1756 Warbonnet was killed in battle 
1757 White Weasel was killed in battle
1758 White Cow was killed in battle
1760 White Bird was killed in battle
1761 Head was killed in battle
1763 Camps in Center was killed in battle
1764 Red Camp was killed in battle
1767 They killed a buffalo dreamer or Wears-a-Mask
1769 Charging Eagle was killed in battle
1769 Mask Wearer was killed
1780 Sacking of Nuptadi Mandan village—took many women and 
children captive
1784 Red Robe was killed
1785 Charging Eagle was killed
1786 Coyote was killed
1787 A heyoka was killed in battle
1785 They came and killed Brown Bear
1796 They killed a Crow with very long hair
1802 Big Rattlesnake was killed in battle with Cree
1808 They came and killed Bull Elk
1809 Again they killed one wearing a red coat
1816 Lumpy Heel was killed
1820 Killed two Utes
COUP COUNTS AND CORN CACHES 139
1821 They killed a white soldier
1835 Running Bull killed an enemy and returned
1839 Eagle was killed in battle
1845 He Crow was killed
1846 White Bull was killed
1849 They killed a Crow, Buffalo Track
1854 They killed Deer Dung
1858 Big Crow was killed
1861 Red Feather was killed
1863 The killed a Crow
1869 Big Fish was killed
1869 High Forelock was killed
1871 Hump was killed in battle
1871 They killed the one on the white horse
1872 Strikes Two was killed
Records of Unusual Coups
1694 Yankton chased the Arikara into the water
1701 Killed one wearing a warbonnet
1762 Yellow Hide counted coup on a Crow
1765 A wounded woman counted coup on an enemy with her stick
1766 Black Lodge counted coup on an enemy
1774 Red Bug counted coup on a Crow with his bow
1774 A heyoka was killed
1784 A man wounded with an arrow counted coup on the enemy with 
his coup stick
1799 Black Face counted coup on two Crows
1801 Blackfoot took an American flag from the Pend d’Orielles
1807 Man in a red shirt was killed with a bullet (first report of 
gun—Brule)
1834 Lame Deer pulled out his own arrow and shot the enemy with it 
again
Mass Casualty Events
1702 Pawnee attacked Dakota camp, but were annihilated
1710 Yanktonai surrounded and annihilated the Wicosawan 
[Tsistsistas?]
1723 The enemy charged and none survived
1723 Oto, Pawnee, and French traders killed 42 Spanish soldiers and 60 
Pueblo warriors
1771 They burned the Mandan out (Larson Village)
1771 They killed many Crows
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1793 Many killed in battle
1798 Three Mandan were killed together
1801 Killed seven Pawnee
1804 Four Sioux killed
1805 Eight were killed
1806 Killed three Pawnee
1807 Eight were killed in battle
1811 Six were killed in a surround
1813 Killed six Mandan together
1827 They killed many Mandan
1828 They killed many Mandan
1841 Crow killed Blackfoot Walking Crow band
1849 Peigan killed 50 Cree or Assiniboin
1853 They killed 30 white soldiers
1856 They killed 10 Crow
1857 They killed 12 together
1862 Eight were killed in battle
1866 A great massacre of Gros Ventre and Crow who attacked a 
Blackfoot Sun Dance encampment
1867 They killed 100 white men
1874 They killed eight Pawnee
Capture Events
1766 Pine Shooter was captured
1769 They took the Snake women and children captive
1780 Big battle with Mandan (Nuptadi Village) took many women and 
children captive
1808 Getting paint, they were captured by the Crow
1838 Pawnee took a Lakota girl for Morning Star sacrifice
1843 A boy was captured
1849 They captured and then killed a winkte
Other
1767 Those speaking the same language fought
1768 They divided themselves into two sides
1835 A Cheyenne was killed by accident by his Lakota band
1842 Pointer gave a Shoshone scout refuge
1856 White Beard (Harney) took hostages
1860 They scalped Four Horns by mistake in battle
1863 They killed four Crow
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notes
 1. The origins of these quotations are disputed. The first appears to go back to the 
Greek dramatist Aeschylus (525–456 bce).
 2. For this analysis, I looked at the Yanktonai Dakota winter count of John 
Bear (Howard 1976), the Oglala Lakota winter count retained by the Amiotte fam-
ily (unpublished), the Sicangu Lakota winter count given to John Anderson (2002, 
my interpretation), the northern Lakota winter count of Charles Holy Bull (unpub-








Rotten Palisade Posts and 
Rickety Baffle Gates




Proto-Arikara farmers, who had moved into the Mis-
souri River valley from the central Plains around ad 
1300, were digging a new fortification ditch in the early 
fourteenth century around an expanded area of their 
settlement, now known as the Crow Creek site, located 
in central South Dakota, when they suffered a mas-
sive attack by enemy warriors (Hollinger, chapter 10, 
this volume). The defensive barrier that encircled the 
community was being constructed to protect the vil-
lagers against an aggressive and violent enemy—per-
haps Siouan-speakers who were being slowly pushed 
out of the Big Bend of the Missouri River, or by 
Caddoan-speakers like themselves who competed for 
the arable strips of land along the narrow Missouri 
trench. Before the project could be completed, an 
overwhelming enemy force overran the settlement, 
burned the earthlodges, and tortured, mutilated, and 
killed at least 486 inhabitants with war clubs ( Johnson 
2007a:120; Kendell, chapter 13, this volume). Children 
and women are underrepresented in the body count—
suggesting that many were led away as captives. The 
carnage was so extensive that it is estimated that few 
if any villagers survived the onslaught. The bodies 
lay unburied for months before being interred in the 
unfinished fortification ditch and then covered with a 
layer of clay, perhaps by relatives from neighboring vil-
lages. In 1978 archaeologists excavated and studied the 
victims prior to reburial, providing a wealth of infor-
mation on the massacre and the nature of violence in 
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the northern Plains ( Johnson 2007a; Willey and Emerson 1993; Zimmerman 
1985; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993). The warriors’ ability to take advantage of 
unfinished defensive system provided them a decided tactical advantage.
Some three hundred years later in the Northeast, an Iroquois force attacked 
villages of the Huron Confederacy. After striking two frontier towns in 1648, 
Iroquois warriors hit the Huron town of Taenhatentaron (St. Ignace) the fol-
lowing summer. Upon breaching the weakest point in the town’s palisade, the 
warriors entered and captured or killed a number of Huron, primarily children 
and women. The Iroquois then stormed the Huron village of St. Louis, and 
assaulted the palisade, cutting their way through the wall and burning the town. 
Their success was predicated on their ability to breach the Huron’s defensive 
walls, to achieve the element of surprise, and to amass an overwhelming offen-
sive force (Abler 2000; Brandão 1997; Lee 2007:707–709; Otterbein 1964, 1979; 
Starna and Brandão 2004; Trigger 1976).
In the winter of 1712 South Carolina troops, composed of colonists, allied 
Yamassees, and other Native allies, under the command of John Barnwell, 
embarked against the Tuscarora. Finding a number of small, unfinished forts 
throughout the region, Barnwell assaulted, besieged, and burned each one 
in turn. The Tuscaroras, having been surprised at Barnwell’s approach, were 
forced to abandon their incompletely fortified towns. In the process they left 
behind a great deal of “plunder” for the South Carolina forces. Barnwell’s stra-
tegic surprise attack caused the Tuscaroras to decide against protecting their 
goods and the partially fortified settlements, and to relocate to a completed 
fort at Hancock’s Town (Lee 2004).
As these examples testify, fortifications throughout eastern North America 
provided varying degrees of protection for indigenous people. Some settle-
ments, such as those of the proto-Arikara, Huron, and Tuscarora, failed to 
protect their populations due to in-progress construction or insufficient 
defense by the existing palisades. In others, fortifications proved successful 
in providing defense and safety (Bridges et al. 2000), but in some cases they 
may have contributed to a detrimental and diminished way of life for the fear-
ful, sequestered inhabitants under attack, siege, or impending threat of attack. 
Poor health may have resulted in hardship and malnutrition from warfare due 
to restricted subsistence activities in the face of aggressive threats (Milner 
1999, 2000; Milner et al. 1991a; Steadman 2011). A decline in health along with 
increased hardship, malnutrition, privation, and undernourishment may have 
been the tradeoff for protection against one’s aggressive and potent enemies. 
A historic example is provided by a French garrison of 93 who died from 
scurvy in the winter of 1688 at Fort Frontenac as a result of an Iroquois siege 
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(Bazely 2007). Precontact fortified settlements may have suffered similar fates 
by restricting populations within confining walls.
Eastern North American defensive enclosures and structures have been the 
focus of long-standing archaeological research, in part, for the information 
they provide concerning aggression, conflict, defense, feuding, raiding, sieges, 
violence, and warfare among indigenous populations (Bamforth, chapter 1, 
this volume; Dye 2009; Lafferty 1973; Milner 2000; Payne 1994; Schroeder 
2006; Schroeder, chapter 9, this volume; Steinen 1992; Trubitt 2003; Vehik, 
chapter 7, this volume). Fortifications require defensive strategies, engineering 
skills, and logistical and tactical organization, as well as available resources 
for log palisades and labor for construction. In addition, the archaeological 
presence of fortifications provides convincing evidence that inhabitants built 
strong defenses because their settlements were being threatened, not simply as 
testaments to chiefly aggrandizement and exhibitions of authority, power, and 
wealth—although these may be components or factors in monumental con-
struction projects (Earle 1997:155–158). Finally, fortifications hint at the nature 
and potential of offensive hostilities and violence and provide key archaeologi-
cal signatures for the pattern and scale of intersocietal aggression and conflict.
Ethnohistoric descriptions of eastern North American fortifications are 
found in accounts stretching from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries 
(Black 1967; Hudson 1997; Keener 1999; Swanton 1946). These sources record 
important details of construction techniques and the political and social 
dynamics of fortifying a town or village and defending it against attack, but 
it is the archaeological record that provides time depth for changes in defen-
sive strategies and construction and maintenance efforts and give clues as to 
regional political relations. When geophysical prospection is integrated with 
archaeological and ethnohistoric research, a more comprehensive, detailed, 
and robust perspective of defensive constructions and layouts may be obtained 
(Kvamme 2007).
By viewing fortification features as artifacts, we may explore their construc-
tion and viability using the same assumptions that apply to other elements of 
architectural culture, such as mounds and plazas. Following Sherwood and 
Kidder’s (2011:69) discussion of mound building, each step of the fortifica-
tion process must be identified and analyzed. For example, builders had to 
acquire materials; accumulate, allocate, and coordinate labor; develop and 
oversee construction plans; and monitor long-term maintenance throughout 
the use life of defensive systems. These myriad activities provide important 
information about a town’s culture, economy, and politics. The perspective 
suggested here integrates construction process and resource acquisition as 
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“artifact.” Fortification construction for these complex architectural features 
required advance planning, considerable engineering knowledge, impressive 
skill, labor coordination, and political investment and organization. In addi-
tion, a regional perspective is required if we are to investigate the development 
and range of fortifications as well as their durability and effectiveness in safe-
guarding the populations they were designed to protect.
Information regarding frequency, scale, and type of warfare may be discov-
ered by investigating the physical features of a fortification system. Defensive 
walls and ditches are sensitive archaeological markers for threats of forceful 
and sustained external violence. Expenditure of labor, resources, and time in 
digging ditches, moats, and trenches; excavating postholes; fastening posts; 
plastering wooden palisade walls; and securing timbers demonstrate that 
threats were real and serious (Fontana 2007:65–66). Vencl (1999:67) notes that 
fortifications are “above all the materialized expression of the human fear of 
being attacked, and losing life, freedom or property,” not to mention loss of 
political autonomy and social viability. People and societies do not build effec-
tive and strong fortification systems “unless there is a good reason to do so” 
(Lafferty 1973:4).
The construction of fortifications also reflects the capability of offensive 
weapons in use at the time that monumental defenses are being planned and 
built. People tend to do the minimum to protect themselves and so fortifica-
tions are often scaled to the level of the attacker’s available resources, tactics, 
and technology, rather than to contemporary fortification capabilities and 
engineering knowledge (Arkush and Stanish 2005:7). For example, enemies of 
the Iroquois League abruptly incorporated flanked designs into their village 
defenses by the 1660s to counter Iroquois adoption of counter palisades, iron 
axes, massed musket fire, and wooden shields when attacking fortified posi-
tions (Keener 1998:96).
Fortifications are especially diagnostic for evaluating intercommunity con-
flict, particularly sites lacking skeletal trauma and trophy-taking behavior 
(Mitchell, chapter 11, this volume). As evidence for past intercommunity rela-
tions, and as durable and empirical remains of conflict and territoriality, for-
tifications are key archaeological signatures of populations who lived in fear 
and the community leaders who attempted to protect those populations (Dye 
2009; Haas 2001; Milner 2000) and who organized and deployed military 
power in potentially hostile environments. Archaeological studies of indige-
nous fortifications are important because they provide detailed evidence of the 
evolution, extent, and nature of antagonistic political relations among com-
petitive social groups and the military mechanisms of aggression, intersociety 
ROT TEN PALISADE POSTS AND RICKET Y BAFFLE GATES 149
conflict, and organized violence. Cooperation also played an important role 
in fortification construction and the alliances built to withstand assaults from 
one’s enemies.
Despite the ubiquity of fortified settlements throughout much of eastern 
North America, few comparative regional summaries have been forthcoming 
(Lafferty 1973; Milner 2000; Payne 1994). As Hammerstedt (2005:218) points 
out, palisades have not received the same attention as mounds, but they are 
no less important because they require as much, if not more, effort, exper-
tise, knowledge, labor, and skill in their planning, construction, and main-
tenance. In this discussion, I employ selected fortified sites from the lower 
Midwest-Southeast, Northeast, and northern Plains to investigate the con-
struction, maintenance, and use of fortification systems. Information from 
these Mississippian, Iroquoian, and Caddoan–Siouan (Middle Missouri-
Coalescent) cultures enable analysis of indigenous wooden fortifications and 
their development, durability, and lifespan.
While archaeological interest usually focuses on areas within or adjacent to 
defensive systems, few studies have compared differences among these forms 
in terms of fortification lifespan; a crucial component of defensive system 
evaluation. The factors behind the construction and maintenance of defen-
sive systems have not received the attention they deserve. One critical area 
lacking in fortification studies is an assessment of when fortifications were 
constructed during the lifespan of a community, their durability as wooden 
structures, and their need for routine maintenance (Krus 2011). Evidence pre-
sented here suggests that fortifications evolved in step with defensive needs, 
the offensive capabilities of one’s enemies, and the regional sociopolitical 
organization. Fortifications as a component of the built environment also have 
multiple layers of conceptually embedded group identities, memories of past 
events, and social meanings. Fortifications, as a durable and encompassing 
form of material culture, powerfully influence human thought and action over 
long time scales (Arkush 2011).
Understanding defensive systems provides insights into a community’s eco-
nomic, military, and political institutions, revealing how communities adapt 
and cope with an oftentimes hostile and violent sociopolitical environment. 
While fortification walls and regional war might bring about political cen-
tralization and regional consolidation through conquest, walled settlements 
also lead to fragmentation and inconclusive cycles of violence, and can hin-
der political aggregation (Arkush 2006), as the various pathways of intercom-
munity conflict and cooperation are both historical and multilinear (Arkush 
and Allen 2006) and may result in divergent political trajectories. Thus, studies 
150 DAVID H. DYE
of fortifications have far-reaching implications for societies throughout the 
world that constructed energy-consuming, expensive, and massive projects 
(Martindale and Supernant 2009; Parkinson and Duffy 2007). Because wooden 
walls have a limited lifespan, they remain viable as defensive structures for only 
brief periods of time without sustained maintenance—to function properly 
they require an intensive and extensive maintenance program. Archaeological 
evidence of fortifications must be evaluated in light of the duration of defensive 
effectiveness and viability within the overall settlement history.
Ditches and walls served multiple purposes. Monumental defensive systems 
require regular attention and it might be argued that community and polity 
leaders could mobilize social labor to keep people busy. Or, in some instances 
walls might serve as snow fences or windbreaks (Reid 1975:7). Wooden bar-
riers also function to obscure the vision of one’s enemies who might wish to 
examine a town’s interiors for signs of weakness (Keeley et al. 2007), and shield 
elite affairs from the non-privileged within the town. Sacred precincts might 
be demarcated from profane space by berms, ditches, and walls. Enterprising 
chiefs, especially in the face of imagined or real threats of attacks, could 
enhance their authority and power through massive construction projects that 
required considerable coordination, expertise, and supervision from an elite 
who possessed the requisite knowledge and skills. Unlike mounds and plazas, 
wooden palisades would have required almost constant attention, and there-
fore would be ideal sources for opportunities of labor commitment and mobi-
lization. It is unlikely however that aggrandizing leaders could have effectively 
mobilized social labor without some degree of a real sense of impending vio-
lence—the sheer mass of public defensive systems and the effort, resources, 
and work required for their construction is a clear signature for seriousness of 
threats to a community’s continued autonomy and viability, as fortifications 
are both costly and time-consuming.
Finally, wooden palisade walls had to be sufficiently sturdy to withstand not 
only military assaults, but also forceful, strong winds. Wind speeds vary from 
region to region, but within any area of North America there can be hurricanes, 
straight-line winds, tornados, or wind gusts. While average wind speeds might 
be slight, palisades had to be constructed to withstand blustery and violent 
winds that periodically threatened buildings, fences, and walls. Eastern North 
America is struck by severe winds at least once per decade, and many places 
are affected annually, if not several times per year. Smith et al. (2010) used a 
quality-controlled database of wind observations from the National Weather 
Service and other regional networks to document thunderstorm wind gusts 
at or above 93 km (58 mi) per hour, and found an average of 373 wind gusts 
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per year across the contiguous United States from 2003 to 2009. There is no 
consistent distribution of severe wind gusts across eastern North American, 
as winds may vary from one area to another as a function of elevation, for-
est cover, large-scale climate change, location, site exposure, and small-scale 
weather patterns (Don C. Bragg, personal communication, 2013), but any set 
of wooden walls would need to have the capability of withstanding strong 
winds to remain effective and viable. To ensure a palisade’s durability and effi-
cacy, regular maintenance and repairs would have to be carried out throughout 
a fortification’s lifespan by a knowledgeable and supervised work force.
the study of fortIfICatIons
Fortifications have been under-appreciated by archaeological and anthro-
pological theorists over the years, but in the past two decades a substantial 
resurgence of interest has appeared in methodology and theory-building 
that focuses on ancient defensive systems, the material remains of fortifica-
tion architecture, and the idea that fortifications are a form of “landscape 
patrimony”—a durable, physical structure expressed on the ground that pro-
foundly shapes the unfolding histories of specific regions. Increasing interest 
in the archaeology and cultural anthropology of intersocietal conflict and war, 
and especially defensive systems and fortifications, has resulted in key archae-
ological signatures being identified for communities concerned with military 
defense and security (Arkush and Allen 2006; Earle 1997; Ferguson 2006; 
Keeley et al. 2007; Rice and LeBlanc 2001; Roscoe 2008; Scott and McFeaters 
2011; Vencl 1999). Some of the most vexing questions facing archaeologists 
today include addressing why some groups are more prone to intergroup con-
flict than others, and how archaeology can develop accurate measures of vio-
lence using material culture, especially defensive structures.
Equally important are the causes of warfare and the role fortifications play in 
political aggrandizement and hegemony, as well as the ways in which fortifica-
tions hinder political centralization and regional consolidation. More nuanced 
and robust, archaeologically based models of political power and social iden-
tifies are crucial for understanding the complexities of fortifications. Finally, 
how do archaeologists go about clarifying the built defensive landscape and 
examining long-term defensive histories and associated multiple layers of 
social identities and memories of past events? An effective understanding of 
fortifications, polity, and warfare can be gained through archaeological investi-
gation of macroscale patterns of defensive systems when defensive systems are 
seen as durable, material, and spatially extensive forms of structure. Fortified 
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landforms and defensive patterns are important components of landscape pat-
rimony, political cycling, and settlement choices. Warfare and its associated 
material culture, especially durable fortifications, involves cyclical processes 
that affect society through the medium of physical defenses and the settle-
ment choices people make based on the specific landscape within which they 
reside (Arkush 2011).
An enhanced understanding of the importance of fortifications and a recent 
renewal of fortification research and defensive systems has taken place in 
many parts of the world: Africa (Kusimba 2006), Asia (China) (Underhill 
2006), Europe (Harding 2013; Parkinson and Duffy 2007), Mesoamerica 
(Connell and Silverstein 2006), the Pacific Islands (including New Zealand 
and Palau) (Allen 2006, 2008; Liston and Tuggle 2006; Liu and Allen 1999), 
and South America (Peru) (Arkush 2006, 2008, 2011; Arkush and Stanish 
2005). Likewise, the last two decades have seen a fluorescence in indigenous, 
defensive system research in North American, including the Great Plains 
(Ahler and Kay 2007; Bamforth 1994, 2006; Owsley and Jantz 1994; and this 
volume), the Midwest and Southeast (Fontana 2007; Krus 2011; Krus et al. 
2013; Milner 2000; Schroeder 2006; Trubitt 2003), the Northeast (Engelbrecht 
2009; Poplawski et al. 2012), the Northwest Coast (Martindale and Supernant 
2009), and the Southwest (Snead 2008; Solometo 2006, 2010). Modern battle-
fields have also been the focus of recent research, including fortifications and 
battle sites (Scott and McFeaters 2011). Ferguson (2006, 2008) provides recent 
global summaries of conflict and warfare, which include defensive architecture 
and fortifications.
One measure of intergroup conflict is the way in which the physical land-
scape is modified, structured, and transformed by the choices made by the 
people who live on it and how the archaeological evidence of violence is inte-
grated and mapped onto the anthropogenic landscape as durable defenses 
(Arkush 2011). The chronology of a community’s fortification construction 
serves to clarify the causes of warfare and violence and to point to fortifica-
tion variability across space and through time under states of violence and 
warfare. Another measure is the changing political climate, including the 
cycling of polities across the region. Existing models of the causes and con-
sequences of feuding, raiding, and warfare need to be integrated with a site’s 
history, the adjacent landscapes, and the relationships that exist between the 
people and their physical and political environment. The main theoretical 
driver behind much of the recent research on fortifications is based on Earle’s 
(1997) model of warfare as one component of how military power functions 
as the strategic use of force, where the focus is on the political economy of 
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fortifications. Fortifications are more than structures to defend people, they 
also serve numerous roles for the people who constructed and maintained 
them, including their ancestral claims, their material possessions, their sacra, 
and the regional social landscape.
Studies of fortifications should be integrated with the larger military litera-
ture on raiding and warfare, particularly on fortification design (Allen 2006, 
2008; Rice and LeBlanc 2001). For example, Lafferty (1973:8) used observa-
tions from his experience in Viet Nam in 1971 and 1972 to study Mississippian 
fortifications from a military design perspective, noting “the general military 
theory of such should be applicable to all times and places within the limits 
imposed by the knowledge of military principles and technology possessed by 
the people constructing the system of fortifications.”
fortIfICatIons In eastern north aMerICa
Earthen enclosures appear as early as the Middle Archaic in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley. The Watson Brake site in northeastern Louisiana includes 
11 mounds connected by a large 1-m-high (3.3 ft) oval earthwork about 280 
m (920 ft) in diameter (Saunders et al. 2005). Initial earthwork construc-
tion began at Watson Brake around 3500 bc. Enclosures are a hallmark of 
Middle Woodland ritual centers throughout much of eastern North America 
(Mainfort and Sullivan 1998). The enclosures found at sites such as Newark, 
Pinson, Toltec, and Watson Brake served fundamentally different functions 
from those of late prehistoric fortifications in eastern North America. The 
Archaic and Woodland earthwork centers were ritual locales for alliance for-
mation, exchange activities, and mortuary programs that dampened conflict 
and promoted cooperation, while Mississippian and Protohistoric defensive 
systems protected populations from aggressive, offensive assaults.
The wide formal, geographic, and temporal variability of enclosures, espe-
cially those used for cosmological and mortuary rituals, has prompted con-
siderable debate and discussion. In contrast to these pre-Mississippian ritual 
locales, which typically lack defensive functions, late prehistoric enclosures 
were clearly constructed to defend settlements that faced escalating aggres-
sion and violent confrontation among competing chiefly or tribal polities. 
After circa ad 1250, farming communities, especially great centers and large 
towns, began constructing defensive enceintes or enclosures in response to 
intensified warfare and threats of intercommunity violence (Krus 2013).
Throughout much of eastern North America, especially the late prehis-
toric lower Midwest-Southeast, Northeast, and northern Plains, fortifications 
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were a critical and vital component of community structure and survival. For 
example, Holley (1999:28) notes “nearly every Mississippian center was forti-
fied in some manner.” Likewise, for the Northeast, Snow (1994:29) remarks 
“most Owasco villages were palisaded by ad 1350.” And for the northern Plains, 
Bamforth (2006:71) observes “Middle Missouri and Initial Coalescent sites 
show evidence for warfare in the form of ditch and palisade fortifications.” For 
over 800 years many communities in eastern North America employed some 
combination of ditches, embankments, and palisades that provided defense in 
the face of varying degrees of massed, armed forces (Fontana 2007; Milner 
2000; Schroeder 2006; Steinen 1992; Trubitt 2003). These forces appear to have 
been organized as chiefly militias. While a seemingly value-laden term, chief-
doms possessed better command over their forces than tribal societies, with 
their “kin militia,” while lacking, however, the command structure of an archaic 
state’s standing army. Thus, “chiefly militia” best describes these temporary war-
rior forces, led by chiefs and their retainers, of Mississippian chiefdoms (Reyna 
1994). Some cultures—such as the Caddo (Perttula 1992:18), Mississippian and 
Plum Bayou communities in the Arkansas Western Lowlands (Rolingson 
2002), Plaquemine (Kidder 2007:205), and virtually all of Florida (Ashley and 
White 2012:18)—generally lacked fortifications, but overall, defensive systems 
were an integral component of late prehistoric town and village life throughout 
much of eastern North America (Milner 2000, 2004).
Evidence of fortifications typically consists of barriers such as ditches, 
earthworks, and walls that were integral to settlement plans. Restrictions were 
placed on the amount of space available for future growth in residential areas 
enclosed by fortified walls. Perhaps the most fundamental consideration for 
indigenous populations centered on defending nucleated civic and residen-
tial zones and their resident populations. Sacred structures such as ancestor 
shrines were especially targeted for attack, desecration, and destruction by 
Mississippian militias (Dye and King 2007; Milner 2000:63). Thus, studying 
defensive structures at archaeological sites allows assessment of the levels and 
nature of violent conflict and cooperation, and the expense of construction 
and maintenance.
As surrounding barriers, defensive enceintes protected resident populations 
and their built features, including mounds, plazas, and a variety of buildings, 
both private and public (Bamforth 2006; Lafferty 1973; Mitchell 2007; Payne 
1994; Snow 1994, 2007). Fortified communities often included bastions, ditches, 
embankments, gates, and palisades (Keeley et al. 2007). Fortifications typically 
leave evidence that is recoverable through excavation, geophysical prospec-
tion, and surface surveys. These indelible signatures of defense and protection, 
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especially when coupled with skeletal trauma, reflect varying degrees of orga-
nized violence, including feuding, raiding, and warfare. Fortifications may 
add weight to interpretations of the form and severity of regional violence by 
delineating efforts to avoid intercommunity conflict.
Simply put, fortifications protect people from attacks by their enemies by 
restricting physical access into a town or village while protecting essential 
routes of entry (Engelbrecht 2009). Fortifications may be defined as building, 
erecting, reinforcing, securing, or strengthening defensive structures that form 
physical impediments. Protective enclosures often consist of some combina-
tion of ditches, embankments, or walls, designed to defend a place by with-
standing attack from an enemy, and impeding access to a refuge or settlement. 
An effective fortification is one that is equal to or greater than the antici-
pated capabilities, strength, and weaponry of an attacking force (Stout and 
Lewis 1998:175). Fortifications are constructed to hinder attackers from flank-
ing maneuvers and surprise attacks (Keeley 1996:56). They often take advan-
tage of natural landforms, such as bluffs, hilltops, islands, river meanders, and 
ridgelines. Some fortification features, such as V-shaped ditches and palisade 
bastions, are clear signs of defensive architecture (Keeley et al. 2007). Non-
defensive archaeological features are sometimes misinterpreted as perform-
ing essentially defensive functions. For example, Mississippian charnel houses 
and chiefly residences, both typically located atop platform mounds, may 
include earthen embankments, surrounding ditches, or wooden fences, but 
these served a non-military barrier or screening function. Likewise, drainage 
ditches, garden barriers, or privacy walls may also lack a military function, but 
might be confused with defensive features (LeBeau, chapter 6, this volume).
Fortifications consist of three basic components: defended gates, enceintes, 
and palisade bastions (Fontana 2007:67–69; Keeley et al. 2007). Enceintes may 
take the form of curtains, ditches, embankments, fences, palisades, and walls. 
These enclosures may not have specifically defensive functions, but wooden 
walls with bastions, an adjoining moat, and an associated embankment are 
clearly defensive structures, despite possible ancillary iconographic, political, 
social, and symbolic associations (Engelbrecht 2003:99, 2009:180; Keeley 1996; 
Keeley et al. 2007). Wooden curtain walls protect a town or village from an 
attacker’s weapons, while allowing defenders to use their most effective coun-
termeasures against an attacking force. The primary purpose of a defending 
force is to deter or prevent entry of attackers into or through a defended perim-
eter. However, if an enemy reaches the base of the curtain wall, then “these 
surficial barriers themselves shield the attackers, causing defenders either to 
expose themselves to discharge missiles or force them to emerge from behind 
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the enceinte in a ‘sally’ counterattack” (Keeley et al. 2007:57). Curtain walls, as 
protective architecture for settlements, changed over time in eastern North 
America as the form and severity of conflict varied, but overall, such defensive 
works signal a level of aggression and combat organization requiring addi-
tional defense. Protective embankments usually include dirt excavated from 
an adjacent defensive ditch, piled up to form a berm or ridge into which posts 
were then placed, thus increasing palisade height and causing water to flow 
away from the bases of rot-prone wall supports. Ditches were often excavated 
parallel to and just outside curtain walls. The most effective ditches are dry and 
V-shaped, and when backed by a curtain wall, are particularly effective deter-
rents to attacking forces (Keeley et al. 2007).
The most vulnerable location for defenders along a curtain wall is the entry 
way. Defending a settlement’s entrance may be achieved by defensive gates or 
towers that assume some form of baffling, flanking, or screening. Bastions may 
be constructed adjacent to an entrance in addition to reinforcing palisades, but 
they must jut out from defensive walls to be effective. They may assume many 
shapes and still be effective. Most bastions are circular, rectangular, or square, 
allowing flanking fire to be directed on any attackers who approach the palisade 
wall or other features such as gates or towers. Bastion intervals are thought to 
have been spaced at about one-half the effective range of offensive weaponry to 
enable overlapping fire power (Fontana 2007:174; Keeley et al. 2007:74–77).
Important considerations in palisade construction include placement (spac-
ing and positioning) of vertical supports, post dimensions (depth, height, and 
width), and wood type. Additional factors include the number of rows, use 
of horizontal members, and location of adjacent elements such as bastions, 
gateways, towers, and walkways (Prezzano 1992:236). Archaeological and eth-
nohistorical data indicate that specific wood types were selected for palisade 
construction. Examples are presented in the following case studies. Wood 
choice was based on considerations of raw material, including decay resistance, 
local availability, and physical attributes. Depending on the degree of resource 
overexploitation and utilization, choices of wood may have been limited to 
considerations of convenience rather than advantageous properties.
Case studIes of IndIgenous eastern 
north aMerICan fortIfICatIons
By the middle of the thirteenth century there was a sharp increase in fortifica-
tions throughout much of eastern North America, suggesting greater violence 
or heightened threat of violence. Widespread interpolity conflict, prompting 
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the construction of defenses, is also seen in buffer zones, conflict iconogra-
phy, settlement nucleation, skeletal trauma, and symbolic weaponry (Dye 2009; 
Milner 2000, 2007). The bow and arrow, introduced in the seventh century 
(Nassaney and Pyle 1999), provided the ideal assault weapon for warriors who 
attacked enemy settlements en masse, but the war club was the preferred kill-
ing weapon (Van Horne 1993). Increased defensive preparedness was the only 
practical, long-term option to maintain village autonomy and sovereignty.
Offensive posturing and intercommunity threats are clearly evident where 
populations begin digging ditches, erecting palisade walls, and placing towns 
or villages in defensive locations. These efforts arose in response to height-
ened levels of violence that began in the Late Woodland period (Knight and 
Steponaitis 1998:11; Little 1999). McElrath et al. (2000:24) note the presence 
of defensively located, fortified, and moated Late Woodland sites in the east-
ern Woodlands, and Green and Nolan (2000:349) state “abundant evidence 
of violent death indicates that raiding or warfare was common among Late 
Woodland peoples.” In the Middle Ohio River Valley, between ad 400 and 
700, relatively large nucleated sites, located on bluff tops, had encircling ditches, 
presumably for defense (Royce 2007). By the end of the Late Woodland 
period across the midcontinent, community life and military defense under-
went additional alterations and transformations, resulting in greater defensive 
needs and stronger fortifications during succeeding centuries (Gramley 1988).
The Mississippian Midwest/Southeast
Although attention has been directed toward the development and nature 
of Mississippian defensive systems (Fontana 2007; Iseminger 1990; Lafferty 
1973; Larson 1972; Stout and Lewis 1998; Milner 2000; Payne 1994; Milner 
and Schroeder 1999; Steinen 1992; Trubitt 2003; Vogel and Allan 1985), few 
archaeologists have examined the timing of fortification building relative to 
the overall occupancy of a community and the durability of palisade walls 
(Krus 2011, 2013). The problem of palisade longevity is not addressed in cur-
rent discussions of Mississippian warfare, yet it holds important implications 
for assessment of the duration and intensity of intercommunity violence. The 
length of time that any particular palisade was in use is unknown for most 
sites. In many instances, charcoal or preserved wood is not available for dat-
ing purposes, making chronological assessments difficult if not impossible. 
Mississippian palisades were either refurbished on a regular basis or had brief 
lifespans of one to two decades, based on direct observations of reconstructed 
palisade decay rates in the Northeast (Prezzano 1992; Warrick 1988). Increased 
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frequency of woodworking tools, including adzes, axes, chisels, and mauls, may 
be indicative, in part, of palisade construction, maintenance, and repair (see 
Poplawski et al. 2012).
A new era of violence is seen in the initial, widespread rise of Mississippian 
fortifications and warfare around ad 1250. The intensity of attacks is reflected 
in the greater numbers and increased strength of fortifications with bastions, 
ditches, embankments, gates, palisades, and towers (Milner 2000). Prior to 
the mid–thirteenth century, few defenses match the scale of those that char-
acterized later defensive efforts, with the exception of Early Mississippian 
towns such as the Mound Bottom (O’Brien and Kuttruff 2012) and Obion 
(Garland 1992) sites.
Mississippian military tactics and operations against fortified towns 
would have included storming defensive walls—especially those that were 
weakened or under construction—by warriors armed with axes, bows and 
arrows, clubs, fire, and knives. Palisades encircling settlements provide 
impressive evidence of heightened expectations for attack, severity of armed 
conflict, social labor to construct fortifications, and threats of increased 
intensity. Throughout much of the lower Midwest and Southeast, fortifica-
tions accompanied the rise of Mississippian chiefly polities (Milner 2000; 
Milner and Schroeder 1999:104). In some areas populations nucleated, while 
in others households and hamlets remained dispersed but sought refuge in 
fortified centers during times of increased conflict and intensified hostilities 
(Dye 1994; Morse and Morse 1983:266).
Palisades were built to withstand attacks from bow-and-arrow warfare and in 
this regard they were usually effective, but when towns were vulnerable through 
palisade weakness or internal strife, one’s enemies would have taken advantage 
of the opportunity to initiate an attack. The bow and arrow, coupled with fire and 
war clubs, fundamentally transformed the nature of intergroup conflict (Blitz 
1988:124). Restructuring both the scale and organization of warfare (Nassaney 
and Pyle 1999:260), militias armed with bows and arrows and war clubs brought 
about a significant increase in mortality, especially in lightly fortified or unforti-
fied communities (Bridges et al. 2000:56). Massed attacks would have prompted 
population dispersion and settlement relocation (Seeman 1992).
The self-bow, generally crafted from a single piece of wood, was used 
throughout the Eastern Woodlands. Self-bows had a cast of about 160 m (525 
ft) (Hamilton 1982), but the effective range may have been closer to 60 m (197 
ft). The bow did not immediately necessitate construction of fortified commu-
nities, but the fortifications that arose around ad 1250 were clearly designed 
as a direct response to militias armed with bows and arrows: tall, plastered, 
ROT TEN PALISADE POSTS AND RICKET Y BAFFLE GATES 159
palisade walls; bastions; constricted entrances; embankments; and deep, wide 
ditches (Milner 2000). Plastered Mississippian palisades may have emerged 
to counteract fire-tipped arrows shot in unison by massed warriors (DePratter 
1983:47). Closely spaced bastions, averaging around 30 m (98 ft) apart, allowed 
defending archers to overlap their fire power and prevent attackers from 
breaching the curtain wall (Fontana 2007:173; Milner 1999:120, 2000:58). This 
distance is comparable to what is found in other areas of the world where 
simple bows are used (see Keeley 1996:96; Keeley et al. 2007). John Smith 
wrote that the Indians of Virginia could shoot well at 40 yards (ca. 37 m) and 
were fairly accurate at 120 yards (ca. 110 m) (Smith 1624:132). Lafferty (1973:138) 
notes that “the curtain walls of all archaeologically known fortifications could 
have been easily defended from the bastions” and that “the bastions of the 
aboriginal Americans were constructed close enough together to have had the 
curtain wall covered by bows and arrows fired from the bastions.”
A member of the Hernando de Soto entrada—a “Gentleman from Elvas”—
described the fortified town of Tascaluça as seen in 1540: “the enclosure, like 
that in other towns seen there afterward, was of thick logs, set solidly close 
together in the ground, and many long poles as thick as an arm placed cross-
wise. The height of the enclosure was that of a good lance, and it was plas-
tered within and without and had loopholes” (Robertson 1993:94). Vogel and 
Allan (1985) estimate that palisade height at Moundville was 3–4 m (9.8–13.1 
ft), based on the depth of postholes. Typical of many Mississippian sites, the 
Annis Village fortifications were built as “screens to prevent raiders from gain-
ing easy access to the village” (Hammerstedt 2005:261).
An increase in skeletal trauma and trophy-taking behavior is associated 
with the rise of Mississippian intersocietal conflict and the construction of 
fortifications. The types and severity of violent trauma also reflect the nature of 
settlement defense. Mortality rates and traumatic injuries were at their great-
est levels in small to medium-sized sites (Bridges et al. 2000). Undefended 
hamlets exposed individuals to direct attack by warriors armed with bows and 
arrows, resulting in high percentages of human remains with embedded arrow 
points. On the other hand, mid-sized sites with defensive features, such as 
palisades, have high mortality from upper-body trauma and cranial injuries 
due to axes and war clubs, but rarely from arrow points. In contrast, the larg-
est and best-defended Mississippian sites were formidable to invaders. Large 
defending forces and strong defenses made communities relatively immune 
from overpowering, successful attacks (Bridges et al. 2000). But to be effective, 
defending militias had to be coordinated and organized and defensive walls 
had to be constructed with skilled planning and sound engineering. Above all, 
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protective palisades had to be evaluated, maintained, and repaired on a regular 
basis to insure their durability and integrity.
There is an interpretive dilemma in assessing the occupational life history of 
Mississippian towns and the palisade walls that surrounded them. If wooden 
palisade walls have a lifespan of some 10–20 years (Cole and Albright 1983:159–
162; Iseminger 1990:35; Lafferty 1973; Scarry 1995:235), then the walls that encir-
cle a long-lived community would have to be maintained and rebuilt many 
times, assuming the inhabitants needed continual protection by the town’s 
fortifications. Even this 10–20-year use-life for fortification may be inaccurate. 
Bragg notes, “depending on the species used, 10–20 years may be too long to 
maintain the structural integrity (strength) of wood buried in typical soils in 
eastern North America, especially in areas with termites, carpenter ants, and 
other wood-consuming detritivores (not to mention fungi)” (Don C. Bragg, 
personal communication, 2013). Blew and Kulp (1964) note that untreated 
fence posts typically have 3–6-year lifespans. Lafferty (1973:108) suggests that 
untreated poles used in palisades would have a shorter lifespan than the 15–20-
year life expectancy of modern creosote-treated telephone poles.
If defensive walls were no longer needed, then presumably the town would 
expand beyond the walls, and debris would extend out from the palisade 
and associated ditches. In some cases, multiple palisade lines are exposed by 
archaeological excavation. In other instances, towns remained within circum-
scribed areas, resulting in deep middens. The majority of Mississippian towns 
had only one functional palisade at a time, although numerous non-defensive 
screen fences might be present, demarcating charnel houses, council lodges, 
courtyards, elite compounds, kitchen gardens, restricted plazas, or other mun-
dane and sacred spaces. How then do we account for single palisade lines at 
so many Mississippian sites that were occupied for several centuries? Did they 
need defensive walls for a short period of time, or were walls rebuilt or refur-
bished over time in such a way as to leave virtually no archaeological evidence?
An example of this problem is seen in a distinctive set of late prehistoric sites 
in the Lower Mississippi Valley labeled the “St. Francis type” by Phillips et al. 
(1951). The site type has a specific configuration that embodies a large, planned 
community laid out in rectangular form with straight, surrounding, and wide 
ditches. These sites stand several meters above the surrounding floodplain, hav-
ing been built up over several centuries from accumulated debris and refuse. 
Surrounding defensive ditches, embankments, and wooden palisades would 
confine the crowded town and its future growth within fixed limits for a con-
siderable time period. Residential structures were located within the encircling 
ditch and palisade wall, resulting in a thick midden. A relatively large number 
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of people are thought to have lived at these sites based on extensive cultural 
deposits, midden depth, numerous structures, and overall site size.
In general, St. Francis–type sites date from approximately ad 1350 to 
1650, representing some 300 years of continuous occupation (P. Morse 1990), 
but some sites, such as Parkin and Rose Mound, have earlier Baytown and 
Mississippian antecedents dating between ad 1000 to 1250 or earlier. Phillips 
et al. (1951:329, table 14) assigned 21 sites to the St. Francis–type settlement 
within an area comprising the Upper Yazoo Basin of northwestern Mississippi 
and the adjoining Lower St. Francis Basin of northeastern Arkansas/south-
eastern Missouri. Textbook examples of the St. Francis–type settlement may be 
found in the St. Francis and Tyronza River confluence area, including Castile 
Landing, Fortune, Neeley’s Ferry, Parkin, Rose Mound, and Vernon Paul.
Philips’s observations of the St. Francis–type sites, as he witnessed them in 
1947, are noteworthy:
As one approaches these sites across the level flood plain, the first impression is 
made by the unusual depth of the refuse that has accumulated. The entire area 
of Rose Mound . . . stands up about 10 feet [3.1 m] above the surrounding plain. 
Cuts into this ‘mound’ showed 2.5 meters [8.2 feet] of rich refuse deposit. This 
impression of the elevation of the entire village area is heightened by the wide 
ditch which surrounds most of the sites of this type. The concentration of the 
refuse in a rectangular area surrounded by a ditch indicates almost conclusively 
that these towns were fortified. A stockade as well as a ditch probably protected 
as well as defined the village area. (Phillips et al. 1951:329)
Sixteenth-century descriptions from the Hernando de Soto expedition of 
the principal town of Pacaha, located on the Mississippi River just north of 
present-day Memphis, Tennessee, provides striking correspondence of eth-
nohistoric accounts with archaeological excavations. Pacaha, encompassed 
around 500 large houses, and was surrounded on three sides by a moat some 
12–15 m (ca. 40–50 ft) wide. The Mississippi River supplied water to the moat 
via an artificial canal three leagues (ca. 16.7 km) long and three fathoms (ca. 5 
m) deep. The canal was so wide that two large canoes could pass one another 
without the oars of one canoe touching those of the other (Hudson 1997:293). 
The fourth side was “enclosed by a very strong palisade in the form of a 
wall made of thick logs set in the ground, touching one another, and other, 
transverse logs fastened and covered with packed mud and straw” (Shelby 
1993:395). The “Gentleman from Elvas” described the town as “very large, 
and furnished with towers; and in the towers and stockade many loopholes” 
(Robertson 1993:117).
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Phillips excavated test pits at Rose Mound, but unfortunately missed 
the palisade wall and so was unable to confirm his hypothesis that the St. 
Francis–type site configuration and layout resulted from a defensive ditch-
and- palisade system. Recent excavations by Jeffrey Mitchem (Bragg 2012; 
Mitchem 2013; Mitchem and Lockhart 2012) at two St. Francis–type sites, 
Parkin and Neeley’s Ferry, however, have confirmed Phillips’s hypothesis of 
defensive ditches and palisades and Garcilaso’s sixteenth-century descriptions. 
The Parkin site is a 6.9 ha (17.1 acre) occupation at the confluence of the St. 
Francis and Tyronza Rivers. The site is surrounded by a ditch 26 m (85 ft) 
wide and 1.9 m (6.2 ft) deep with an adjacent palisade and associated bastions. 
Palisade posts extend into sterile clay, and appeared to be holes from which 
posts had been removed, as opposed to post molds where the original post has 
burned or decayed in place (Mitchem 2013). Typical of Mississippian palisades, 
charcoal or wood was lacking for radiocarbon dates. Based on later superim-
posed houses, the site continued to be inhabited for a substantial length of 
time after the palisade had either been destroyed or dismantled. Members of 
the community may have removed the posts for fuel or building materials, or 
they may have been forced to eradicate the palisade if they found themselves 
dominated by another polity. Two human burials were found above the pali-
sade postholes, indicating that they were buried after the palisade had been 
dismantled. Interestingly, one of them had a chert adz in the area of his abdo-
men ( Jeffrey M. Mitchem, personal communication, 2013).
Neeley’s Ferry is another important Parkin-phase site with a 14-m-wide 
and 1.1-m-deep ditch and adjacent palisade. Unlike Parkin, the Neeley’s Ferry 
palisade posts were left in place and had rotted, perhaps because the site was 
abandoned with the palisade wall still standing. Overlapping features indi-
cate some palisade rebuilding or repair (Mitchem 2013). Excavations at Parkin 
and Neeley’s Ferry point to the need for more detailed excavations docu-
menting the nature of fortification systems because repairs have important 
implications for the degree of political consolidation and violence. Parkin and 
Neeley’s Ferry reveal differences in palisade maintenance and repair, indicat-
ing the problems archaeologists face when interpreting community protection, 
defensive systems, and site longevity.
Mississippian fortifications present challenges for archaeological inter-
pretations of conflict and violence. Palisade construction and maintenance 
have not received sufficient attention to tackle questions of duration and lev-
els of intercommunity raiding and warfare. The timing of fortification con-
struction and evaluation are crucial for such assessments and archaeologists 
investigating Mississippian fortifications must examine palisade durability, 
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rebuilding, and refurbishing to answer the questions of warfare intensity and 
military organization. The length of time that a palisade wall is viable may be 
addressed through detailed excavation and chronological assessment where 
posts remained in the ground. Archaeological approaches to palisade mainte-
nance in the Northeast offer innovative methods for eastern North America.
The Northeast: Iroquois 
Violence in the form of small-scale raiding may date as early as ad 950 
with the advent of the Medieval Maximum (ad 950–1250), and the collision 
of southward-moving eastern Algonquian hunter-gatherers with northward-
migrating northern Iroquoian swidden farmers (Snow 2010:219–225). By the 
late tenth century fortified villages were being built on defendable terrain away 
from major transportation routes, suggesting that concerns with defense dic-
tated settlement placement (Snow 1995). In the Upper Susquehanna Valley 
multifamily dwellings and fortified villages are evident between ad 1000 and 
1100 (Prezzano 1992:431). Swidden farming prompted periodic, short-distance 
village relocation due to depleted soil, which resulted in competition over 
vaguely defined territorial tracts, especially hunting reserves. Proto-northern 
Iroquoians pursued revenge-based raids consisting of small war parties (Snow 
1994), necessitating defenses to prevent counterattacks and retaliation. Evidence 
of violence is reflected in arrow-riddled bodies, cannibalism, protective palisades, 
and trophy-taking behavior (Snow 2001). Iroquois palisades evolved to become 
increasingly effective barriers and defensive structures (Keener 1999:782).
By approximately ad 1250, a time when many Mississippian centers were 
being fortified, most northern Iroquoian villages were also being palisaded, 
some having exterior ditches. During the fourteenth century, the frequency of 
well-planned, heavily palisaded sites increased throughout Iroquoia as raiding 
and warfare intensified (Snow 1994). Communities that had been formerly 
separate but allied, now begin to relocate and amalgamate for defense into 
fewer and larger fortified settlements (Birch 2010a, b; 2012; Williamson 2007). 
The sporadic violence that had been evident prior to the fifteenth century now 
erupted into endemic warfare, perhaps impelled by increased stresses resulting 
from climate change, especially droughts (Cook et al. 2007). Communities 
relocated to more defensible locations and coalesced with neighboring groups 
for mutual protection. An ideology of revenge prompted increased compe-
tition, confederacy formation, village fortification, and population fraction-
ing. Intervillage aggression was replaced by conflict among confederacies that 
sought to annihilate one another through genocidal warfare (Snow 1994).
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Ethnohistoric records provide documentation for postcontact Iroquoian 
attacks against fortified settlements (Keener 1998). Militias were organized 
on the village, nation, or confederacy levels in which several hundred warriors 
might be involved for joint enemy raids (Brandão 1997; Trigger 1990). Taking 
calculated tactical approaches to increase their chances of survival, and to 
ensure success in raids against fortified positions, war parties of five to 20 indi-
viduals relied on ambushes and surprise attacks. They avoided frontal assaults 
on fortified villages and, if outnumbered, refrained from engaging in combat. 
When threatened with attack, especially by an enemy that appeared too strong 
to resist effectively, they burned their own settlements, retreated behind pali-
sades, scattered into the surrounding countryside, or sought refuge at neigh-
boring villages with which they had previous alliances. If their defenses were 
sufficiently strong, on the other hand, they might remain in the village or town, 
protecting their possessions, resources, and themselves (Milner 1998:75).
As with Mississippian militias, Iroquois warriors used bows and arrows 
first when attacking an enemy, followed by hand-to-hand combat with war 
clubs, and finally, using knives for trophy-taking. Fighting continued until 
one group fled, surrendered, or was wiped out. In the first decade of the seven-
teenth century, Champlain noted relatively bloodless battles between massed 
confrontations of warriors. These assaults were quickly abandoned in favor of 
ambushes and small-scale raids once muskets were introduced into the exist-
ing suite of weaponry (Richter 1983:538).
Iroquois palisades evolved over time with a general increase in overall size 
(Keener 1999:782; Prezzano 1992:242). Palisades that surrounded Iroquoian vil-
lages often consisted of a single row of tall saplings, interlaced with bark, logs, 
and poles. Interwoven branches were used for fortifying temporary camps, 
but palisades constructed around permanent villages made use of bark sheets 
(Poplawski et al. 2012). Defensive construction included baffled entrances, 
ditches, protected gateways, scaffolds, and towers. Houses were positioned a 
considerable distance from the palisade wall to protect the inhabitants from 
ambushes (Prezzano 1992:435). Palisades often contained three rows of posts 
with a vertical central row; the outer rows being bent inwards and lashed at 
the top. Bark and withes were interwoven between the posts and small verti-
cal poles were sometimes fitted between gaps in the uprights (Funk 1967:81; 
Jones and Jones 1980:66; Ritchie 1980). Logs might be piled up and then 
lashed behind and between the posts, to at least the “height of a man” (Coyne 
1903:23). These palisades, when completed, stood between 4 and 10 m (13 and 
33 ft) in height (Prezzano 1992:248; Ritchie 1980:307). A walkway or platform 
was created by fastening poles or logs at the top of the palisade where the 
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vertical members crossed (Biggar 1924:155–156; 1929, 3:122; Sagard-Théodat 
1939:91), providing a sturdy, self-supporting structure several meters wide that 
was difficult to breach (Knight 1987:181).
At the Eaton site in western New York, an ancestral Erie village dating to 
approximately ad 1550, Poplawski et al. (2012) argue that the relative abun-
dance of large used flakes and core fragments found by the palisade were used 
for cutting bark lashing and cordage used in its production. Ethnohistoric ref-
erences indicate that bark could be removed from trees or palisade poles after a 
slow fire had been set under them and warm water poured over them to facili-
tate bark removal with the aid of antler, bone, or wooden chisels. Poles with 
the bark removed would last longer than those with bark, as they would not be 
subject to insect infestation between the wood and the bark, and they would be 
more resistant to decay and rot (Hamell and Rogers 2001; Poplawski et al. 2012).
Beauchamp (1905:111–112) notes, “for a triple stockade . . . but one line of 
post holes was required. The cross poles needed none, and for some stockades 
no holes at all were used . . . A shallow trench, or anything to hold the base 
of the pickets temporarily in position was all that was needed.” Laying the 
auxiliary poles horizontally between the vertical supports explains why many 
Iroquois palisades are defined by shallow post molds and are often considered 
“flimsy” based on archaeological evidence. As an example of the complexity of 
palisade design, the Boland site (ad 1000–1100) palisade consisted of a baffled 
entrance, elevated scaffolds, and protected gateway (Prezzano 1992:435).
In his 1655 account, the Dutch ethnographer Adriaen van der Donck pro-
vides an early description of a Mohawk/Mohican palisade:
First they lay a heavy log on the ground, sometimes with a lighter one on top, 
as wide and as broad as they intend to make the foundation. Then they set 
heavy oak posts diagonally in the ground on both sides to form a cross at the 
upper end, where they are notched to fit tighter together. Next another log is 
laid in there to make a very solid work. The palisades stand two deep and are 
strong enough to protect them from a surprise attack or sudden raid by their 
enemies, but they do not as yet have any knowledge of properly equipping such 
a work with curtains, bastions, and flanking walls, etc. (Donck 2008:83)
In 1666 a French military force observed a Mohawk village that included a 20 
foot (6.1 m) tall, triple palisade, a prodigious hoard of provisions, and an “abun-
dant supply of water they had provided, in bark receptacles, for extinguishing 
the fire when it should be necessary” (Le Mercier 1959:145). Water was stored in 
bark buckets placed along galleries or in watchtowers (Sagard-Théodat 1939:91). 
During Champlain’s voyage made in 1615 to Canada, he describes Iroquois 
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palisades as “well-supplied with gutters, placed between each pair of palisades, 
to throw out water, which they had also under cover, in order to extinguish fire” 
(Champlain 1882:131). Given the flammable nature of Iroquoian villages, storing 
an abundance of water on platforms over wooden palisades would have been 
crucial for putting out fires during attacks (Poplawski et al. 2012).
The average precontact village was relocated about every 25 years as a result 
of depletion of agricultural soil, construction supplies, and firewood (Warrick 
1988:49). Given estimates of limited village occupation for Iroquoian sites 
and a use-life for construction posts between five and eight years, palisades 
would have to be rebuilt from three to eight times during a village’s lifes-
pan (Prezzano 1992:253–256). Palisade maintenance would therefore result in 
removing considerable numbers of decayed posts because the average-sized 
Iroquoian village required approximately 20,000 poles for construction and 
maintenance of long houses and palisades (Finlayson 1985, 1998; Heidenreich 
1971:152). Structural decay and depletion of available timber for suitable posts 
might also have precipitated Iroquoian village abandonment and relocation 
(Warrick 1988:50; 1990). Early French accounts document the transportation 
of house and palisade poles to new settlements upon the abandonment of old 
villages (Prezzano 1992:254).
Experimental archaeology reveals the limitations of Iroquois palisade lon-
gevity. Protective walls constructed of mixed hardwoods, such as beech, maple, 
and oak, had short use-lives. For example, the mixed-hardwood palisades 
at “Crawford Lake and Lawson reconstructed villages rapidly decayed and 
blew down in windstorms only 3 years after construction” (Warrick 1988:49). 
Reconstructions using cedar have much longer use-lives. Longwoods village 
survived for 16 years and was in an excellent state of repair because it received 
annual maintenance, including replacement of unsound posts. Without main-
tenance, cedar posts lasted 29 years at the Huronia village. A reconstructed 
village built of pine and cedar at Cayuga Lake, however was falling apart after 
22 years (Warrick 1988). As was the case with the Lower Mississippi Valley St. 
Francis–type sites, there is a general lack of charred or preserved timbers in 
Iroquoian sites (Warrick 1988:24), suggesting that post removal was routine 
and that charring or other post treatments were not a component of long-term 
maintenance and repair.
Warrick (1988) designed a method for estimating the age of Iroquoian pali-
sades by determining the decay rate of the wood species used in palisade con-
struction. He employed use-life curves and tables for various wood species 
based on their average decay rate and postulated three key assumptions about 
longhouse construction that are applicable to palisades. First, the initial design 
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of construction was recognizable, therefore original and replacement posts 
could be determined. Second, when structures were repaired, the decayed 
posts were replaced almost immediately because all defensive components 
were critical for stability. Third, replacement posts were not inserted into the 
same holes as the original posts, suggesting that decayed post butts were left 
in place. The average use-life of palisade posts at the Boland site would have 
been between four and eight years, but the effective lifespan would have been 
limited, suggesting that actual palisade use-life at a particular village may be 
shorter than estimates based on pole decay rates. Average post use-life is mea-
sured at the point when 60 percent of posts fail due to mechanical stress, but 
it is doubtful that palisade walls would have been allowed to reach the point 
of failure (Prezzano 1992).
Fortified villages in the Northeast present different problems from those 
associated with Mississippian towns. Iroquois fortifications appear flimsy and 
weak from an archaeological perspective, compared to the deep-set and thick 
posts of Mississippian towns, but closer examination reveals a sturdy defense 
system composed of complex entrances, gateways, and scaffolds. As is the 
case with Mississippian fortifications, Iroquois settlements were short-lived, 
and they would have required continual maintenance and repair of posts and 
wall segments to provide protection for village inhabitants. Assessments of 
Northeastern fortifications reveal much about the evolving nature of Iroquoian 
aggression and violence. Research in the Northern Plains offers new perspec-
tives on the ways in which eastern North American communities coped with 
a violent political environment.
The Northern Plains: Proto-Arikara and Proto-Mandan
Plains Village cultures appear on the Middle Missouri River as early as 
ad 1000 ( Johnson 2007a:168), and from the outset fortified villages and skel-
etal trauma are evident. Village farming success at the northern margins of 
plant cultivation was made possible with the warmer climate regime of the 
Medieval Maximum. The competitive edge of Plains villagers was enhanced 
through their exchange with Mississippian cultures to the east; the westward 
expansion of crops, including beans, corn, squash, and sunflower; the adoption 
of the bow and arrow; and the eastward movement of bison (Gibbon 1993; 
Henning 2005). In the Middle Missouri region, violence and warfare can be 
linked to droughts on a decade-to-decade scale. Sites were fortified during 
large-scale or extended periods of droughts and they were not fortified during 
wet intervals (Bamforth 1994, 2006, chapter 1 in this volume; Blakeslee 1994; 
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Brooks 1994; Hollimon and Owsley 1994; Owsley 1994). A culture of aggres-
sion and violence associated with settled farming, along with templates for 
constructing and maintaining defensive systems, may also have accompanied 
a developing farming adaptation. Fortifications consisting of ditches and pali-
sade walls were part of the community plans for these earliest Plains villagers 
(Bamforth 2006), and provide telling evidence for increased levels of commu-
nity protection, intersocietal violence, and military organization.
Woodland-period settlements typically lack fortifications, but once Middle 
Missouri people began to engage in farming, village sites reveal a shift toward 
defensive measures. Violence apparently took the form of small-scale raids 
precipitated by intermittent bouts of feuding. By the eleventh century, feud-
ing and raiding intensify, resulting in lightly fortified villages surrounded by 
ditches. Although these communities consisted of relatively small popula-
tions, confrontations could become severe and violent. Population clustering 
of these earliest village farmers is evident, perhaps representing political alli-
ances among ethnically similar populations (Clark, chapter 12, this volume).
Almost half the sites scattered along the Middle Missouri River and dating 
to the period from circa ad 1000 to 1100 are fortified, suggesting that conflict 
and violence were central concerns. The Sommers site, for example, was ini-
tially unfortified, but in the late eleventh century the inhabitants constructed 
a fortification ditch and palisade around a series of houses at the north end of 
the site. Sommers is an “unusually large site composed of almost 100 houses 
within and outside of a fortification ditch, indicating a consolidation of peo-
ples for mutual defense” ( Johnson 2007a:170). Potential attackers menacing 
Sommers include local hunter-gatherers, Middle Missouri villagers, and resi-
dent Late Woodland groups (Clark, chapter 12, this volume). Neighboring 
Plains villagers probably also threatened these fortified communities because 
they possessed sufficient warriors as well as the organizational capability to 
storm defensive positions with mass assaults. Some hunter-gatherer sites to 
the north, however, were also fortified and their occupants may have been the 
assailants (Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume). In the twelfth century, the forti-
fied Fay Tolton site was the scene of violent confrontation between occupants 
and attackers (Hollimon and Owsley 1994). Also at this time, local population 
clusters fissioned, expanded northward, and became heavily fortified, with 
buffer zones separating them (Clark, chapter 12, this volume).
Evidence from the thirteenth century is clear for three divisions of fortified 
villages consisting of ethnically different populations who occupied the same 
stretch of the Missouri River but who were separated by buffer zones (Clark, 
chapter 12, this volume). By the end of the century, all traces of the Initial 
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Middle Missouri villagers disappear from the archaeological record, perhaps 
as a result of deteriorating climatic conditions, incursions of competing proto-
Arikara (Initial Coalescent) groups from the central Plains and proto- Mandan 
(Extended Middle Missouri) villagers from the north, and disruptions in the 
Cahokia exchange network ( Johnson 2007a:100, 178).
The fourteenth century witnessed strong, fortified towns with large popu-
lations and massed attackers. The massacre of almost 500 Initial Coalescent 
(proto-Arikara) occupants of the Crow Creek site indicates a rise in violence 
(Hollinger, chapter 10, this volume; Willey and Emerson 1993; Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993). Conflict may have been generated by outsiders, such as 
the Oneota who were expanding into the northern Plains from the east, or 
by Caddoan-speaking (Coalescent) central Plains villagers who had recently 
moved into the valley, or by the resident Siouan-speaking (Middle Missouri) 
people who were being forced to move northward, out of the Big Bend region. 
The escalated violence appears to have resulted in some villages becoming 
larger and more compact. These intrusive (Initial Coalescent) settlements 
were fortified by complex and elaborate defenses consisting of ditches, pali-
sade walls, and bastions surrounding the village perimeter (Bamforth, chapter 
1, this volume; Johnson 2007a:178). Bastions are designed to prevent massed 
attackers from breaking down or setting fire to palisades, suggesting that a 
fundamentally different scale of conflict and organizational basis for combat 
was present in the fourteenth century. Village leaders were now able to mobi-
lize large forces and bring together multicommunity alliances.
Zimmerman and Bradley (1993) suggest that these Initial Coalescent com-
munities may have competed with resident Middle Missouri populations for 
horticultural floodplain land. Linkages of an ideology of status, violence, and 
warfare may have brought about changes in dehumanization of the enemy, 
male status, and trophy-taking behavior. Patterns of socialization created an 
ethos of sanctioned violence (Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume). Populations 
throughout the region reestablished their presence as evenly distributed, 
paired fortified villages. Interestingly, one of these pairs consists of two differ-
ent cultural traditions (Coalescent and Middle Missouri), suggesting that alli-
ances are not always structured along cultural or ethnic lines (Clark, chapter 
12, this volume).
By the early 1400s, newly established horticultural sites were open and 
unfortified, with substantial intersocietal interaction. But during the mid- to 
late 1400s, the Middle Missouri communities reaggregated into large forti-
fied towns and witnessed reduced intervillage interaction (Bamforth, chapter 
1, this volume). Two population clusters separated by a buffer zone, situated 
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along the Middle Missouri, apparently represent Siouan-speaking, proto-
Mandan/Hidatsa to the north and Caddoan-speaking proto-Arikara to the 
south. Some type of interethnic rivalry apparently played out between these 
two groups in the form of violent conflict. However, Mitchell (2007) sug-
gests that ancestral Mandan towns may have defended themselves from one 
another in the face of increasing competition for control of exchange net-
works. At the same time, fortified hunter-gatherer sites on the northeastern 
Plains, such as the Shea site, may have been involved in violent confrontations 
with Middle Missouri villagers. These groups may have been proto-Lakota or 
hunter- gatherers located to the west in the Black Hills (Bamforth, chapter 1, 
this volume).
By the later 1400s, community size had increased again, and fortifications 
had become elaborate and widespread in the south, although they appear to 
remain absent in the north. This pattern of fortifying permanent horticul-
tural communities, at least in some regions, continues into the contact period. 
Fortifications ranged from a ditch and palisade set across the neck of a prom-
ontory, to elaborate bastioned walls incorporating chevaux-de-frise obstacles 
(Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume). Buffer zones still remained between divi-
sions, including one that separated two fortified Initial Coalescent commu-
nities. Regionally, there was a trend for dispersal, but locally small clusters 
are also evident (Clark, chapter 12, this volume). Communities appear to 
have remained relatively large and fortified well into the sixteenth-century 
(Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007b:152).
Northern Plains fortifications and warfare have been topics for discussion 
by a number of researchers (Bamforth 1994, 2006; Caldwell 1964; Ewers 1975; 
Henning 2005; Hollimon and Owsley 1994; Kay 1995, 1996, 2007; LeBeau 
2010; Lehmer 1971; Owsley 1994; Robarchek 1994; Willey and Emerson 1993; 
Zimmerman and Bradley 1993). However, the maintenance and durability of 
palisades in the face of limited timber resources has rarely been discussed 
(Griffin 1977; Mitchell, chapter 11, this volume). Construction of a Middle 
Missouri earthlodge village, especially its ditch-and-palisade system, would 
have been an organized and planned community process, requiring the efforts 
of a large workforce to cut and move substantial amounts of timber (Wilson 
1934). Judging from the planned nature of most villages, a settlement would 
have been constructed during a relatively short period, perhaps a few weeks 
or less, and occupied quickly by a substantial, aggregated population. The vil-
lage was probably abandoned as a single event, with many of the inhabitants 
moving simultaneously to construct another village at a new location. It is 
also possible that a new fortified village was built prior to abandonment of 
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the previous settlement. Therefore, large numbers of lodges within a typical 
village may have been abandoned in one village and constructed in another in 
a coordinated and synchronous manner ( Johnson 2007a:57).
Ethnographic reports (Will 1930; Wilson 1934; Weitzner 1979) and data 
obtained from modern earthlodge reconstructions (Ahler 1988) indicate that 
the useful life of an earthlodge is about 20 years or less, due primarily to rot-
ting posts and beams that form the main structural support elements of such 
lodges ( Johnson 2007a:65). If a village were in use for more than about 20 to 
30 years, there should be clear evidence of repairs or replacements ( Johnson 
2007a:65). The norm is for a village to be occupied for a half-century or less, 
perhaps only for a decade or two ( Johnson 2007a:66). In the Big Bend region, 
for example, each village was inhabited for about 30 years. The brief occu-
pation of most Middle Missouri villages is seen as a “response to warfare, 
competition for bottomland suitable for horticulture, timber depletion, and 
the meandering effects of the Missouri River on available floodplain lands” 
( Johnson 2007a:100).
Timber depletion was a primary factor in Middle Missouri village locations 
and movements because non-domestic units, such as palisades, would have 
required considerable amounts of wood for initial construction and subse-
quent maintenance. Building and fortification repair would have continued 
throughout the occupancy of a village, further affecting timber resources. To 
utilize timber in the immediate surroundings most efficiently, villages would 
have been located near young stands of cottonwood and willow, whose con-
stituent elements were dense, had relatively small boles, and were fairly straight 
(Griffin 1977).
Demands for timber in palisade construction may have influenced bastion 
construction at sites along the Middle Missouri, where they were spaced about 
every 54 m (177 ft), almost twice the spacing of Mississippian bastions. Keeley 
et al. (2007) suggest that the distances between Middle Missouri bastions 
resulted from the use of sinew-backed compound and/or composite bows, 
which had a longer cast than the eastern self-bow. “Thus, prehistoric eastern 
North American bastions were spaced at one half the effective range of a 
self-bow at the same time that the intervals between bastions on the Upper 
Missouri were half the effective range of the composite bow” (Keeley et al. 
2007:77). Bastion spacing may have also resulted from scarcity of timber along 
the Missouri River, in addition to the casting abilities of Upper Missouri bows.
Cottonwood (Populus deltoides) and willow (Salix spp.) appear to have been 
the preferred trees used for posts in their respective habitats in the Great 
Plains, but there may not have been many other options in wood choice. 
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Buffalobird-woman (Hidatsa) noted that tobacco garden fences were made 
from diamond willow (Salix spp.) posts (Wilson 1917:126). Cottonwood and 
willow have short use-lifespans and would have required constant palisade 
inspection and repair. Given that Middle Missouri villages were occupied for 
some 30 years or longer, palisade post maintenance and repair would have been 
primary concerns. The earliest description of Middle Missouri defenses comes 
from Jean Baptiste Truteau. He noted in his 1795 journal (Nasatir 2002:295–296):
The Ricaras have fortified their village by placing palisades five feet [1.5 m] high 
which they have reinforced with earth. The fort is constructed in the following 
manner: All around their village they drive into the ground heavy forked stakes, 
standing from four to five feet high [1.2–1.5 m] and from 15 to 20 feet [4.6–6.1 
m] apart. Upon these are placed cross-pieces as thick as one’s thigh; next they 
place poles of willow or cottonwood, as thick as one’s leg, resting on the cross-
pieces and very close together. Against these poles which are five feet [1.5 m] 
high they pile fascines of brush which they cover with an embankment of earth 
two feet [0.6 m] thick; in this way, the height of the poles would prevent the 
scaling of the fort by the enemy, while the well packed earth protects those 
within from their balls and arrows.
Truteau’s account accords well with the archaeological evidence of fortifica-
tions in the Middle Missouri Valley, but this area too presents problems similar 
to those of the Iroquois, who frequently moved their villages. To what extent 
do heavily fortified villages reflect the degree and intensity of conflict and 
violence in the northern Plains? The well-documented development of short-
lived, fortified village farming communities offers important opportunities 
for assessing palisade construction techniques and maintenance requirements. 
Middle Missouri Valley populations shared common ground with Iroquoian 
and Mississippian communities in defense of their communities, but differ-
ences in environment, history, and political organization present challenges 
and intriguing research questions for archaeologists.
dIsCussIon
Throughout eastern North America, the chronology of fortification con-
struction and an appreciation of defensive structure maintenance and repair 
are poorly defined and understood (Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume; Clark, 
chapter 12, this volume; Prezzano 1992). A raft of questions may be posited. 
At what point in the lifespan of a site’s history were fortifications built and 
maintained? How long do fortifications last and how much effort is expended 
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toward construction, maintenance, and repair? Do multiple fortifications rep-
resent contraction or expansion of village dimensions (Clark, chapter 12, this 
volume)? Were posts shortened and then reused in the palisade as supports? 
Were old posts pulled and used as building materials, employed as firewood, 
or simply discarded? Did conflicts erupt among groups over scarce wood 
resources, especially if certain preferred species were desired? Which aspects 
of palisade construction represent engineering compromises concerning effec-
tiveness, expedience, and resource (post) availability? How were structurally 
inadequate logs inspected/tested? Would fortification builders have allowed 
posts to stand until they failed, would they have dug into the decaying post to 
look for unacceptable levels of rot, or would they have replaced posts follow-
ing a predetermined interval based on their prior experiences (Don C. Bragg, 
personal communication, 2013)?
Palisades are often treated as long-standing, durable features, an interpreta-
tion that unfortunately results in the perspective of violence and warfare as 
continuing over protracted periods of time rather than as episodic and limited. 
Based on known durability rates of posts in eastern North America, palisades 
would have required frequent and routine maintenance for long-term viabil-
ity, resulting in considerable effort with construction and maintenance using 
stone adzes, axes, and chisels. Some palisades may have been “expedient con-
structions meant to deter ambushes and sneak attacks in the middle of the 
night or early in the morning” (Hammerstedt 2005:230). Lewis and Kneberg 
(1946:33) suggest that the palisade at the Hiwassee Island site was used only 
at certain times during the site’s occupancy, rather during the entire history.
Many posts, due to rotting, would have been intentionally removed on a 
regular basis, but this would be difficult to assess in the archaeological record 
(Lafferty 1973:109). Rebuilding presents a different archaeological signature. 
For example, the 20,000-log Cahokia palisade was built and then rebuilt four 
different times between ad 1170 and 1300 (Trubitt 2010). As one palisade 
weakened with age, a new one replaced it. During excavation it was possible 
for the excavators to see where portions of a new wall were erected in front 
of an old wall, which was subsequently removed. Thus, a continuous barrier 
was maintained at all times (Iseminger 1990:31). Palisades may also have been 
realigned due to community contractions and expansions. Hammerstedt 
(2005:129–138) records three nested palisades at Annis Village, representing 
successive enlargements of the town over time.
Researchers have attempted to quantify the labor involved in palisade con-
struction (Bigman et al. 2011; Hammerstedt 2005; Iseminger 1990; Krus 2011; 
Lafferty 1973; Milner 1998). Hammerstedt (2005:226–231) calculated the labor 
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required to construct the palisade at Annis Village and found that labor costs 
were similar to those for mound construction. The third and last palisade, 
measuring 277 m (909 ft), required 1,385 posts and took less than 20 days to 
construct. Proportionally more labor was invested in moving and raising posts 
than to fell trees. The time involved in palisade post inspection, planning, and 
replacement was not calculated. Lafferty (1973:98) suggests that “it took an 
estimated 500 to 100,000 man-hours to build 100 linear feet of earth wall 
while it took 50 to 400 man-hours to build a similar section of wood wall.” A 
wooden palisade would require between three and six hours of labor for each 
linear meter (Lafferty1973:93).
Not only were labor demands high, but the need for construction tim-
bers also brought about deforestation, which had a dramatic impact on the 
environment (Chacon and Mendoza 2012:477). During the lifespan of the 
Toqua site on the Little Tennessee River, for example, over 20,000 trees were 
removed from the surrounding forest to build three different palisades during 
various phases of the village occupancy (Davis 2000:30). The Etowah palisade 
stretched along the Etowah River for more than three-quarters of a kilome-
ter. The approximately 5-km palisade constructed around Moundville, located 
on the Black Warrior River, may had as many as 125 square-tower bastions, 
spaced every 35–40 m, each of which was 4 m wide and 7 m deep (Bridges et 
al. 2000:39–40; Dye 2006:114).
In the temperate forests of eastern North America, wood decay is caused 
primarily by fungi, which consume wood fiber when supplied with sufficient 
oxygen and a suitable moisture and temperature regime (Warrick 1988:36). 
Thus, wood posts placed in the earth decay first at the ground line (Krzyzewski 
and Spicer 1974; Krzyzewski et al. 1980:2). In many parts of North America, 
particularly the Southeast, termites can be a major consumer of wood with 
ground contact, while other insects that cause major problems with wood 
degradation include carpenter ants and powderpost beetles (Don C. Bragg, 
personal communication, 2013).
Decay rates of untreated wood are known for many North American 
trees (Blew and Kulp 1964) that were likely used in log palisade construc-
tion: in the Northeast, northern white cedar (Thuja occidentalis); in the lower 
Midwest-Southeast, eastern red cedar ( Juniperus virginiana) and pine; and in 
the Middle Missouri, cottonwood (Populus deltoides) and willow (Salix spp.). 
The rate of decay in eastern North America depends on a number of circum-
stances. Young, fast-growing trees of many species, including bald cypress and 
eastern red cedar, produce sapwood that is prone to predation by insects and 
decay. Heartwood, the most resistant wood type, usually forms later in the 
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growth cycle as the tree moves protective chemical compounds into the dead 
tissues at the center of the stem. Moisture content, salt content, and soil acid-
ity also give rise to increased decay. Too little oxygen, usually, from too much 
water, will slow wood decay, as will soils high in salt content or acidity levels. 
Extremely dry conditions will also slow decay (Don C. Bragg, personal com-
munication, 2013). Soil conditions do not affect post use-life, nor does char-
ring (Prezzano 1992:241; Warrick 1988:39), but decayed posts would have been 
replaced almost immediately, necessitating routine inspection and testing to 
relocate such posts. Most posts would begin to decay from the outer surface 
inward—assuming posts with existing heart rot were not being used. External 
decay is not necessarily indicative of what the internal condition of the wood 
is like. A post may be doughty, punky, or rotted on the outside, yet it may be 
sound in the middle, especially if it has a lot of heartwood (Don C. Bragg, 
personal communication, 2013). In 1973, Lafferty (1973:186) called for long-
terms experiments of palisade walls to “see how they decay when exposed to 
different conditions” and his call is as pertinent today as it was then.
ConClusIon
In this chapter I have suggested that archaeologists consider construction 
episodes, labor planning, long-term maintenance, and resource procurement in 
their discussions of fortifications. Palisades should be examined as artifacts, that 
is, they must be investigated from the perspective of the overall construction 
system, including the process of production and maintenance. Archaeological 
evidence for palisade maintenance is evident at many late prehistoric sites. 
Determining whether posts have been burned, pulled, or rotted in places pro-
vides compelling evidence for maintenance and rebuilding episodes. Thus, the 
use-life of palisades may be correlated with the lifespan of a community and 
the degree of labor and material costs involved in fortification construction.
Evidence presented here suggests that fortifications evolved in step with 
village defensive needs, the offensive capabilities of one’s enemies, and socio-
political organization. Fortifications are cultural artifacts that require actions 
and decisions on the part of their builders. Accumulated skills learned from 
trial and error would have been taught to the next generation. These learned 
skills involved advance planning, labor mobilization, and resources manage-
ment, and were essential to construction and maintenance. The engineers 
who planned and built the multitude of fortifications found throughout the 
eastern Woodlands had to be mindful of the community’s level of defen-
sive needs and their enemies’ offensive level of combat power. As military 
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deployment, organization, and weaponry changed, so did levels of fortifica-
tion sophistication.
The more common and diverse forms of archaeological evidence for vio-
lence are circumstantial or indirect and may include exchange, fortifications, 
iconography, settlement patterns, and weapons. Fortifications, intentionally 
constructed to repel offensive attacks, remain one of the most obvious and 
unambiguous archaeological indicators of severe intercommunity conflict 
(Fontana 2007; Keeley et al. 2007; Lafferty 1973; Milner 2000; Schroeder 2006; 
Trubitt 2003). Unequivocal characteristics of defensive fortifications include 
baffle gates, bastioned palisades, and V-sectioned ditches (Keeley et al. 2007). 
These fortification features have been identified among many, if not most, of 
the late prehistoric cultures in eastern North America (Milner 2000). They 
indicate that, as social organization became more complex, so did the capacity 
for intercommunity aggression and violence. Fortifications are archaeological 
signatures of intersocietal conflict, or at least the potential for conflict, because 
structural defenses indicate elevated levels of warfare. The construction of for-
tifications in eastern North America required considerable knowledge, labor, 
and planning on the part of indigenous engineers. Only a regional perspective 
enables us to investigate the evolution, maintenance, and variability of well-
developed defensive architecture in eastern North America.
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Throughout our world’s history, wars and interpersonal 
conflicts have been an integral part of the human evo-
lutionary experience. There is ample evidence that such 
conflicts often occurred in the Old World on a large 
scale, and this has led to the belief that interpersonal 
conflict is a very human phenomenon in general. In 
short, where there are humans, there will be interper-
sonal conflicts, and populations in the New World were 
not immune from such conflicts that at times led to war. 
Indeed, there is archaeological evidence of interpersonal 
conflict on varying scales, including war, among the great 
civilizations of Central and South America (Palka 2001). 
Archaeological evidence of conflict is also apparent in the 
southwestern and eastern Woodland regions of North 
America (Brose and Greber 1979; Charles and Buikstra 
2006; Dye 2009; LeBlanc 1999; Lee 2004; Mahon 1958; 
Potter 1968; Squier and Davis 1998). Logically, it would 
make sense to assume that there was also precontact 
warfare occurring on the Plains of the United States as 
well. There are ample tribal oral histories and anthro-
pological reports, as well as archaeological evidence that 
contribute to the study of Great Plains warfare during 
both the precontact and postcontact periods.
My goal here is to consider what some of the spe-
cific lines of evidence that archaeologists have often 
used to infer war do and do not tell us about the pres-
ence of war on the Northern Plains—particularly the 
ditches surrounding human settlements, which are 
widely taken as strong evidence for war (Bamforth 1994; 
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Bowers 1992; Caldwell 1964; Denig 1976; Dye 2009; Ewers 1975; Winham et al. 
1994; Keeley et al. 2007; Lehmer 1971; Toom 1992; Wood 2001; Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993). The assumption that these ditches were solely for fortifica-
tion has served as the impetus for this chapter, which addresses the following 
question: is the presence of ditch earthworks primary evidence of prehistoric 
warfare within the Middle Missouri subarea of the Great Plains?
arChaeologICal assessMent of PrehIstorIC 
Warfare on the MIddle MIssourI
What constitutes archaeological evidence of war? Which artifacts and 
associated features are indicative of warfare? On the modern battlefield these 
questions are answered by identifying remnant artifacts used in battle, such 
as armored vehicles, military planes, and high explosives craters, to name a 
few. This is not the case when dealing with prehistoric warfare, due to the 
fact that the tools and weapons used in ancient war in virtually all cases could 
have served dual purposes. An example of such equifinality exists in the case 
of projectile points, which could have been used as readily as hunting imple-
ments or weapons during interpersonal conflict. Because none of the artifact 
types known archaeologically from the Great Plains can be interpreted as 
having an exclusive function as weapons of warfare, archaeologists have been 
forced to rely on other kinds of evidence. This issue compels one to consider 
what other elements of the archaeological record may have a similar lack of 
clarity in terms of purpose and function. For the purposes of this discussion I 
will look at three criteria for identifying prehistoric warfare:
1. Design and frequency of possibly defensive structures
2. Artifact association/distribution 
3. Ostological/Ossuary evidence
Design and Frequency of Ditches
Landscape modification through construction of fortifications has been a 
time-honored indicator of warfare in historical and archaeological contexts 
from the Old World. Keeley et al. (2007) suggest that landscape modification 
that appears defensive in nature was intended to protect the inhabitants from 
attack. In addition, Dye (2009:7) lists ditches as one of the most important 
indirect pieces of evidence for warfare. However, ditches by themselves are not 
necessarily fortifications—in many areas, people dug ditches for practical pur-
poses like irrigation or to mark off ceremonial areas. Defensive ditches typically 
have U- or V-shaped cross-sections, with the earth from the ditch piled on the 
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inside of the ditch and a palisade constructed along the high point formed by 
this earth. More complex fortifications have bastions and most fortified sites 
have some means of restricting access to the site’s interior, often, but not always, 
a baffle gate. (Keeley et al. [2007] discuss all of these features of fortifications in 
detail.) Even when some combination of these features is present, though, we 
need to look to the other criteria for warfare mentioned above—fortifications 
tell us about the potential for violence, not about actual violence.
And even defensive fortifications might possibly reflect reasons for exclud-
ing people from a residential area other than war. This is not to say that dur-
ing the contact period, when early explorers and researchers came to the area, 
these ditch earthworks were not being used as fortification or at least being 
used as barriers to mark a separation between the populations inside and out-
side of the village. It is well-known that trade networks existed before the first 
non-Native explores came to the area and long before Euroamerican settlers 
moved into the area. The Middle Missouri was a trade center because of the 
access to the river and to rare and isolated stone resources such as Knife River 
flint (Winham and Calabrese 1998:285). Like trade goods, ideas and patho-
gens may also have traveled along those routes. Depending on their nature, 
these new ideas or pathogens, rather than physical conflict, may have led to 
the development and redesign of some walled earthworks.
To explain the causes of warfare, Ember and Ember (1992) found that the 
fear of unpredictable future natural disasters (e.g., floods, prolonged droughts, 
and shortened procurement times) in association with population growth will 
generally lead to war. In this view, the fear of nature and the fear of “Others” 
play a key role in understanding the beginnings of warfare (Ember and Ember 
1992:256). Along these lines, Bamforth (2006) also looks to environmental 
conditions as contributing factors in the development and construction of for-
tified villages within the Middle Missouri between ad 900 and 1700, arguing 
that radiocarbon dates can link the construction of fortifications to climatic 
conditions; his analysis suggests that walled earthworks were more prevalent 
in the Middle Missouri region during times of sustained drought (Bamforth 
2006). Based on these results, Bamforth suggest a direct correlation between 
the prevailing climate and the possibility of warfare. The variations of climatic 
episodes on the Plains are not as dramatic as some other worldwide episodes; 
however, as we have recently witnessed in the Great Plains, there were drought 
cycles that lasted a decade (Bamforth 2006). These cycles correlate with the 
ebb and flow in the construction of walled earthworks.
In the American Southwest, LeBlanc (1999:55–56) attributes these changes 
to the possibility of warfare. Similar changes can be seen at numerous sites 
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along the Missouri River, more notably the Sommers site, Fire Heart Creek site, 
Crow Creek village, and Cattle Oiler site. These sites show evidence of possible 
decline in use and reoccupation from ad 900 to 1700. In addition to evidence 
of new earthlodges, the walled earthworks at some sites also show evidence of 
movement. The latter is most evident at the Double Ditch site. Through the 
use of geophysical techniques, two additional concentric ditches, found outside 
of the previously known ditches, have recently been identified. There are two 
possible explanations for the “quadruple ditch” features. First, the ditches may 
show contraction (Kvamme 2007:215–216). This does not appear to be due to 
warfare but was perhaps a reaction to depopulation caused by European-borne 
diseases, such as smallpox. Alternatively, the multiple ditches at Double Ditch 
may indicate repeated construction episodes linked to the growth of the village. 
As more people came to the village site, the old barricade had to be moved and 
enlarged to accommodate the new arrivals. Again, if we look to the Southwest 
as an example, this type of population movement may be the result of climatic 
change and/or conflict (LeBlanc 1999:56–68).
Keeley and his colleagues suggest that the presence of a fortification ditch 
with bastions is proof positive of warfare and argues further that ditches with 
V- or U-shaped cross-sections are very strong evidence of war (Keeley et al. 
2007). Keeley’s research on Old World and New World archaeological sites 
has led him and his colleagues to classify certain construction characteristics 
as clear indicators of defensive fortification. Bastions are fairly widespread in 
the Dakotas (Lehmer 1971), but they are far from universal: many ditches lack 
them and they are often absent in postcontact sites, a period when we know 
that conflict was very common.
Keeley et al. also suggest that the shape of the defensive trenches is a cal-
culated engineering choice designed to prevent penetration of the village, and 
that by looking to the cross-sections of these ditches, a researcher can distin-
guish the function as fortification. For example, Keeley suggests if a ditch’s 
cross-section shows a deep V-shape (> 1 m) with high-angle sidewalls it was 
intended for fortification, while a ditch with a shallow (< 1 m) trapezoidal 
profile and low-angle sidewalls is representative of a function other than for-
tification (Keeley et al. 2007:58). Ditch profiles can be modified by postdepo-
sitional erosion and different sediments may lend themselves more readily to 
a classic defensive shape, but the characteristics Keely et al. specify are impor-
tant. Within my research area, ranging from the mouth of the White River 
to the mouth of the Yellowstone River, the ditch cross-sections show vari-
ability between V-shaped and trapezoidal profiles (figure 6.1). Many ditches 
are indeed V- or U-shaped, but some vary in shape from section to section 
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(compare, for example, Wood’s [1967] ditch profiles in Maps 16 and 17). Some 
profiles may be altered by erosion, but the diversity of forms nevertheless 
could suggest multiple reasons for digging ditches.
Heaping the earth from the interior of the ditch and building a palisade in 
that pile of earth is also strong evidence for a concern with defense. Artificial 
heaps of earth are more susceptible to erosion than the natural ground sur-
face, and such erosion can eliminate evidence for a palisade. Seeing a pali-
sade also requires excavation sufficiently far into the interior of the site to 
locate it—at Huff, for example, the palisade appears to have been set a meter 
or more inside the trench. At this site Wood (1967:54, 57) also documents a 
second row of posts around a bastion that may be defensive, but notes that 
neither of the two long excavations of the palisade were wide enough to see 
if this extended around the entire circumference of the site. With this cau-
tion in mind, it remains true that there are sites in the Middle Missouri with 
ditches but no remaining trace of a palisade (e.g., Fay Tolton; Wood 1976).
We can also consider the frequencies of sites with and without fortifications 
as evidence for warfare. If ditches are evidentiary proof of conflict, then an 
area that is relatively densely populated should have an abundance of fortified 
villages. In the Middle Missouri this is simply not the case. When one looks 
at the number of villages with ditched earthworks through time, it becomes 
apparent that there are far more villages without ditch structures. A χ2 test and 
a likelihood ratio test were performed, to demonstrate this statistically. Using 
data that represent a long span of time, it is possible to look for correlations 
concerning fortification patterns over time and between different traditions 
and Middle Missouri variants.
The dataset was compiled from an electronic database maintained by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The database contained 
all known archaeological resources within the Omaha District. The Omaha 
District contains the six mainstem dams that run along the Missouri River. 
The USACE’s GIS database incorporates cultural resources managment GPS 
data for accuracy. Included in this database are different attributes for each site. 
These include Cultural Affiliation (five categories), Attribute (site number), 
Site type (three categories), Elevation, Condition, Resource Management, 
Recommendations, Impact (three categories), Site Name, Project Location 
(lake location), Lake State, and County.
I queried the database to find all sites that had earthlodge, village, earth-
lodge village, fortification, fortified village, depressions, dugout, cache pits. I 
chose to run a query on multiple searches due to the different reporting styles 
archaeologists have used throughout time on the Missouri River mainstem. 
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Figure 6.1. Profiles of five ditches 
from villages located along the 
Missouri River in North and 
South Dakota: (A) Huff village 
(after Wood 1961:Map 11); (B) 
Crow Creek village inner ditch 
(after Kivett and Jensen 1976:17); 
(C) Fay Tolton (after Cottier and 
Cottier 1976:4); (D) Crow Creek 
village outer ditch (after Kivett 
and Jensen 1976:17); and € Dodd 
site (after Lehmer 1954:7). 
I tried to be all encompassing in my query in order to gain the most data. I 
copied the results of the query into SPSS.
The null hypothesis for this test states that there is no difference between 
time period and fortification patterns in the Middle Missouri region (or H0: 
Vg = Ft, where Vg = Village and Ft = Fortification). In order determine what 
statistical test would be the most appropriate, I ran a crosstabs to check the 
validity of my data with a chi-square and likelihood ratio test.
With a total number of 579 cases, which were separated into nine catego-
ries, the results of the chi-square test show that with a chi-square value of 
54.63, degrees of freedom of 8, and the probability value of less than 0.001 
(p = < .001), it is extremely unlikely that the differences noticed are due 
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the vagaries of sampling. As the graph in figure 6.2 illustrates, there is a 
disparity between the number of fortified and unfortified villages. When 
viewing these results one must keep in mind the issues with the dataset as 
well as the fact that more testing should be done and more analyses using 
data sources other than the USACE are needed to cross-check the results. 
But for an archaeologist on the ground, the fact of the matter is there are 
far more village sites without ditch structures than there are with ditches. 
Which leads back to the fundamental question: what is the use and function 
of these earthworks?
Figure 6.2. Number of sites with and without fortifications by taxonomic unit. IMMV, 
Initial Middle Missouri Variant; EMMV, Extended Middle Missouri Variant; TMMV, 
Terminal Middle Missouri Variant; MMIC, Middle Missouri Coalescent; MMEC, 
Middle Missouri Extended Coalescent. 
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Perhaps the answer lies in oral tradition. One of the central figures in 
Mandan oral tradition is the Lone Man. In one of the stories, Lone Man 
built a corral made of cedar to protect a village from an oncoming flood. This 
later turned into a symbol of the village, in which a planked wall made of 
cottonwoods surrounded a red cedar that symbolized Lone Man (Bowers 
2004:113, 161–163). It is possible that this symbol of the village also served as a 
fortification to protect the village from water and attackers, while symbolizing 
Mandan oral tradition.
Artifact Association/Distribution
Artifact association and distribution are obvious and important indicators 
of all types of behavioral patterns in the archaeological record, including pat-
terns of conflict. Because prehistoric populations did not make weapons solely 
for interpersonal conflict per se, the distribution and association of common 
artifact types should play a relevant role in any interpretation of conflict. For 
example, if there are numerous projectile points on either side of a ditch, an 
interpretation of conflict may be warranted (see Keeley [1996:18–19] for an 
example of this). Conversely, if one finds an abundance of household refuse, 
such as broken pottery, butchered animal bones, charred seeds, and other broken 
utensils, this could indicate the ditch was used as a landfill for unwanted refuse.
To test for prehistoric warfare, artifact distribution research was conducted 
to compare the types of artifacts found within the ditch versus those located 
inside a house structure. The test was intended to identify a distinction 
between projectile-point deposition versus other types of chipped-stone arti-
facts, specifically end scrapers. In general, if one sees a much greater number 
of projectile points within and around the ditch earthworks than within the 
house context, one can assume that there may have been some activity requir-
ing the use of projectile points occurring around the ditch. Such a disparity 
could be considered as evidence of prehistoric warfare.
The first site in this analysis is the Molstad Village (39DW234), which is 
located on the T2 terrace just above the floodplain of the Missouri River 
in north-central South Dakota. The site has been dated to ad 1400–1500 
( Johnson 2007a:178–181) and is the earliest village within the northern tier 
of the Middle Missouri to have rectangular rather than circular earthlodges 
(Hoffman 1967:46). This village has a ditch structure that surrounds the entire 
settlement, with evidence that a palisade was erected on the village side of the 
ditch. This analysis focuses on four test units from the original excavations. 
These are XU 4, which bisects the northern portion of the ditch; XU 1, which 
DITCHES OR EARTHWORKS 185
bisects the ditch and palisade at the southern end of the site; Feature 7, which 
excavated the bastion feature; and house 2, which lies near the center of the 
village. A comparison of artifact distribution is drawn by looking at these 
excavations within four key areas of the site (Hoffman 1967).
The second site analyzed is the Fay Tolton site (39ST11). Fay Tolton is 
located on a T2 terrace ridge overlooking the Missouri River floodplain in the 
central part of South Dakota. Unlike the Molstad site, the ditch structure does 
not encompass the entire site. This is most likely due to the location of the site 
on a toe ridge surrounded by deep drainages on three sides. Therefore, only a 
single linear ditch was constructed across the toe ridge, perpendicular to the 
drainages. Also unlike the Molstad site, Fay Tolton does not have a palisade. 
This analysis focuses on two excavation areas, including the ditch earthwork 
and House 2 (Wood 1976).
Table 6.1 shows the results of the testing for artifact distribution at Molstad 
and Fay Tolton. Based on the results of this analysis it is apparent that the 
ditches contained fewer artifacts, compared to the house contexts. More 
important, few projectile points were found within or near the ditch structures, 
which does not support the idea that conflict took place at these locations. 
Feature 7 at the Molstad site is interesting because the excavation is specifically 
of the bastion feature. Normally bastions are strongholds within a fortification 
for defenders to protect the outer side of the wall (Keeley et al. 2007). Feature 
7 did have one projectile point but it also contained two end scrapers. One 
would expect that if the bastion were built for a defensive purpose there would 
be more projectile points or chipped-stone debitage recovered at the location. 
Though a formal analysis of debitage was not made, a preliminary look at the 
data showed limited amounts of chipped-stone debris.
Osteology
Osteological and ossuary evidence present a more direct indicator of inter-
personal conflict than landscape modification. If the skeletal remains show 
evidence of blunt-force and/or sharp-force trauma, then it could be more 
confidently assumed that interpersonal conflict did take place. Once again, 
researchers have to be cautious of wholesale assumptions relating all evidence 
of trauma with warfare. There are other explanations for the existence of such 
evidence, such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, and ancestor worship (Ewers 
1975; Bowers 1992 and 2004).
Skeletal evidence of violent death is the most dramatic evidence of warfare, 
and it is present in the Middle Missouri. However, although it is dramatic, it 
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Table 6.1. Molstad (39DW234) and Fay Tolton (39ST11) artifacts by location
Excavation Projectile Points End Scrapers Total
Molstad (39DW234)
XU 1 (Ditch) 0 0 0
XU 2 (Ditch) 6 16 22
XU 4 (Ditch) 0 0 0
Feature 7 (Ditch) 1 2 3
House 1 10 22 32
House 2 7 6 13
House 4 1 2 3
House 6 1 2 3
House 7 13 32 45
Total 39 82 121
Fay Tolton (39ST11)
Ditch 0 0 0
House 1 6 3 9
House 2 7 4 11
Total 13 7 20
is not widespread. Many communities in this region seem to have disposed 
of the dead in archaeologically invisible ways, making it difficult to search for 
osteological data. However, two sites in particular illustrate notable osteologi-
cal evidence of warfare. The most famous is site 39BF11 (Crow Creek), which 
contained a mass burial with human remains showing evidence of sharp-force 
and blunt-force trauma, scalping or trophy-taking, and nutritional deficien-
cies (Gregg and Gregg 1987; Willey 1990). Human remains deposited within 
a ditch show clear osteological evidence for interpersonal conflict (Bamforth 
1994; Kivett and Jensen 1976; Willey 1990; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993).
The second site is Fay Tolton (39ST11), where bodies on the floor and in 
open-cache pits of burned houses imply a similar successful attack (Hollimon 
and Owsley 1994:346–347; Wood 1976; Lehmer 1971). At Fay Tolton, evi-
dence that has been attributed to warfare is based on the discovery of recently 
deceased individuals lying unburied on the floor of a burned house (one of 
them with a projectile point embedded in her lower leg) and an individual 
missing his head and several cervical vertebra who was slumped in an empty 
cache pit in another house. Past violence at this site is suggested by infected 
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scalping marks on a child and healed cranial fractures on an adult male 
(Hollimon and Owsley 1994).
Despite this evidence, the presence of trophy-taking at the site may be over-
stated. One individual (burial 3) was mostly intact, except that the skull and 
mandible were missing, which has traditionally been attributed to trophy- 
taking (Lehmer 1971:101; Butler 1976:29). However, there is an alternative 
explanation to warfare found in ethnographic sources that may explain the 
missing skull. The Mandan have clan bundles and these bundles contain 
fetishes that sometimes include human remains, most notably skulls (Bowers 
2004, 1992). Another individual (Burial 1C), was found with both hands miss-
ing, once again with an interpretation that suggests that these were trophies. 
But the lack of butchering marks on the remaining extremities is inconsistent 
with identified hand removal from other sites. The missing appendages may 
be the result of postdepositional processes (Hollimon and Owsley 1994:348), 
although the analysts who identified this pattern think this is unlikely.
dIsCussIons and ConClusIons
The criteria discussed in this chapter were developed to determine what 
archaeological evidence for prehistoric warfare exists within the Middle 
Missouri region. There is no doubt that there was war in that region, but con-
sidering the multiple lines of evidence examined here shows the limitations 
on our ability to understand when, where, and why Middle Missouri com-
munities fought one another. The multifunctionality of many of the artifacts 
that can cause blunt-force and sharp-force trauma, and therefore can be inter-
preted as weapons of war, precludes the simple reliance on the presence of 
these items as proof positive of interpersonal conflict. This is true to a lesser 
extent about the existence of the ditch earthworks, as well as any of the other 
criteria discussed above. However, when we can see multiple criteria together, 
it becomes far more reasonable to investigate the possibility further that pre-
historic warfare did occur at a particular location. I have shown that there are 
very few cases where we can do this.
Despite the abundance of land on the Plains, preindustrialized farming 
is limited to floodplains; consequently, resource limitations and periods of 
reduced crop yields forced villages to relocate. But the question follows as to 
what happens when a new population comes into the area? Historically, con-
flict ensues as competition for resources escalates and this combined with a 
fear of “Others” can play a significant role in the development of conflict (see 
Ember and Ember 1992). We know that new populations have moved into the 
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Middle Missouri repeatedly, including farmers from the central Plains in the 
1300s, hunter-gatherers from the Midwest in the 1700s, and Euroamericans 
from the 1600s onward. In an environment of limited resources, migrations 
like these can set the stage for conflict. However, we need to look closely at 
the evidence to see if and when conflict actually occurred, and to keep in mind 
other kinds of interactions and other ways of solving human problems.
The goal of this chapter is not to dispute the notion that the ditches sur-
rounding some Great Plains villages could have been used for defensive pur-
poses. Instead, the purpose is to assess whether or not the ditches themselves 
can function as stand-alone evidence to prove that prehistoric warfare took 
place. Generally speaking, people have always participated in some sort of 
interpersonal conflict and Ember and Ember (1992), along with Bamforth 
(2006), may be correct in that the environment often plays a major role in the 
development of such conflicts. Ditches encircling settled villages are the most 
obvious evidence that archaeologists have linked to war, but they do not by 
themselves tell us much about war. People dug ditches for more than one rea-
son, and, even when they dug them for defense, ditch-and-palisade perimeters 
could take on meanings that went far beyond the simple prospect of violence. 
Building defenses in anticipation of being attacked is also very different from 
actually being attacked, and I have shown that there are very few sites in the 
Middle Missouri where we know attacks occurred. Furthermore, the majority 
of settled communities in the Middle Missouri do not show evidence of for-
tification, and it is just as important to understand this as to understand sites 
that do show this evidence.
As with many research problems, the goal is not to answer the question 
unequivocally but to add to the discussion of the topic. I do think that calling 
these ditched earthworks “fortifications” is an error in our vocabulary with 
associated assumptions that archaeologists need to address. Ultimately, we do 
not know if these ditches were used solely for fortification or if there were 
other uses, nor what those alternative uses may have been. Based on the study 
presented herein, if one looks to the artifact distribution the ditches could be 
interpreted as communal middens. The existing data are skewed due to archae-
ological techniques used during Smithsonian Institution River Basin Surveys 
and the fact that research questions beyond simply working out regional cul-
ture history were not well developed. At the time that many of these villages 
were excavated, archaeologists simply felt that there was a need to gather as 
much information as possible, with the hope that they would be analyzed at a 
later date. Unfortunately, this is still a work in progress and there are numer-
ous collections awaiting analysis. Going forward, a primary goal needs to be 
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to conduct this research addressing the kinds of issues discussed in this study.
Ditches could have served a multitude of purposes and I have developed 
two functional categories that these ditched earthworks could possibly fit. The 
first is a “social” function. The category encompasses social and ceremonial 
activities that could be associated with the construction of a group project. 
We can see these types of social and ceremonial projects occurring in the 
Scioto River valley of Ohio with Hopewell culture and also with the platform 
mounds of the Mississippian culture (Neusius and Gross 2007). The second 
category is “functional” in the utilitarian sense. This category encompasses the 
practical purposes for having a ditch that surrounds the village. Examples of 
this could include serving as a borrow pit for earth to construct earthlodges, a 
drainage system to channel water and/or waste away from the village, a mid-
den to dispose of material waste, or a constructed landscape that would pro-
mote growth of certain plants in order to promote the domestication of these 
types of plants (Neusius and Gross 2007; Bleed 2006).
Perhaps the answers are found in native oral tradition. The Lone Man sto-
ries point to one possibility. Of course this is speculative and, in the end, more 
research is needed to answer the question: What are these ditched earthworks 









Constructions interpreted as fortifications are rare, 
if not nonexistent, on the Plains until the Late 
Prehistoric period, after ad 900/1000 (see Schroeder, 
chapter 9, this volume). Even so, fortification is pre-
dominantly a northern Plains phenomenon, being 
quite rare on the central and southern Plains as far as 
we presently know. Reasons for why sites are fortified 
are numerous. Explanations for northern Plains forti-
fication include climatic deterioration that decreased 
food supplies and increased conflict (Bamforth 2006). 
Limited arable land, combined with a growing popu-
lation, is another proposed explanation (Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993). Ethnic conflict though is perhaps 
the more common reason given for northern Plains 
conflict and hence for the need to fortify as well. 
This conflict may occur between hunter-gatherers 
and Middle Missouri–, Coalescent-, and Oneota-
tradition farmers. But, more often conflict is posited 
to be between the farming groups (Caldwell 1964:2–3; 
Hollinger 2005; Johnson 2007a:218; Keeley 1996:56–
57). Regardless, all of these problems also were 
occurring on the central and southern Plains, but 
fortification seldom was used.
Outside the Plains, fortification is seen as occur-
ring for all of the reasons cited for the northern 
Plains as well as for yet other reasons (Allen and 
Arkush 2006:14; Emerson 2007:130; Keeley 1996:56–57; 
Milner 2007:197–198; Topic and Topic 2009:52–54; 
Trubitt 2003). Cross-culturally, frequent internal 
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(same cultural group) conflict correlates with village fortification (Otterbein 
2004:192). The basic logic for construction of fortifications, which is often 
implied but only occasionally explicitly stated, is that conflict intensified to 
some point where fortification became necessary (i.e., Arkush 2009:198–200; 
Dye 2009:11, 146–148; Dye and King 2007:162; Emerson 2007:135–137; Inomata 
and Triadan 2009:66–69; Jones 2004:7; Keeley 1996:55–56; Lambert 2007:211; 
Lovisek 2007:63, 72; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998:25, 32–36; Otterbein 
2004:192–193; Solometo 2006:30–31, 33–34, 36–37, 51–52; Topic and Topic 
2009:52–53). The degree of social complexity is sometimes suggested to affect 
fortification decisions, with less-complex societies having less-intense warfare 
and therefore resorting less often to fortification. At the other end of the 
social scale, political centers may be fortified, or fortification may be entirely 
unnecessary because of military size and distribution. Exceptions would be 
outposts and frontiers (Arkush 2011:63–66). Fortification also is sometimes 
attributed to attacks that are not predictable (Solometo 2006:53). The question 
addressed below is why people come to a decision that conflict has reached the 
point that it is necessary for them to fortify.
defInIng fortIfICatIon for thIs study
There are lots of different types of fortifications. These include walls that 
run for substantial distances, like Hadrian’s Wall and the Great Wall of China. 
Substantially built walls and towers once surrounded many European cities. 
Trench systems and discontinuous lines of military weaponry and facilities 
(such as the Maginot Line) played important roles in World Wars I and II. 
Military forts are common features of most state-level societies. Apart from 
large, state-level projects there are smaller fortifications. Many fortifications 
around the world were designed to protect single small settlements or to pro-
vide refuge for people in several such settlements. What a fortification defends 
can include a group of soldiers, a resident population or the population within 
a general area, elites, noncombatants, and property, including stored foods, 
livestock, and symbols of identity and/or authority (Dye 2009:101, 145–146; 
Ingram 2012; Keeley 1996:56; Klingelhofer 2010; Milner 2007:187–189).
The discussion that follows refers specifically to fortifications involving a 
system of walls, usually surrounded by a trench, following Keeley et al.’s (2007) 
discussion. This system of walls and trenches encloses either wholly or par-
tially a settlement or village and/or provides refuge to people residing in an 
area during conflict. If a wall-and-trench system is only a partial enclosure, 
the remaining perimeter is usually a natural feature involving a steep drop-off, 
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like a riverbank or bluff. While these fortifications usually involve one or more 
stockades or palisades, they can also consist of just a series of trenches. The 
main feature is that they provide loci around which conflict can center.
Obviously, construction of walls can occur for more reasons than just con-
flict with outsiders. Social differences within a resident group can involve 
walls that separate such groups from one another. Elites not uncommonly 
wall themselves off from some section of the populace. A walled enclosure 
can also serve as a corral into which to drive bison or pen horses (Halsall 
2003:215; Keeley et al. 2007). In addition, I have tried to select examples where 
it is known, either from written documents or material remains, that external 
conflict was occurring.
funCtIons and Costs of fortIfICatIon
Fortification is primarily a defensive weapon, reflecting a perception of threat 
by the leadership of a political entity and/or the population as a whole (Allen 
and Arkush 2006:7; Dye 2009:11; Keeley 1996:56; Pauketat 2009:255; Topic and 
Topic 2009:52). That is not to deny that fortification also has an offensive ele-
ment—essentially an intimidation value. However, its intimidation value must 
come from the presence of conflict, as otherwise building a fortification seems 
more likely to be viewed as an odd activity with little inherent meaning (Allen 
2006:198; Dye 2009:148; Eames 2011:65; Keeley 1996:57; Pauketat 2009:255).
Assuming that defenders are within a fortification, the fortification protects 
defenders as well as others and provides defenders an advantage. It causes 
attackers to focus on one or only a few locations, such as gates or entryways. 
The offense is then massed and more accessible to the defense. In addition the 
fortification is an obstacle to the offense and they must attempt to overcome 
it. In trying to breach a fortification the attacker’s combat power is dissipated 
and their chance for success is lessened. Fortification further aids the defense 
by obscuring details on defensive numbers and positions. All of these things 
maximize defensive efforts and make it easier for defenders to inflict casualties 
on attackers. In effect, fortification reduces the number of defenders needed 
for successful protection (Eames 2011:65–67; Keeley 1996:56; Mearsheimer 
1989:57–58; Pauketat 2009:255).
At the same time, there are downsides to fortification. Fortification con-
centrates the defender population, too. Should the fortification be breached 
or compromised in some way or the defending population somehow be weak-
ened, those inside can suffer higher losses because of limited escape options 
(Eames 2011:65; Solometo 2006:45; Topic and Topic 2009:52). A population 
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that must stay near its fortified location can suffer from limited opportunities 
to forage, hunt, or farm. Internal and external social relations may suffer from 
consequences of stress and social inequality may increase (Dye 2009:12, and 
chapter 5 in this volume; Solometo 2006:36–37; Vehik 2002).
Fortification is also an expensive undertaking (Dye 2009:11; Keeley 
1996:55–56; Solometo 2006:36–37, 52; see also Schroeder, chapter 9, this vol-
ume). Construction and maintenance requires investment of time, labor, and 
resources (Topic and Topic 2009:52 and Dye, chapter 5, this volume). Plains 
fortifications involved trenches or ditches that were greater than a meter deep 
and wide. The interior edge of a trench usually had, or is assumed to have had, 
a palisade constructed of wooden posts. These posts had to be cut, transported, 
and set into the ground. On the Plains, wood can be a limited and quickly 
exhausted resource. Additional construction features such as bastions and mud 
plaster expand the construction effort, as do the pits excavated at many sites in 
association with trenches (see Drass et al., chapter 8, this volume). The greater 
the length of a fortification, the more the construction effort and some Plains 
fortifications ran for more than a kilometer (Caldwell 1964). Many fortifica-
tions also were not a one-time effort as at least some on the northern Plains 
were allowed to lapse and then were built again. Multiple fortifications at a 
site are not uncommon; prominent examples include Double Ditch (32BL8) 
in North Dakota with at least four fortification events and Bryson-Paddock 
(34KA5) in Oklahoma with a minimum of four (see Drass et al., chapter 8, 
this volume and chapters in this volume discussing Crow Creek). While some 
facilities with multiple fortifications may reflect the expansion or contraction 
of fortification, it is possible all were in use at the same time. Finally, fortifica-
tion takes labor away from other tasks or, more exactly, increases the amount 
of labor in which people have to engage.
In sum, fortification is an expensive defensive weapon. Substantial labor 
and materials are required. The more elaborate the fortification, the greater the 
engineering required. For instance, the value of bastions is to provide overlap-
ping fire lest the attacker dig under or go through locations where fire does 
not overlap. Engineering must take that into account. Decisions that a loca-
tion needed fortification and needed certain kinds of fortification were likely 
products of careful consideration.
fortIfICatIons and PoWer relatIons
As noted above, one of the proposed functions of fortification is to reduce 
the number of defenders needed for a successful defense. Some anthropologists 
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see fortifications as “tipping the balance of regional power relations” (Pauketat 
2009:255 see also Allen and Arkush 2006:7). That is, fortification increases the 
chance for a successful defense by increasing defensive numbers. Regardless 
of whether the view is one of being able to get by with fewer defenders or to 
increase the number of defenders, the point is that fortification increases the 
chance of a successful defense by altering defensive strength relative to that of 
the offense or attacker. While ratios of defenders to attackers are not directly 
addressed in anthropological discussions of fortification, generalizations can 
sometimes be found (Dye 2009:145). New Zealand pa fortifications were 
occasionally sacked by “direct and overwhelming” assault (Allen 2006:198). 
LeBlanc (2006:443) suggests that in tribal and chiefdom societies the attack-
ing group will leave part of their force at home for defensive purposes. In 
consequence, the attacking group typically will be smaller than the defensive 
group, thereby favoring the defense.
So, if a fortification shows evidence of being breached, the general assump-
tion is that an overwhelming force was involved. The discussion that follows 
tries to quantify generally what “overwhelming” might involve and then to 
look at what that could say about sociopolitical relations at the time. The 
emphasis here is on “could.” That is, quantifying the notion of “overwhelming” 
expands and directs the kinds of questions we can ask about the nature of con-
flict and the associated sociopolitical dynamics. It is not an answer to anything 
in and of itself. The basic argument is that fortifications were actually built to 
keep power relations between the defender and attacker below a certain level. 
It is proposed that fortifications will be constructed when the ratio of attack-
ers to defenders reaches the point at which defenders perceive the possibility 
of being overwhelmed, not as a rare event, but as a likely to highly likely event.
Possibly the earliest written source on what it takes to overwhelm or defeat 
an enemy dates from 403 to 221 bc, the Warring States period, in China. 
The author(s) of that document note an attacking force should do different 
things, depending on the ratio of attackers to defenders, beginning with 10:1 
and moving down. It concludes with: “If you are in no way your enemy’s 
match, avoid contact. A small force tenaciously resisting will be captured 
by a large force” (Tzu 2011:19). While the last two sentences do not state a 
ratio, the first implies less than 1:1 and the last simply a much greater number 
of attackers. In the early nineteenth century, Napoleon considered an army 
supported by a fortress or river to be unconquerable if the ratio of offense to 
defense was 2:1 or less (Phillips 1940:435). Other military strategists from the 
early nineteenth century also stressed the importance of numerical superior-
ity (Handel 2001:157–163).
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There are many modern approaches or theories about what is needed to 
defeat an enemy. One approach is numerical preponderance: that is, the side 
with the greatest numbers will commonly win. A second argues that the side 
with the more advanced technologies will prevail. Other approaches address 
multiple factors, including the preceding but also many other things, such 
as tactics and morale. Some try to model the entire dynamics of a conflict 
(Biddle 2004:2–3, 5, 14–19, 27; Epstein 1989). However, without extensive writ-
ten records it is almost impossible to address such things as leadership, tac-
tics, and dynamics with any accuracy. For the most part, the discussion below 
involves conditions of more-or-less technological parity, although inequalities 
are considered in some of the discussion. So, for these reasons the following 
discussion centers on the issue of numerical preponderance.
Numerical preponderance advocates commonly use a 3:1 ratio of attackers 
to defenders. While the ratio often refers to personnel, it can be of weapons or 
other things instead. Discussion from this point on refers to numbers of people. 
The basic idea is that the number of attackers to defenders should approach 
and usually exceed 3:1 in favor of attackers for a defending group to be over-
whelmed, captured, or massacred. This is known as the 3:1 Rule, or Rule of 
Thumb. The rule is used in modern military planning (Robertson 1987:138–139). 
However, there is definitely debate on its utility and accuracy as well (Biddle 
2004:14–17; Dupuy 1979:13; Epstein 1989:91–93; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998:75 
and n91; Kress and Talmor 1999; Luttwak 2001:142; Mearsheimer 1989:65; 
Robertson 1987:138–139).
The origin of the rule is not clear. It seems to come out of military experi-
ences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Epstein 1989:97n20; 
Mearsheimer 1989:59n14). At this point, one can argue about the difference 
between relatively modern warfare and that associated with Native peoples of 
the Great Plains. However, the ratio has been used to discuss early medieval 
warfare that, while it still involves technological differences, is more similar to 
Native American conflict (Bachrach 2002:80). The ratio also may have been a 
known norm in medieval times (Bachrach 2002:82).
Regardless of the origin of this rule or its association with modern warfare, 
it is evident from the last 2,000+ years of written documents that people have 
long had concerns about the size of opposing forces and what it takes for an 
offense to overwhelm and defeat a defense, and that seems to involve an offense-
to-defense ratio of 3:1 or greater. Since the rule is not a universal, it could be 
questioned whether sufficient knowledge existed of opposing-force strengths 
for the ratio to be of use to Native peoples of the Great Plains. Certainly Native 
North Americans were aware that numerical superiority was desirable to win 
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conflicts (Handel 2001:115, 155, 159, 363, 411; Heuser 2010:93, 96). Equally, being 
outnumbered prompted concern for defense (Heuser 2010:96–97, 150). Native 
Americans scouted their enemies and traded with them as well. The calumet 
ceremony is a perfect example of an opportunity to assess another’s strength 
(Fletcher 1996). Native peoples certainly assessed strength relations while con-
ducting ceremonies and trading, to say nothing of conducting scouting expedi-
tions. Ceremonies and socializing among men, particularly within the context 
of war or military societies, often focused on planning attacks and assessing 
outcomes (Murie and Parks 1981). Thus, successes and failures were repeatedly 
reviewed. Middle Missouri–, Coalescent-, and Oneota-tradition sites demon-
strate that fortifications were built, allowed to lapse, and then rebuilt. This can-
not be a random event. Something prompted such activities. People had to be 
aware of numerical strengths and any potential differences that might result in 
their being overwhelmed. Was that relationship exactly 3:1 or greater always? 
No, human behavior is too complex to be determined by only one thing all the 
time, if ever (Biddle 2004:69–72, 86–89, 227–228; 2007; Davis 1995:16; Dupuy 
1979:11–13, 108–109, 123, figure 3–1; Handel 2001:163–164). But the 3:1 ratio or 
something very close to it has a long history cross-cutting different technol-
ogies and provides a useful guideline by which to explore the sociopolitical 
framework for fortification on the Plains and by small-scale societies elsewhere.
The 3:1 rule most directly refers to local superiority and to frontal or head-
on attacks against entrenched defenders (Biddle 2004:15; Davis 1995:4–5, 16–17; 
Luttwak 2001:142; Mearsheimer 1989:54, 62). The defender is expected to do 
the bulk of fighting from prepared positions, including fortifications, and to 
make little use of counterattack (Davis 1995:25; Mearsheimer 1989:63, 65). This 
situation for the Plains is most similar to fortified villages and refuges.
An attacker requires a large numerical superiority to break through a defense 
that is comparable in quality (Mearsheimer 1989:58). As the principal Plains 
weapons were bows and arrows with similar sizes and shapes of arrowheads, it 
seems unlikely that differences in technology were present. For the Plains, dif-
ferences in the possession of the horse and gun (not readily quantifiable) poten-
tially could alter outcomes. These are considered below in some of the examples. 
For this analysis these other factors that make up “quality” will be considered 
equal, so the standard caveat “all other things being equal” is relevant.
PlaIns Warfare and fortIfICatIon
Peace and conflict are sometimes seen as flip sides of a coin. Following 
that logic, some researchers argue that the lack of fortifications reflects the 
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presence of peace (Dye 2009:16; Pauketat 2009:257). However, such is not 
the case (Otterbein 2004:18, 192–193), as will be demonstrated below. While 
fortification appears to be lacking until the Late Prehistoric period on the 
Plains, conflict does not just suddenly begin after ad 900. It was clearly taking 
place long before that (Lambert 2007:212–214; Miller 2008:206–209; Scheiber 
2006:605; Vehik 2002:41–43 and references cited therein). There is instead a 
continuum between peace and conflict. Somewhere along that continuum, 
moving increasingly toward conflict and either winning or losing, people 
make decisions that they need to fortify their location. It is in that context that 
the 3:1 rule becomes useful for analyzing warfare on the Plains and elsewhere.
It is important to reiterate that fortifications are generally meant to defend 
against frontal assaults on a location. It is unlikely, because of costs, that a 
fortification would be constructed without a threat (real or imagined) of sub-
stantial population loss. Although Plains warfare is commonly seen as having 
been more about raids and counting coup based on historic descriptions, it 
is clearly the case from the Crow Creek site in South Dakota (Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993) and the discussion below, that Plains warfare also included 
overwhelming settlements and massacring and/or capturing their occupants. 
Crow Creek is not likely an anomaly—given the number of other fortified and 
aggregated occupations (see Sundstrom, chapter 4, this volume).
Early Southern Plains Warfare
Documents from Coronado’s 1541 expedition onto the southern Plains note 
that various societies were enemies of one another (Flint and Flint 2005). 
Unfortunately there are no further details, but none of the expedition accounts 
describes fortified sites.
No fortified sites are described by the Oñate expedition of 1601 either. The 
expedition encountered a group of Escanjaque who were hunting bison west of 
the Arkansas River in north-central Oklahoma. The Escanjaque encouraged 
the expedition to attack their enemies, the people of the Great Settlement 
or Etzanoa (figure 7.1). The people of Etzanoa lived in a large, aggregated 
farming settlement on both sides of the Walnut River near where it joins the 
Arkansas River in south-central Kansas (Hammond and Rey 1953:751–756, 841, 
854; Vehik 1986).
Expedition accounts describe the sizes of both groups. We can debate end-
lessly how accurate early historic population counts are. The point to the sub-
sequent discussion is not the absolute counts, but the relative sizes (ratios) of 
the two groups. The Etzanoan settlement consisted of 1,200+ houses at the low 
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end and “close to” 2,000 at the upper end. Several different people counted the 
houses (Hammond and Rey 1953:754, 846, 867–868). The population of a house 
was estimated at between eight and 10 people (Hammond and Rey 1953:754). 
Etzanoans were a Wichita group, specifically ancestral to the Wichita subdi-
vision of the modern Wichita tribe, and eight to 10 people per house is fairly 
consistent historically (Perkins et al. 2008:table 2; Vehik 1986, see Vehik 2006 
for a discussion of Wichita subdivisions). With 1,200 houses and eight people 
per house a population of 9,600 is indicated. At the upper end of houses and 
numbers of people per house, around 20,000 people may have resided in the 
settlement. Population of the Escanjaque camp was estimated at 5,000–6,000 
people or, in two cases, warriors. Descriptions indicate the Escanjaque were 
out bison hunting with men, women, and children all present (Hammond and 
Rey 1953:751–752, 759, 841, 854, 865).
Figure 7.1. Sites and locations discussed in text. 
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For purposes of discussion, because the Etzanoans lived in an aggregated and 
not a dispersed settlement, they provide a locus that the Escanjaque could attack. 
Assuming counts were of people, not warriors, the Etzanoan population was 
double or more that of the Escanjaque group. A 1:1.6 or greater ratio in favor of 
Etzanoa suggests a direct Escanjaque attack on the Etzanoan village would be 
unlikely. That does not mean that advantage would not be taken of opportuni-
ties where awareness was lax or a substantial number of people were away from 
the village, just that under normal conditions an attack would be unlikely.
Historically when only a count of warriors was available, a multiplier was 
used to estimate the total population. This multiplier was most commonly five 
(see discussion in Perkins et al. 2008:441–442 for attendant problems). In this 
case, the Escanjaque population would be 25,000 to 30,000. The ratios then 
range between 2.6 and 1.5 to 1. This time the ratio is in favor of the Escanjaque. 
A frontal attack on Etzanoa still seems unlikely to marginal.
During the time Oñate’s expedition was in the area, the Escanjaque did 
not attack Etzanoa, at least while its residents were there. However, once 
Etzanoa was abandoned the Escanjaque did burn many houses and steal corn 
(Hammond and Rey 1953:848). Escanjaque failure to attack Etzanoa in this 
instance, however, does not mean they never attacked farmers on the eastern 
edge of the southern Plains. One member of the Escanjaque party, whom the 
Spanish named Miguel, originally resided in a similar village, Tancoa, farther 
to the north in central Kansas. He was captured in an Escanjaque attack on 
that village (Hammond and Rey 1953:874–875). Unfortunately, there are no 
other details about the nature of that attack.
As the Escanjaque and people of Etzanoa were frequently at war (Hammond 
and Rey 1953:875), it seems likely that opportunities did arise for one or the 
other to attack, as the Escanjaque did to Tancoa. Frontal assaults on the 
Etzanoan village are unlikely, but attacks on Etzanoan special-task groups 
operating away from the settlement are another matter.
Even though Etzanoa likely had a much larger population than the 
Escanjaque group, evidence suggests the people of Etzanoa were concerned 
about being attacked. Etzanoans not only lived in a large group, known 
archaeologically as the Lower Walnut focus, but most of their settlement was 
on the floodplain and low terraces of the Walnut River near where it joins the 
Arkansas River (Hoard and Schoen 2012; Wedel 1959:344–379). This setting 
involves large patches of highly fertile soil likely frequently renewed through 
flooding (Horsch 1980). Oñate expedition accounts describe the settlement 
pattern as consisting of clusters of houses with the houses surrounded by farm 
fields. The fields were never out of sight of the village (Hammond and Rey 
200 SUSAN C. VEHIK
1953:755, 844, 846, 858, 867). Small parties therefore would not range far to work 
the fields, limiting their susceptibility to attack. Etzanoa’s settlement strategy 
represents a major change from that used no more than 200 years earlier when 
settlements involved a few houses scattered along stream valleys. Although 
warfare had altered settlement strategies significantly, attacks had not reached 
the point where Etzanoans believed they might be overwhelmed and there-
fore needed to fortify their settlement.
At least at the beginning of the seventeenth century, written records suggest 
farming people on the eastern edge of the southern Plains could live in large-
enough aggregations that the chance of a settlement being overwhelmed was 
small (compare to Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume). However, this strategy 
had brought with it a substantial reorganization of sociopolitical systems 
(Vehik 2002). Subsistence production was likely restructured as well, since 
storage facilities almost double in size and tend to occur in clusters at this time. 
Sociopolitical ceremonies and organizations designed to organize the dispa-
rate cultural entities that were coalescing into these large communities were 
no doubt developed. Had Oñate’s expedition decided to help the Escanjaque, 
their firearms and horses would have increased the possibility that the 
Etzanoans would be overwhelmed through technological advantage. Indeed, 
Etzanoans abandoned their settlement when they perceived the Spanish to 
have hostile intentions. As things stood at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, large farming settlements on the eastern edge of the southern Plains 
did not need fortification to cope with conflict, they did it instead through 
aggregation and substantial sociopolitical and subsistence reorganization. An 
interesting question that cannot be addressed here is at what point aggrega-
tion was viewed as less costly or more desirable than fortifying smaller villages.
bryson-PaddoCk sIte
Around a century after Oñate visited Etzanoa, the descendants of Etzanoa, 
along with another Wichita subdivision, established two fortified loca-
tions about seven miles to the south of the Walnut River juncture with the 
Arkansas River. These villages, represented by the Bryson-Paddock (34KA5) 
and Deer Creek (34KA3) sites are on the west bank of the Arkansas River 
about 3.2 km apart. Bryson-Paddock quite likely was established earlier than 
Deer Creek, possibly in the late seventeenth century, while Deer Creek’s occu-
pation may begin around 1735 (Vehik 1992:325). Both sites were abandoned 
by 1757 (Weddle 2007:31, 55). Bryson-Paddock is about 40 acres in size and 
has as its east boundary a 70-foot vertical limestone bluff. This is almost the 
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only such setting on the Arkansas River between Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, and the only one that gives way to a broad, gently sloping upland 
where something more than a small settlement could be placed. This location 
no doubt was selected for the steep bluff and adjacent sloping upland. Deer 
Creek occupies a slight knoll on a low terrace overlooking the river and sur-
rounding terrain (USGS Kaw City NW, Okla.-Kans. 7.5 minute quadrangle 
map). By 1740 these two villages most likely were the only Wichita villages 
left on the Arkansas River, although it is possible a village remained at the 
juncture of the Walnut and Arkansas Rivers (Vehik 2012).
According to Felipe de Sandoval, in 1750 these two villages consisted of 
houses made of poles and grass (standard Wichita circular, conically shaped, 
grass-covered houses). “All were fortified with poles and earth” that had 
openings (Wedel 1981:72). Similar openings for musket fire existed at the 
slightly later and related Longest site (34JF1) on the Red River (Weddle 
2007:27, 31, 55). Deer Creek was likely a village of the Taovaya subdivision of 
the Wichita, while Bryson-Paddock was occupied by the Wichita subdivi-
sion. Both groups traded hides, meat, and fat/oil of bison and other animals 
to the French (Vehik et al. 2010).
Of the two sites, Bryson-Paddock has a long history of research while Deer 
Creek has seen almost no research. Excavations began in 1926 at Bryson-
Paddock and took place again in the 1970s. Research during the past decade 
at Bryson-Paddock includes remote sensing and excavation (see Drass et al., 
chapter 8, this volume). Remote sensing detected none of the houses described 
by Sandoval. Wichita houses were built on the original ground surface. Because 
they did not penetrate the ground surface, these houses may have been plowed 
and eroded away. This is a common problem on Wichita sites. Four trenches, 
some with large-diameter inset posts, have been defined, though. One trench 
includes semi-subterranean structures possibly representing hiding places 
into which noncombatants retreated, such as is described for the Longest site 
(Weddle 2007:10, 55). Regardless, Sandoval does not describe any such structures 
nor does he note any fortifications beyond a palisade. His description implies 
the whole village was fortified, although our work does not necessarily sup-
port that. There are at least two surface structures along with many storage pits 
and trash mounds that are outside the fortified area as we have reconstructed 
it. Whether the areas outside the fortification, especially the cache pits and 
surface structures, are contemporaneous with the area inside the fortifications 
is unknown. Possibly, when initially established, Bryson-Paddock was unforti-
fied but that as time passed fortification became increasingly necessary. As well, 
some features were constructed after at least some trenches were abandoned.
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Deer Creek and Bryson-Paddock in the late 1740s and 1750s were transit 
points for people wanting to make connections with New Mexico. Interrogation 
of three Frenchmen in 1749 and Felipe de Sandoval in 1750 who all made it to 
New Mexico provided the Spanish with warrior estimates for the two villages: 
300, more than 300, and 500 warriors in total (Wedel 1981:69, 70–71, 73). At 
five people per warrior, there are about 1,500 to 2,500 people in the two vil-
lages. Thus, there are likely between 750 to 1,250 people in each village. In addi-
tion, when the residents of Bryson-Paddock and Deer Creek moved south to 
the Longest site in the late 1750s the number of warriors was given as more 
than 500. This number comes from Antonio Treviño, who spent two years as 
a captive in the village represented by Longest, and so his count is likely to be 
reasonably accurate (Weddle 2007:51, 55). This estimate is for the Taovaya and 
Wichita as well as Iscani subdivisions. How many warriors the Iscani contrib-
uted is unknown. Subsequent discussion will use both 300 and 500 warriors.
Excavations indicate intensive burning in two areas of the innermost 
trench/subterranean structures at Bryson-Paddock while other areas are 
unburned, suggesting that the fortifications could have been breached at some 
point. According to the Wichita, it was the Osage who drove them from the 
Arkansas River valley (Flores 1985:48). A prelude to Wichita abandonment 
of the valley involves Great Osage destruction, around 1750, of a Wichita vil-
lage already decimated by measles and smallpox (Pease and Jenison 1940:357). 
While this village might be the one represented by Bryson-Paddock, there is 
no way to determine that at present.
With the Osage attack on the Wichita it is possible only Osage warriors 
were involved, as Great Osage villages were in west-central Missouri at the 
time. In 1749 the number of Great Osage warriors is said to be 700 (Din and 
Nasatir 1983:49). The warrior-to-warrior ratio would have been between 1.4 
and 2.3 to 1 in favor of the Great Osage, if they were attacking both villages. 
If attacking only one village, the ratio would have been between 2.8 and 4.7 to 
1 in favor of the Great Osage. Assuming non-warriors (women, children, old 
men) also need to be overwhelmed, the ratio ranges between a little over 1:1 
to 1:1.8 in favor of the Wichita. All but one of these ratios are marginal for 
overcoming a fortified village without the aid of a smallpox/measles epidemic 
that either decreased the fighting population or left it physically very weak. 
Without the epidemic, the Osage would have faced a more rigorous defense, 
and with a force ratio mostly below 3:1, the Osage would likely not have been 
successful. There is no evidence that the Wichita village was totally annihi-
lated, however, as both Bryson-Paddock and Deer Creek were occupied into 
the mid- to late 1750s. If there was another village to the north of these two, 
WHY FORTIFY? 203
there is no evidence as to whether it continued to be occupied into the later 
1750s or not. Regardless, it seems very likely the breaching of village fortifica-
tions was aided by an epidemic that affected the force-to-force ratio.
The Wichita exacted revenge for this attack. They waited until the Great 
Osage moved out of their wooded western Missouri home to hunt (Nasatir 
1990:44). The Osage were likely hunting bison to the north and northwest of 
Bryson-Paddock and, being in the open, they were more exposed to attack. Still, 
quite likely because of low force-to-force ratios, the Wichita had to enlist help 
from the Comanche in order to attack the Osage. Both sides suffered losses, 
with the Osage losses probably being more severe (Din and Nasatir 1983:47). 
The Osage, of course, then desired revenge. This time, not having the advan-
tage of a preceding episode of epidemic disease, the Osage, too, needed help, 
as their force-to-force ratios were likely still below 3:1. Their prospective allies, 
the Illinois, were dissuaded from participating by the French (Nasatir 1990:45).
The Wichita had many enemies in the early eighteenth century and it 
is not clear exactly against whom the people of Deer Creek and Bryson-
Paddock were fortifying. Conflict between the two villages is unlikely. They 
were actively trading together with the French, and the occupants of both vil-
lages resided near one another upon removal to the Red River. Other Wichita 
were between the Red River and central Texas and seem unlikely enemies. 
Certainly the Osage are one possibility, especially when the Wichita response 
force is split between two villages. Other possibilities include the Comanche 
and Apache. The Wichita and Comanche made peace sometime in the first 
half of the 1740s (Wedel 1981:69–71) and so at some point earlier in time the 
Comanche were in conflict with the Wichita. The Comanche in the early 
eighteenth century had only recently moved from the Rocky Mountains onto 
the Plains, displacing the Apache southward. Prior to 1730 the major threat 
was likely from the Apache (Wedel 1988:102–105). Perhaps much like the 
Escanjaque 100+ years earlier, fall communal bison hunts provided any or all 
of these three groups opportunities to attack the Wichita. The Wichita at this 
time were losing population to epidemic disease while more mobile groups 
such as the Apache, Comanche, and Osage were increasing in population.
Differences in technology could increase the likelihood of offensive suc-
cess for the Osage in spite of some low force-to-force ratios. A little later in 
time, the Osage were feared because of their firearms skills (Weddle 2007:55). 
However, the Osage still needed help from epidemic disease and allies to 
attack the Wichita in the 1750s and so their possession of guns may have 
provided limited advantages against a fortified setting. The Wichita also had 
guns, but at least in the late 1740s they had insufficient supplies of ammunition, 
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although Sandoval simply noted the Wichita were not very proficient in the 
use of guns (Wedel 1981:69, 70, 71, 73). Apache and Comanche access to horses 
could lower the force ratio needed to attack the Wichita, but it is not clear that 
horses would provide an advantage against fortifications. In fact, if all trenches 
at Bryson-Paddock existed simultaneously, horses and humans would wind up 
in the trenches if attempts were made to jump them. The Wichita also had 
horses, although it is not clear how many, and they seem to have come through 
trade with the Comanche (Wedel 1981:73). Wichita use of horses would have 
required leaving the fortification and a change in fighting tactics. It would 
also have brought a reduction of force inside the fortifications. It does not 
seem likely that guns and horses would have provided attackers an advantage 
in this instance.
Splitting the Wichita defensive force into two groups seems a questionable 
strategy. It renders both villages more susceptible to attack since it increases 
enemy force-to-force ratios. While one Wichita village could respond to an 
attack on the other, to do so would bring responders out from the fortification 
that provides their defensive advantage. Loss of cover by the Wichita could 
aid the attackers, especially if those attackers have more firearms, are better at 
using them, and/or are mounted. It would also leave the responding village 
rather defenseless. Strategically, it would be better to settle in one fortified vil-
lage, thereby concentrating all 500 defenders, which substantially lowers the 
likelihood of a frontal Osage attack.
The question is then, why were two villages rather than one established? 
Potentially the fortified area at Bryson-Paddock could not accommodate 
the Taovaya without doubling its size. Though doubling the size seems 
feasible, it is possible that after 50+ years of living at Bryson-Paddock the 
resources to enlarge the fortification were not available. Unfortunately we 
do not have enough data on construction-post sizes over time to see if they 
decrease. Still, Deer Creek is fortified and so the only problem seems to be 
the distance over which posts would have to be moved in order to enlarge 
the Bryson-Paddock fortifications.
Although it might seem feasible to simply cut down on the spacing between 
houses and add Deer Creek residents to the Bryson-Paddock village without 
doubling its size, there is a potential downside. Grass houses easily catch fire. 
Historically the Wichita spaced them about 100 feet apart to prevent the spread 
of fire. So adding more houses without increasing village size seems unlikely.
Potentially, ethnic differences were significant enough that separate resi-
dences were desirable. In 1765 at the Longest site, separate settlements were 
maintained by the three Wichita subdivisions (Weddle 2007:55). In 1808 
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the Wichita and Taovaya resided in one village but did so in separate areas 
(Flores 1985:50). Potentially the two subdivisions may have preferred to live 
apart, even though that affected force-to-force ratios. Still, that introduces 
the question of why, with 300 years of experience welding different groups 
together through coalescence, the Wichita and Taovaya at this point would 
not simply continue the process.
It is also possible that there was not enough fertile land within safe walk-
ing distance of Bryson-Paddock to support 2,500 people. In 1808 the Wichita 
establishment on the Red River had about 2,000 people supported by farming 
a total of 450 acres (Flores 1985:48, 50, 56). This is 0.225 acres per person. For 
2,500 people to live in one village at Bryson-Paddock just under 563 acres of 
land would be needed. Although the upland soils surrounding the Bryson-
Paddock and Deer Creek sites are fertile and potentially tillable, most fields 
were likely on the more easily worked terraces and floodplains of the Arkansas 
River (the type of setting farmed in 1601). Sandoval describes the Wichita as 
living in their villages year round and growing corn, beans, and squash. He 
does not say where the fields were. As he arrived at the villages by boat, the 
fields were possibly in the floodplain/terrace setting (Wedel 1981:59). Around 
1,000 acres are available from the Arkansas River valley terraces and floodplain 
within a mile upstream and downstream of Bryson-Paddock. However, within 
half a mile upstream and downstream of Bryson-Paddock, the Arkansas River 
valley is narrower than either above or below. Only about 480 acres of terrace 
and floodplain soil is available between those constrictions. Thus some of the 
acreage for farming would require a greater travel distance, thereby increas-
ing opportunities for raiders. It may be, then, that separate residences were 
established, not primarily to maintain distinct ethnic identities, but to ensure 
adequate amounts of farmland within close and safe proximity to each village.
In sum, between 1601 and 1680–1700, epidemic disease and warfare 
decreased the numerical advantage the Wichita subdivision once enjoyed over 
its enemies. Their numbers continued to decrease through the eighteenth cen-
tury. Their village was moved from the wide and fertile floodplain and terraces 
of the Walnut River valley and placed in a setting that was naturally defensive 
and the Wichita then proceeded to increase their defensive capability by for-
tifying all or parts of it. In the process of settling the Bryson-Paddock loca-
tion, Wichita fields were no longer in immediate proximity to their houses 
but instead were likely placed on terraces and a floodplain below a 70-foot 
vertical drop-off. With a loss in population, certain tradeoffs became neces-
sary to maintain security, and the proximity of fields was that tradeoff. The 
Wichita and Taovaya subdivisions clearly anticipated the possibility of being 
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overwhelmed and so they fortified. Nonetheless, even with fortification, force-
to-force ratios become such that the Wichita could not maintain their hold 
over the Arkansas River valley, so they moved south in closer proximity to 
other Wichita (and the Comanche) and away from the Osage.
In their new location on the Red River, the Taovaya fortified their village 
while the Wichita lived adjacent to them but did not construct a fortifica-
tion. The Iscani subdivision of the Wichita also lived nearby. Both went into 
the Taovaya fortification when threatened. Documents imply that not only 
is the Taovaya village fortified but so are fields and corrals (Weddle 2007:30, 
32–33, 55, 126–127). Ortiz Parilla in 1759 attacks this grouping of Wichita and 
especially the Taovaya fortification. This attack fares badly. Afterwards, Ortiz 
Parilla admits he was outmanned and deficient in weaponry and resolve when 
faced by the Wichita along with their Comanche and other allies (Weddle 
2007:127). In this case the offense was not remotely capable of overwhelming 
or even competing with the defense and Ortiz Parilla quickly made a retreat.
dIsCussIon
The southern Plains analyses incorporate written documentation but such 
records are not necessary to use the 3:1 rule to explore issues surrounding for-
tification and conflict. Crow Creek is an example (details are in several other 
chapters in this volume). Crow Creek village belongs to the Initial variant of the 
Coalescent tradition. It overlooks the Missouri River in southern South Dakota. 
The site dates to the fourteenth century ( Johnson 2007a:122). People of uncer-
tain identity massacre approximately 500 people at Crow Creek. Commonly 
the attackers are considered to be people of the Middle Missouri tradition but 
some suggest other Initial Coalescent groups, an Oneota-tradition complex, or 
yet others (Caldwell 1964:2–3; Hollinger 2005; Johnson 2007a:218; Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993). There are two fortifications at the site and Zimmerman and 
Bradley (1993:220) believe the outer and most recent was unfinished at the 
time of attack. The outer ditch is 4.6 m wide in general and between 1.8 and 
3.7 m deep. Two very limited test excavations did not detect a palisade (Kivett 
and Jensen 1976:8, 70). The ditch in and of itself would have been a formidable 
obstacle, with or without a palisade. Nonetheless, if the Crow Creek fortifica-
tion is unfinished, then much like the Osage attack on the Wichita, a nearby 
village might be able to take advantage of an opportunity and annihilate Crow 
Creek to gain its land or for some other reason.
The question is how feasible such action is, and that is where the 3:1 rule 
is useful. At least 50 houses are in the Initial Coalescent occupation at Crow 
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Creek (Kivett and Jensen 1976:68). The nearest known, contemporaneous 
Initial Coalescent site is Talking Crow (39BF3) ( Johnson 2007a:figure 29). 
It is possibly the attacking village, as it is relatively close by (Zimmerman 
and Bradley 1993:220), although others suggest Talking Crow is an ances-
tor or descendant of Crow Creek ( Johnson 2007a:178). The number of Initial 
Coalescent houses at Talking Crow is unclear but seems to be around 32 
(Smith 1977:1, 14). Assuming the same number of people and warriors per 
house at both villages, the difference in house numbers suggests that if Talking 
Crow was the attacker, the force-to-force ratio was not in their favor and they 
likely would not have been able to overwhelm and annihilate Crow Creek—
probably not even with surprise.
The next nearest contemporaneous Initial Coalescent site, Whistling Elk 
(39HU242), is around 64 km upstream ( Johnson 2007a:figure 29). It consists 
of somewhere between 33 and 67 possible houses (Toom and Kvamme 2002:8). 
Whistling Elk alone could not generate a force-to-force ratio large enough 
to overwhelm Crow Creek and only at the highest end of possible house 
numbers could it, in concert with Talking Crow, potentially overwhelm Crow 
Creek. But, gaining control over land is not likely a motivation for Whistling 
Elk’s participation. It is a long distance to travel just for the use of farmland, 
unless they planned to move there. However, no Coalescent-tradition site 
occurs in the area of Crow Creek or Talking Crow until after 1650 ( Johnson 
2007a:figures 29–39). An attack on Crow Creek by another Initial Coalescent 
village alone seems unlikely. If two or more villages united to make an attack, 
farmland seems an unlikely motivator.
The nearest Extended variant of the Middle Missouri–tradition site, Durkin, 
is near Whistling Elk. It probably was not occupied contemporaneously with 
Whistling Elk, although Clark (chapter 12, this volume) suggests they are 
contemporaneous. Other Extended Middle Missouri villages are farther on 
up the Missouri River ( Johnson 2007a:figure 29). There is no information on 
the size of these villages or the number of houses. In general villages of the 
Initial and Extended variants of the Middle Missouri tradition have 15–30 
houses, with villages in more southern areas being larger, generally having 
between 20 and 30 houses. Average house size is 875 square feet (Lehmer 
1971:66, 69; Winham and Calabrese 1998:287). Initial Coalescent villages have 
an average house size of 642 square feet ( Johnson 1998:313). Crow Creek had 
a total of 32,100 square feet of housing while a Middle Missouri–tradition 
village with 30 houses had only 26,250 square feet. Assuming similar per per-
son space requirements, Crow Creek is unlikely to have suffered an attack by 
a single Extended Middle Missouri–tradition village. An attack by multiple 
208 SUSAN C. VEHIK
villages would require movement over a substantial distance and through 
an area where there were other Coalescent-tradition villages. If more than 
one Extended Middle Missouri village attacked Crow Creek, the motiva-
tion is unclear, as gaining control of that location increases the distance to 
other Extended Middle Missouri villages. Not only were there no subsequent 
Extended Middle Missouri occupations of the Crow Creek location but also 
later Middle Missouri–tradition villages and most Coalescent villages are far-
ther up the Missouri River ( Johnson 2007a:figures 29, 30, 34). Coalescent-
tradition villages return to the Crow Creek area around 1550, but Middle 
Missouri–tradition villages continue a northward move. An attack by Middle 
Missouri–tradition villages on Crow Creek seems unlikely.
It is difficult to assess Hollinger’s argument that the attackers were from 
the Oneota tradition. There is no information on numbers or sizes of houses 
in Oneota villages. The only comparative information is site size, with Initial 
Coalescent at an average of 25.6 acres ( Johnson 1998:313) and Oneota with 
between 15 and 21 acres for three sites most likely contemporaneous with 
Crow Creek (Hollinger 2005:190, 192, 213). All three traditions likely used 
village space much differently and so site size is not a very good comparison. 
Nonetheless, site size is comparable, suggesting Oneota likely needed more 
than one village to overcome Crow Creek.
Clearly the occupants of Crow Creek expected an attack by a force that 
could overwhelm them or they would not have been in the process of for-
tifying themselves, but that force likely numbered closer to 1,500 than the 
200 suggested to have lived at Talking Crow (Smith 1977:152). Use of the 3:1 
rule does not provide a definitive answer to who essentially annihilated Crow 
Creek but it does suggest that whoever did it likely involved an alliance of 
two or more other villages, either of the same or different traditions: the best 
guess is an alliance of Oneota villages. Crow Creek was the nearest Coalescent-
tradition village to Oneota occupations in extreme southeastern South Dakota. 
In the century following Crow Creek most Coalescent-tradition occupa-
tions are farther up the Missouri River ( Johnson 2007a:figure 30). But, with 
the collapse of Oneota that begins in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth 
century (see Hollinger, chapter 10, this volume), there is a southward shift 
of Coalescent villages back into the region once occupied by Crow Creek 
( Johnson 2007a:figures 34 and 36).
Lest it be thought that only sedentary people fortify, there are fortified fall 
bison-hunting locales, represented by the Edwards I (34BK2) and Duncan 
(34WA2) sites of western Oklahoma. The Shea site and other similar ones in 
North Dakota also likely were fortified seasonal camps (Michlovic and Schneider 
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1993). These fortified areas are possibly refuges. Nonetheless, their analysis could 
be accomplished based on considerations of the amount of space that was forti-
fied. People generally do not construct fortifications with more perimeter than 
can be defended. To do so results in weak areas that can be breached.
The issue remains as to why the northern Plains fortification history differs 
so much from that of the southern and central Plains. Briefly, the answer may 
lay in the wider and more continuously distributed floodplains of the central 
and southern Plains. Southern Plains soils at least were also potentially more 
productive. From the early soil survey reports (1920s–1950s), when corn was 
commonly grown on both the northern and southern Plains, the per acre 
corn productivity was greater on the southern Plains. The southern Plains 
also has a longer growing season. As a result, Late Prehistoric–period farmers 
could generally deal with conflict by forming larger residential groups on the 
southern Plains, such as is reflected by the Lower Walnut focus. Because the 
northern Plains has narrow, discontinuously distributed floodplains that are 
less fertile, farming people could not make as great a use of aggregation as a 
defensive tactic. Consequently, they adopted fortification earlier.
ConClusIons
It is not really the intensity of conflict nor its unpredictability that is the cause 
of fortification. Rather it is the belief that an overwhelming attack is possible. 
People either know this from direct experience or perhaps can be led to believe 
such is possible. An overwhelming attack can occur when the force-to-force 
ratio reaches 3:1 or greater in favor of the attacker. Fortification is an attempt on 
the part of the defense to keep the force-to-force ratio below that value. Because 
fortification is an expensive defensive undertaking, no doubt other solutions 
will be attempted first, if possible. Occupying points on the landscape offering 
defensive advantage and aggregating into larger groups are potential options—if 
they are feasible. The ratio of potential attackers to defenders also may be such 
that fortification will not help. Abandonment in such a case may take place as 
opposed to suffering a Crow Creek level of annihilation. The Wichita who lived 
at Bryson-Paddock and Deer Creek ultimately opted for abandonment.
Use of the 3:1 rule helps frame issues and questions surrounding conflict and 
use of fortification in a more precise manner. Use of the rule gives direction 
to questions about why people decide to fortify, why fortifications are allowed 
to lapse, and why they fail. With further consideration we should be able to 
refine our understanding of why people decide to fortify and define the factors 
that are important to that decision.
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In 1759 Spanish forces attacked a Wichita village on the 
Red River in south-central Oklahoma. This expedition 
provided the first description of a Wichita fortification, 
a roughly circular rampart and stockade surrounded 
by a ditch. Wichita groups, however, erected similar 
structures as early as ad 1500. Magnetic surveys and 
excavations at an early eighteenth-century Wichita 
village, Bryson-Paddock, revealed at least four con-
centric ditches representing portions of fortifications. 
The efforts expended to excavate ditches and build 
extensive fortifications at large villages reflect inten-
sification of intertribal conflict in the southern Plains 
by 1700, probably arising from increased mobility with 
the arrival of horses and competition over access to the 
European market economy. This is a period of increas-
ing social complexity, regional trade and economic 
development, and coalescence marked by increasing 
village size, territorialism, and construction of exten-
sive defensive features.
Relative to the numerous investigations of fortified 
indigenous village sites on the northern Great Plains 
(Bamforth 1994; Caldwell 1964; Jones 2004), we know 
much less about southern Plains fortifications (Bell 
1984; Drass 1998). Increasingly, however, archaeologists 
use geophysical analyses and excavations to investigate 
suspected fortifications in southern Kansas, Oklahoma, 
and Texas, some dating to as early as ad 1500 (Drass 
and Baugh 1997). In this chapter, we present new 
archaeological evidence emanating from a decade-long 
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investigation of the Bryson-Paddock site (34KA5), located in north-central 
Oklahoma along the banks of the Arkansas River. As described below, between 
approximately 1680 and 1755, one subdivision of the Wichita occupied Bryson-
Paddock while another subdivision occupied its nearby sister site Deer Creek 
(34KA3). Both sites contain abundant French trade goods and large numbers 
of indigenous hide-scrapers produced from local chert (Vehik et. al. 2010). 
Artifacts and faunal remains demonstrate the intensification of hide tanning 
by Wichita women. Households exchanged these bison robes with French 
traders for European commodities (Wedel 1981).
Archaeologists have long hypothesized that both Bryson-Paddock and 
Deer Creek included fortifications, but until 2004 neither site had been sys-
tematically excavated to examine this hypothesis. In fact, with the exception 
of several trenches dug to cross-section suspected ditches, no indigenous for-
tification on the southern Plains had ever been extensively excavated prior to 
our work.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss our findings, specifically, the struc-
ture and function of numerous linear ditches that have been discovered. To 
better interpret these ditches, we begin by first reviewing the observations of 
contemporary eyewitnesses concerning Wichita fortifications and their con-
struction. We then compare historical descriptions with archaeological data 
from Bryson-Paddock and other fortified sites in Oklahoma and Kansas. We 
argue that different types of entrenchments existed simultaneously, constitut-
ing a fortification complex that included dry moats, palisade ramparts, and 
interior semi-subterranean shelters. Combining historical and archaeological 
data provides a rare opportunity on the southern Plains to critically evaluate 
historical descriptions with the archaeological record. While written accounts 
provide valuable momentary descriptions of structures, archaeological inves-
tigations permit us to examine the temporal development of fortifications 
across the entire region and within particular sites.
hIstorICally rePorted fortIfICatIons 
on the southern PlaIns
Spanish, French, American, and Native American observers noted native 
fortifications at different times and places on the southern Plains. Significantly, 
every known account comes from villages attributed to a subdivision of the 
Wichita. Five or more affiliated groups historically composed the Wichita-
speaking Caddoan people, including Taovaya, Tawakoni, Waco, Iscani, and 
Wichita (proper). In the words of the perceptive French chronicler, Jean 
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Louis Berlandier, in 1830: “Fortifications are rare among the Texas Indians. 
They are found in only three tribes of the same nation, in the villages of 
the Huecos [Wacos], Tahuacanos [Tawakonis], and Tahuaiasses [Taovayas]” 
(Berlandier 1969:55n47).
Some of the earliest, and certainly the most detailed, descriptions of a for-
tification come from the Red River village inhabited by the Taovaya from 
roughly 1757 to 1811. Known today as the Longest site (34JF1), it is located in 
Jefferson County, Oklahoma (figure 8.1) (Bell and Bastian 1967; Duffield 1965; 
John 1975; Newcomb and Fields 1967). On October 7, 1759, a large Spanish 
expedition attacked this village in retaliation for the sacking of the San Sabá 
mission in central Texas the previous year by Taovaya and Comanche raiders 
( John 1992; Weddle 2007). Arriving at the Red River, the expedition’s Spanish 
officers briefly glimpsed the Taovaya’s defenses before being driven off by 
mounted Comanche and Wichita warriors. Captain Juan Ángel de Oyarzún 
later wrote how he saw “at the short distance of a gunshot, a village consisting 
of oval-shaped huts enclosed by a stockade and moat, and that its entrance 
road is enclosed in the same manner” (Weddle 2007:124). Within the enclosure, 
Taovaya warriors with French muskets fired across the river at the Spanish.
Figure 8.1. Protohistoric and historic Wichita sites and fortifications on the southern Plains. 
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Six years later, another Spanish soldier—this one captured and held for six 
months by the Taovaya—had a much better opportunity to inspect the same 
fortress inside and out. The soldier, Antonio Treviño, described the fortress 
as “made of split logs, which the Indians have placed separate one from the 
other in order to make use of muskets, the weapons they use, through them.” 
Elaborating further, he said that it was
completely surrounded on the outside by an earthen rampart, close to more 
than a vara and a third [approximately 1.13 m] in height, which serves them as 
an entrenchment, and, about four paces to the east and west, a very deep trench 
made so that no one can come close to the fortress, on horseback. Inside there 
are four subterranean apartments occupying all of its circumference, into which 
all of the people who cannot help with the defense of the said settlement retreat 
in time of invasion.1
As Treviño’s account makes clear, three different structural features com-
prised the Taovaya fortification: (1) a rampart and palisade; (2) a trench or “dry 
moat” outside the fortification to impede approach; and (3) four subterranean 
structures entrenched along the interior circumference of the fortification. 
Treviño believed the Taovaya built the entire structure to resist the Spanish 
attack in 1759. It remained in use at the time of his captivity in 1765.
Although archaeologists conducted limited test excavations on the fortifi-
cation ditch at Longest in 1967, until 2013 no work had been done to identify 
the “subterranean apartments” mentioned by Treviño. An oval-shaped fea-
ture (labeled structure 8 on the 1967 excavation map) just inside the fortifica-
tion may represent part of one of these subterranean structures (see Bell and 
Bastian 1967:figure 30).
Elsewhere, other accounts from Texas provide similar information regard-
ing Wichita fortifications and subterranean structures likely built between 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1836 John Ridge 
recorded John Smith’s recollection of a Cherokee expedition against a 
Tawakoni village near Waco, Texas, in 1830 (Foreman 1931; also see Jackson 
2005 and Watt 1969). Smith describes how Tawakoni warriors hid in a long 
lodge partially underground:
In the middle of the village we found Gah wah na nah [a Cherokee Chief and 
accomplished warrior] standing, watching the mouth of a large & long lodge 
which stood over a hole in the ground . . . He said a great many have gone in 
that hole & most of them are warriors . . . The Big lodge where Gah wah na 
nah stood proved to be the arsenal of the tribe & a place of refuge. It was about 
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forty five feet long & twelve feet wide. Posts were stuck in the ground in the 
centre of the hole which was dug about waist deep. A ridge pole extended hori-
zontally across the posts, & ribs of poles extending from it down to the ground 
on each side which was covered with corn stalks covered over with dirt. Close 
to the mouth of this singular place of refuge & defence, stood a lodge which 
was unoccupied, which we used as a screen from the enemies shot. (Foreman 
1931:256)
Smith’s description of the assault on the Wichita village in 1830 focuses en-
tirely on the semi-subterranean shelter without mention of a parapet, stockade, 
or ditches.
In the same year, Berlandier (1969:54–55, 144–145) describes Wichita forti-
fications as consisting of “square or rounded ditches, surrounded by breast-
works,” (Berlandier 1969:54) and these “circular embankments and trenches 
[are built] within their villages” (Berlandier 1969:145). One village occupied 
by the Tahuacono [Tawakoni] reportedly had a “double ring of fortifications 
around their town” in 1829 (Berlandier 1969:144). He goes on to describe 
Wichita semi-subterranean shelters as ditches “covered with a roof of wood 
strong enough to resist gunfire” (Berlandier 1969:54), adding that these are 
“subterranean forts with only one door, big enough and deep enough to hold 
families and warriors” (Berlandier 1969:55). Unfortunately, no evidence exists 
that Berlandier actually visited Wichita villages; his descriptions were prob-
ably obtained from local settlers (Berlandier 1969:126n174).
In 1858, Chickasaw Indians led by Indian agent Douglas Cooper conducted 
an expedition in southwestern Oklahoma (Foreman 1927). In his journal, 
Cooper describes several abandoned Wichita villages including one in the 
area of Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He notes how they arrived “at the old Kechi 
or Wichita Village on Cache creek [Fort Sill area] and encamped to recruit 
the men and horses . . . This place was last occupied by the Wichitas and the 
remaining of their fortifications are easily traced” (Foreman 1927:386). Later 
on the same trip he describes another old camp: “Visited the old Waco village 
about 5 miles from camp also the ancient Wichita village say 10 miles higher 
up Cache creek. Here we found traces of the same kind of fortifications as 
found at the village lower down” (Foreman 1927:386–387). However, Cooper 
provides no information on these “fortifications.” He later passes an occupied 
Wichita village on Rush Creek and estimates 150 lodges are present but he 
says nothing about fortifications. A Comanche camp next to the Rush Creek 
village was later attacked by US Cavalry, but the troopers also make no com-
ment on fortifications. In 1834 the US Dragoons (accompanied by the artist 
George Catlin) visited a village at Devil’s Canyon, again without mention of 
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fortifications or subterranean structures. So it seems that with the Wichita’s 
movement north from Texas to Oklahoma, they initially built fortifications 
but soon after abandoned the practice. As their population continued to 
decline in the 1830s and beyond, the loss of a labor force may have prevented 
construction. By the 1850s they were relying on the US government for protec-
tion on their reservation near Anadarko, Oklahoma.
Historical accounts provide ample information about the presence of forti-
fications in particular Wichita villages. The palisades did not encircle villages, 
but served as a redoubt and refuge within villages during attacks, as illustrated 
in the Spanish attack in 1759 and the Cherokee assault in 1830. Moreover, a 
variety of observers over time report semicircular and semi-subterranean 
“lodges” or “apartments” as a standard type of refuge, either within stockades or 
in the absence of stockades. Until the recent excavations at Bryson-Paddock, 
however, such structures had never been definitively identified or excavated in 
the southern Plains.
fortIfICatIon features at bryson-
PaddoCk (34ka5) and related sItes
Archaeologists, ethnohistorians, and artifact collectors long suspected the 
presence of fortifications at the eighteenth-century sites, Bryson-Paddock 
(34KA5) and Deer Creek (34KA3), located on the west side of the Arkansas 
River approximately 2 km apart from one another in far northern Kay County, 
Oklahoma (figure 8.1). Based on maps and French accounts, members of the 
Taovaya subdivision apparently occupied Deer Creek, in contrast to Bryson-
Paddock’s Wichita subdivision inhabitants (Vehik 1992:327). Bryson-Paddock 
is north of Deer Creek on a high bluff overlooking the west side of the river. 
In one historical account, French traders passed through the villages on their 
way from Louisiana to Santa Fe. Arrested and interrogated by suspicious 
Spanish officials in Santa Fe, the traders described the villages, mentioning 
fortifications, but provided no details (Wedel 1981).
A third eighteenth-century site, Neodesha Fort (14WN1), is located on the 
Verdigris River in southeastern Kansas. Like Bryson-Paddock and Deer Creek, 
Neodesha Fort was one of a pair of Wichita villages occupied simultaneously. 
One of the Neodesha sites may have been visited by Claude Charles Dutisné in 
1719. But, he made no mention of a fortification at the time of this visit. Today, 
the Neodesha Fort site has been mostly destroyed by modern activities and the 
location of the second village is not known. Visitors to the Neodesha site begin-
ning in the 1870s through the 1930s, however, recorded evidence of ditches and 
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ramparts. The earliest descriptions indicate embankments 0.6 m high by 3.7 m 
wide laid out in a U-shape over an area estimated at 117 m by 146 m (Weston and 
Lees 1994). One or two ditches were present just outside of the embankments 
and these are estimated at 1.2 m deep and about 3 m wide at the top.
Like Neodesha Fort, no excavations have occurred at Deer Creek. Surface 
collections, however, suggest an early eighteenth-century occupation (Sudbury 
1976). A large portion of Deer Creek has never been plowed and a possible 
fortification ring is very visible (figure 8.2). Early maps of the fortification 
indicate a U-shaped ditch about 76.2 m in diameter with adjacent earthen 
embankments around the head of a draw (Corbyn 1976). The draw may be 
an entryway allowing protected access to a spring on the edge of the nearby 
Figure 8.2. Aerial photo (1938) of the possible fortification at the Deer Creek site, 34KA3. 
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creek. A second ditch is reported on the west side of this feature. Corbyn 
(1976) also suggests a possible bastion and various interior features (includ-
ing a large rectangular area) based on aerial photographs. Magnetic, electrical 
resistivity and radar surveys in the 1980s confirm many of these features, but, 
without excavation, the function of the suggested bastion remains untested. 
Little information can be ascertained about features and activities within the 
structure. Trash mounds and features are present over a considerable area out-
side of the possible fortification, indicating that most residences were not pro-
tected by the structure.
Initial excavations at Bryson-Paddock took place in 1926, resumed in the 
1970s, and have occurred there almost annually since 2003 as a joint project 
involving the Oklahoma Archeological Survey, the University of Oklahoma, 
Oklahoma State University, and the Oklahoma Anthropological Society. The 
site may have been occupied as early as the late 1600s. Artifacts, Spanish and 
French descriptions, and a thermoluminescence date all indicate a definite 
occupation in the early eighteenth century and extending until mid-century. 
Unfortunately, radiocarbon dates from the site are inconclusive, ranging from 
ad 1490 to 1959 calibrated (Drass et al. 2004). The available historical docu-
mentation (Wedel 1981) indicates the occupants of Bryson-Paddock and 
Deer Creek migrated south in the mid-1750s to locations along the Red River, 
including the Longest site (34JF1), where the Spanish attacked the Taovaya 
fortress in 1759.
Joseph Thoburn (1930) organized the 1926 excavations at Bryson-Paddock 
overseen by his foreman, Otto Spring. Excavations focused on mounds that 
they believed were collapsed earthen houses but are now understood to be 
trash deposits. The excavators also mentioned a possible ditch segment in an 
unplowed field (figure 8.3). Limited work on the ditch revealed little informa-
tion, but Thoburn (1930:77) suspected a larger U-shaped trench was present. 
Archaeological work almost 50 years later continued to test additional trash 
mounds and to expose house patterns (Hartley and Miller 1977).
Beginning in 2003, our research has employed magnetic and resistivity 
survey technology to examine the distribution and extent of features across 
the site. Magnetometers/gradiometers, especially, have successfully identi-
fied small anomalies that, when tested, reveal storage pits and hearths. Large 
blocks of magnetic data have also led to the identification of long linear anom-
alies resembling ditches or similar features (figure 8.4). Subsequent ground- 
truthing through excavation resulted in the classification of these features as 
either fortification ditches or covered semi-subterranean trenches. We discuss 
each type of ditch in turn.
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Figure 8.3. Visible ditch segment in pasture at Bryson-Paddock site, looking north. Photo 
taken November 2005. 
Fortification or Rampart Ditches
The excavation of several large magnetic anomalies at Bryson-Paddock 
revealed cross-sections of ditch features. Initially two parallel, linear magnetic 
anomalies about 30 m apart in the plowed field were tested, revealing ditches 
about 60–80 cm deep and 3–4 m wide (figure 8.5). Subsequent magnetic sur-
veys and excavations revealed the presence of four ditches (numbers 1–4, from 
inner to outer ditch) that encircle the head of a small dry draw that runs 
northwest to southeast across the middle of this site (figure 8.6). The now-dry 
draw may have had a spring in the eighteenth century, or the Wichita may 
have caught water in a basin at the head of this creek. Maps of the nearby 
Deer Creek fort tentatively indicate similar protected access to a spring. Later 
evidence from the Longest site suggests the fortification protected access to 
water from a spring and the Red River.
Excavations indicate that three of these linear features (#2–4) are ditches 
representing dry moat trenches. As the Wichita dug these trenches they 
apparently deposited the excavated soil to the inside of the fortification to 
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Figure 8.4. Bryson-Paddock Site. (A) Magnetic map exhibiting linear features that are 
portions of fortification and structure ditches in the north plowed field at Bryson-Paddock. 
Arrows indicate ditches. Note that lighter areas are higher magnetic values representing 
ditch fill and these occur outside darker linear anomalies of low magnetic values that are 
thought to represent remnants of parapets that have been plowed down. (B) Magnetic map 
with fortification ditches and potential ditches marked in black and the semi-subterranean 
shelter ditch, the innermost ditch, marked in white. Dashed lines indicate the possible but 
unconfirmed ditch locations. Two instruments were used: a cesium magnetometer and a 
gradiometer. The instruments covered some of the same areas. 
form ramparts. At the Longest site, the Spaniard, Antonio Treviño (discussed 
earlier), described a similar embankment as an “earthen rampart, close to more 
than a vara and a third [approximately 1.13 m] in height, which serves them 
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as an entrenchment.” Although no embankments or ramparts remain visible 
in the plowed field at Bryson-Paddock, slight rises are evident on the interior 
sides (west sides in this location) of the ditches identified in the unplowed 
portion of the site. The magnetic surveys provide some evidence for embank-
ments. The highest magnetic readings at Bryson-Paddock occur within filled 
ditches, and lower readings occur on the original interior surface adjacent to 
the ditch where soil was piled as inhabitants dug it (figure 8.4). The relatively 
high magnetic readings are therefore likely caused by deposition of highly 
organic trash and soils in the ditches (see Kvamme 2006:218–219). The lower 
magnetic readings reflect how native soils were removed and piled to the inte-
rior side as the ditch was dug. These geophysical readings at Bryson-Paddock 
reinforce the idea that Wichita excavators deposited soil on the inside of the 
three ditches to form embankments for a palisade. Evidence also suggests that 
all three fortification trenches had been filled in during occupation of the site. 
Excavations revealed pits and a hearth that had been dug into the filled for-
tification ditches. The ditch fill included trash such as broken pottery, burned 
Figure 8.5. Cross-section of the north ditch (#4) in the eastern part of the plowed field at 
Bryson-Paddock (34KA5). Arrows indicate the edges of the ditch. 
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clay pieces, lithic tools and debris, and charcoal in a brown to dark-brown 
organic soil. Thus, ditches were filled and the Wichita occupation extended 
long enough that activity such as pit construction impinged on filled ditches. 
At least some of the soil from the embankments may have been used to cover 
trash thrown into the fortification trenches.
The Bryson-Paddock fortification ditches are U-shaped or a rounded 
V-shape in cross-section; they narrow from over 3 m across at the top to 
2 m or less at the bottom (figure 8.7). In the least-eroded areas, the fortifica-
tion ditches were dug 110–120 cm below the surface at the time of occupa-
tion. Although these ditches do not have the sharp V-shape that Keeley et al. 
(2007) consider characteristic of most historic fortifications, they do contract 
toward the bottom. The top width and depth dimensions also fit the model 
Figure 8.6. Aerial view of the Bryson-Paddock site, indicating probable fortification 
ditches and subterranean structure. (Map made with Google Earth 2006 image.) 
Figure 8.7. Profiles of semi-subterranean structures (A–B) and fortification ditches 
(C–D) at the Bryson-Paddock (A, C) and Longest (B, D) sites. 
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for defensive ditches (Keeley et al. 2007:58). In addition, the small excavation 
into the Longest fortification ditch revealed a profile (Bell and Bastian 1967) 
resembling the fortification ditches at Bryson-Paddock. The Longest ditch is 
120 cm deep and about 4 m wide at the top, narrowing to 2.25 m at the bot-
tom. More recent excavations in another portion of the Longest ditch exposed 
similar width dimensions (3.3 m at top and 2.3 m at bottom), but ditch depth 
extended only 1 m.
The Bryson-Paddock fortification ditches run along a fairly good slope 
on the south side of a ridge down to a gently sloping area at the south end. 
Irregularities appear in the visible magnetic distribution of these features, but 
the three ditches generally parallel each other and are 6–10 m apart at the 
closest points. The ditches appear to be continuous but metal and deeper soil 
deposits at the base of the slope along a road and modern fence line obstruct 
the magnetic readings for certain sections. In addition, a modern farm terrace 
on the north end of the fortification complex truncates the outer or fourth 
ditch, which would otherwise encircle an area about 140–150 m east–west and 
over 160 m north–south. The inner fortification ditch (second ditch) is 120–125 
m east–west and over 140 m north–south.
Covered Semi-Subterranean Structure
The most distinctive and extensively excavated linear feature at Bryson-
Paddock is visible in the unplowed pasture as an 8–10-m-wide depression 
running downslope, south, and making an almost right-angle turn to the west 
(figure 8.3). This is the innermost linear feature (ditch #1) seen on the magnet-
ics in the plowed field and occurs in an area of only slight slope. It also encir-
cles the head of the draw and extends across an area of 100 m east–west and 
over 95 m north–south. Excavations tested the feature in four different loca-
tions. Numerous soil cores confirmed its position in other areas. Excavations 
included a trench to cross-section the feature in the unplowed area, and a large 
excavation block in the southeast end of the plowed field, located north of the 
unplowed portion.
Initially, the feature appeared to represent another fortification ditch. 
However, excavations revealed significant differences. It was wider than other 
fortification ditches extending from 4 m to almost 5 m across. In cross-section 
its walls were vertical near the bottom and expanded only slightly toward 
the top. The floor of the feature was flat at 70–80 cm beneath the modern 
plowed surface and unplowed pasture (although the surface in the pasture 
is in a depression about 40 cm deeper than surrounding areas). It was also 
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filled with organic soil and trash from occupation, although few artifacts were 
found in the floor area. Two pits overlapped one edge of the ditch, obviously 
dug after the ditch had been filled. The trench had evidence of burning on the 
floor and intensive burning was apparent in some of the excavated units. In 
addition, excavators encountered burned post or beam sections near the floor, 
and post molds in the floor in all four excavated sections of the ditch. These 
postholes extended down to 70 or 80 cm below the floor. In the unplowed 
pasture section of the ditch, soil appeared to have been thrown to the west or 
inside portion of the ditch to form a low, now-eroded embankment. Initially, 
we presumed this embankment to be a remnant of a rampart supporting a 
stockade for defense. However, no evidence of post molds was found in the 
small area of embankment that was excavated.
Obviously, it would be highly unusual to have post molds and burned post 
sections on the floor of a dry moat, especially if it were located at the foot of an 
embankment and stockade. Indeed, the other three ditches at Bryson-Paddock 
lack these features. We therefore expanded excavations in one section of the 
ditch to further evaluate the structure. The feature in this area has a southeast 
end marked by an abrupt rise to a shallow depth (30–40 cm). This shallow area 
extends less than a meter to the southeast before a ditch feature resumes and 
apparently extends south into the pasture, where it would tie into the unplowed 
portion of the ditch. The main excavations followed the ditch feature northwest 
in the plowed field in an attempt to identify a northwestern edge. Over 14 m 
of the ditch were exposed but no end was encountered (figure 8.8). To further 
complicate matters, another ditch was discovered intersecting the main ditch 
from the north. This intersecting ditch was excavated and extended 6 m to the 
north and was 5.5 m wide. In the center of this short ditch feature we encoun-
tered an ash-filled basin hearth about a meter in diameter that was dug into 
the floor (at 70 cm below the current surface). Four post molds surround this 
hearth, forming center posts for a roof that covered it (figure 8.8).
In light of the historical accounts of Wichita fortifications, our excava-
tions provide strong evidence that the innermost ditch—found in the plowed 
fields as well as the unplowed pasture—served as a covered semi-subterranean 
structure with a room built as an extension off the larger structure. The nearly 
straight walls and over 4-m-wide flat floors of this inner trench are distinct 
from other fortification ditches at the site. The large, deep, post molds in the 
floor and evidence of burned wood elements (post or beam pieces) as well as 
clinkers from burned grass suggest that this ditch and the northern room were 
covered by a grass-thatch roof. The structure burned, leaving small charred 
post or beam sections, burned floors, and an abundance of charcoal in the floor 
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Figure 8.8. Map of excavations in ditch #1, the semi-subterranean structure, on the 
southeast side of the plowed field. Posts had been dug from the floor level, starting about 
70–80 cm beneath the surface. 
area. Few artifacts are found in the floor area, indicating the structure was 
either abandoned before burning or few activities took place in it. Based on the 
visible extent of this feature, as well as magnetic data, the semi- subterranean 
structure parallels the fortification ditches, but it is 12–25 m inside the nearest 
fortification ditch (ditch #2).
Although the descriptions are brief, the subterranean shelters reported by 
Treviño at what is today the Longest site, or in Smith’s account of the “Big lodge” 
at the Waco village, appear to be represented archaeologically by the innermost 
ditch structure at Bryson-Paddock. As mentioned, post molds, burned beam or 
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post fragments, a hearth, and a flat floor all fit with our expectations for what 
we would see archaeologically in a roofed semi-subterranean structure. None of 
these features has been found in the three other fortification ditches at the site. 
The depth and width dimensions of the Bryson-Paddock subterranean structure 
also roughly match those of the underground “lodge” described at the Waco vil-
lage (Foreman 1931). The presence of a shallow divide in one part of the trench 
at Bryson-Paddock suggests that we may have excavated into portions of two of 
these subterranean shelters. The Bryson-Paddock subterranean structure encir-
cles the inside of the fortification much as Treviño described for the Longest 
site fortification. Based on geophysical data, we suspect that four or more such 
shelters may be identifiable within the Bryson-Paddock fortification.
Magnetics indicate that some of the northern and western ditch sections 
may intersect or at least include extensions similar to the one excavated off the 
innermost trench on the east side (figure 8.4). One of these possible extensions 
is on the northwest corner of the inner ditch but it appears on the magnetics 
to intersect with a moat-type ditch to the north. Excavations have not been 
conducted on this section of the feature, but extensive soil coring has been 
done in an attempt to confirm the presence of an intersecting ditch. The cor-
ing revealed a large, roughly rectangular feature 30–40 cm deep, but continued 
coring outside this feature indicated that a trench or ditch about 60 cm deep 
is present and likely crosses beneath the shallower rectangular feature. Based 
on the magnetics and coring, this linear anomaly is a section of ditch that 
ties into other ditches on the north end of the fortification. A possible ditch 
section may be present between ditches 1 and 2 on the northwest side of the 
fortification, but there have been no excavations to confirm this structure and 
it does not appear to continue in other areas of the fortification.
The fill of every ditch contained artifacts but they provided no clue to the 
order of construction or whether the ditches were all in use at the same time. 
Excavations across the site have noted numerous examples of overlapping fea-
tures, suggesting a relatively long occupation or, less likely, repeated occupa-
tions during the early to mid-1700s time period. The few historic records seem 
to indicate an occupation of at least 30 years but likely longer. Given that the 
site was occupied for a considerable time, the fortification ditches may have 
been dug at different times. The filling of the subterranean structure inside 
the fort suggests that the fort was not abandoned at the time this structure 
was burned; it may have been intentionally burned by the occupants. Storage 
pits dug into the three outer, moat-like ditches show that they also were aban-
doned and filled during occupation. Filling of the fortification ditches may 
suggest that another fort was built at the site. Magnetics to the west, outside 
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the fourth ditch, have not revealed clear evidence of other ditch features nor is 
another ditch visible in magnetics on the southeast side. There is also no clear 
evidence that a second covered subterranean structure was built after the inner 
one burned. In the unplowed field, ditch #3 is about 4 m wide and has relatively 
straight walls, similar to the roofed ditch (ditch #1). However, the small cross-
section excavation of ditch #3 did not encounter post molds. Thus, we are not 
confident that this wide ditch is a second roofed subterranean structure. More 
work is needed to determine if the fort was enlarged outside of the fourth ditch, 
or if there is another fort structure elsewhere on this large site.
Summary of Fortification Features
Investigations at Bryson-Paddock have identified a series of ditches that 
were parts of fortifications resembling forts described at later historic Wichita 
sites. At least four ditches were built near the center of Bryson-Paddock on a 
south-sloping ridge (figure 8.9). The ditches extend in a roughly circular pattern 
around the head of a dry draw or creek that may have been a source of water 
in the eighteenth century. The pattern of some ditches is irregular based on 
the magnetics, and there are indications that ditch segments may join or inter-
sect other ditches. The outer three ditches appear to be dry-moat-type features 
used in conjunction with earthen ramparts and probably a stockade for defense. 
The innermost ditch constitutes the remains of a specialized semi-subterranean 
structure. Ramparts or embankments are not clearly visible at Bryson-Paddock 
but magnetic data suggest that earth from the ditches was piled to the inside. 
No posts for a stockade have been encountered at the site but plowing, erosion, 
or use of the earth from embankments to fill ditches may have removed enough 
soil to destroy any post molds formerly found in the embankments. Even the 
largest of these ditches and embankments would only encircle part of this large 
village; many houses, pits, and trash mounds are not enclosed by the fort (figure 
8.9). However, the filling of all the identified fortification ditches while the site 
was still occupied may indicate that another ditch with ramparts and a wooden 
stockade could have encircled a much larger area of the village.
The inner ditch at Bryson-Paddock served as a semi-subterranean structure 
that lined the inside of the fortification. The excavations at Bryson-Paddock 
represent the first archaeological research on one of these specialized struc-
tures. The structure is similar to Treviño’s description of them at the Longest 
site on the Red River and to later historical descriptions of shelters at Wichita 
villages in Texas. Treviño’s limited description noted how they were used to 
store supplies and as safe shelters for noncombatants during attacks, thereby 
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constituting an important part of Wichita defenses. The size and shape of one 
large excavated segment of the semi-subterranean structure matches these his-
toric descriptions. Evidence from Bryson-Paddock suggests that large posts 
scattered throughout the ditch supported a roof of wooden beams covered by 
grass thatch. Soil may have been placed over the thatch but there is very little 
burned clay in the fill. No entryway is apparent in the excavated portions of 
the structure; entry may have been through the roof. The short ditch exten-
sion with a central hearth and four center posts at Bryson-Paddock, however, 
has not been described at later Wichita villages. This extension resembles the 
footprint of a small Wichita house, but this structure is semi-subterranean 
Figure 8.9. Map of Bryson-Paddock magnetic surveys with identified and projected 
fortification ditches (three black outer rings) and semi-subterranean shelter (inner gray 
ring). Dashed lines indicate unconfirmed ditch locations. 
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and connected to the larger semi-subterranean structure that appears as a 
ditch in the magnetic surveys. More recently, test excavations at Longest in 
2013 uncovered a small section of one of the four subterranean “apartments” 
witnessed by Treviño. In cross-section (figure 8.7) this feature closely matches 
the inner ditch at Bryson-Paddock, although the Longest subterranean struc-
ture is wider (7.4 m wide at the top and 5.9 m at the bottom) and deeper (1.3 m). 
Like the excavated ditch at Bryson-Paddock, the Longest ditch had a flat floor, 
post molds extending down from the floor, and burned roof supports in the fill.
Finally, no indications of bastions, baffled gates, or similar defensive struc-
tures have been recovered at Bryson-Paddock. The draw may have been used 
as a southeast entryway into the fortification. The magnetics do indicate an 
apparent break in the fourth, outer ditch on the east side of the fort (figure 
8.10). Testing of this area revealed no ditch here although there are clear indi-
cations of the ditch within a few meters to the north and south. Similar breaks 
are evident in the second and third ditches in the same area although there 
have been no excavations of these possible entryways. Other entryways may 
be present. An eastern entry could have been easier to defend since access 
from the east is limited by the high, steep bluff to the river that is within 150 
m of the fort. The inner semi-subterranean structure does not appear to have 
a gap in the area of the possible east entryway.
Sites such as Bryson-Paddock, Deer Creek, and Neodesha Fort provide 
evidence of the intensified defensive efforts undertaken by the Wichita in 
the early eighteenth century. The organization of large, often paired, villages, 
spaced within a few kilometers of each other, and the labor needed to con-
struct massive features such as fortifications and underground shelters may be 
an indication of increasing social complexity at this time. Unfortunately, few 
burials have been identified from protohistoric sites and evidence of social dif-
ferentiation is minimal. Further investigations will be needed to document the 
timing and location of fortifications across the southern Plains, and to identify 
the factors leading to their construction. To further explore these issues, albeit 
tentatively, we turn to archaeological evidence of fortifications predating the 
structures just described.
other arChaeologICal eVIdenCe 
of WIChIta fortIfICatIons
Just as more research is needed for the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
forts, investigations need to be undertaken to create an accurate chronology 
of the earliest fortifications on the southern Plains. At this time, we do know 
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that relatively small fortified sites in the sixteenth century preceded the larger 
and more complex eighteenth-century structures discussed above. The earliest 
fortifications in the southern Plains appear before European contact, about 
200 years prior to the occupation of Bryson-Paddock and Deer Creek. Circular 
ditches are found at certain sixteenth-century Wheeler and Garza phase sites 
in western Oklahoma and northwest Texas (figure 8.1) (Drass and Baugh 1997). 
Interpreted as the remains of fortifications, they have been identified at the 
Edwards I (34BK2), Duncan (34WA2), and Bridwell (41CB27) sites. Edwards I 
and Duncan are today located in plowed fields in western Oklahoma. Before 
plowing leveled the fields, the ditches had embankments on their inner side. 
Limited excavation indicates the ditches are about 1 m deep, 2–3 m wide at the 
top, and encircle an area about 50 m across, a relatively small portion of each 
site. At Bridwell in the Texas Panhandle, an embankment remains to this day, 
measuring approximately 60 cm high (Drass and Baugh 1997).
Little is yet known of the activities that occurred within these early forti-
fications—only limited test excavations have been undertaken and magnetic 
surveys indicate some anomalies but none has been thoroughly excavated. No 
Figure 8.10. Magnetics on the southeast side of the Bryson-Paddock fortification. Arrows 
point to ditches and possible entryway. 
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semi-subterranean shelters have been identified. The Duncan and Edwards sites 
contain significant amounts of nonlocal trade materials, particularly items from 
the Southwest such as pottery, obsidian, turquoise, and Olivella-shell beads.
By the mid-sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, the Spanish expeditions 
of Coronado (1541) and Oñate (1601) reported large populations of people 
now believed to be Wichita living in villages along drainages in southern 
Kansas. These sites are today collectively known as the Great Bend aspect, 
consisting of two foci, the Little River and Lower Walnut (Wedel 1959). 
Numerous Great Bend sites exist, but no fortifications have been identified. 
Fortifications in southern Kansas only appear with the later eighteenth-cen-
tury site, Neodesha Fort (14WN1).
Recently, Baugh (2007) has suggested that previous interpretations of 
“council circles” (Vehik 2002; Wedel 1967) within seventeenth-century villages 
in south central Kansas may actually be remnants of fortifications. In fact, 
Wedel’s 1940 and 1965 excavations at the Tobias site (14RC8) revealed a circular 
pattern of semi-subterranean structures and Baugh suggests that “rings” visible 
around the structures may be ditches. Wedel (1967:57) tentatively termed the 
semi-subterranean structures “pithouses,” but in their shape and construction 
they seem reminiscent of semi-subterranean shelters described historically, as 
well as the semi-subterranean structure found at Bryson-Paddock. Without 
testing to identify ditches or a circular pattern of post molds indicative of a 
palisade, doubts persist concerning the function of these council circles.
the IMPetus to fortIfy
Anthropologists and archaeologists use various types of evidence to docu-
ment or infer warfare on the Plains, including oral history, historical docu-
mentation, human osteology, settlement patterns, weaponry, iconography, and 
the construction of fortifications (Bamforth 1994; Ewers 1975; Lambert 2002; 
Lowie 1935; Newcomb 1950; Robarchek 1994; Willey 1990). Until recently evi-
dence of conflict on the southern Plains before European contact primarily 
depended on human osteological studies, although defensive site locations 
in west Texas have been noted for the Late Prehistoric period (Brooks 1994; 
Lintz 1986). Early evidence of violence in the southern Plains has been pro-
posed (Baugh 2007; Boyd 1996; Dial and Black 2010; Lambert 2002). However, 
before ad 1200 or 1300 warfare seems to have been predominantly small-
scale and low-intensity raiding, probably resulting in few deaths. After about 
ad 1300, consolidation of populations into large but dispersed sites along 
the Arkansas River in central and southern Kansas may represent increased 
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emphasis on defense (Baugh 2007; Blakeslee and Hawley 2006; see Jordan 
2010 for a discussion on concentrated populations and defense). A similar 
change in settlement pattern may have occurred in western Oklahoma and 
west Texas after ad 1450. In addition, the appearance of fortifications at this 
time represents the clearest evidence for the rise of warfare at the end of the 
Late Prehistoric period.
Archaeologists speculate as to why fortifications initially appear in the 
southern Plains after ad 1450, and why they continue to be used into the his-
toric era (Brooks 1994; Drass 1998; Drass and Baugh 1997; Drass and Savage 
1992). Construction of fortifications is generally seen as symptomatic of inten-
sified conflict (Arkush and Allen 2006; Dye 2006). Warfare on the Plains 
has frequently been explained by applying ecological/economic or sociocul-
tural models (Bamforth 1994, 2006; Biolsi 1984; Ferguson 1984). Concerning 
the latter model, factors such as prestige, social stratification, revenge, and/
or competition have been posited as causing conflict among historic groups. 
Archaeologists frequently assume similar motivations for earlier conflicts. 
Ecological/economic explanations, on the other hand, center on environ-
mental changes impacting subsistence. Subsequent population movements 
led groups to compete, sometimes violently, for access to resources. Other 
scholars envision the arrival of Europeans as further impacting native warfare: 
the horse expanded group territories, increasing intergroup conflict, and the 
acquisition of guns affected the technology of warfare and defense (Dye 2006; 
Newcomb 1950).
In the case of the Wichita, however, other consequential immigrants arrived 
prior to Europeans, perhaps contributing to the development of fortifications. 
By 1500, frontier areas formed as Apache groups moved south into the High 
Plains of the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles. Wichita villagers lived just to 
the east on the rolling prairies where archaeological evidence suggests popula-
tion consolidation (coalescence) occurred during the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries. Contemporaneous faunal evidence indicates bison hunt-
ing intensified among Wichita groups at this time (Drass 1997; Savage 1995). 
Conflicts over hunting territory likely developed as the Apache moved into 
the Wichita’s western hunting grounds. Significantly, our earliest evidence of 
southern Plains fortifications appears in this western frontier area.
Long-distance trade also became significant at this time. With coalescing 
populations, social stratification and the search for prestige would further 
contribute to inter- and intratribal conflicts (Vehik 2002). Struggle over the 
control of Plains–Southwest trade routes may also have stimulated conflict 
and defensive measures. Alternatively, fortified sites such as Duncan near 
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the western frontier may have served as trade centers. Defensive structures 
could have discouraged conflict and protected valuable goods during fall 
trading fairs.
During the next two centuries, Wichita populations concentrated into large, 
often paired, villages in the eastern Plains, and these villages were typically 
fortified. Wichita groups remained in the short- and mixed-grass prairies to 
the west, but to date archaeologists have not found any western fortifications 
after approximately 1600. Increasing mobility associated with greater special-
ization in hunting dispersed bison populations in the western prairies could 
have rendered fortifications impractical.
By the early eighteenth century, conflict may have intensified as evidenced 
by the larger fortification complexes present at Bryson-Paddock, Deer Creek, 
and Neodesha Fort. This intensification probably resulted from a variety of 
ecological, economic, and social factors. The historic record documents the 
presence of horses at this time and trade with Europeans was escalating. The 
arrival of horses expanded the ranges of tribes and the potential for increased 
raiding, especially for the coveted horses, which were probably more abundant 
for southern Plains tribes than for other Plains peoples. Greater mobility also 
brought tribes such as the Comanche and Cheyenne south into the south-
ern Plains, heightening the potential for conflict and also possibly disrupting 
some of the Wichita trade with the Southwest. At the same time, the Osage 
were intensifying pressure on the Wichita from the northeast. Uneven distri-
bution of guns may also have changed the balance between some eastern and 
western tribes’ defenses, and epidemics from European diseases would have 
impacted populations, encouraging coalescence of groups into larger and/or 
closely spaced villages as a means to improve defenses. Considerable labor and 
organization would be necessary for construction of defensive structures, and 
social stratification among the Wichita may have increased at this time.
The Wichita of the southern Plains occupied one of the last areas in the 
region to receive significant European trade. This changed rapidly between 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as French traders moved up the 
Arkansas River to obtain bison hides, meat, horses, Apache slaves (Barr 2005), 
and other items from the Wichita in exchange for a variety of European goods 
(Vehik et al. 2010). At this time, conflict mounted with eastern tribes, especially 
the Osage, as they attempted to control the Wichita’s access to trade (Morris 
1970; Vehik 2006). Historic documents also indicate Wichita groups raided 
and probably traded with Apache (Newcomb 1950:324) and later Comanche 
groups to the west to obtain more horses and bison products for trade with 
the French. Thus, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Wichita had 
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moved from the extreme periphery of the European market to a position as 
middle men in an intensifying trade in bison products as well as other goods. 
Conditions that once favored increasing conflict prior to European contact 
accelerated in the eighteenth century. Opportunities to broker trade between 
the French and the Comanche grew, as did hostilities against the Apache. 
Hostilities eventually culminated in the Wichita and Comanche raid on the 
Lipan Apache at the mission of San Sabá in 1758, followed by the Spaniards’ 
retaliatory strike on the Red River site in 1759. With these hostilities, Wichita 
fortifications firmly entered the historic record.
suMMary
Unlike northern Plains fortifications, which encircled entire villages, 
southern Plains forts functioned as places of refuge within villages. Most 
houses and activity areas remained external to a smaller circular fort situ-
ated in the center of the village. These forts were constructed with ditches 
and ramparts that held wooden-pole stockades. In addition, the presence of 
substantial semi-subterranean structures ringing the inside of some of the 
palisades (possibly as early as the seventeenth century) suggests further pro-
tection for noncombatants as well as a storage place for valuable goods and 
supplies. The shelters encircled the interior of the entire Bryson-Paddock 
fortification, an area 90–100 m in diameter. Evidence from the Longest site 
reveals that the fortification protected access to water from a spring and 
the river. Maps of the Deer Creek fort show similar protected access to a 
spring. At Bryson-Paddock, a now-dry creek may have had a spring in the 
eighteenth century, or the Wichita may have caught water in a basin at the 
head of this creek.
Data from fortified southern Plains sites indicate that the size and com-
plexity of Wichita fortifications changed significantly between the sixteenth 
to eighteenth centuries. Yet, only the early eighteenth-century Bryson-
Paddock site has been extensively excavated. We now recognize not simply 
a fortification “ring” but a true fortification complex of multiple ditches and 
embankments in a circular pattern with one ditch serving as an interior semi- 
subterranean shelter. This fortification complex resembles those noted histori-
cally by a number of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century eyewitnesses on the 
southern Plains. That the Wichita spent so much time digging ditches to con-
struct, rebuild, and expand their defensive complex over time demonstrates 
the urgent salience of defense at Bryson-Paddock and related villages between 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.
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The goal of this chapter is to interpret and to a lesser 
degree contextualize a site known as the Alcova 
Redoubt (hereafter the Redoubt). The architectural 
remains and cultural materials found on this site are 
highly suggestive of a planned fortification. Currently, 
the designations of fortifications as a site type have 
been only lightly considered in the Wyoming literature 
(Hoxie and Rzeczkowski n.d.; Keyser and Poetschat 
2005; Keyser 2007b; Loendorf and Good 1977) and 
arbitrarily assigned to sites better described as defen-
sive locations (Adams 1994; Frison 1988; Loendorf and 
Good 1977). This chapter therefore establishes a solid 
definition of a fortification and its relationship to other 
hunter-gatherer archaeology sites of the Wyoming 
region. Fortifications sites found in the Wyoming 
region do not directly correlate with the complexity of 
fortifications described throughout this book. However, 
several key features appear throughout all fortifications 
sites globally and are considered in a broader discus-
sion of defense-related sites focusing on the social and 
temporal conditions that may have led to the develop-
ment of planned fortification in a region synonymous 
with hunter-gatherer peoples.
The prehistory of the northwestern Great Plains 
is typified by egalitarian hunting-gathering groups 
(Frison 1991). The groups are broadly defined as “soci-
eties in which there is a short time between the acqui-
sition and the consumption of food, where individuals 
have equal access to resource and methods of resource 
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extraction, and use mobility as a method of dispute resolution” (Kelly 1995:295). 
“Dispute resolution” is of prime importance because egalitarian hunter- 
gatherers generally move to avoid outer group violence, a factor (among many) 
that keeps their personal possessions low (Kelly 1995:296). Mobility as a form 
of conflict mediation seems to preclude fortification use and leaves open the 
question: when do hunter-gatherers build defensive structures?
Hunter-Gatherer Violence
The presence or absence of violence in egalitarian hunting and gathering 
groups spans a theoretical range between two extremes: at one end, egalitarian 
groups are more violent than modern western civilizations’ deadliest wars (Keeley 
1996), and at the other extreme the rarity of interpersonal violence makes hunter-
gatherers among the greatest peace negotiators the world has known (Fry 2006). 
I would like to circumnavigate the theoretical allegiances latent in these two 
extremes and focus instead on the violence prevalent in hunter- gatherer popula-
tions (Keeley 1996; Fry 2006). There are both peaceful and aggressive foragers 
(Kelly 1995). So the question becomes not whether egalitarian groups are violent, 
but what form does their violence take? Interpersonal group violence should 
have a different archaeological signature than organized warfare.
“Warfare” here is defined as “potentially lethal fighting among separate com-
munities that is viewed as a legitimate, even desirable, means of advancing a 
group’s position relative to that of its neighbors. “Warfare involves collective rather 
than individual parts” (emphasis added, Milner 2007:182–183). This differs from 
violence defined as “a severe form of physical aggression, violence entails forceful 
attacks, usually with weapons that can result in serious injuries or death” (Fry 
2006:11). Warfare has to be organized at a group level, whereas violence involves 
the physical aggression of any person who does harm with no specific benefit 
to a group. Violence, such as feuding and revenge killings, does not have to 
lead to warfare. Many egalitarian band-level groups often do have episodes of 
intergroup or interpersonal violence (Fry 2006; Kelly 2000; Otterbein 2004). 
However, there are often accepted limits to which levels of violence can reach 
within groups (Kelly 2000:11–38). This is because the violence is typically “spe-
cific and not generalized and does not escalate beyond a sequence of events that 
encompass homicide followed by the execution of the killer” (Kelly 2000:42–43). 
The cross-cultural ethnographic evidence from band-level societies reinforces 
the lack of war (Fry 2006; Keeley 1996; Kelly 2000; Otterbein 2004).
The incidence of violence among the Semai, for example, shows they have 
a “homicide rate of 30.3 per 100,000 population per annum” or about two 
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homicides every 22 years for a group of 300 (Knauft et al. 1987:458). A similar 
figure is suggested for the !Kung, the Hadza of Northern Tanzania, the Mbuti, 
and the Gebusi (Knauft et al. 1987:458–459). Studies of these groups suggest 
egalitarian groups fluctuate between periods of low violence and periods of 
frequent violence with relatively high violence rates per capita (Knauft et al. 
1987; Keeley 1996). However, when hunter-gatherer groups are viewed at long 
intervals, low aggression marks the ethnographic record more than do high 
levels of violence (see Fry 2006:box 5.1 and 5.2; 63–64; 66–67). This has led to 
the conclusion that “no peaceful society is expected to be absolutely devoid of 
all forms of aggression at all times” (Fry 2006:63). Hunter-gatherers seem to 
fluctuate between violent periods but as a whole have low incidences of vio-
lence with no systematic warfare as defined in this chapter (Fry 2006).
Drawing upon ethnographic cross-cultural studies of conflict, Keeley main-
tains some “90 to 95 percent” of all human societies engage in warfare (Keeley 
1996:29). Examining frequency of war, Keeley (1996:32) suggests greater politi-
cal complexity increases the frequency of war. A similar conclusion is reached 
by Fry (2006:100–113, 2007:69–80). However, Keeley (1996:32) also suggests 
“70 to 90 percent” of prestate societies engaged in warfare at least once every 
five years and the archaeological evidence of “well-studied regions” (Keeley 
1996:39) reflects this pattern—stretching warfare back some 10,000 years. For 
some researchers, the ethnographic signature of war informs and reinforces 
the archaeological signature of war (Keeley 1996). However, the coarse reso-
lution of the archaeological record makes it difficult to elucidate differences 
between war and violence, although iconographic studies may suggest other-
wise (see Keyser, chapter 3, this volume).
There is no doubt violence is indicated in the archaeological record 
(Martindale and Gill 1983; Scheiber 2008; see discussion of Roper 1969 in Fry 
2006:134–135), but warfare is less clear. Cases like the 12,000–14,000-year-old 
cemetery known as Jebel Sahaba in Sudanese Nubia are often used to argue 
for both the antiquity and existence of early warfare (Keeley 1996; Otterbein 
2004:74). Excavations at Jebel Sahaba uncovered the remains of 59 skeletons, 
with 24 showing direct evidence of violent trauma (Thorpe 2003; Wendorf 
1968). The contemporaneity of the burials has never been established, leading 
to a justifiable critique of the site as only containing reoccurring acts of homi-
cide, execution, or a burial for the murder victims (Fry 2006; Thorpe 2003:152–
153). The often-cited human bone bed at the Crow Creek site in south-central 
South Dakota with some 500 individuals, an associated palisade, and burned 
lodges is a much clearer indicator of warfare (Willey 1990; Zimmerman and 
Bradley 1993). This suggests archaeologists cannot interpret warfare from any 
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one line of data (Solometo 2010). We know violence exists in the record of 
egalitarian groups, but what both Keeley (1996) and Fry (2006) have demon-
strated is that warfare seems to hinge on political complexity.
The Wyoming Region
The ephemeral architecture and small size of archaeological sites found in 
the Wyoming region argue for more, small, highly mobile groups (Frison 1991; 
Kelly 1995:124). As aforementioned, mobile groups tend to move if neighbor-
ing groups become hostile (Kelly 1995:294; Fry 2006). In an area where low 
group sizes and high mobility were prevalent, low incidences of violence and 
fortifications should be the norm. The latter is simply because non-residential 
defensive structures (i.e., fortifications) are a costly endeavor that hunter-
gatherer groups cannot easily offset without sustainable resource patches 
or food storage. It is unjustifiable for a mobile group to invest labor into an 
elaborate structure that does not have an immediate economic benefit (Kelly 
1995). Fortifications are more typically built and maintained by large groups 
of people (see Mitchell, chapter 11, this volume). To argue fortification use is 
to argue for either a decrease in mobility or an increase in group size, or both. 
This very signature is evident in the archaeological record during the transi-
tion from the Late Prehistoric to the Protohistoric period (1500 bp to ~200 
bp) of the Wyoming region (Sutton 2004).
The residential-site size and the radiocarbon data serve as a proxy for a 
population size that peaked between ad 1000 and ad 1500 in the Wyoming 
region (Surovell et al. 2009; Sutton 2004). During this increase in settlement 
size there was a presumed change in social structure to account for larger 
group cohesion (Sutton 2004). Both the iconographic and skeletal evidence 
are suggestive of violence prior to the horse (see Keyser, chapter 3, this vol-
ume). But a shift in the intensity and incidence of violence to full-blown war-
fare seems to coincide with the influx of European goods into indigenous 
communities (Sutton 2004; Wolf 1997). Three independent lines of evidence 
support this position. First is an increased use of stone structures for defense 
(i.e., in fortifications) in the Protohistoric period (Conner et al. 1977; Hoxie 
and Rzeczkowski n.d.). Second is an increase in violent rock art depictions 
with European trade goods (Keyser and Poetschat 2005). Finally, the skeletal 
record indicates higher levels of violence in the Protohistoric than in any of 
the preceding periods.
In a sample of 93 individuals dating to the Late Prehistoric period (ad 
1500–1700) one-third show some evidence of violence (Scheiber 2008). This 
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is demonstrated by injuries on skeletal remains that include “projectile points 
embedded in bone, parrying fractures, and the presence or absence of projec-
tile points found in the graves” (Scheiber 2008:35). The Scheiber (2008) skel-
etal overview does not parse out violent death in the Protohistoric period but 
does show a decrease in the average age of death.
The average age of death for 257 individuals dating to the Protohistoric-
period assemblage is 25 years. According to Scheiber (2008:37), “many more 
people were dying at a young age, and very few older adults are found” in the 
Protohistoric period. In fact, Scheiber notes the mean age of death reaches 
an all-time high in the Protohistoric period, with 63 percent of the sample 
labeled as “young-adults” from 20 to 39 years old (Scheiber 2008:39). This is 
an increase of young adult deaths of nearly 41 percent over the preceding Late 
Prehistoric and Archaic periods (a timespan covering at least three millennia). 
It is important to note the violence and young ages of death recorded in these 
samples may not necessarily be representative for the escalation of warfare. 
The violence could be seen as a simple increase in interpersonal conflict as a 
result of expanding group size in the Protohistoric period (Scheiber 2008:39; 
Sutton 2004), but the presence of a site like the Redoubt makes it appealing 
to argue for the presence of warfare during this period.
According to Keeley (1996:55), fortifications are the “costliest and largest 
pieces of preindustrial military technology that prehistoric peoples utilized 
to defend against assailants.” As such, the construction of defensive struc-
ture required organized labor focused on a planned design. Therefore, the 
construction of fortifications is a practice egalitarian societies seldom if ever 
embarked upon (Keeley 1996). Otterbein (2004:189) states, “hunters and gath-
erers did not build walls around their camps.” Jones (2004:161) also echoes 
Otterbein’s position by stating that “nomadic hunting bands did not build 
complex fortifications.” It may then be argued that if a fortification is pres-
ent in the Wyoming region, there were also levels of social differentiation 
(O’Brien 2013; Vanpool and O’Brien 2013). The importance of this, however, 
is not to argue for the increasing social change of the inhabitants that built 
the Alcova Redoubt; more work is needed to test the link between social dif-
ferentiation and fortification construction. The remainder of this chapter is 
dedicated to justifying how this site qualifies as a planned fortified structure.
fortIfICatIons
The use of architecture to defend a location is a practice that stretches back 
possibly over 10,000 years with the site of Jericho (Bar-Yosef 1986; Fry 2006; 
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Keegan 1994). Certainly by 7000 bp defensive architectural elements were 
in use in the Old World (Keeley 1996). The characterization of architecture 
as defensive in the archaeological record is dependent on agreeable defini-
tions. In a recent review of fortifications Schaepe (2006:674) determined the 
National Park Service’s (2005) definition of “works erected to defend a place” 
best characterized defensive architecture (Schaepe 2006:674). To qualify as 
defensive, the erected architecture must refer to features including walls, bas-
tions, and locations on the landscape that have a purely military function 
(Kelly 2000; Keeley et al. 2007; Schaepe 2006). Several examples of such loca-
tions can be found in the Missouri Trench area and are reviewed in this book 
(Bamforth 1994,; chapter 1, this volume; Clark, chapter 12, this volume; Jones 
2004; Keeley 1996; Kvamme and Ahler 2007; Kvamme 2008; Mitchell, chapter 
11, this volume; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993).
By definition, a fortification must have architecture and this architecture 
must include a wall system. A “wall system” is defined as the “surrounding bar-
riers or enclosures that prevent access to and, almost always, obscure vision of 
a particular location” (Keeley et al. 2007:57). Individual components together 
comprise an “enceinte,” or wall. These include the wall (sometimes referred to as 
a “curtain”), any gates, bastions, and associated ditches (Keeley et al. 2007). Sites 
not meeting these criteria are considered “defensive sites” (Schaepe 2006:674). 
Defensive sites contain little or no architecture and are defendable “through 
means of position in a landscape that restricts access to a place, thereby serv-
ing to protect it from attack” (Schaepe 2006:674). Defensive sites are primarily 
located in a “naturally defensive or strategic location” (Keeley et al. 2007:56). 
A butte-top occupation with short wall segments or no walls is a defensive 
site. Fortifications, on the other hand, have architecture, incorporate the use 
of weapons into wall construction, and concentrate those weapon systems on 
specific locations (e.g., entry points). Fortifications are major undertakings, 
whereas defensive locations are not. But not all fortifications are built the same.
Fortifications can be seen on a continuum with refuge fortifications at 
the more ephemeral end of the scale, and strongholds at the permanent 
end. Strongholds can best be considered castle-like. “A stronghold is a place 
not merely of safety from attack but also of active defense, and also a base 
from which they [the occupants] may sally forth to hold predators at bay 
and to impose military control over the area in which their interests lie” 
(Keegan 1994:139). A refuge fortification, on the other hand, “is a place of 
short-term safety, of value only against an enemy who lacks the means to 
linger in the vicinity or who operates a crude strategy of raiding” (Keegan 
1994:139). Generally, nomadic groups protect themselves from spontaneous 
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attacks via refuge building ( Jones 2004:162). The Grapevine Creek account 
is one such account of refuge fortification use (Hoxie and Rzeczkowski n.d.). 
Secoy (1992:54) and McGinnis (1990:33) both talk of a Blackfoot attack on 
a Flathead village: “Instantly down went the tents and the tent poles, which, 
with the baggage formed a rude rampart . . . a steady charge of cavalry . . . but 
the horses did not break through the rampart of pointed poles (Keyser and 
Poetschat 2005:130; Secoy 1992:54).
The two types of fortifications—refuges and strongholds—would have had 
similarities and differences in terms of architecture and location on the land-
scape ( Jones 2004; Keegan 1994; Keyser 2005:127–130). A refuge fortification 
is constructed in a very quick fashion and will usually contain no more than a 
simplistic wall, or one of the additional characteristics: “location at high eleva-
tions and on steep landforms characterized by elevation differences in altitude, 
such as hilltops or mountains; concealment of site interiors from outsiders; 
presence of large viewsheds, prominent lookout points, and/or settlement 
surveillance” (Sakaguchi et al. 2010:1172). A refuge-style fortification site will 
include both landscape and (at least) hastily built architecture.
A stronghold fortification, on the other hand will contain almost all of the 
following: “a curtain which shields defenders from the attackers by blocking 
the vision (of what’s happening behind the curtain), provides a raised posi-
tion to both fire and view attackers from, and slows down the advancement of 
attackers into the defended position” (Keeley et al. 2007:57. Stronghold fortifi-
cations are much larger in scale than refuge fortifications.
Components of a Wall System
A fortification must have a wall “curtain or surrounding wall deterring pas-
sage over or through a defended perimeter . . . which provides a screen of 
maneuver for defenders” (Keeley et al. 2007:57–58). Examples of curtains in 
an archaeological context can be found in the North American Great Plains 
in sites like Huff (Bamforth 1994), Jiggs-Thompson ( Jones 2004) and Crow 
Creek (Zimmerman and Bradley 1993). These curtains or walls were con-
structed by placing large timbers on end at regular intervals ( Jones 2004). 
Obviously, the curtain is one of the major, if not the major, component of a 
fortification. The remaining features of wall systems can be seen as building 
off of or reinforcing the defensibility of a curtain.
In some cases, the entry points of curtains are designed to expose, trap, or 
hinder attackers (Keeley et al. 2007). These locations are “defended gates” work-
ing in conjunction with the curtain to expose the attackers to the defenders. 
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The simplest form of a defended gate is a baffled gate. This type of gate over-
laps the wall segments so an attacker moving through the gate is exposed to 
many persons on the inside of a fortification wall (Keeley et al. 2007). Gate 
construction can be quite complex (Keeley et al. 2007:63–65). The purpose, 
however, is to lure in attackers into the curtain (Keeley et al. 2007).
Ditches are commonly placed in front of curtains. The purpose of a ditch is 
rather straightforward and is (excluding the manual labor) relatively easy to 
construct before a wall (curtain) is erected. It works effectively to slow down or 
prevent attackers from reaching or scaling the walls (see Keeley et al. 2007:59). 
The material removed from the ditch can aid in reinforcing the wall thus 
strengthening the fortification. Many examples of North American ditched 
archaeological sites backed by a wall or palisade can be found in the Middle 
Missouri–tradition sites of the northern Great Plains of North America 
(Clark, chapter 12, this volume; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993). Well-placed 
ditches can keep attackers from gaining entry to the wall but are considerably 
more useful when bastions are incorporated into the wall.
“Bastions are external projections of a barrier [that is, they are protru-
sions from the curtain] large enough to hold several defenders and their 
firing weapons” (see Keeley et al. 2007:69 for a diagram). Bastions “inflict 
flanking fire on any attackers closely approaching the enceinte and adjacent 
bastions” (Keeley et al. 2007:67). All bastions have in common an intended 
weapon system using some type of projectiles. By using projectile weapons, 
there is an overlapping line of fire for any individuals stationed in the bas-
tions that approximates a 180-degree arc. Bastions are evenly spaced, taking 
into account the weapon system to be used by people stationed in the bas-
tions (Keeley et al. 2007). Commonly this spacing is between “one half and 
one third the effective range of the principal defensive projectile weapons” 
(Keeley et al. 2007:70), allowing the adjacent bastions to lend mutual sup-
port in defending the wall between them. However, immediately in front 
of any rectangular bastion, for example, is an area of “dead ground,” where 
attackers are protected from missiles from the curtain and the other bastions 
(Keeley et al. 2007: 69). When all of the features are combined, whether a 
group builds a fortification with a wall system incorporating some or all 
of the features listed above, it is an incredible undertaking (illustrations in 
Keeley et al. 2007:69).
A defensive site does not require the labor, planning, or resources a fortifica-
tion does. Groups can easily move on top of or into an area with a command-
ing viewshed with practically no investment. A fortification, however, requires 
something much different, as Mitchell (2010:3) states:
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fortifications effectively measure social perceptions of war. That is, they are 
sensitive barometers of a community’s expectation or anticipation of collective 
violence. This is so because they are costly: building them requires the coordi-
nated labor of a significant fraction of the community and they consume large 
amounts of [material] . . . They create a need for community-level leadership, to 
settle on an appropriate and cost-effective design and to manage construction. 
And because any fortification is only as effective as its weakest section, they 
require sustained and coordinated maintenance . . . In short, fortifications can 
be seen as a form of monumental architecture, which only were built when the 
community collectively deemed them necessary. And because they took time to 
build and had to be designed and put up prior to the onset of active hostilities, 
they indicate trends in community sentiment over a period of time.
The “community sentiment” then has to be one of self-preservation to build 
a fortification. A group has to know it can offset the cost of construction 
required for a fortification. Moreover, a group has to know who is attacking, 
where the likeliest places of attack would be concentrated, and the size(s) of 
the group(s) attacking. A miscalculation in any of these variables and the like-
lihood of death increases. Self-preservation is an incredible motivator.
Otterbein (2004) argues the use of fortifications is limited to chiefdoms 
or state-level societies, as these are the only groups able to offset building 
costs (Otterbein 2004). Gat (2006:168) argues fortification use was a product 
of sedentary agriculturalist societies. Because of their fixed resources, these 
groups had to have a heightened sense of security. Agriculture does not make 
groups build fortifications but sedentism may result in fortification (Gat 
2006:172), especially in situations like the Great Plains, where nomadic tribes 
co-occurred with sedentary groups (Keeley 1996). These are typically strong-
hold fortifications, which besides helping protect crops, also secure specific 
industries or areas of specialized crafts (Gat 2006:169).
Fortifications can also mark the edge of frontiers or territorial boundaries. 
Keeley (1996:132) has suggested that the “vulnerability and volatility of fron-
tiers explain why they have been buffered by . . . fortifications.” Fortifications 
on frontiers are often placed between different social organizations such as 
“civilized/tribal; pastoral nomad/village farmer; and farmer/forager” (Keeley 
1996:132). Typically, frontier fortifications are refuge style because groups 
with large territories defend their territory and not specific locations ( Jones 
2004:162). Fortifications located on territorial boundaries should be simpler 
than ones designed to protect specific economies or trade.
Fortifications are costly and require a specific set of social and economic 
conditions for construction. These conditions vary widely as demonstrated 
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here but the constant variable has to be one of perceived attack. The fortifica-
tions of the Coastal Salish are argued to be a response to a widespread prestige 
economy based on “the acquisition and exchange of goods and people as slaves” 
(Schaepe 2006:677). The variable of constant threat in this example is obvious. 
The Salish, faced with such a threat, built wooden palisades, cantilevered plat-
forms, and ladders to deter attack (Schaepe 2006). They built a wall system: a 
fortification. The existence of a fortification in the Wyoming region suggests 
that at least in one case the community sentiment toward the perception of 
attack justified the construction of a fortification.
the alCoVa redoubt
The Redoubt is located on an isolated sandstone butte in central Wyoming. 
More specifically, the site is situated on the northeast edge on the tallest, most 
isolated, sandstone-capped feature in the local drainage basin (figure 9.1).
It is a small site, measuring 53 m north–south by 120 m east–west. The most 
striking features on the site are three juniper and sandstone walls (known 
individually as the East Wall, West Wall and Inner Wall), two of which define 
the eastern and western boundaries (East Wall and West Wall). The third 
Figure 9.1. Overview of the Alcova Redoubt, looking northwest. The bracket frames the 
site boundary. 
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wall (Inner Wall) runs north–south through the interior of the site. A small 
bench west of the Inner wall measuring 53 m north–south by 22.5 m east–west 
contains almost all of the occupational debris (figure 9.2). Small amounts of 
residential material (i.e., lithic debitage and burned rock) are located near the 
West Wall but do not approach the frequency recorded around the Inner Wall 
(figure 9.3).
The East, Inner, and West Walls
A location of the wall system around the site is dictated by a sandstone 
caprock that varies from 5 m in the western, south-central, and north-central 
portions of the site to nonexistent in the eastern portion. The vertical height of 
the caprock cliff fortifies close to 75 m of the northern portion of the site and 
60 m of the southern portion. Any cracks or easily scalable areas in the caprock 
are blocked with short juniper-and-sandstone wall segments. The remaining 
portions of the butte with no caprock have long lengths of interwoven juniper 
and sandstone wall.
These three distinct wall segments measure 223 m long. The East Wall is 
the largest of the three wall segments, being 100 m long. It has several distinct 
construction methods, including vertical juniper poles with woven rock and 
wood, coursed sandstone slabs (dry-masonry), horizontal wooden beams rein-
forcing vertical sandstone slabs, and stacked wood. This wall terminates in the 
northeast and southern area of the site where it intersects the caprock cliffs.
The East Wall is the tallest and most representative of the three wall seg-
ments, measuring 1.5 m at its tallest point; it also has the most material left of 
the three wall segments (figure 9.4). The amount of juniper and sandstone in 
the East Wall suggests it was the tallest of the three wall segments. The Inner 
Wall bisects the East Wall in the south-central portion of the site. The Inner 
Wall measures 63 m long. This wall segment is not as continuous as the East 
or West Walls. The tallest portion at present measures half a meter high. There 
are two different construction methods apparent in the Inner Wall, including 
angled sandstone slabs and stacked wood. This Inner Wall may have been the 
original East Wall. For some reason, the walls were expanded east, and materi-
als from the Inner Wall were robbed for this proposed expansion (figure 9.5). 
Almost all of the occupational debris on the site is located behind (i.e., west 
of ) the Inner Wall. It is also possible the Inner Wall served as a secondary 
defense in case the East Wall was breached.
The West Wall, measuring 60 m north–south, is the shortest of the three 
wall segments. This wall segment has the same construction method as the 
Figure 9.2. Overview of the Alcova Redoubt. Labels correspond to the wall and cliff 
segments described in text. Each number corresponds to the bastions described in the text. 
The shaded shapes are large pieces of the detached butte caprock. 
Figure 9.3. The Alcova Redoubt artifact-distribution map. Dashed lines are ceramic 
scatters. Triangles are projectile points. Ringed circle is a glass bead, and shaded areas 
represent large pieces of detached butte caprock. Half-circles are wickiups. Squares are 
manuport piles. M, individual manuports; X, obsidian flakes; P, steatite pipe; B, bifaces; 
S, scraper. 
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Figure 9.4. Overview of the East Wall, looking north. 
East Wall, including vertical juniper poles with woven rock and wood, coursed 
sandstone slabs (dry-masonry), horizontal wooden beams reinforcing vertical 
sandstone slabs, and stacked wood. This wall segment is not a continuous wall. 
Instead wall segments were constructed around large slump blocks, producing 
a terraced wall system. The result is a wall with six vertical meters of difference 
between its upper and lower portions (figure 9.6).
Small wall remnants are present in both the northern and the southern 
cliff areas (figure 9.7). These small wall portions block vertical cracks in the 
sandstone caprock. The method of construction of these small wall segments 
differs from the main wall. Vertical juniper posts were placed in the ground 
and large horizontally placed logs were woven around the post to form a short 
wall. There are nine of these short wall segments on the site. All building 
material incorporated into the walls is readily available around the site. The 
sandstone outcrops in the west portion of the site are probably where most of 
the rock was gathered ( John Albanese, personal communication, 2006). There 
are no axe or cut marks on any of the juniper poles. Deadfall juniper is abun-
dant throughout the immediate area and was the likely source of the material 
for the walls.
250 BRYON SCHROEDER
Figure 9.5. Overview of the Inner Wall, looking north. Arrows designate large sandstone 
slabs incorporated into the wall. 
The Date of the Redoubt
The Redoubt has only been surface inventoried and mapped with no recov-
ery of datable materials; therefore no absolute date can presently be assigned 
to the site. However, certain components of the current surface artifact assem-
blage are highly suggestive of a Protohistoric date for the site. These artifacts 
include a single blue glass bead, or “seed bead,” a highly carved steatite pipe 
fragment, two separate ceramic scatters, and the high amount of wood found 
in the wall system (figure 9.8).
The 17 surface projectile points alone suggest the site typologically dates to 
the Late Prehistoric period. Fifty-three percent of the projectile-point assem-
blage are tri-notched projectile points; 18 percent are side-notched; 12 per-
cent are corner-notched; and another 12 percent are unnotched Cottonwood 
Triangular points. A single point fragment with notch remnants completes 
the current assemblage. The points strongly resemble specimens found at the 
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Mummy Cave layer 38 (Husted and Edgar 2002:plate 60), the River Bend site 
(Buff 1983:figure 6; McKee 1988), and the High Rise Village, all of which sug-
gest a very late occupation for the site (Koenig 2010).
The ceramics on the site come from two separate concentrations and rep-
resent two vessels. Both vessels do not resemble Intermountain Ware often 
associated with Shoshonean groups (Frison 1991:116–117; Larson and Kornfeld 
1994; Mulloy 1954). Both vessels have fingernail impressions on the exterior 
surfaces. This style of decoration is described throughout northern Colorado 
and eastern Utah (Cassells 1997:246, figure 10–10; Janetski 1994:164–165; 
Loendorf 2002:79; Middleton et al. 2007).
Figure 9.6. Portion of the West Wall. The dashed line (beneath the feet of the person in the 
photo) denotes the wall portion. 
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Figure 9.7. Example of a blocked portion of a vertical crack in the caprock of the northern 
and southern cliffs. 
There are two Protohistoric diagnostic artifacts on the Redoubt. The first is 
a blue glass seed bead. The second is a steatite pipe fragment manufactured 
with the use of metal tools (Richard Adams, personal communication, 2007). 
Unfortunately neither artifact provides a calendar age. Torus beads are rela-
tively time transgressive and such a small sample makes it difficult to assign 
dates (von Wedell 2011). The steatite pipe was carved with trade goods but 
metal detector surveys on site failed to locate any associated metal.
The wall portions complicate any assigned date. The 223 m (over a tenth of 
a mile) of continuous wall include at least 45 (US) tons (90,000 pounds) of 
stacked juniper and sandstone material. There is no one preferred construction 
method evident in the design of any wall that could be interpreted as multiple 
building episodes. This is most evident in the Inner Wall, which was likely 
dismantled completely to serve as a secondary wall or originally stood as the 
outer wall. The likelihood of multiple occupations during a technologically 
similar period then is very real for this site and needs to be dealt with in a dif-
ferent study that has the expressed goal of dating the site.
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Diagnostic surface artifacts discovered on the Redoubt date to both the 
Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric periods. The amount of stone debitage, 
stone projectile points, wooden features, ceramics, and a solitary glass bead 
all coupled with a lack of metal artifacts is highly suggestive of a late Late 
Prehistoric or an early Protohistoric date hovering around ad 1600 to ad 1700. 
Assignment to this age bracket is bolstered by the lack of military trade para-
phernalia and other metal artifacts, the incidence of which would be expected 
to be higher if the site were closer to the nineteenth century.
The description of the individual artifacts, as well as the architectural fea-
tures on site now, make it possible to illustrate how they come together as 
evidence of a well-planned fortification site.
The Alcova Redoubt as a Fortification
Several lines of evidence can be used to demonstrate the Redoubt is a 
planned fortification. The first is the location and design of the three wall 
Figure 9.8. Overview of artifacts discovered on the Alcova Redoubt: (a) example of the 
Uncompahgre pottery vessel, (b) all projectile points discovered on site, (c) blue glass bead, 
(d) steatite pipe fragment. 
254 BRYON SCHROEDER
segments. The second focuses on the bastion features incorporated into the 
wall design. The final line of evidence comes from the location and types of 
weapon systems discovered on site that integrate with the wall system.
The site is located on an isolated sandstone butte top. This is the first fea-
ture making it a good defensive location. However, to move the site out of 
a “defensive location” categorization and into that of a “fortification” requires 
more. The Redoubt has only six entry points due to the steep talus slopes sur-
rounding the conical butte. The builders of the site focused the wall segments 
on these six entry points. The easiest access points have the tallest and lon-
gest wall segments (e.g., the entire 80-m length of the East Wall). The Inner 
Wall further serves to thwart an attack from the east as it acts as a secondary 
defense against a breach of the East Wall (in addition to being the possible 
original East Wall). The West Wall is terraced, on and around, large slump 
blocks of caprock acting as a lure for attackers. The natural terracing provides 
6 m of fall from the highest to lowest wall segments in the West Wall, making 
it ideal for the use of projectile weaponry against climbing attackers. This and 
the presence of bastions in the remaining wall segments lead to the interpreta-
tion that all the walls were manufactured with projectile weaponry in mind.
The Bastions
Incorporated into the design of both the East and West Walls are at least 
eight (and possibly as many as 12) bastions; all what Keeley et al. (2007:69) 
identify as rectangular bastions. Two of these are incorporated into the main 
wall, which is used as a rear wall to the protrusion, while six others are simply 
U-shaped protrusions with no ‘backing’ wall. All of the bastions on site are large 
enough to hold two full-size adults and their weaponry (figure 9.9). The eight 
features can also be defined as rectangular bastions, the most common in pre-
history, as this style is easy to build and holds multiple individuals (Keeley et al. 
2007:68–69). Bastions typically have heavier foundations due to the extra height 
and weight constraints these features place on walls (Keeley et al. 2007). This 
situation does not directly correlate to the Redoubt because the bastions were 
built on sandstone bedrock rather than on a wall. However, there are more sand-
stone slabs incorporated into bastion construction than in the main wall seg-
ments. Presumably this was to protect defenders stationed in the bastions from 
incoming projectiles, as they would have been the most susceptible to an attack.
Bastions are only effective when accompanied with a projectile weapon sys-
tem. The distance between each bastion should concentrate the weaponry on 
the areas of perceived attack, but also allow for overlapping areas of fire. This 
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is evident in the design of the site. The East Wall contains five of the eight 
bastions (B1–B5), all of which have a line of sight on the approximate 80 m of 
easily accessible terrain barricaded by the wall. These five bastions also provide 
an overlapping field of fire covering this entire wall segment. The West Wall 
is created by the remaining three bastions (B6–B8), all of which provide an 
overlapping field of fire on the western apex (see figure 9.2).
Without the incorporation of the bastions into the wall, the site would be 
relatively easy to breach. The bastions made it possible for defenders to use pro-
jectile weaponry while protecting the wall. However, defense of the wall was 
only possible with the aid of this projectile weaponry. Currently there are two 
projectile weapons systems evident on the site, both associated with the bastions.
Weapons Systems
The most prevalent weapons on site are softball-sized river cobbles. These 
were carried from base of the butte (approximately one mile southeast) and 
Figure 9.9. Overview of Bastion 1. The East Wall boundaries are emphasized with 
dashed lines. 
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placed around the Inner and East Wall segments. There are five distinct manu-
port piles, containing 133 stones, at an average of 26 stones per pile (figure 9.10). 
The mean stone size is 11 cm by 5 cm, with an average weight of 0.920 kg (2 lbs). 
All five piles are found in direct association with wall segments. Survey around 
the Redoubt has found manuports in three of the six entry points. Currently 
the best interpretation of the five manuport piles is as cached rocks to be used 
as potentially lethal throwing stones.
Keeley and colleagues suggest that thrown rocks could kill at 30 m, but they 
do not mention the rock’s size (Keeley et al. 2007:73). Therefore, the Redoubt 
manuports were likely for a close-combat scenario, or used as the primary 
weapon, during periods of high wind (common at this site). One of the manu-
port piles is located inside Bastion 1, and with manuports discovered in three 
of the six entry points, it is easy to suggest they were to be used in a battle 
scenario.
The second weapons system present on the Redoubt is the bow and arrow, 
which has an effective killing range varying from 70 to 90 m (Keeley 1996:53). 
Figure 9.10. Example of stones in a manuport pile near the East Wall, presumably to 
have been used as projectile weaponry. 
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Historic accounts of bow use from the Pawnee suggest accuracy at 80 paces 
(Mead 1986:210–211), and a demonstration of bow use by Sioux men suggest 
surprising accuracy at 60 feet (19 m) (Ambrose 2000:209–210). Using 70 m as 
an absolute maximum, overlapping fire from all of the bastions would easily 
be possible with a bow and arrow. Six of the 17 projectile points found during 
this study were near wall segments. However, no projectile points have been 
found embedded in the wooden walls or on the steep slopes surrounding the 
butte. Despite this, the bow was likely the primary weapon used by defenders.
Summary
The Redoubt is located on an isolated landform. It has 223 m (over a tenth 
of a mile) of continuous wall. This wall overlooks or blocks all entry points to 
interior and occupied portions of the site. Spaced throughout the wall are bas-
tions providing overlapping fields of fire to protect breachable segments of the 
wall. Though there are two weapon systems on the site, only one, the bow, pro-
vides this overlapping fire. When combined, these individual elements create 
an “erected work” that incorporated both a weapon and a wall system, making 
this site a fortification (Schaepe 2006).
An estimate of the defensive force required to use this fortification can be 
extracted through several sources. Beginning with the defensive features, bas-
tions provide protection for “one or more defenders and their gear,” making 
two people the maximum number posited for each bastion on site, for a maxi-
mum of 16 stationed in bastions alone (Keeley et al. 2007:68). Because the East 
Wall bisects the easiest area to breach, 10 additional defenders are estimated to 
be stationed along it to reinforce those in the bastions. Single defenders sta-
tioned at the nine short wall segments in the caprock of the North and South 
Cliff would add an additional nine defenders and round out the defensive force. 
The total protecting force is estimated at around 35 individuals for the site. This 
number assumes a siege scenario for the site and requires a group to be on (a 
reasonable assumption given the amount of domestic debris) or near the site.
Ethnohistoric and historic accounts help to further corroborate this num-
ber. The Grapevine Creek site has 23 individual U-shaped structures erected 
by the Piegan. These structures are essentially bastions, which means as few 
as 23 and as many as 46 Piegan defenders were present at this battle (Hoxie 
and Rzeczkowski n.d:39). Peter Koch recorded a breastwork built on an iso-
lated butte during a failed horse raid by 32 River Crow near the Dry Fork of 
the Missouri River (Koch 1896:300–301). The Pierre’s Hole battle described by 
Zenas Leonard suggests an indigenous fortification “large enough to contain 
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500 warriors” (Leonard 2001:53). Although no fortifications were recorded, a 
similar number of Piegan and Shoshone warriors were described by the Cree 
Saukamapee (Sahkomaupee) during a single battle (Tyrell 1916:328–330 in 
Bamforth 1994:99). Rock art representations suggest smaller groups ranging 
from 10 to 20 individuals were likely associated with individual feuding or raid-
ing events (Keyser, chapter 3, this volume). The Redoubt then is seen as the 
collaboration of individual raiding or family groups, at least some of which had 
militaristic experience, and who occupied the site possibly while building it.
dIsCussIon
The use of fortifications like the Redoubt in the Wyoming region is par-
ticularly interesting when the specific demographic and economic conditions 
are considered (Sutton 2004). Focusing on a population-based explanation for 
the escalation of conflict, it is evident violence intensifies and increases from 
the Late Prehistoric to the Protohistoric period for the Wyoming region. New 
archaeological cultures such as Avonlea and Rose Spring do appear in the Late 
Prehistoric of the Wyoming region, and are found in association with violent 
deaths and possible simple defensive locations (Davis et al. 1994; Delacorte 1994; 
Dyck and Morlan 2001; Francis and Loendorf 2002; Frison 1988; Garfinkel 
2007; Husted and Edgar 2002; Martindale and Gill 1983; Scheiber 2008). The 
dating of topographically isolated (i.e., defensive) sites suffers from a lack of 
absolute dates, but relative surface dates suggest an increasing use of defensive 
architecture culminating with fortifications use for the region. The construc-
tion of fortifications in the region may then be the result of a complex and 
protracted demographic shift that incorporated new technologies and changed 
social structures by the Protohistoric period (O’Brien 2013; Sutton 2004).
The Late Prehistoric Period (ad 150–1600)
The Late Prehistoric period in the Wyoming region is marked by a shift 
in projectile-point technology, presumably coinciding with a shift in technol-
ogy from the atlatl dart system to the bow and arrow (Mulloy 1958; Frison 
1991). Distinct projectile-point styles denote this shift, such as Avonlea, found 
from Wyoming north to the Canadian Plains of Alberta, and Rose Springs 
(Rosegate), found in Wyoming west to California and northwest to Oregon 
(Deis 2004; Garfinkel 2007; Husted and Edgar 2002; Thomas 1981), as well as the 
Desert Side-Notch (DSN) series and Cottonwood triangular projectile point 
(Pigniolo 2004; Thomas 1981). Avonlea projectile points were once thought to 
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represent Athabaskan-speaking groups migrating south from Canadian grass-
lands into the Wyoming region (Dyck and Morlan 2001), but this position now 
seems untenable (Matson and Magne 2007:143–145). Projectile points morpho-
logically defined as Rosegate, of the DSN series, or as Cottonwood Triangular, 
suggest influence from human groups in the larger Great Basin culture area. 
The latter two in particular may represent the expansion of Numic speaking 
groups out of the Great Basin into the Wyoming region (Garfinkel 2007). The 
origins of the both DSN and Cottonwood Triangular projectile points in the 
Wyoming region are split into two camps. One side suggests linguistic patterns 
and material culture place the homeland of the Numic-speaking peoples some-
where in the Great Basin, migrating east around 1300 bp (ad 650; see Sutton 
and Rhode 1994 for a discussion of the problem). The other suggests the point 
styles were the youngest styles associated with an indigenous Shoshonean 
population in the Wyoming region for as long as 5,000 years, (Francis and 
Loendorf 2002; Husted 1995a, 1995b, 2002; Husted and Edgar 2002; Husted 
and Mallory 1967; Morgan 2010). This problem is unresolved but the later 
migration narrative is preferred for this discussion.
Radiocarbon dates collected from the Avonlea type-site in Saskatchewan 
place the date of Avonlea in Canada around 1500 bp (ad 450), while dated 
Avonlea sites south of Saskatchewan cluster around 1300 bp (ad 650; Klimko 
and Hanna 1988). Dyck and Morlan (2001:126) suggest an Avonlea home-
land in the Saskatchewan–Montana area. Stylistic similarities in projectile 
points predating Avonlea that were found in Saskatchewan–Montana sug-
gest cultural continuity (Dyck and Morlan 2001). These point types have been 
found in association with butte-top occupations (Frison 1988), leading some 
to speculate they may have clashed with groups in the region still using the 
atlatl (Francis and Loendorf 2002).
The Rose Springs or Rosegate archaeological culture, first identified in 
Owens Valley, California, has a distribution over much of the Great Basin 
culture area and its periphery (Husted and Edgar 2002; Thomas 1981). The 
Rosegate complex dates from 1400 bp to 700 bp (ad 550 to ad 1250), with a 
more intensive occupation beginning around 1300 bp (ad 650) in the Great 
Basin (Dies 2004). These point styles are found in the Wyoming region and 
date to 1260 bp (ad 690) (Husted and Edgar 2002). They have also been found 
embedded in human skeletal remains in what is now southwest Wyoming 
(Martindale and Gill 1983; Scheiber 2008).
The entry of new archaeological cultures into the Wyoming region, during 
the Late Prehistoric, is further indicated by different ceramic traditions. In 
southeastern Wyoming sites belonging to the Upper Republican and Loup 
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River/Itskari ceramic phases of the Central Plains tradition are indicative of a 
westerly expansion of maize horticulturalists around ad 1000–1400 (Michael 
Page, personal communication, 2010; Charles Reher, personal communication, 
2005; Scheiber and Reher 2007; Steinacher and Carlson 1998). Ceramics from 
these traditions have been found on butte-top occupations in southeastern 
Wyoming (Charles Reher, personal communication, 2005).
Ceramics found at the Medicine Lodge Creek, Piney Creek, and Big 
Goose Creek sites in northeastern Wyoming bracket a nearly identical date 
of ad 1200–1450 (Frison 1967a, 1967b; Page 2007). These ceramics may indi-
cate a proto-Crow presence (a relative of Mandan/Hidatsa horticulturalists 
from the Great Plains) and have also been found in association with butte-top 
occupations (Frison 1967a; Page 2007).
Material from these archaeological material cultures are found on probable 
defensive locations with very simple or no architecture (Adams 1994; Frison 
1988). Currently it appears that defensive sites in the Wyoming region are 
older than fortifications with extensive architecture. This could be directly cor-
related to both limited violence and the smaller size of groups in the Late 
Prehistoric (Keeley 1996; Miller 1999, 2008; Scheiber 2008; Scheiber and Gill 
1997). Certainly, violence levels were high in the Late Prehistoric but they do 
not seem high enough to justify the construction of a fortification such as the 
Redoubt; that is to say, the community sentiment was not tilted toward such 
a large community effort (Mitchell 2010). The groups occupying the region 
must not have been large enough or deemed it important enough to build 
fortifications. However, by the Protohistoric period it seems both group size 
and sentiment toward fortification construction changed (Sutton 2004).
The Protohistoric Period (ad 1600–1800)
A short list of the indigenous groups occupying the Wyoming region during 
the Protohistoric period include the Blackfeet, Crow, Comanche, Cheyenne, 
Nez Perce, Apache, Kiowa, Arapaho, and Shoshone (Frison 1991; Sutton 2004). 
Many of these groups either directly or indirectly contacted Euroamerican 
groups for the first time in the Protohistoric period. Contact with Euroamericans 
groups caused rapid social reorganization, resulting in larger tribal configura-
tions (Sutton 2004: 39–47; Wolf 1997:176–181). This reorganization was partly 
from the introduction of new technologies like the horse and (later) the gun 
(Wolf 1997). The introduction of the horse had a dramatic effect in the Wyoming 
region (Secoy 1992), as “it endowed owners with enhanced military capabilities, 
transportation, hunting capacity, and mobility” (Wolf 1997:176). An example of 
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this includes the Comanche (a division of Shoshone hunter-gatherers), who 
became “the Spartans of the prairies” after the acquisition of the horse (Hoebel 
2006:129). The Shoshone illustrate what happened to many of these groups and 
are of interest here as their historically recorded territories and probable items 
of material culture best explain the Redoubt:
By circa 1825, the Eastern or Wind River Shoshone occupied a region stretch-
ing . . . from the northern slope of the Uintah Mountains to the Red Desert and 
the Green Mountains, thence across the Sweetwater divide to the southern tip 
of the Big Horn Mountains. Then having cut diagonally to Thermopolis, it went 
down the Big Horn River as far north as the Shoshone River. It followed this 
stream over the Absaroka Range, then went to Yellowstone Lake and the Tetons. 
From here it ran almost due south to its starting point. (Shimkin 1947:247)
This group was “one big group, a ‘tribe’ with a central chief, an advisory coun-
cil, and a warrior sodality” (Hultkrantz 1961:38). As a large group they occasion-
ally hunted “among the buffalo grounds at the Sweetwater and North Platte” 
(Hultkrantz 1961:38). Local Shoshone place names (e.g., [k� yat�wener] or [tu’ 
iwiĉant�’wënër]) reinforce this described boundary (Shimkin 1947:252). They 
had a later expansion northward to the Bighorn Valley and eastward to the 
Laramie Range as bison herds diminished (Hultkrantz 1961). The Shoshone 
base, however, “was still the land around the Green River” (Hultkrantz 1961:37). 
The Redoubt is situated on the east edge of this territorial boundary and has 
material objects consistent with other sites suggested to be of Shoshone origin 
(Adams 2010; Buff 1983; Frison 1991; Zeimens 1975). While mindful of the pit-
falls inherent in arguing for Shoshone ethnicity from material objects (Larson 
and Kornfeld 1994; Jones 1997), there are a number of sites with similar artifact 
classes found inside the aforementioned Shoshone territory.
Material culture associated with Shoshone groups has long been inter-
preted in the Wyoming archaeological record, and perpetuating this trait list 
is rife with pitfalls (Barth; 1998[1969]; Hodder 1982; Jones 1997). However, 
new work on high-altitude villages in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem 
(GYE) has discovered materials consistent with known Shoshone occupa-
tions (Adams 2010; Koenig 2010; Hultkrantz 1974; Scheiber and Finley 2011; 
Scheiber and Finley 2010; Shimkin 1947). Sites located along the east edge of 
known Shoshone territory have a similar suite of artifacts, including subsis-
tence practices and lithic materials (Zeimens 1975; Schroeder 2010a, 2010b). 
This includes the presence of lithic materials from the Green River Basin, 
Yellowstone, and Absaroka Mountains, similar chipped-stone tools, and the 
use of steatite, wickiups, and pottery (Adams 2006, 2010; Schroeder 2010a, 
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2010b; Zeimens 1975). The Redoubt has most of the materials matching several 
proposed Shoshonean sites (Adams 2010; Husted 1995a, 1995b, 2002; Husted 
and Edgar 2002; Husted and Mallory 1967; Newton 2011; Scheiber and Finley 
2010). The exceptions are the lack of bifacial Shoshone knives (Frison 1991:134) 
and the presence of a possible Uncompahgre Brown Ware vessel. There are 
several bifacial tools outside of projectile points and preforms found at the 
Redoubt, but these are too fragmentary to be classified. The Uncompahgre 
Brown Ware is associated with Ute groups linguistically linked to Shoshone, 
suggesting at the very least a linguistic affiliation (Loendorf 2002). Seasonality 
might account for the difference in artifact assemblages as well. Regardless, 
the similarities between items of material across sites suggest some links, and 
when historic territories (applicable in the case of the Redoubt) are considered, 
a Shoshone affiliation for the Redoubt is worth considering.
If the site was built by a Shoshone group on their eastern territorial bound-
ary, the following scenario may apply: the site served as a frontier fortification 
used by the Eastern Shoshone and established the eastern edge of their terri-
tory. It would have allowed them to move into hostile territory like the North 
Platte River area or further north into the Powder River Basin to hunt large 
herds of bison and to retreat to a protected point if encountered by hostile 
groups. It would have provided peace of mind for expeditions but also asserted 
ownership in the territory. This speculative scenario draws from the site’s loca-
tion and construction, which indicate that whoever was involved with it had a 
sense of ownership of the land, or at the very least a sense of a static territori-
ally boundary consistent with that described for the Shoshone.
Summary
The transition from the Late Prehistoric to the Protohistoric was a time 
of tremendous change in the Wyoming region. New technologies began 
to emerge, and with the technology, butte-top occupations and violence 
rise (Davis et al. 1994; Delacorte 1994; Dyck and Morlan 2001; Francis 
and Loendorf 2002; Frison 1988; Garfinkel 2007; Husted and Edgar 2002; 
Martindale and Gill 1983; Scheiber 1993). Future studies need to elucidate 
whether these technologies represent actual population increases or diffusion. 
Scheiber (2008:39) has suggested that the violence levels recorded in the Late 
Prehistoric were an “outgrowth of population increase, territory circumspec-
tion, and resource depletion.” Initial studies focused on understanding demo-
graphic sizes suggest this same pattern for the Late Prehistoric (Surovell et al. 
2009). The conditions leading to an intensification of conflict then have roots 
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in the Late Prehistoric period. The cumulative effect of this violence, coupled 
with an introduction of new groups and technologies, only increased this war-
fare to include fortification use (as defined here) by the Protohistoic period.
ConClusIons and future researCh
Warfare and violence by themselves are not something to be romanticized. 
They are destructive processes that ruin lives on multiple levels. However, we 
need to be aware of the shaping force these events would have in the lives 
of prehistoric peoples (Keeley 1996, 2001). If our goal as archaeologists is to 
reconstruct the lives of past peoples, then we must reconstruct all parts of their 
lives (Keeley 2001). In the archaeology dealing with nomadic groups, this can 
become virtually impossible. These groups’ mortuary practices did not involve 
cemeteries or other interment methods that preserve bone, and they built few 
or no defensive sites (Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume).
The argument here is that the construction and use of a single fortifica-
tion in the Wyoming region marks a shift toward more elaborate defensive 
architecture that also marks a shift in the frequency of warfare. I do not 
approximate these frequencies or argue the conditions leading to an increase 
of warfare. However, I do suggest the construction of the fortification is a late 
phenomenon associated within a period of demographic and technological 
transformation (Sutton 2004). This idea is suggested in the ethnographic lit-
erature from all hunter-gatherers wherein groups defined as complex hunter-
gatherer groups are more likely to go to war than small egalitarian groups 
(Keeley 1996: 38; Fry 2006:100–113; 2007). This social shift is also reinforced 
in the construction of a fortification, which would require coordination and 
planning on a large-group level. Certainly the suggested numbers for defend-
ers on the Redoubt signal a larger group.
Currently the pattern of warfare in the Wyoming region does not seem 
endemic or even persistent. The archaeological record simply does not rein-
force a trend consistent with this view. If warfare were a constant, why is the 
Redoubt the first-described large-scale fortification? There should be more 
fortifications in a period of warfare. I do not think we can say more than 
that violence levels rose in the Late Prehistoric and possibly escalated to war 
very late in the prehistory of the region. I do not want the Late Prehistoric/
Protohistoric transition to be viewed as an extension of the historic Indian 
wars. Warfare is not an inherent part of humanity; it is a choice. Considering 
the record of the region at length, it appears Native groups chose not to go to 
war for almost all of the prehistoric record.
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Warfare studies in the Wyoming region are still in their infancy. Finer 
resolution of the dated sites could reaffirm that hunter-gatherers did in fact 
respond in ever-increasing ways to save lives and protect their land. The usage 
of fortifications could be checked with tribal boundaries to see if the two 
coincide. Bioarchaeological studies could separate violence from warfare if the 
intensity and scope of fortification use was better understood. Currently we 
do not know much. We know that the Redoubt is a Protohistoric fortifica-
tion, that there are probably defensive sites throughout the region (a major 
undertaking is for someone to find just how many there are), and that there 
is violence in the skeletal record. Wherever warfare studies in the Wyoming 
region lead researchers, I hope they will not forget warfare is a hellish topic 
and affects lives in profound ways. Most important, the people who occupied 
these defensive sites and fortification (especially in the Protohistoric period) 
are related to groups still occupying the region today. We need to be aware of 
this when interpreting the evidence of war.
Part 4




Conflict and Culture 




The great Prussian military philosopher Carl von 
Clausewitz (1984:87) wrote that “war is merely the con-
tinuation of politics by other means.” However one 
chooses to define it, with the possible exception of a 
catastrophic natural disaster, war is the most traumatic 
agent of change likely to affect a society or group. It has 
the power to change everything. For people engaged in 
intergroup conflict, changes may be forced upon them, 
ranging from where they live, to the technology they use, 
to the ways in which they hunt, farm, or trade, to their 
political alliances, to their ideology, to their physical and 
mental health. The significance of war’s effect on a peo-
ple is hard to overemphasize and so it must be given its 
due recognition as a force for change in the past.
If we underestimate war as a force for change we 
are likely to misinterpret a myriad of cultural phenom-
ena impacted directly or indirectly by war. As archae-
ologists we typically work with the mundane material 
residues of the archaeological record—such as lithics, 
ceramics, and faunal and floral remains—and from 
these traces we make inferences about more complex, 
more ephemeral, human behaviors. We inevitably draw 
conclusions about settlement patterns, trade relations, 
technology, subsistence practices, and sometimes reli-
gion. Now take an average site report that emphasizes 
these lines of evidence and approaches of inquiry and 
reread it with an eye to war. If the people being studied 
were living under the constant threat of war, or were 
regularly participating in long-distance raiding, or were 
268 R. ERIC HOLLINGER
assimilating captives taken from a group very different from their own, or were 
training their young boys to become warriors through overcoming an enemy, 
then how accurate would our interpretations really be? Would the choice of 
where they lived have been based more on defensibility than on proximity to 
the nearby chert outcropping? Would the decorations on their pottery have 
been a result of the potter simply mimicking her mother’s work or would it be 
an expression of an ideology invoking the protection of a deity responsible for 
war? Would the animal protein they consumed have been a result of dietary 
and cultural preferences, or would it simply have been a consequence of the 
only species available in a territory constrained by pressure from a persistent 
enemy? How we interpret the archaeological record and reconstruct culture 
history is impacted by whether past peoples were engaged in warfare, and, if 
so, the nature and intensity of the associated conflict. 
Evidence of war can vary greatly (Dye 2009; Hollinger 2005). Obvious 
signs are the traces of interpersonal violence exhibited on human remains like 
axe wounds, decapitations, and arrow points embedded in bones, which are 
typically underrepresented (Milner 2005:150). Yet even these are open to chal-
lenge as evidence of feuding or domestic violence if one seeks reasons to doubt 
explanations of war. Somewhat less-certain lines of evidence of conflict can 
be found in the archaeological record as defensive fortifications, as settlement 
patterns reflecting concerns for defense (e.g., LeBlanc 1999), as weapons, as 
artistic renderings of weapons (e.g., in this volume, Greer and Greer, chapter 
2; Keyser, chapter 3; and Sundstrom, chapter 4), as well as captives and victims, 
and as evidence of intentional burning of houses (Roper 2001) and whole vil-
lages (Ewen 1990:84–85; Tanner 1987:30). Even more open to debate is indirect 
evidence of war, such as the sudden truncation of trade patterns or the exis-
tence of no man’s lands between territories.
The ethnohistoric studies make it clear that war was a fact of life for Native 
Americans. One might argue that historic accounts and oral traditions from 
the time of early contact show extraordinary violence and conflict due to desta-
bilizing disease, firearms, and colonial competition resulting from European 
encroachments. But the preponderance of the evidence, much of which comes 
from the Plains and Midwest, reveals that interpersonal violence, scalping, 
stabbing, shootings, decapitations, mutilations, raiding, and even massacres 
were happening thousands of years before European contact. There is no ques-
tion that warfare was occurring in the prehistoric American midcontinent. 
The questions now surround the nature, intensity, and consequences of that 
warfare and, of particular interest to me, the question of who was fighting 
whom (Hollinger 2005).
CONFLICT AND CULTURE CHANGE ON THE PLAINS 269
In the midcontinent during the late prehistoric period, I think the people 
responsible for the Oneota tradition were heavily involved in war. From the 
time the Oneota archaeological manifestation first appeared in Wisconsin and 
the Red Wing area of Minnesota as early as the eleventh century ad, there 
is evidence of conflict with non-Oneota groups. There are a number of Late 
Woodland villages in the area that exhibit traits suggesting a positive rela-
tionship with intrusive Mississippian populations. Many of these sites were 
fortified with palisades (Salkin 2000). The best-known of these was the heav-
ily fortified temple mound complex of Aztalan in southeastern Wisconsin 
(Barrett 1933). The ceramics at this site are around 75 percent Late Woodland 
types and 25 percent Middle Mississippian, mixed in a way that suggests a 
site-unit intrusion of Mississippians living with cooperating Late Woodland 
populations (Overstreet and Clark 1995). Who did they fear? No Oneota pot-
tery was found at Aztalan, although contemporary Oneota populations were 
nearby. A charnel house, a number of houses, and the palisades at Aztalan 
were burned and human remains found inside the walls included trophy heads, 
and victims of blunt-force trauma, scalping, mutilation, and burning (Barrett 
1933; Holcomb 1952; Sullivan 1990a, 1990b). Burning of charnel houses was 
a major objective in Mississippian warfare in the Southeast (Dye and King 
2007). By ad 1200 Aztalan and the related Late Woodland communities of 
the region were no more and Oneota populations controlled the region for 
the next 400 years.
This story of conflict and culture change played out again and again in inter-
actions between Oneota and non-Oneota populations as the Oneota people 
and/or culture spread throughout the Midwest and eastern Plains. Oneota 
violence is probably best documented in the central Illinois River valley. In 
this region between ad 1200 and 1300, Mississippian towns like Orendorf 
and Larson were palisaded and then partially burned (Conrad 1991; Emerson 
1986:15; Harn 1978) and skeletal remains there showed increasing levels of vio-
lence (Conrad 1993; Emerson 1999; Goodman et al. 1984:293). Around ad 1300 
an Oneota population, known as the Bold Counselor phase, intruded into the 
region. Bold Counselor villages were located on defendable bluff-tops and 
some were probably palisaded, and skeletal evidence of violence is common. 
At the Norris Farms 36 cemetery, one of the earliest Bold Counselor phase 
sites, 21.6 percent of the 264 individuals excavated exhibited skeletal or con-
textual evidence of violence, probably the result of intermittent raiding. Men, 
women, and children suffered scalpings, decapitations, celt and arrow wounds, 
and mutilations (Milner 1992a, 1992b; Milner and Smith 1990; Milner et al. 
1991a; Milner et al. 1991b; Santure 1990). The remains were exceptionally well 
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preserved. Poorer preservation would have caused much of the evidence of 
violence to go unrecognized.
Despite moving into a region where they suffered frequent attacks, they did 
not move away and they apparently began to merge with one of the two regional 
Mississippian traditions. They began cohabitating and their ceramic traditions 
began blending (Esarey and Conrad 1998:46). I interpret this as evidence that 
the Bold Counselor phase people had been invited into the central Illinois River 
valley by a Mississippian people with whom they had formed alliances and ties 
through kinship and trade (Hollinger 2005:160). They may have joined their 
hosts and allies in conflict against other Mississippians farther to the south (La 
Moine River) with whom their hosts were already fighting.
Even the great town of Cahokia and surrounding towns exhibited a con-
cern for defense during this period. A palisade with defensive bastions enclos-
ing 205 acres of the central precinct was built late in the twelfth-century 
Stirling phase and was rebuilt three more times over the next century into the 
Moorehead phase (Anderson 1969; Holley et al. 1990; Iseminger et al. 1990). 
At the same time, mound construction in the region decreased, the population 
decreased, and storage huts and houses at Cahokia and the East St. Louis site 
were burned (Trubitt 2003). By the early fourteenth century, the population 
at Cahokia, represented by the Sand Prairie phase, had dwindled to a fraction 
of its former size and Oneota of the Groves phase and the Bold Counselor 
phase intruded into the American Bottom region ( Jackson 1998). Soon there-
after, Cahokia was completely abandoned by Middle Mississippians, probably 
seeking refuge among relatives in fortified towns of southeastern Missouri 
and Arkansas, where populations increased (Morse and Morse 1983:262–266; 
Morse 1990:169) as Cahokia was vacated in the face of Oneota expansion 
(Hollinger 2005:174–176).
Many other regions of the Midwest and Plains experienced Oneota expan-
sion between ad 1200 and 1300 and many sites of this period have produced 
evidence of conflict. During the thirteenth century, the populations of the 
Central Plains tradition living along the Missouri River in small unforti-
fied earthlodge hamlets in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri began to 
be attacked. Burned lodges (Roper 2001) and skeletal remains, such as were 
found at the Nebraska phase Cannibal House site, provide evidence of family 
massacres (Gilder 1913; Hollinger 2005:193). By ad 1300, they had abandoned 
their homes in these regions and consolidated as the Initial Coalescent tradi-
tion in southeastern South Dakota, along the Missouri River in small villages 
fortified with ditches and bastioned palisades. Oneota people quickly occu-
pied the abandoned homelands of the Central Plains tradition peoples.
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Even after fleeing the central Plains, the Initial Coalescent tradition people 
were not safe, as demonstrated by the massacre of the Crow Creek villag-
ers. Crow Creek was one of the southernmost villages and was nearest the 
frontier with Oneota populations that had expanded into northwestern Iowa, 
southeastern South Dakota, and southwestern Minnesota. Excavations at 
Crow Creek revealed that the village population was massacred while the vil-
lage and palisade were being rebuilt (Willey and Emerson 1993). Bodies were 
found inside burned houses and a mass of skeletal remains containing at least 
486 individuals was found eroding from the fortification ditch. The bodies of 
these people had been mutilated, disarticulated, and scavenged by carnivores, 
and then were collected and deposited in the ditch (Gregg et al. 1981; Willey 
1990; Willey and Emerson 1993; Zimmerman and Bradley 1993; Zimmerman 
and Whitten 1980). As many as 95.4 percent of the 415 observable crania, 
including men, women, and children, exhibited evidence of scalping (Willey 
1990:106). Observed traumas also included arrow and celt wounds, bludgeon-
ing, decapitation, tooth evulsion, and the removal of hands and feet, probably 
as trophies. I do not think that this massacre was perpetrated by a nearby 
and closely related Coalescent tradition village in competition for local farm-
land. Although Initial Coalescent villagers were probably in conflict with their 
Middle Missouri tradition neighbors to the north (Bamforth 1994; Kay 1996; 
Lehmer 1971; Winham and Calabrese 1998:316) as they were driven farther 
into that group’s historic territory, the Crow Creek village was on the opposite 
side of Initial Coalescent tradition territory—the only potential enemies to 
the south and east of the village at that time were Oneota (Hollinger 2005:212).
By ad 1300, Oneota territories reached their maximum expansion. Oneota 
sites were found from central Kansas, to central Indiana, and from northern 
Michigan to central Missouri (Hollinger 2005). Other groups that had pre-
viously inhabited these areas abandoned the territories or disappeared com-
pletely, either exterminated or assimilated by Oneota.
ConsolIdatIon and stabIlIzatIon
By circa ad 1400 the Oneota expansion had ended and populations began 
to withdraw from many of the recently occupied territories (Hollinger 2005). 
Oneota groups consolidated into large communities at strategic locales along 
major rivers and important transportation routes. Areas abandoned by the 
Oneota included central Indiana, the central Illinois River valley, the Apple 
River locality, the central Des Moines River valley, the central Plains west 
of the Missouri River trench, most of southeastern South Dakota, and 
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southern Minnesota including the Blue Earth and Red Wing areas. Lingering 
Mississippian populations also abandoned the central Illinois River valley and 
the American Bottom regions by ad 1400.
At the same time, Oneota populations aggregated at locations of strategic 
importance around the southern end of Lake Michigan and along the west 
side of Lake Winnebago in eastern Wisconsin, from which they controlled 
trade and travel between the western Great Lakes and the west. Along the 
Upper Mississippi River, the Oneota concentrated in the La Crosse region 
of southwestern Wisconsin, northeastern Iowa, and southeastern Minnesota. 
Farther south, the Oneota consolidated in the Mississippi alluvial-plain 
region of southeastern Iowa and western Illinois, with only small, temporary 
settlements in the American Bottom and lower Illinois River valley. Along the 
Missouri River, the Oneota were centered in central Missouri at the 300-acre 
Utz site complex, with its associated earthwork fortification, and at the Leary 
site in southeastern Nebraska. In the northwest, the Blood Run site complex, 
covering as much as 1,200 acres on either side of the Big Sioux River, domi-
nated the region and probably controlled the exchange of red pipestone from 
the nearby pipestone quarries.
The sprawling Oneota villages of this period were probably composed of 
longhouses as much as 65 m in length (Hollinger 1993, 1995). Fortifications 
were rare during the previous period of expansion and when they did occur 
they were usually palisades lacking earthworks. Defensive earthworks and 
palisades during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have been identified in 
association with the large population centers and may represent an increased 
investment in defending the locality. The sheer numbers of people at these 
centers would have been a considerable deterrent to any possible aggressors, 
so fortifications may have served as redoubts in the event of a potential raid 
during times when more warriors were away.
A period of relative stasis ensued for the next 200 years in which no new 
territories were acquired and none were lost. Trade with non-Oneota groups 
was almost nonexistent during the period of Oneota expansion but then 
peaked during this period of consolidation. Although never in great quanti-
ties, exchange goods included copper, marine shell, bison and other animal 
parts, pottery, and lithics such as obsidian, turquoise, and especially red pipe-
stone (Hollinger 2005:265–266). This macroscale pattern of aggregation was 
repeated among neighboring non-Oneota groups who also concentrated in 
large villages and increased investment in defense of strategic locales. Wide 
buffer zones such as the “vacant quarter” of the central Mississippi River valley, 
formed between Oneota centers and their non-Oneota neighbors (Hollinger 
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2005:281). In the northeastern Plains among the Extended Coalescent tra-
dition for instance, Caldwell (1964:3) referred to this period as the “Pax La 
Roche,” and it was characterized by a decreased emphasis on defense in those 
areas not bordering the territory of the Middle Missouri tradition.
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mark a Pax Oneota for the midconti-
nent (Hollinger 2005:253, 299). Conflict did not stop but changes occurred in 
how it happened. The wholesale invasions of the previous period were replaced 
by occasional long-distance raids into contested no man’s lands and beyond 
to enemy territory. Portable art among Oneota sites of this period, including 
decorated pottery, incised bone, shell, and pipestone tablets and pipes con-
tinued to reinforce an ideology centered on war and war-related symbolism 
(Benn 1989; Hollinger 2000, 2005). Oneota iconography included images of 
weapons, warriors, bodies of victims, and raptors, commonly associated with 
warfare in ethnohistoric mythology.
dIsIntegratIon
Beginning no later than the early seventeenth century, European-introduced 
pandemics began to sweep through the densely populated Oneota longhouse 
villages. Disease at least minimally destabilized and possibly completely deci-
mated the Oneota centers. Central Algonkian-speaking groups, some armed 
with guns, were pushed out of the Ohio Valley and Michigan by Iroquois 
raiders (Hunt 1967) and expanded into the eastern territories of the weakened 
Oneota. By ad 1640 the Oneota abandoned the La Crosse terrace of south-
western Wisconsin, the southern Lake Michigan area, southeastern Iowa, 
and western Illinois, and the remaining centers were considerably reduced in 
strength. By 1690 the historic Oneota in the form of the Ioway Tribe fled the 
Mississippi River for northwestern Iowa. Other Oneota descendents—the 
Missouria, Otoe, and Winnebago tribes—were similarly reduced by warfare 
and disease. Some of the earliest accounts of the Missouria noted that they 
had once been the most powerful tribe along the Missouri River but were 
“almost reduced to nothing” (Nasatir 1952:I:6) by disease and war. The fur trade 
and the global economy forced changes in subsistence and settlement pat-
terns, and social and political organization. Out of necessity, remnants of the 
Oneota formed new alliances with Caddoan, Siouan, and Algonkian descen-
dents of what were once their enemies. In much the same way that Oneota 
had probably absorbed other peoples three to four centuries earlier, Oneota 
merged with more powerful groups and contributed to their ethnogenesis in 
the early historic period.
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ConClusIon
Conflict was an important process in the history of Oneota and other 
groups of the Late Prehistoric and Early Historic American midcontinent. 
Conflict was both a context and a cause of cultural change. Patterns of con-
flict are identifiable at the macroscale of the midcontinent and over periods 
of hundreds of years. The challenge then for the archaeologist is to identify 
the material traces of conflict and contextualize it in efforts to understand its 
origins, directionality, and consequences. Violence and lesser forms of conflict 
had commonalities among the prehistoric people of the Plains and midcon-
tinent just as it had and has among all humanity. The questions of how those 
commonalities manifested among various past populations and how they 
dealt with them or failed to deal with them is where we need to be careful 
in our interpretations. The simple acts of farming, hunting, and tool-making 
were not so simple with fear of war looming, so it is crucial to identify conflict 







War—in contrast to interpersonal violence—depends 
on domains of cultural representation that define 
enemies and delimit the bounds of acceptable conduct. 
Organized, armed conflict between communities or 
societies requires social institutions to sanction com-
bat and to marshal the resources necessary to sustain 
it. War’s costs and benefits are tallied in social terms, 
not only for combatants but also for their families and 
communities. War, in short, has a cultural and social 
context (Ferguson 1984; Kelly 2000; Pauketat 2009).
Anthropologists and historians studying nineteenth-
century warfare in the Plains understand this. Though 
they disagree on the factors that triggered conflict 
(Albers 1993; Biolsi 1984; Robarchek 1994), their most 
compelling accounts recognize that warfare was a col-
lective enterprise requiring the consent, planning, and 
participation of noncombatants as well as combatants 
(Mishkin 1940). They also recognize that the cultural 
schemas and social institutions that made war pos-
sible were historical constructs (Robarchek 1994). For 
these scholars, accounting for collective violence is not 
only a matter of identifying causes but also of under-
standing war’s place in the social fabric of particular 
times and places.
This chapter applies that sociohistorical insight to 
archaeological cases by considering the relationships 
among war, trade, and economic productivity in the 
Middle Missouri subarea of the Plains, a stretch of the 
Missouri River valley running from the mouth of the 
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Yellowstone River in western North Dakota downstream nearly to the mouth 
of the Niobrara River in northern Nebraska ( Johnson 2007a:3) (figure 11.1). 
The archaeology of the Middle Missouri is well suited to a sociohistorical 
analysis of war because the frequency and intensity of armed conflict varied 
there and because those variations can be linked to changes in settlement pat-
terns and demographics, subsistence productivity, trade patterns, migration, 
and other economic, social, and cultural factors.
eVIdenCe for Warfare
Signs of collective violence are conspicuous in the Middle Missouri. War 
has left its mark in the details of settlement design and location (Lippincott 
2007); in occurrences of catastrophic structure fires (Wood 1976); in images 
painted or carved on stone or drawn in ledgers (Afton et al. 1997; Keyser 
1987a); in trophies made from human body parts (Owsley et al. 2007); and 
in community demographic profiles (Bowers 1950; Owsley et al. 1977). Each 
Figure 11.1. Location of the Middle Missouri subarea. 
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of these signs yields a unique perspective on war. Osteological evidence of 
traumatic injuries documents the intensity of particular conflicts as well as the 
nature of battle tactics (Willey 1990). Depictions of battles or of individual 
combatants in rock art illustrate weapons, troop configurations, and the cul-
tural significance of warfare (Keyser 1977a, 1987a; chapter 3, this volume).
However, the predominant testaments to war in the Middle Missouri are 
ditch-and-palisade fortifications. Owing to their depth and extent, defen-
sive ditches even today are the most prominent features of many villages and 
towns in the Middle Missouri (Ahler 2005; Lehmer 1971; Swenson 2007; 
Tiffany 1982; Wood 2001). In a few cases, the presence or specific form of a 
ditch has been revealed only through excavation or geophysical survey (Ahler 
2005; Kvamme and Ahler 2007). However, fortifications are on the whole less 
affected by sampling or recovery biases than are other types of evidence.
The character of organized conflict can be described by multiple variables, 
such as the sizes of opposing forces; the types of combat formations or weap-
ons used; the nature of the social or cultural relationships between contending 
groups; the aims of the conflict; or the frequency, duration, or predictabil-
ity of attacks (Solometo 2006). Many of those variables can be measured 
by the ubiquity, distribution, or design of defensive works (Arkush 2011; 
Mitchell 2007). Fortifications are effective proxies because they are costly. A 
decision to invest in a fortification, as well as the selection of a particular 
design, reflects a community’s assessment of risk based on their perceptions 
of the prevailing character of war, including its frequency and predictabil-
ity, the relative sizes of warring groups or communities, the technology of 
combat, and the zeal with which it is pursued (Arkush 2011; Mitchell 2007; 
Solometo 2006). Building a fortification requires the coordinated labor of 
many people and consumes resources that could otherwise be conserved or 
put to other uses. Middle Missouri fortifications nearly always featured con-
tinuous, 1–2-m-deep ditches backed by wooden palisades. Those palisades 
used up hundreds or thousands of trees, which also were needed for building 
timber-frame houses. To maintain a fortification’s effectiveness, ditches had 
to be cleaned periodically and palisade posts had to be replaced. Data from 
Middle Missouri sites with lengthy occupation histories show that fortifica-
tions were repeatedly reconstructed on new alignments, necessitating excava-
tion of a new ditch and relocation and replacement of palisade posts (Ahler 
2005; Mitchell 2008). The addition of specialized features, such as bastions, 
further increases costs (Keeley et al. 2007). Fortifications also can levy indi-
rect costs. Excavation has revealed gates in some Middle Missouri defensive 
works, but a 1738 description of one fortified town indicates that access was 
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gained by what only can be considered a staggeringly inconvenient arrange-
ment of retractable ladders (Smith 1980).
A community’s decision about whether, and how, to build a fortification 
also reflects the prevailing technology of warfare. Fortifications are designed 
to defend against particular kinds of weapons deployed in particular ways. Thus, 
offensive and defensive strategies develop in tandem, with changes in offen-
sive weapons and tactics generating cognate changes in the design of defensive 
works ( Jones 2004). For example, the fortifications surrounding seventeenth-
century villages in northeastern North America became more complex and 
more massive as the Iroquois adopted new weapons and battle tactics, and 
as the intensity of combat escalated (Keener 1999). Similarly, European and 
American military engineering manuals written in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries testify to the close correspondence between the design 
of fortified positions and the battle tactics deployed against them. As Mahan 
(1968:7) observes, “the attack and defence of intrenchments, bear a necessary 
relation to each other; and it is upon a knowledge of the course pursued by the 
assailant, that the principles regulating the defence should be founded.”
Thus, a fortification is a sensitive barometer of a community’s expectations 
of war and of their understanding of how it was waged. Because defensive 
works took time to build and had to be designed and put up prior to the 
onset of active hostilities, they reflect medium- to long-term trends in com-
munity sentiment. For the Middle Missouri, data on settlement plans and 
construction sequences indicate that fortifications mostly were integral to the 
initial size and layout of towns and villages, rather than post facto responses 
to immediate or transient threats (Lehmer 1971; Mitchell 2013). However, a 
community’s expectations about the likelihood or intensity of war cannot be 
considered unmediated: leaders have a stake in peoples’ perceptions and may 
use a heightened sense of danger to further their own political purposes.
VarIatIons In the frequenCy and IntensIt y 
of MIddle MIssourI Warfare
Warfare was endemic in the Middle Missouri: fortified settlements occur in 
every section of the river valley (Clark, chapter 12, this volume) and at any given 
moment from the 1000s through the late 1800s at least some of the region’s farm-
ing communities anticipated war. But if collective violence was recurring and 
widespread, it was not ever-present. Fortified towns and villages are unevenly 
distributed, both spatially and temporally, indicating that the focus of combat 
shifted and that conflict waxed and waned. For instance, in the southern Middle 
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Missouri during the 1500s, many communities were sprawling and undefended 
(Krause 2001). There also were times and places, marked by frequent and com-
plex fortifications, when people regularly anticipated large-scale attacks.
Warfare was especially prevalent in the Middle Missouri during three peri-
ods (figure 11.2). The earliest occurred on the Plains–Prairie border in eastern 
South Dakota and northwestern Iowa beginning in the 1000s. The communi-
ties involved, which are assigned to the Initial variant of the Middle Missouri 
tradition, were the first aggregated village settlements in the northern Plains 
( Johnson 2007a; Mitchell 2012; Toom 1992). The second case of prevalent war-
fare occurred along a short stretch of the Missouri in central South Dakota 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, coincident with the arrival and 
establishment of a distinct cultural group, called the Initial variant of the 
Coalescent tradition ( Johnson 1998; Steinacher and Carlson 1998). The third 
period of frequent conflict occurred in the northern Middle Missouri, in cen-
tral North Dakota above and below the mouth of the Heart River, beginning 
in the 1400s and continuing into the mid-1700s (Mitchell 2013; Wood 1967).
Figure 11.2. Locations of three conflict zones marked by high frequencies of fortified 
settlements. IMM, Initial Middle Missouri; IC, Initial Coalescent. 
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The model developed in this chapter omits the second of these three cases, 
the Initial Coalescent in central South Dakota, primarily because its origins 
and early development are not well understood. Initial Coalescent people were 
immigrants to the Middle Missouri, but debate continues on the nature of 
their interactions with contemporaneous groups both on the Missouri and in 
the central Plains to the south. It also seems likely that the political economic 
context of Initial Coalescent warfare differed from that of the other two cases, 
both of which were indigenous developments. Whether Initial Coalescent 
warfare was an internecine conflict, as Zimmerman and Bradley (1993) argue, 
or whether it was a conflict between different cultural groups, it may have 
been sparked by resource competition among adjacent farming communities 
(Bamforth 1994). Direct competition among clustered communities could 
have been a factor in earlier Initial Middle Missouri warfare (Lensink 2005), 
but was not a factor in Heart River warfare (Mitchell 2013).
Thus, the remainder of the chapter focuses on two Middle Missouri con-
texts where warfare was especially widespread and intense: Initial Middle 
Missouri villages on the Plains–Prairie border dating from the 1000s through 
the mid- to late 1200s, and towns and villages in the Heart River region dating 
from the early to mid-1400s through the mid-1700s.
the soCIal and eConoMIC Context of tWo Cases 
of ChronIC Warfare In the MIddle MIssourI
The conflicts that Initial Middle Missouri communities experienced dif-
fered in some respects from those experienced later by Heart River commu-
nities. One key difference was the overall prevalence of warfare. Only about 
half of the known Initial-variant villages are fortified (Tiffany 1982; Toom 
1992), whereas virtually every post-1400 settlement in the Heart region was 
stoutly defended (Swenson 2007; Wood 2001). Another difference lies in the 
labor and resources expended on fortifications. Many western Initial-variant 
settlements are protected only by a short ditch-and-palisade system spanning 
the narrow neck of the bluff or terrace on which they were built, a type of 
fortification known as a “promontory fort” (Keeley et al. 2007) (figure 11.3). A 
number of eastern Initial-variant settlements did feature an encircling forti-
fication (figure 11.4). However, only a few Initial Middle Missouri fortifica-
tions incorporate projecting strong points known as bastions, which allowed 
defenders to direct crossing fire at a massed attacking force (Keeley et al. 2007).
By comparison, Heart-region fortifications were far larger and far more 
elaborate. The best-documented Heart-region fortification surrounds the 
Figure 11.3. The Initial Middle Missouri Jiggs Thompson site. Dashed ovals indicate the 
locations of houses. Redrawn from Caldwell and Jensen (1969:figure 18). 
Figure 11.4. The Initial 
Middle Missouri Wittrock 
site. Dashed ovals indicate 
the locations of houses. 
Redrawn from Anderson 
(1986). 
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mid-fifteenth-century Huff site (figure 11.5) (Ahler and Kvamme 2000; 
Kvamme et al. 2009; Wood 1967). At Huff, the community built a massive, 
carefully engineered system more than 600 m (2,000 ft) long that incorpo-
rated 10 prominent, regularly spaced bastions. The fortification also featured 
angled and presumably sharpened poles known as chevaux-de-frise that pro-
jected upward and outward from the base of the palisade. Later, in the 1600s, 
massive earthen ramparts that increased the height of defensive positions were 
incorporated into the fortifications encircling other Heart-region communi-
ties (Ahler 2005). Such costly and carefully designed defenses represent a clear 
response to direct, large-scale assaults mounted by well-organized infantry 
(Keener 1999; Mitchell 2007; Toy 1955).
These differences in the frequency and design of village fortifications indi-
cate that war in the Heart region in the 1400s, 1500s, and 1600s was more 
frequent, and was waged on a larger scale, than it was during Initial Middle 
Missouri times (Mitchell 2007). In fact, the labor and material resources that 
Heart-region communities expended on defense likely were matched in North 
Figure 11.5. The fifteenth-century Huff site. Reproduced from Wood (1967). 
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America only by Mississippian communities in the Midwest and Southeast 
and by Iroquoian communities in the Northeast.
Despite these differences, though, Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River 
communities shared a remarkable number of social and economic characteris-
tics, which also set them apart from other Middle Missouri village groups. Both 
experienced active population aggregation that made their settlements among 
the most prominent features of the regional cultural landscape (Mitchell 2012, 
2013; Tiffany 2007). In both cases, aggregation occurred rapidly through an 
amalgamation of related but previously separate communities, rather than 
through an increase in total population, although the total population of the 
Heart region was much higher than that of the Plains–Prairie border region. 
Initial Middle Missouri communities each housed about 250 people and only 
a small number were occupied concurrently (Tiffany 2007; Toom 1992). The 
average Heart River town of the 1400s and 1500s housed about 900 people, a 
threefold increase over the mean size of the communities their direct ances-
tors built in the 1200s and 1300s (Mitchell 2013).
In both the Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River cases, the distances 
between contemporaneous communities decreased as population concentrated 
into a smaller number of larger settlements. For instance, in the Heart region 
at the turn of the sixteenth century, one well-studied settlement housed more 
than 2,000 people, while another 1,400 people lived in a second settlement just 
3.5 km to the north (Mitchell 2008). The result was an unprecedented peak in 
population density.
Long-distance exchange was critical to both Initial Middle Missouri and 
Heart River economies. Trade was a crucial catalyst for the formation of 
aggregated Initial Middle Missouri settlements (Lensink 2005; Tiffany 2007). 
Initial-variant villagers living in the Prairie Peninsula in northwest Iowa have 
been called the “preeminent traders” of the day, owing to abundant evidence 
for their interactions with stratified Mississippian societies located to the 
south and east (Henning 2007:71). Trade likely included prosaic perishables, 
but the most conspicuous imports were symbols of Mississippian influence 
and ideology (Tiffany 2003, 2007). Local Initial Middle Missouri potters 
also produced ceramic containers inspired by distinctive Mississippian forms, 
additional evidence for the deep social significance of their trade relationships.
In the Plains to the west, Initial Middle Missouri communities imported 
copper and marine shell and produced local versions of Mississippian-inspired 
pottery. But they were more heavily involved in another trade network, one 
that ferried Knife River flint, a high-quality toolstone found mainly in west-
central North Dakota, southward to their villages on the Missouri ( Johnson 
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1984, 2007b). This network brought them into contact with Late Woodland 
bison hunters living near the quarries. Evidence for technological accultura-
tion in pottery and other items among the bison hunters shows that the social 
contacts engendered by the Knife River flint trade were both sustained and 
intimate (Ahler 2007; Krause 2007).
As a share of the total economy, trade was even more important for the 
residents of the Heart River towns. The settlements at the Heart were the hub 
of a far-flung, multilateral trade network that incorporated downriver village 
communities occupied by Coalescent-tradition groups as well as mobile hunt-
ers living throughout the northern Plains, from the Red River valley west-
ward to the Rocky Mountain Front and as far north as southwest Manitoba 
and southern Alberta (Mitchell 2013). Trade items included copper, marine 
shell, catlinite (red pipestone), Knife River flint, and pottery, almost certainly 
accompanied by maize and bison meat and hides. The widespread occurrence 
of technologically and morphologically hybrid ceramic assemblages through-
out the Heart River interaction zone indicates that this system, like the ear-
lier Initial Middle Missouri network, involved not only material exchange, 
but also the movement of people and the adoption of new cultural practices 
(Ahler 1984; Michlovic 2008; Nicholson 1991).
In both Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River contexts, long-distance 
trade was embedded in a broader process of economic intensification. On the 
Plains–Prairie border, Late Woodland groups had taken up maize horticulture 
before ad 1000, but Initial Middle Missouri communities were the first to 
successfully establish a subsistence economy combining intensive maize farm-
ing with frequent bison hunting, a dynamic strategy that Plains Village groups 
would continue to pursue for almost 900 years. Initial-variant settlements also 
represent the first true villages—aggregated settlements housing at least 100 
people—in the northern Plains, the coalescence of which represents a crucial 
intensification of social relationships (Lensink 2005).
In the Heart region, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century economic intensi-
fication entailed major transformations in the organization of pottery and 
stone-tool production that featured the appearance of both individual and 
community craft specialization (Mitchell 2013). This was coupled with efforts 
to increase the productivity of agriculture, hunting, and other subsistence 
activities. In concert with community aggregation and settlement clustering, 
these changes reinforced the Heart River towns’ role as ports of long-distance 
trade and stimulated the formation of local and regional markets. Both of 
these trends in turn provided additional incentives for the expansion of spe-
cialized craft production.
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Thus, for both Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River communities, war-
fare accompanied a common set of demographic and economic changes. Those 
changes, although transformative and surely disruptive to prior practices, were 
not sources of societal stress. Rather, they stimulated economic expansion and 
material abundance. In both contexts, trade relationships afforded access to 
the produce of enormous regions. The abundance of storage features in both 
Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River contexts testifies to the strength of 
their economic systems. The positive effects of this abundance are visible in 
people’s bodies: limited osteological data suggest that the both Initial-variant 
and Heart River groups enjoyed reasonably good health (Bass and Berryman 
1976; Williams 2002).
These were also periods of social and political reorganization. For both 
Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River communities, intensified produc-
tion and expanded participation in long-distance trade networks engendered 
a growing web of social relationships that offered leading citizens new oppor-
tunities to accumulate prestige and exercise power. The economic spiral driven 
by intensification and trade also boosted those communities’ regional political 
influence (Mitchell 2013).
One could argue that these villages and towns were forced to defend them-
selves simply because they were wealthy. But at least three factors argue against 
the view that the fortifications surrounding them were designed merely to pre-
vent raiding inspired by economic jealousy. First, many ditch-and-palisade sys-
tems clearly were engineered to defend against large-scale, organized assaults, 
the intent of which may well have been the annihilation of the settlement’s 
inhabitants. The view that extreme enmity motivated at least some of the farm-
ers’ adversaries is confirmed by evidence of horrific violence from the Initial 
Middle Missouri Fay Tolton site (Wood 1976). Second, because their settle-
ments were comparatively large, Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River groups 
were better able to field effective military forces than either scattered bands of 
bison hunters or residents of the smaller, often undefended settlements located 
in adjacent regions (Mitchell 2007). Third, the abundant evidence for hunter-
gatherer acculturation during both periods suggests that regular, face-to-face 
interaction, rather than isolation, was the social norm of the times.
The recognition that trade and warfare sometimes went hand-in-hand in 
the Middle Missouri is by no means new. Wood (1967) drew attention to this 
seeming paradox for the Heart River towns more than 40 years ago. Just as 
Heart River farmers’ contacts with hunter-gatherers and with downriver farm-
ers intensified in the 1400s, the predictability of warfare also increased. The 
fact that a strikingly similar pattern characterizes Initial-variant communities 
286 MARK D. MITCHELL
suggests that, in the Middle Missouri generally, widespread and often intense 
war was bound up with population aggregation, expanding long-distance 
trade, and economic intensification.
Neither cultural nor ecological factors in isolation adequately account for 
war in either of these two cases. Although both Initial Middle Missouri and 
Heart River communities represent elements of the long-lasting Middle 
Missouri tradition, which is defined by shared architectural styles, ceramic 
technology, and subsistence practices, the direct cultural connection between 
them is tenuous at best (Wood 2001). In addition, the direct ancestors of the 
Heart River communities of the 1400s, who are assigned to the Extended vari-
ant of the Middle Missouri tradition, enjoyed a two-century period of relative 
peace following the disappearance of Initial Middle Missouri communities. 
Thus, Middle Missouri–tradition warfare cannot be attributed directly to a 
deeply held martial philosophy.
Subsistence shortages triggered by drought may have been a factor in some 
cases of Middle Missouri conflict (Bamforth 1994, 2006), but they do not 
explain Initial Middle Missouri or Heart River warfare. Initial-variant com-
munities first came together during a relatively warm, dry period but later 
fortified settlements were built and occupied during a wetter period (Fritz 
et al. 2000; Moberg et al. 2005). In the Heart region, major population reor-
ganization began during a period of relatively favorable climatic conditions. 
Megadroughts hit the Middle Missouri in the mid-1400s and again in the 
mid-1500s, but the Heart River towns remained fortified before, during, and 
after these events (Stahle et al. 2007). Northern Hemisphere temperatures 
were declining during the Heart River coalescence of the fifteenth cen-
tury, reaching their lowest point during the last 2,000 years around ad 1600 
(Moberg et al. 2005). However, aggregate storage capacity appears to have 
increased during this period (Mitchell 2013).
ModelIng MIddle MIssourI Warfare
One starting point for building a model of Initial Middle Missouri and 
Heart River warfare is the rich documentary and ethnographic records of 
the northern Plains. Narratives dating to the late 1700s and early 1800s note 
the pervasiveness and intensity of warfare, speculate on the causes, course, 
and consequences of particular conflicts, and even provide details of specific 
engagements. Many early-twentieth-century ethnographies include first- 
person narratives of battle, in which combatants spell out their motivations to 
war along with its social rewards and costs.
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But there is ample reason to be skeptical about direct historical research. Too 
often archaeologists use specific historic analogies as “ready-made” interpre-
tations of their data, rather than as sources of testable models or hypotheses 
(Roper 2007). Building workable models from ethnographic or historic data 
requires archaeologists to evaluate the goodness-of-fit between the details of the 
source and the archaeological subject of interest (Stahl 1993; Wylie 2002). This 
subject-side or comparative analysis inevitably exposes both similarities and dif-
ferences between an analogy and an archaeological case. No analogy will make a 
perfect fit and so tracing points of commonality as well as divergence is crucial 
for identifying the domains over which a model does and does not function.
How, then, does the context of nineteenth-century warfare compare to the 
two archaeological cases from the Middle Missouri? One crucial difference is 
the dramatic effects horses and guns had on warfare in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. Both of those imports altered military tactics and technol-
ogy (Secoy 1953), but their effects extended far beyond the battlefield. Horses 
increased people’s mobility and transport capacity. Both horses and guns ignited 
a quest for military superiority that put a premium on the economic and politi-
cal relationships through which those items were obtained. The changes horses 
and guns wrought occurred quickly: both of those things arrived in the northern 
Plains in the mid-1700s, but were ubiquitous within a half-century.
Another difference between the context of nineteenth-century war and that 
of the two Middle Missouri archaeological cases lies in the roster of societies 
living in the northern Plains during those periods. The eighteenth century 
witnessed migrations of many new groups into the region, migrations that 
prompted new alliances and as well as new enmities. Moreover, the politi-
cal economies of many long-term residents, including the Mandans at the 
Heart River, were changing during this period. Those migrations and eco-
nomic adjustments were accompanied by disease-induced population declines 
beginning in the 1600s (Fenn 2001; Ramenofsky 1987).
However, significant similarities also exist between the political economic 
context of Plains warfare in the late 1700s and 1800s and that of the two Middle 
Missouri cases. As was true for Initial-variant and Heart River communities, a 
massive, multilateral trade network stitched together the nineteenth-century 
Plains. Many groups depended on exchange and a few even made their living 
principally as traders, brokering European goods, native-made crafts, and sub-
sistence products. That network produced a complex web of interdependen-
cies among culturally and socially disparate tribal groups, interdependencies 
encouraged by differing modes of production and by spatial and temporal 
ecological variation across the Plains (Albers 1993). That intense connectivity 
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is rightly considered a basic feature of the northern Plains fur and robe trades 
of the 1700s and 1800s (Swagerty 1988), but Middle Missouri communities 
were no less connected in the 1100s or the 1500s.
The 1800s also was a period of economic expansion and, for some groups, 
of nearly unprecedented wealth. Increases in economic productivity began well 
before European traders entered the region (Mitchell 2013; Vehik 2002), but 
the availability of European trade goods, especially horses and guns after 1750, 
spurred many more groups to intensify production and to expand their partici-
pation in the trade network. This economic expansion conferred material ben-
efits on individuals, lineages, and communities. Some Plains groups had long 
recognized hereditary class distinctions (Holder 1970), but colonial trade pre-
sented new opportunities for ambitious men of low station to control surpluses 
and thereby increase their status (Lewis 1942). Some groups used their unique 
access to critical items to amass tremendous capital in the form of horse herds.
Thus, the conduct of war on the battlefield—defined by the size and com-
position of military units and by the weapons used—was evolving rapidly 
during the nineteenth century. However, in both the Middle Missouri cases 
and in the nineteenth-century case, warfare was accompanied by demographic 
reorganization, large-scale multilateral trade, economic expansion, and mate-
rial abundance. In view of these structural commonalities, it is reasonable to 
use patterns evident in the nineteenth-century record of intense warfare to 
develop models for exploring earlier episodes of similarly intense conflict in 
the Middle Missouri.
Warfare in the Nineteenth Century
No single factor or circumstance provoked combat in the nineteenth cen-
tury. But a persistent theme in the historical and ethnographic records is the 
complex articulation between warfare and economic relationships, especially 
trade. Collective violence was woven into the material and cultural fabric of 
Plains exchange. The widespread calumet ceremony, which facilitated trade 
by establishing fictive kinships between trading partners, commonly began 
with mock skirmishes (Blakeslee 1975). The calumet may also have been used 
in some contexts to forge political alliances for military purposes (Blakeslee 
1981). The intimate connections between war and exchange are also embodied 
in the architecture of nineteenth-century trading posts, which were at once 
hubs of commerce and stockaded enclosures, deservedly dubbed “forts.” Both 
the form of the calumet and the architecture of the trading posts reminded 
buyers and sellers that conflict was never far away.
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One particularly widespread connection between war and exchange was the 
use of violence—or the threat of violence—by nearly every group to restrict 
and channel the flow of trade. Control of trade routes enabled both mobile 
groups and farmers to set themselves up as profit-taking brokers. Jablow 
(1951:37) summarizes the abundant documentary evidence for what he calls 
“restraint of trade.” In 1794, for instance, the Omaha waylaid Jean Baptiste 
Truteau on his way up the Missouri to prevent him from trading with the 
Ponca, even though the Omaha and the Ponca were allies at the time. Two 
years later, the Arikaras attempted to stop John T. Evans for similar reasons. 
In the north, the Assiniboines sought to interpose themselves between North 
West Company traders and the Mandans and Hidatsas. For their part, the 
Mandans opposed North West Company traders’ attempts to directly contact 
groups living west of the Missouri.
The specific methods groups used to affect their blockades varied and guile 
frequently preceded violence. In some cases, the hosts of a trading event 
sought simply to prolong it by spreading rumors about their rival’s treachery. 
But blockades were not merely based on bluster: for example, violence was 
only narrowly averted in the tense standoff between Lewis and Clark and 
the Tetons at the mouth of the Bad River in 1804, a conflict prompted by the 
Tetons’ efforts to control trade on the Missouri (Ronda 2002).
Jablow (1951:52–56) also describes a rather different kind of connection 
between war and trade, one exemplified by what he calls the “peculiar” rela-
tionship between the Tetons and the Arikaras. The Tetons obtained horses, 
mules, and agricultural products from the Arikaras, for which they offered 
European trade goods, including guns, in return. But the Tetons attempted 
to dictate the terms of trade by simultaneously harassing the Arikaras, steal-
ing what they could, and by abducting or killing Arikaras caught away from 
the protection of their villages. The Arikaras rightly feared the Tetons, but 
nevertheless were obliged to endure their abuse, depending as they did on 
the Tetons for the goods they supplied. Citing Lewis and Clark’s view of the 
situation, Jablow argues that the Tetons were free to mistreat the Arikaras, 
and other village-dwelling groups, because they did not need the Missouri 
River trade to supply them with critical items. But this seems little more than 
an uncritically accepted boast: the Tetons clearly did need the Arikaras, or 
another similarly positioned group, to supply them with horses and agricul-
tural products. A more realistic explanation is that the Tetons’ Arikara policy 
reflected an attempt to maximize their profits by appropriating Arikara labor. 
This was a risky strategy that demanded a delicate balance between commerce 
and violence. Violence, and the threat of violence, discouraged competition 
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and effectively lowered the price they had to pay for horses. But destroying the 
Arikaras ran the risk of triggering a realignment that could cut off the flow of 
horses. Thus, Jablow (1951:53) appropriately describes the Teton–Arikara rela-
tionship as an example of “colonial exploitation.”
Patricia Albers (1993) identifies two other processes linking war and trade 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One was the competition between 
rivals occupying similar political economic positions in opposing “trade chains” 
(Albers 1993:122). For instance, allied groups obtaining goods from French trad-
ers came into conflict with similarly positioned groups obtaining goods from 
English traders. Europeans encouraged client relationships and promoted war 
between their clients and those of competing powers ( Jablow 1951:51).
Albers’s second process linking war and trade was regional political eco-
nomic realignment. Europeans’ efforts early in the nineteenth century to trade 
directly with Plains groups upset relations among native peoples who previ-
ously had been allies, prompting new conflicts as each sought to carve out a 
new position within the realigned trade network (Albers 1993:123). Groups 
who pursued similar economic strategies were most likely to come into con-
flict. In some cases, local economic changes fostered emerging hostilities 
among former allies. For instance, Missouri River farmers’ increasing involve-
ment in the horse trade in the mid-1700s put them at odds with mobile groups 
who previously had been their allies.
Albers also points to even smaller-scale tensions between war and trade. In 
addition to warfare between economic rivals, conflicts also arose between stead-
fast allies and trading partners, commonly to “adjust temporary imbalances in the 
flow of resources” (Albers 1993:125). Conversely, sporadic trade between staunch 
enemies—generally facilitated by intermediaries with kin in both of the warring 
groups—was a catalyst for the emergence of new strategic alliances. There was, 
Albers (1993:126) concludes, a fine “line between relationships built on symbio-
sis and those resting on war.” Put another way, war was one component of “an 
ongoing relationship between peoples” (DeMallie and Parks 2003:75).
Apart from these strategic connections between war and trade, historic and 
ethnographic sources also point to a tactical or situational connection. Such 
situational connections are is well illustrated in a historical account provided 
to Gilbert L. Wilson, a Presbyterian minister and ethnographer, by a Hidatsa 
named Wolf Chief (Wilson 1918). Wolf Chief ’s account is set at Star Village, 
a settlement the Arikaras briefly occupied in 1862 (Metcalf 1963). In August of 
1862 about 2,000 Sioux from one or more bands camped near the village for a 
trading visit. During the visit a Sioux man, hoping to make a trade for cotton 
cloth, brought a bison robe to an Ojibwa trader who had built a small post in 
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the village. When the Sioux objected to the terms of the exchange, the trader 
shot at two nearby Sioux women. In turn, the man offering the robe attacked 
the trader’s cabin, at which point the trader’s Arikara assistant returned fire. A 
general fight then broke out, with the Arikaras seizing Sioux women in the 
village and the Sioux seizing Arikara women in their camp. Men caught on 
both sides were killed.
However, Wolf Chief ’s account makes it clear that the action precipitated 
by this incident of failed reciprocity flowed directly from larger strategic 
relationships. As the battle developed, the Arikaras asked the Hidatsas, who 
were living across the Missouri at Like-A-Fishhook Village, for assistance. 
The Hidatsas at first refused, primarily because the Arikaras had previously 
rebuffed an attempt by a Hidatsa chief to establish a peace treaty with them. 
Instead, the Hidatsas came to the aid of the Sioux, with whom the Hidatsas 
had successfully arranged such a treaty. In the end the Hidatsas brokered a 
truce, in the process agreeing to admit the Arikaras into Like-A-Fishhook. But 
their initial reluctance to do so was guided by broader strategic relationships.
Documentary accounts illustrate the fluidity of these strategic relationships. 
Truteau, for instance, reports that in 1792 a confederated Sioux, Cheyenne, and 
Arikara force of some 2,000 attacked one of the Hidatsa towns on the Knife 
River (DeMallie and Parks 2003:69). The Hidatsas withstood a nine-day siege, 
during which the attackers suffered heavy casualties. But only a decade later, 
the trader Le Raye learned that the Sioux and Cheyenne were themselves at 
war ( Jablow 1951:56), and in 1806 Charles Mackenzie encountered a delegation 
of Cheyenne peace ambassadors to the Hidatsas ( Jablow 1951:38). Maximilian 
(Witte and Gallagher 2012:52) reported a similar realignment between the 
Mandans and the Yanktonais: in the summer of 1833 the farmers refused the 
Yanktonais’ offer of a peace treaty but in September changed their minds and 
hosted a trade fair at Mitu’tahakto’s (Fort Clark) attended by 200 Yanktonai 
households. Thus, despite combatants’ claims of relentless enmity for their 
opponents, it is clear that patterns of alliance and conflict shifted rapidly, an 
indication that political economic relations were at least as important to pat-
terns of warfare as were cultural differences.
dIsCussIon and dIreCtIons for future researCh
Warfare during the 1800s was different than it had been during the 1400s and 
1500s in the Heart region or during the 1100s and 1200s in the Plains–Prairie 
border. Nevertheless, the clear association in all three of these cases between 
frequent, intense fighting on the one hand and economic intensification and 
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large-scale, multilateral trade on the other suggests that warfare did not erupt 
over competition for scarce resources, but rather over control of the trade sys-
tem. What was at stake was not the possession of specific resources but rather 
power over the principal engine of wealth, status, and political influence dur-
ing periods of expansion and abundance.
Nineteenth-century historical data identify a variety of specific connec-
tions between war and trade, including appropriation of labor, restraint of 
trade, competition among trade-chain rivals, and political economic shifts. 
Determining which of these processes best explains Heart-region or Initial 
Middle Missouri warfare will require new archaeological analyses. However, 
it seems unlikely that some of the processes observed in the nineteenth-
century also operated during earlier periods. The unusual character of the 
Teton–Arikara relationship was a function of the contrasting source areas for 
horses, in the northern Southwest and southern Rockies, and guns, in the 
upper Mississippi region and on Hudson’s Bay. It is likely that key resources 
were more widely distributed in the past and so the kind of labor appropria-
tion the Tetons practiced may have been uncommon during earlier periods. 
In addition, nineteenth-century trade-chain rivalries emerged primarily from 
competition among colonial powers. If such parallel alliances existed in the 
Middle Missouri they must have been organized rather differently than those 
documented in the nineteenth century.
Other documented connections between war and trade fit better with the 
archaeological data now in hand. Evidence for rapid demographic change and 
economic intensification among both Initial Middle Missouri and Heart River 
communities suggests that regional political economic shifts, coupled with 
consequently altered trade relationships and shifting alliances, was a principal 
cause of conflict. For example, the Heart-region farmer-hunters’ documented 
efforts to increase the productivity of bison hunting may have altered their 
relationships with mobile groups who previously had supplied meat and hides 
(Mitchell 2013). Finally, the incentives that both farmers and hunters had to 
control the flow of goods and the terms of trade gave all parties equally good 
reasons to restrain selected vectors of trade, a major factor prompting conflict 
in the nineteenth century.
A sociohistorical approach to war highlights the fact that the causes and 
consequences of collective violence vary tremendously in different contexts 
(Allen and Arkush 2006; Arkush 2011). For example, Allen (2008) argues that, 
among the Maori, fortifications were a product of chiefly power but, once in 
place, were impediments to further political integration. Arkush (2011) makes 
a similar case for some Late Intermediate–period Andean groups. Little is 
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known about the political connections, if any, among Initial Middle Missouri 
communities, but at the Heart River regional economic and political integra-
tion clearly took place after nearly every settlement was fortified (Mitchell 
2013). The evidence suggests that settlement clustering initially was prompted 
by a defensive alliance but that it was the subsequent expansion of household 
and community craft specialization and the development of local market-
places that primarily led to the formation of a multicommunity confederacy.
The distribution of sixteenth-century settlements in the northern Middle 
Missouri is superficially similar to a simplified or idealized pattern that Arkush 
(2011:table 3.1, figure 3.1) presents for tribal confederations or weakly central-
ized chiefdoms, which consists of a cluster of fortified settlements separated 
by buffer zones from other clusters of settlements. However, closer inspection 
reveals a distinctive, and so far unexplained, feature of the Middle Missouri 
distribution (Mitchell 2007). The Heart region, at the center of the northern 
Middle Missouri, contained a cluster of a dozen or more settlements, virtually 
all of which were stoutly fortified and that ranged in population from around 
200 to 2,000 people. To the northwest along the Missouri, an approximately 
40-km-long buffer zone separated these settlements from a cluster of simi-
larly sized but largely undefended communities. To the south, a 100-km buf-
fer zone separated the Heart-region cluster from a cluster of mostly smaller, 
undefended or only weakly defended villages. Why the communities of the 
Heart region, the most densely settled cluster and therefore the one most able 
to field a large number of soldiers, would also be the most heavily fortified is 
not clear. Equally unclear are the reasons for the lack of parity in the frequency 
or design of fortifications across the northern Middle Missouri. If attacks 
by the residents of adjacent settlement clusters prompted the construction of 
defensive works in the Heart region, why would those adjacent settlements 
be undefended or weakly defended? Mobile bands—the only other groups 
living in the region—may have targeted the Heart-region towns owing to 
their control of the trade network. In any case, this asymmetrical settlement 
pattern was stable, persisting for roughly two centuries from the late 1400s to 
the late 1600s.
A sociohistorical approach also points up the fact that no single model 
is likely to account for all occurrences of warfare in a particular region or a 
particular cultural setting. For example, the model developed in this chapter 
likely does not account for the intense conflict that arose when Coalescent-
tradition groups entered the southern Middle Missouri in the fourteenth cen-
tury, which may instead have been a product of economic stress triggered by 
local subsistence shortfalls (Bamforth 1994, 2006). Nor does the model likely 
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apply to the sporadic and smaller-scale warfare that occurred in the northern 
Middle Missouri during the late 1200s and 1300s.
No analysis should forget that, like any other cultural practice, warfare has 
its own history. Nineteenth-century combatants frequently voiced a desire 
for revenge to redress acts of violence or theft perpetrated by their enemies. 
Because those desires commonly were expressed in terms of ethnic enmity, 
the antagonisms that carried conflict forward could linger, even as regional 
political economic relationships were shifting. Fortifications themselves also 
perpetuated the conditions for war (Allen 2008; Arkush 2011; Pauketat 2009). 
Regardless of how complete or well-maintained they may have been, ditches 
and palisades defined both literally and figuratively who was an insider and 
who was an outsider and reminded residents and visitors alike that war loomed 
over their transactions. Nevertheless, the fact that the context of conflict docu-
mented for the nineteenth century is foreshadowed in the archaeological record 
of the region demonstrates the power of putting war in sociohistorical context.
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The term “ethnic warfare” has been frequently applied to 
explanations of group conflict worldwide (Horowitz 
1985) and archaeological interpretations have been no 
exception, favoring this model to explain warfare in 
the Middle Missouri (Hollimon and Owsley 1994; 
Kay 1995; Johnson 1998; Johnson 2007a; Lehmer 1971). 
Two models of ethnic warfare exist: internecine war-
fare between resident Initial Middle Missouri and 
Extended Middle Missouri populations (Lehmer 1971), 
and external warfare between invading Coalescent 
and resident Middle Missouri groups. The former 
scenario of intercommunity conflict either occurred 
between different Middle Missouri populations 
occupying similar territory or was generated from a 
political split between the two Middle Missouri vari-
ants. The latter hypothesis postulates an “invasion” by 
central Plains villagers, as seen in the Initial variant 
of the Coalescent tradition, into the homeland of the 
Middle Missouri–tradition villagers. This influx of 
people created territorial battles between the Middle 
Missouri–tradition and the Coalescent-tradition vil-
lagers. This interpretation follows the more prevalent 
view of group conflict as “ethnic” and provides a tidy 
and attractive explanation of the archaeological evi-
dence for violent conflict.
For some, the discovery of the Crow Creek massacre 
in 1977 has reinforced the model of ethnic warfare. But 
what if this does not fully explain violent conflict in 
the Middle Missouri? What if relationships between 
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and among the Middle Missouri and Coalescent villagers are more complex 
than the traditional model implies? What if Middle Missouri warfare is not 
adequately explained by an “us versus them” model? Though Great Plains 
archaeologists have challenged these assumptions (Hollinger 2005; chapter 10, 
this volume; Mitchell 2007; Stewart and Zimmerman 1989; Zimmerman and 
Bradley 1993) many researchers adhere to the traditional model.
Settlement studies, specifically site cluster analysis, may not yet be able to 
identify the Crow Creek attackers, but they can help describe the dynamic 
and intricate relationships among the village horticulturalists of the Missouri 
River trench. Clustering studies have had important implications for the study 
of warfare ranging from simply identifying warfare to identifying state forma-
tion (LeBlanc 1999, 2006). In the case of the Middle Missouri, clustering can 
be used to identify locations of potential political alliances.
brIef Chronology and Cultural InteraCtIon
Any discussion of cultural interaction must be preceded by an exanima-
tion of the taxonomic framework of the archaeological region in question. 
The taxonomy of the Middle Missouri was first proposed by Lehmer (1954) 
and further refined by Lehmer and Caldwell (1966) and Lehmer (1971). The 
intent here is not to rehash a detailed description of Middle Missouri tax-
onomy but to provide a basic framework for the archaeologically defined 
cultures. Lehmer’s modified taxonomy defines two major cultural tradi-
tions in the Middle Missouri geographical division, with each divided into 
three variants: the Initial (IMM), Extended (EMM), and Terminal (TMM) 
Middle Missouri as well as the Initial (IC), Extended (EC), and Post-Contact 
Coalescent (PCC). The Initial Middle Missouri is further broken into two 
subvariants: Initial Middle Missouri east (IMMe) and west (IMMw). The 
majority of sites in the Missouri River valley in South Dakota are assigned to 
the IMMw and the debate concerning the origins of the IMM are centered 
on two models. The first argues that the IMM is the result of migrant pop-
ulations from northwestern Iowa and southeastern Minnesota mixing with 
local Late Woodland populations (Toom 1992). More recently, archaeologists 
have argued that there is continuity between indigenous Late Woodland and 
IMM populations with local development (Tiffany 2007; Henning and Toom 
2003). Similarly there is some debate regarding the origin of the EMM. While 
some contend the EMM is not a direct outgrowth of the IMM (Lehmer 1971), 
Ahler (2007) argues that the EMM is result of the interaction of the northern 
expression of the IMM with northern Late Woodland groups. Regardless of 
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its origination, the EMM is first identified in North Dakota and later expands 
into South Dakota ( Johnson 2007a). As far as the TMM is concerned, there is 
little argument that these populations are descended from the EMM groups 
( Johnson 2007a; Toom 1992).
The emergence of the Coalescent tradition is attributed to the influx of 
village horticulturalists from the central Plains. While the origin of the 
Coalescent tradition needs additional clarification, it is clear that each sub-
sequent variant within the Coalescent is an outgrowth of the previous. By 
definition, the Coalescent shows traits of both central Plains and Middle 
Missouri groups, indicating some sort of positive material and cultural trade 
between the two groups. This is evident in the IC, the earliest Coalescent 
variant, where ceramic analysis indicates that IC pottery derives from Loup 
River/Itskari, St. Helena, and Anoka phases of the central Plains while set-
tlement patterns and fortifications are similar to Middle Missouri styles 
( Johnson 2007a). To what extent the Middle Missouri and central Plains 
migrants coalesced is still up for some debate. Steinacher and Carlson (1998) 
and Tiffany et al. (2011) argue that the IC is better viewed through the 
Central Plains–tradition Anoka phase rather than a Middle Missouri variant. 
It is fairly clear that the EC are descendent from the IC but Steinacher and 
Carlson question to what extent the EC mingled with the Middle Missouri–
tradition villagers. Settlement patterns in the EC shift from larger nucleated 
sites to smaller, more-dispersed sites, perhaps as a result of warring during 
the occupation of IC sites (Zimmerman and Bradley 1993). Finally, the PCC 
is marked by the appearance of a change in pottery styles and introduction 
of European trade goods ( Johnson 2007a).
Contemporaneity between variants of both the Middle Missouri and 
Coalescent traditions poses some confounding issues for a regional-scale 
study with considerable temporal depth within the Missouri area. Johnson 
(2007a) helped to alleviate this problem by organizing sites into 13 time peri-
ods, each spanning from 35 to 100 years in length, that encompass the period 
between ad 1000 and 1850. Assignment to each period was identified by 
chronometric dating and ceramic typologies. Though the inherent nature 
of chronologies dictates continued verification and refinement, this work 
allows village locations to be interpreted within a regional framework with 
a relatively tight chronological control for the first time. Table 12.1 shows 
the potential intervillage cultural interaction within the chronological frame-
work presented by Johnson (2007a).
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ClusterIng and Warfare studIes
Site clustering has been used in several forms in the study of warfare. 
Archaeologists often cite the practice of clustering as a causal factor in sociopo-
litical development related to the formation of chiefdoms and states (LeBlanc 
2006). Under this model, a centralized sociopolitical organization can derive 
from an initial condition of geographic isolation among allied villages, thus 
forming a functional need for political groups to perform the increased roles 
of a central, coordinating leadership. Some archaeologists working from an 
evolutionary perspective are beginning to study warfare beyond the con-
fines of developing complexity. For example, Allen (2008) suggests warfare 
as a contributing factor in sociopolitical collapse and disorganization, and 
Arkush (2011) examines clustering and buffers in a non-centralized society, 
using Sahlins’s (1961) segmentary lineage as a model to explain warfare in the 
Titicaca Basin.
The importance of geographic buffers has been noted in the Middle 
Missouri region as well. First discussed by Lehmer (1971) and expanded by 
Kay (2007), buffers have been used to show social distance and frontier expan-
sion in the Cannonball subdivision that has been interpreted as evidence for a 
separation of TMM villages from Coalescent-tradition villages. In any region, 
this clustering and separation would have been a tactical move that created 
protection for villages through physical proximity with friendly neighbors. At 
Table 12.1. Aggregation of Chronology and Taxonomy presented by Johnson (2007a)
Period Dates (ad) Tradition/Variant Present
1 1000–1100 IMM
2 1100–1200 IMM; Charred Body Complex (North Dakota only)
3 1200–1300 IMM; EMM
4 1300–1400 EMM; TMM (North Dakota only); IC
5 1400–1500 TMM (North Dakota only); IC ; EC
6 1500–1550 IC; EC
7 1550–1600 EC






ALLIANCES, CLUSTERS, AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS 299
the same time there were significant expanses of land, referred to as no man’s 
lands, which were sacrificed as uninhabited territories to maintain these pro-
tective alliances. These sacrifices included the losses of arable land and access 
to wood resources for both construction and fuel, and were amplified during 
times of drought (LeBlanc 1999). The extant studies of Middle Missouri sub-
division buffering can be enhanced twofold. First, archaeologists can look at 
alliance building beyond the strict confines of ethnic boundaries as defined by 
the taxonomic framework. Second, researchers can utilize a suite of statisti-
cally derived locational information to understand the function of clustering 
beyond the mere visual identification of buffers.
Similar to Arkush (2011), I find it useful to return to Sahlins and the concept 
of segmentary societies in order to understand alliances. While the “segmen-
tary lineage” concept may not perfectly fit the villagers of the Middle Missouri, 
the segementary aspect of tribal organization does provide a good foundation 
from which to address intergroup social relations. Acknowledging the cave-
ats of stringent labels, the Band-Tribe-Chiefdom-State model is used herein 
as a convenient framework for comparison and not as a doctrine concern-
ing evolutionary trajectories. Sahlins describes a tribe as a “segmental orga-
nization” (Sahlins 1961: 325) with an organization based upon multiple family 
groups or bands. Each band is a self-sufficient unit and is the smallest family 
group that occupies a specific territory. While bands may meet at seasonally 
appropriate times, and are bound through social rules and intermarriage, the 
tribe is not a strongly unified political organization. More so, the tribe may be 
better described in terms of ethnic identity instead of political consolidation 
(Sahlins 1961:325). Sahlins suggests three “facts” of tribal life. First, because 
of the segmentation, there is an inherent disunity within the tribe and no 
permanent confederation. Second, despite this loose political structure, the 
tribal units will ally when faced with an external enemy. Third, after the com-
petition is resolved the bands will return to the relative political indepen-
dence of the segmental organization (Sahlins 1961:326). While the Tiv and 
Nuer of Sahlins’s original study were patrilineal, matrilineal kinship systems 
can be segmented as well (see Schwimmer 2003): the kinship system of the 
historic Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara was matrilineal. The important fac-
tor is that segmented societies are loose confederations of hierarchical politi-
cal groups. In the Middle Missouri subregion, these political unit—families, 
clans, or bands—were organized into villages, with related villages loosely tied 
politically together (Bowers 1992:26; 2004:26). In fact, among the Hidatsa, the 
intervillage confederation was so loose that there was no unifying tribal coun-
cil prior to the smallpox epidemic of 1780s (Bowers 1992:26–27).
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This fluid model can become more complex through relationship-building 
practices. Generally speaking, Plains groups depended on their neighbors in 
a symbiotic relationship based around both kinship relationships and sodali-
ties (Albers 1993). Ethnographic evidence throughout the Great Plains and 
the greater Midwest shows a broad trend of solidifying existing ties between 
communities and creating new relationships through encounters with exter-
nal groups. Formal rites such as the Calumet of the Captain Ceremony 
(Blakeslee 1981; Albers 1993; Hall 1997) and the Making of Relations among 
the Ogallala (Brown and Steltenkamp 1993) served to initiate kinship ties 
between previously unrelated people. Not only do these kinship mechanisms 
reduce warfare, but they also create trading relations. No direct application 
of these particular ceremonies to the prehistoric past is intended here, but 
it is important to note that, at least during historic times, mechanisms were 
in place to create peace within potentially hostile relationships. While these 
sodalities did not prevent war, it did serve to reduce raiding between symbi-
otic groups (Albers 1993).
Archaeologically identifying the sociopolitical unit of the band may be 
difficult, but one could treat each village as an autonomous political unit. 
Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry (2007b) show that there are interac-
tions between Middle Missouri and Coalescent villages, as shown through 
ceramic styles. Mitchell (2007) sees an interplay between trade and war in 
the late Plains Village–pattern sites in North Dakota. These studies show 
that while the taxonomies serve as useful tools to describe who, when, and 
where, they do not aid archaeologists in defining base political units. That is, 
each village makes its own decisions based on social and economic justifica-
tions. Genetic and linguistic relationships play a role in decisions, but are not 
the defining reason for being an ally or enemy. Simply put, archaeological 
taxonomies do not define cooperative or competing relationships—interac-
tions between villages do.
If intervillage alliances were complex during historic times, it is reasonable 
to believe that these relationships were equally complicated throughout the 
prehistoric past. The nature of alliances is dynamic and, while it may be com-
mon for alliances to be forged, many are broken and few persist unchanged 
for very long durations. However, it is these long-term relationships that are 
most identifiable in the archaeological record. Though it may be difficult to 
identify the mechanisms for alliance building, settlement patterns can be used 
to infer when and where these alliances may have occurred. Specifically, cluster 
analyses, informed by fortification strategies, can indicate where and when 
these complex relationships existed.
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VIllage loCatIons and Chronology
In order to investigate the presence of alliances in the Middle Missouri 
and how these relationships may have changed across time, cluster analyses 
are performed here using locational data from Plains Village–pattern sites 
located along the Missouri River in South Dakota (figure 12.1). These sites 
occupy, in order from north to south, the Cannonball, Grand–Moreau, Bad–
Cheyenne, Big Bend, and Fort Randall geographical divisions of the Middle 
Missouri, as defined by Lehmer (1971). Sites located outside the trench along 
major tributaries, as well as sites located in the James River floodplain, were 
excluded from the study. The sites within each of the 13 time periods defined 
by Johnson (2007a) are treated as contemporaneous villages, with the under-
standing that this assumption may not hold true as more data are analyzed. 
In total, a population of 141 site locations is included in the study group and 
individual time-period populations varied from one site location (Period 13) 
to 29 locations (Period 9).
Figure 12.1. Study area overview, South Dakota. Shaded relief map courtesy of the South 
Dakota Department of Environment & Natural Resources (SD DENR). 
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MethodologICal aPProaCh
To conduct the analysis, I used a series of geographical statistical techniques 
that fall under the category of point pattern analysis. Therefore, the data 
included in the analysis comprise geographical site centroids for each of the 
village locations. Two of the techniques utilize measures of randomness while 
the third is a non-parametric density analysis. Inherent in many geographical 
analyses is the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). Simply stated, the 
MAUP refers to changes in the results due to the changes in the size and 
location of the study area. One way to visualize this is to think of election 
results. When the results are tallied at the state level there is one result. When 
broken down by county, there is a different result, and yet another result when 
aggregated by voting district. This does not mean that any one of these results 
is inherently flawed, but that it is important to understand results within the 
scale of analysis.
With point pattern analysis, issues arise with the size and shape of the 
study. Study areas can be arbitrary. That is, the area can be defined by a shape 
(rectangle, ellipse, envelope, etc.) that encloses all of the points. Study areas 
can also be bounded naturally, as in the case of a river basin, plateau, or ter-
race. Each of these methods has both benefits and limitations. In the case of 
archaeological point patterns, natural study areas are defined by the landscape. 
They attempt to replicate a livable area as defined by the environment, but 
they explicitly eliminate areas that may have been the focus of some human 
activity. Arbitrary areas are defined by the parameters of the technique, but 
they can include multiple environments that natural areas exclude. I took sev-
eral steps in order to reduce the effects of the MAUP. First, I used multiple 
analyses, including nearest neighbor analysis, Ripley’s K statistic, and kernel 
density estimates. Second, the analyses were conducted at different scales and 
with different areas. Lastly, one technique (Ripley’s K ) utilizes a multiscalar 
approach to show the variability in the size of clustering.
Nearest neighbor (NN) analysis has been used in archaeology for many 
years and, in the past, has been a primary tool for identifying cluster patterning 
at both the regional and the site scale (Hodder and Orton 1976; Whallon 1974). 
The use of NN statistics may have become prevalent because it is simple to 
calculate and interpret (Conolly and Lake 2006:164). Its detractors claim that 
the use of the NN statistic is not multiscalar and its use allows for assumption 
violations as well as errors due to edge effects (Durand and Pippin 1992:264; 
Conolly and Lake 2006:164).
The most common NN equation was developed by Clark and Evans 
(1954). The results of this equation can interpret the data in terms of clustered, 
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random, or regular distributions. The concept behind the statistic is that, in a 
random distribution of points, the estimated mean NN distance is related to 
density. Restated, it is “the expected mean distance between nearest neighbors 
in a random distribution is equal to the reciprocal of twice the square root of 
points in that given space” (Durand and Pippin 1992:264). The coefficient is 
simply calculated as the ratio of the observed mean distance of nearest neigh-
bors divided by the expected mean distance of nearest neighbors. The results 
will produce a value between 0 and 2.1491. A value of 1 equates to a random 
distribution, a value less than 1 identifies clustering, and a value greater than 1 
is evidence of uniform distribution (Durand and Pippin 1992:265).
Ripley’s K statistic is an index of non-randomness for differing scale values 
used to identify clusters. It creates a random distribution of points, from a 
Monte Carlo simulation, and compares the highest and lowest values, or the 
“envelope,” to the sample value. The statistic is calculated from a value of point 
intensity, or λ. The formula λK(r) is the expected number of points within the 
radius (r). The K-distribution is an aggregate of frequency of λ at different inter-
vals of r. Using 1,000 to 5,000 iterations of the simulation can usually obtain 
95 percent confidence (Bevan and Conolly 2006:221). Clustering can then be 
identified by comparing the actual population to the random population.
Kernel density estimates (KDEs) are a well-discussed statistical method 
that has seen minimal use in archaeology (Baxter et al. 1997:347; Wheatley 
and Gillings 2002). A KDE is a form of histogram that is represented in a 
smoothed fashion and allows for the presentation of multiple datasets in one 
figure. It can be used for either univariate or multivariate statistics (Beardah 
and Baxter 1996; Baxter et al. 1997:347) but bivariate statistical analysis (x and 
y coordinates) is generally used for spatial studies.
Univariate KDE can be thought of as a number of points (x1 to xn) located 
on a line. At each variable on the line a bump is placed and the shape of the 
bump is a result of the weighting function (kernel), or K(x), while the spread 
is determined by the bandwidth (h). The value of h can be defined through a 
priori knowledge of the data, either through an equation or other knowledge 
of the data. Alternatively, h can be defined by “plugging-in” techniques where 
different values are tested in order to find the best fit. A value that is too large 
will “over-smooth” the results; while underestimating h will yield results that 
are too coarse (Baxter et al. 1997:348).
Bivariate KDEs have a similar principle except that, instead of points on a 
line, variables x and y are displayed as points on a plane. Each point is again 
represented by a “bump.” Choices of bandwidth are performed in a similar 
fashion as univariate decisions for h, but tend to be more subjective. With an 
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individual point, the results appear as a “bull’s eye.” If there are overlapping 
results they are displayed as contour lines (Baxter et al. 1997:348–349). Most 
examples of KDE have been performed to show clustering of artifacts at the 
site level (e.g., Beardah and Baxter 1996; Baxter et al. 1997), but KDEs can also 
be used at the much larger regional level (Wheatley and Gillings 2002:187).
The use of these three techniques in concert alleviates the issues of any one 
of the methods individually. The NN analysis, while showing clustering at the 
global scale, does not show clustering at the local scale. The Ripley’s K sta-
tistic addresses the multiscalar issue but is affected by the MAUP. The KDE 
helps to visualize the location of the clustering, while comparing scalar issues 
through calculating the statistic multiple times with different parameters.
results
Nearest Neighbor Analysis
The NN analysis was conducted using an area defined by a combination 
of the Missouri River Trench and the extent of all the sites located within 
the trench with the calculations made using ArcGIS 10. One study area was 
used for all of the time periods and I calculated the NN for seven out of the 
13 periods identified by Johnson (2007a). Periods 1–3 and 13 were excluded due 
to an extremely low population (n < 10). The results are presented in table 12.2.
Periods 5 through 7 show a dispersed settlement pattern, while Periods 8, 9, 
and 11 fall within a normal distribution. Only Period 10 indicates a clustered 
patterning. The average NN ranged from roughly 8 to16 km for the dispersed 
settlement pattern and roughly 5.75–9.80 km for the random pattern. The 
average NN for the clustered settlement pattern was 4.5 km.
Ripley’s K Statistic
To test the potential for and significance of clustering, I first ran the Ripley’s 
K statistic using Crimestate III (Levine 2010). There were four time periods—
Period 5 (ad 1400–1500), Period 6 (ad 1500–1550), Period 9 (ad 1650–1700), 
and Period 10 (ad 1700–1750)—that had large enough populations (N = 19, 22, 
29, and 28, respectively) to garner significant results. For comparison, 1,000 
random populations were calculated for each time period. The bounding study 
area was defined by a minimum enclosing rectangle. A new rectangle was cal-
culated for each time period, resulting in study areas that were defined by the 
centroids of village locations and the sample relevant only to each individual 
time-frame.
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Figure 12.2 shows the results of Ripley’s K analysis. It charts a square root of 
k [L(t)] by distance in kilometers. The solid line charts L(t) for the actual pop-
ulation, while the dashed lines indicate the maximum and minimum L(t) for 
the random populations. The latter two create the random “envelope” indicat-
ing the boundaries for non-random significance. For Period 5, the population 
falls outside of the random envelope between 2 and 25 km (represented by the 
dotted lines). This indicates that clustering occurs non-randomly (intention-
ally) at scales ranging from 2 to 25 km. The results from Period 6 show similar 
results, but clustering is significant at smaller scales (2–16 km), while Periods 
9 and 10 show significant clustering at much larger scales (0–60 km and 0–45 
km, respectively). Overall, these results indicate that village clustering is evi-
dent and significant during these four time periods and that clustering shifts 
from relatively smaller to relatively larger scales over time.
Kernal Density Estimates
Although the KDE analysis does not show statistically significant clusters, 
it allows one to visualize clusters and identify patterns. The analysis is not 
inherently temporal or multiscalar but, when calculated for multiple periods 
and at different scales, it can be used in those capacities. This analysis shows 
intensity of occupation during each of the defined chronological periods. To 
tie in the results of the Ripley’s K statistic, the KDE search was conducted at 
two scales—16 km and 25 km—the results of the two smallest significant clus-
ter groups. This allows for a relatively localized analysis (16 km) and a more 
regional scale analysis (25 km). I calculated KDEs for Periods 1–10, excluding 
Periods 11–13 because of the relatively small number of sites and the random 
results for the NN statistic in Period 11.
Table 12.2. Results of the Nearest Neighbor Analysis
Period (ad) N Result Ratio Z-Score Expected (m) Observed (m)
5 (1400–1500) 19 Dispersed 1.601229 5.013573 6,674.74 10,687.79
6 (1500–1550) 22 Dispersed 1.279397 2.507055 6,202.97 7,936.07
7 (1550–1600) 13 Dispersed 1.96265 6.640047 8,069.37 15,837.36
8 (1600–1650) 12 Random 1.163473 1.083346 8,398.87 9,771.86
9 (1650–1700) 29 Random 1.073497 0.757178 5,402.72 5,799.80
10 (1700–1750) 28 Clustered 0.819657 –1.82562 5,498.35 4,506.76
11 (1750–1785) 11 Random 1.031614 0.200586 8,772.33 9,049.66
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While one must be careful not to equate ditches with warfare (LeBeau, 
chapter 6, this volume), the structures can still be viewed as one line of evi-
dence for defensive strategies and I will mention their locations. The chronol-
ogy of fortification building is poorly defined with current data. It is difficult 
to estimate at what point the fortifications were built, and in the case of vil-
lages with multiple fortifications it can be difficult to identify the order of 
construction. The presence of fortification needs to be understood within this 
context, but patterns do exist and these data are used anecdotally.
Some interesting patterns emerge during the analysis of Johnson’s 
(2007a) Period 1 (ad 1000–1100). The earliest, and the most intense, occu-
pations occur in the Big Bend and Bad–Cheyenne geographical divisions. 
At the regional (25 km) scale there is one cluster that lies mostly in the 
Big Bend and two outlying isolated sites, one each in the Cannonball and 
Fort Randall divisions (figure 12.3). Throughout time, settlements aggregate 
around the Big Bend clusters and the outliers in the Cannonball and Fort 
Randall division. This sets up the major clustering groups and unoccupied 
zones. At the local scale, two concentrations are exhibited within the Big 
Bend cluster. Fortifications are present at three of the seven villages in the 
Figure 12.2. Ripley’s K results for Periods 5, 6, 9, and 10. 
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region during this first period, which at this point is only occupied by Initial 
Middle Missouri villagers.
During Period 2 (ad 1100–1200) the local clusters expand well into the Bad–
Cheyenne division (figure 12.4). The Grand–Moreau division remains unoccu-
pied, but the unoccupied zone decreases in size while the Fort Randall unoc-
cupied region remains approximately the same size. Four of the nine villages 
are fortified. Interestingly, within the Big Bend and Bad–Cheyenne regions an 
additional unoccupied zone is introduced.
Period 3 (ad 1200–1300) marks the end of the Initial Middle Missouri, the 
beginning of the Extended Middle Missouri, and the beginning of occupation 
in the Grand–Moreau region. Following the split in the Bad–Cheyenne and 
Big Bend settlement clusters during Period 2, the buffer zones between these 
groups decrease in size at the regional scale during Period 3 (figure 12.5), but 
local clustering is still present. Despite the additional population living in the 
Grand–Moreau area, there is still a significant separation between the Grand–
Moreau and Bad–Cheyenne regions, with a smaller separation between the 
Big Bend and Fort Randall regions. While fortifications are now present in 
all three regions, they are most abundant within the Bad–Cheyenne and Big 
Bend clusters.
Figure 12.3. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
1 (ad 1000–1100). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.4. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
2 (ad 1100–1200). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.5. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
3 (ad 1200–1300). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
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Overall, Period 4 (ad 1300–1400) shows less-intense occupation of the 
region and a more dispersed settlement pattern. There is a separation, both 
regionally (figure 12.6) and locally, into paired villages, which are relatively 
evenly distributed regionally. The unoccupied area of the Grand–Moreau 
is significantly reduced and the Bad–Cheyenne to Big Bend empty area 
reemerges. The settlements of this period are also heavily fortified with all but 
two of the villages possessing fortifications and each pair having at least one 
fortification. It is within this period that we see the first appearance of the 
Initial Coalescent villagers. Contrary to expectations of initial ethnic-group 
separation, one of the site pairs includes both cultural traditions.
Period 5 (ad 1400–1500) marks the beginning of the Extended variant of the 
Coalescent tradition. During this time there is a further reduction in the unoc-
cupied buffer of the Grand–Moreau. The buffer between the Big Bend and 
Bad–Cheyenne divisions remains the same and serves to separate two fortified 
Initial Coalescent communities (figure 12.7). At the regional scale there appears 
to be a general trend for dispersal, while at the local scale, smaller clusters 
are evident within Bad–Cheyenne, Grand–Moreau, and Cannonball divisions. 
Five of the 19 villages are fortified, including the two southernmost villages.
During Period 6 (ad 1500–1550) the unoccupied zones are not significantly 
present at the regional scale (figure 12.8), but the local clustering trend con-
tinues. Fortifications are present at northern sites in the Grand–Moreau sub-
division and southern sites in the Big Bend. This period marks the end of the 
Initial Coalescent.
The border of the Fort Randall geographical division is reoccupied dur-
ing Period 7 (ad 1550–1600), ending the general northward settlement trend. 
Coupled with this southern expansion is another increase in the Grand–
Moreau/Bad–Cheyenne buffer zone (figure 12.9). At both the regional and 
local scales there is a dispersed settlement pattern in the Bad–Cheyenne 
and Big Bend geographical divisions, but an intense local cluster on the 
Cannonball/Grand–Moreau border. There is also a dramatic shift in fortifi-
cation strategy with only two walled sites (one at the northern periphery) in 
the Bad–Cheyenne region but palisades present at three of the four of the 
Cannonball/Grand–Moreau sites. It is noteworthy that there is a large unoc-
cupied zone north of the Cannonball/Grand–Moreau cluster, spanning the 
territory up to the Heart River in North Dakota.
During Period 8 (ad 1600–1650) there is an overall decrease in occupation 
intensity throughout the region. The most intense area of occupation is located 
at the southern boundary of the Big Bend division near the mouth of the White 
River. The largest unoccupied zone is between the White River group and the 
Figure 12.6. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
4 (ad 1300–1400). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.7. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
5 (ad 1400–1500). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.8. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
6 (ad 1500–1550). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.9. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for Period 
7 (ad 1550–1600). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
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Big Bend/Bad–Cheyenne group (figure 12.10). Local clustering is evident within 
the northern Grand–Moreau/Cannonball area and the only fortified villages are 
located within these northern groups. Period 8 marks the end of the Extended 
Coalescent and the beginning of the Post-Contact Coalescent in North Dakota.
Marking the beginning of the Post-Contact Coalescent in South Dakota, 
there is a florescence of occupation during Period 9 (ad 1650–1700) through-
out all geographic divisions of the Missouri River. Clustering is evident locally 
(figure 12.11) and regionally, and unoccupied areas are present in the Grand–
Moreau, Bad–Cheyenne, Big Bend, and Fort Randall areas. All of the northern 
villages of the Grand–Moreau and Cannonball divisions remain fortified, while 
fortifications in the other divisions are centrally located within the clusters.
Settlement patterns in Period 10 (ad 1700–1750) exhibit regional disper-
sion with local clustering (figure 12.12). The unoccupied zone in the Grand–
Moreau division is maintained while the Fort Randall division is abandoned 
and site locations move northward, beginning a trend of movement out of 
South Dakota. Fortifications are spread broadly throughout the region, except 
at the southern cluster of sites.
Figure 12.10. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDE for 
Period 8 (ad 1600–1650). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.11. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for 
Period 9 (ad 1650–1700). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
Figure 12.12. Results of the 16-km (left) and 25-km (right) KDEs for 
Period 10 (ad 1700–1750). Shaded relief map courtesy of the SD DENR. 
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Discussion
Though the results of the Ripley’s K and NN analysis seem to be conflict-
ing at points, this can be attributed to scalar issues. Ripley’s K is inherently 
multiscalar, but it relies heavily on the definition of the study area. With the 
study area defined by the minimum enclosing rectangle, clustering has a sim-
ple cause, the location along the Missouri River. But, upon closer inspection, 
other patterns exist that are significant at different scales (see Periods 5, 6, 
9, and 10). Alternatively, the reduced study area of the NN analysis shows 
a pattern of more-dispersed settlement. But even within the NN analysis, 
the results shift through time. Taking both analyses into account, the results 
show dispersal at the regional scale, with clustering locally, and the intensity 
of this pattern shifts throughout time. The upper and lower scalar limits of 
the Ripley’s K results indicate that the upper limit of clustering (i.e., distance 
where the populations fall back into the random envelope) ranges from 16 
km (Period 5) to 60 km (Period 10). These upper limits may indicate the geo-
graphical extent of the political alliances during those periods.
The results of the KDE visualize when and where the alliances were located. 
While KDE results, in general, are influenced by researcher-defined parameters, 
in this case we reduced this influence by using scales informed by the Ripley’s K 
results. The larger-scale KDE (25-km parameters) may be overly inclusive; the 
smaller-scale results (16-km parameters) may be overly exclusive. Using the two 
scales, comparing the results to each other and comparing the result to the NN 
and Ripley’s K results is the best way to understand the nature of the clusters. 
Generally, clusters are located in each of the predefined geographical subdivi-
sions in South Dakota. Throughout time these clusters expand and contract 
and, at some points, are defined by a northern group (Cannonball and Grand–
Moreau divisions) and a southern group (Bad–Cheyenne and Big Bend) group. 
For instance, in Period 3 at the 16-km and 25-km scales (figure 12.5), there are 
clusters in four of the geographical divisions while in Period 7 (figure 12.9) the 
clusters consolidate and there are no longer significant clusters at these scales.
Fortification strategies also vary throughout the settlement clusters. Fre-
quently, fortifications are dispersed across the region, as they are in Periods 3, 
4, 5, and 6. In Periods 7, 8, and 9 sites are fortified in northern South Dakota, 
but not frequently in the south. Fortified villages can be placed at the edge 
of clusters, as they are in the Bad–Cheyenne/Big Bend cluster in Period 5, 
whereas the Bad–Cheyenne and Big Bend clusters of Period 9 show a central-
ized fortified village with unfortified neighboring villages.
When not associated with a larger cluster, a village may pair with another 
village, with at least one being fortified (see Periods 3 and 4). An interesting 
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example of this strategy can be found during Period 4 (figure 12.6) with 
the Durkin Village, an unfortified Extended Middle Missouri village, and 
Whistling Elk, a fortified Initial Coalescent village. This may indicate an alli-
ance between communities belonging to different taxonomic variants, which 
have sometimes been interpreted as representative of different ethnic groups. 
Even if there were no formal alliance, the lack of fortification at Durkin 
Village indicates that the Extended Middle Missouri village did not fear 
attack from their potentially ethnically different neighbors, at least in this 
instance. This type of relationship may contradict the traditional view of a hos-
tile relationship between Middle Missouri and Coalescent villagers. While 
the exact timing of the Crow Creek massacre cannot be identified (Bamforth 
and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007a), this unorthodox pairing is contemporaneous 
with the Initial Coalescent component of the Crow Creek village. This does 
not disprove that the massacre was perpetrated by Middle Missouri villagers; 
however it does call into question assumptions concerning pan-regional hos-
tilities between Middle Missouri and Coalescent peoples.
A similar situation occurs during Period 3 (figure 12.5) with Stony Point, 
a fortified Initial Middle Missouri village, in close proximity to Ketchen 
Village, an unfortified Extended Middle Missouri village. Depending on the 
unresolved ancestral origins of the Extended Middle Missouri, this potential 
alliance has significant implications for intergroup warfare. If the Extended 
variant is directly related to the Initial, then the pairing may simply be the 
result of continuity between the variants during a transitional period. If the 
Extended Variant does indeed represent an incursion of ethnically similar yet 
distinct immigrants from North Dakota, then the potential alliance suggests 
greater complexity of intergroup social relations. Again, while it is difficult to 
say that these two villages were definitively allied, the fact that the Ketchen 
villagers traveled into IMM territory and did not feel the need to fortify indi-
cates that the EMM people did not fear attack.
Conversely, just as there are intertradition and variant pairings and clus-
ters, there are unoccupied zones, or no man’s lands, separating villages of the 
same tradition and variant. The unoccupied zones are between IMM sites 
present in Period 1 (figure 12.3) and this pattern persists until Period 3 (figure 
12.5), when the IMM abandon the Cannonball and Grand–Moreau and the 
northern no man’s land separates EMM villages. These unoccupied zones are 
present at times when there is only one tradition throughout the Missouri 
River in South Dakota, suggesting internecine warfare, while less-dramatic, 
unoccupied zones are present in Period 4 (ad 1300–1400; figure 12.6) dur-
ing the first appearance of the IC. If ethnic warfare was the only applicable 
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model, the no man’s land would be found between EMM and IC clusters. In 
reality, there is no clear division between EMM and IC sites and, when there 
is separation, the unoccupied zones occur between EMM sites or between an 
EMM cluster and a mixed EMM/IC pairing. It is obvious that the nature of 
these relationships can be better understood with more precise chronologi-
cal data. However, the settlement patterns within the currently established 
village chronology show territorial clustering and dispersal within these 100-
year time frames.
The pattern of fortification building is also informative as it pertains to 
the nature of warfare. Frequently, where no man’s lands are present, Middle 
Missouri–tradition villagers fortify the frontiers. All of the IC sites included 
in this study are fortified. While the Middle Missouri–tradition villagers were 
enhancing some of the unoccupied zones with palisades, IC villagers protected 
all sites, or at least all sites included within Johnson’s (2007a) chronology.
Ultimately, archaeologists need to consider four scenarios while discuss-
ing the combatants of Missouri River warfare: (1) Plains Village versus Late 
Woodland and/or nomadic hunters, (2) external village warfare, (3) internecine 
village warfare, and (4) interregional warfare. While external village warfare 
is the most commonly argued scenario, there is growing evidence for other 
scenarios as well. For instance, at the fortified Fay Tolton village there are 
indications of site burning and osteological evidence for interpersonal con-
flict (Hollimon and Owsley 1994). Also, Fay Tolton is occupied during the 
same period (Period 2) as the Late Woodland Charred Body Complex occu-
pations, suggesting the possibility of conflict between Late Woodland and 
IMM along with the cooperative interaction that Ahler (2007) shows. Others 
have noted that the personal conflict at Fay Tolton may indicate internecine 
warfare (Krause 2012:130). There is similar debate concerning the Crow Creek 
massacre with some hypothesizing that it may have been the result of inter-
necine war (Zimmerman and Bradley 1993; Zimmerman and Stewart 1991) 
and others arguing that the massacre may be the result of Oneota expansion 
(Hollinger 2005; chapter 10, this volume).
ConClusIons
Archaeologists may discover that every scenario will not be present at all 
times, but it is likely that they are not mutually exclusive. This study shows 
the importance of understanding warfare at different scales, in both the meth-
odological and interpretive frameworks. The relationship of settlement, land-
scape, and warfare will also be furthered by addressing some key issues.
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In the Middle Missouri, the idea of ethnic warfare as the sole model of 
warfare among village farmers is called into question. Violent conflict cer-
tainly had an ethnic component, but looking at the Middle Missouri through 
a lens of a segmented society is informative to understanding village politics. 
That the band is the base political level has implications in both war and peace. 
These ties can be implied by studying the clusters and fortification strategies 
in the Middle Missouri.
Although there is temporal variation in fortification strategy, there is a need 
for better chronology of fortification building. At what point in the occupa-
tion were the fortifications built? This is important at sites like the Arzberger 
village, where it was occupied in parts of two centuries. For sites that have 
multiple concentric fortifications, such as the Stony Point village, in what 
order are fortifications built? Do multiple fortifications represent expansion 
or contraction of village size? Is this consistent in all villages with multiple 
fortifications? Finally, to strengthen the relationship of settlement patterns 
with warfare, archaeologists should attempt to identify and test other reasons 
for clustering and thus potentially exclude competing models.
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The Crow Creek Massacre




The study of violence has been a central point of dis-
cussion for many social scientists, as violence appears 
so intimately intertwined with the rise of humanity 
and civilization. Some of the first records of human 
history, unsurprisingly, come in the form of mili-
tary histories, which inevitably are records of violent 
human interaction (Keeley 1996:3). In fact, records of 
warfare span the globe from ancient Egyptian hiero-
glyphs, to Mayan ritual practices, to modern civil 
war stories (Keeley 1996). Likewise, bioarchaeologi-
cal research unequivocally demonstrates that humans 
have been subject to interpersonal violence, especially 
among men (Walker 2001:573). A deeper look into 
the historic and archaeological record indicates that 
women also played an active role in warfare. Women’s 
roles involve not only the acquisition of weapons, and 
celebration of victories, but also suffering the humili-
ation and misery of defeat.
While much literature has been devoted to the analy-
sis of interpersonal violence in its modern form, less 
research has been devoted to understanding causes of 
violence in earlier, prehistoric societies (Milner 1995; 
Walker 2001). This facet of human history is worthy of 
exploration as the archaeological record of the Great 
Plains yields evidence of warfare preceding the arrival 
of Europeans by hundreds of years (Bamforth 1994). 
Evidence of violence in the Great Plains, however, is 
infrequent before ad 950 (Lambert 2002:224). It is 
not until ad 1200 that indications of violent human 
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interaction, including increased use of fortifications and village abandonment, 
become more prevalent in the archaeological record of North America.
Indicators of violence can also be observed on the human skeleton. Analysis 
of human remains can yield data pertaining to extrinsic factors, such as envi-
ronmental fluctuations, economic shifts, and resource instability, which may 
exacerbate violent human interaction (Walker 2001:574). In this sense, human 
skeletons often provide otherwise unobtainable information about the inter-
actions of prehistoric peoples, including hostility and warfare (Milner 1995). 
Traumatic injuries in ancient human remains also provide a direct source of 
evidence for testing theories of warfare and interpersonal aggression. The 
evaluation of skeletal evidence of violence is made difficult, however, because 
interpretation is often unreliable and violent trauma is not always easily rec-
ognized (Milner 1999; Walker 2001).
In prehistoric times, weapons were often indistinguishable from everyday 
tools (Milner 1999). Therefore, archaeologists and anthropologists are faced 
with the problem of determining what forms of skeletal trauma constitute 
intentional violence. The location of an injury may indicate its cause (Armelagos 
1977; Lahren and Berryman 1984; Lovell 1997; Merbs 1989). For example, parry 
fractures, fractures of the ulnar shaft, are frequently associated with victims of 
assault because they occur when the victim raises his or her hands in a form 
of defense (Walker 2001). Parry fractures, however, are not always defensive 
injuries, but can also result from a fall, where an individual attempts to catch 
him- or herself in making contact with the ground. Parry fractures are just one 
example of trauma that cannot be reliably distinguished as accidental or violent. 
Fortunately, traumatic mutilations, such as scalping, decapitation, and other 
trophy taking, are all manifest on skeletal remains as clearly distinguishable 
forms of intentional interpersonal violence (Walker 2001).
Scalping is one of the most reliable and most easily identified expressions 
of intergroup conflict (Olsen and Shipman 1994). Scalping is defined as “the 
forcible removal of all or part of the scalp” (Nadeau 1944:1677). Osteological 
evidence of scalping is recognized by a characteristic pattern of cut marks. 
Cuts, or clusters of cuts, typically encircle the superior and anterior portion of 
the skull (Bueschgen and Case 1996:230). Evidence of healed scalping is also 
suggested by the presence of periosteal reaction on the frontal and/or parietal 
bones from infection or by bone remodeling following the survival of a scalp-
ing (Bueschgen and Case 1996:230; Miller 1994:212; Snow 1941:55).
Because it removes only the skin of the head, scalping was not directly 
intended to take another’s life, but the practice was an act of violence that 
was most often performed upon the enemy, except in certain cases of tribal 
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ritual (Reese 1940:9). In both prehistoric and historic times, scalping by a 
Native American can be interpreted as a final insult or ultimate curse upon 
the victim ( Jacobi 2007:312). To guarantee entry into the afterlife, certain 
Native American tribes believed that an individual must be physically com-
plete, and removal of an enemy’s scalp precludes physical wholeness ( Jacobi 
2007:312). Scalping, therefore, provides a tangible token of physical and 
spiritual dominance and was rarely practiced upon members of one’s own 
society (Seeman 2007:171).
Scalping has often been claimed to be of European origin. However, while 
Europeans may have encouraged and promoted the practice, the ethnographic 
and archaeological records indicate that it was present before European arrival 
(Allen et al. 1985:23; Owsley and Berryman 1975:44; Neumann 1940:289). Early 
explorers and settlers had no preexisting words to describe the practice when 
they first encountered it among Native American tribes (Axtell and Sturtevant 
1980: 462). There was no terminology to describe scalping in English, French, 
or Spanish, so when the Native American tradition was first encountered, new 
words had to be developed or old words were used ambiguously to refer to the 
practice (Allen et al. 1985:23). There is also ample evidence in the archaeologi-
cal record of the occurrence of scalping in North America before European 
contact (Owsley and Berryman 1975:44).
The Crow Creek site offers an opportunity to study the practice of scalp-
ing. Crow Creek is the site of a prehistoric massacre in which the village was 
raided and villagers were slaughtered and placed in a mass grave (Willey 
1990; Willey and Emerson 1993). The skeletal remains of more than 486 
people were excavated from two human bone beds uncovered at the site. The 
frequency of mutilations recorded on victims of the Crow Creek massacre 
approached 100 percent (Willey 1990:151). The most prevalent manifestation 
of interpersonal violence was the presence of cuts on the frontal bones of 
victims, indicative of scalping. Altogether, more than 90 percent of the fron-
tal bones recovered from Crow Creek showed evidence of scalping (Willey 
1990:105; Willey and Emerson 1993:257).
Some authors report that there is not a significant relationship between a 
victim’s age and sex, and whether or not they were scalped (Allen et al. 1985:29). 
No man, woman, or child was spared from the scalping custom. In many cases, 
the scalps of individuals in noncombatant categories, such as women, children, 
the sick, and the elderly, were considered valuable because they provided evi-
dence that a warrior had penetrated an enemy’s defenses (Allen et al. 1985:29; 
Owsley 1994:337). Further evidence comes from the Crow Creek site, where 
the human bone bed contained equal numbers of scalped males and females. 
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It is apparent that both males and females were subject to this trophy-taking 
practice. Also, members of all adult age groups were scalped.
Upon initial inspection, the Crow Creek site does appear to corroborate pre-
vious speculation about the relationship between age, sex, and the likelihood 
of an individual being scalped. The goal of this study is to provide an in-depth 
assessment of the relationship between scalping and an individual’s sex and age.
arChaeologICal baCkground
Crow Creek offers a unique opportunity to study the scalping practice in 
great detail, as it is the site of a prehistoric massacre. The exact date of the 
Crow Creek massacre is unknown; however, dates have been posited from 
the early 1300s to the mid-1400s (Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007a; 
Willey 1990:1). At the time of the massacre, Crow Creek was raided and villag-
ers were slaughtered (Willey 1990; Willey and Emerson 1993). After a period 
of exposure above ground, the bodies of the victims were gathered and placed 
into a mass grave at the western end of an outer fortification ditch surround-
ing the Crow Creek site (Willey 1990:130). Surface exposure is suggested by 
the presence of taphonomic indicators; puncture marks and broad grooves, 
indicative of canid scavenging, are present on the remains (Willey 1990:131). 
Excavation of the outer fortification ditch revealed a mass grave containing 
the skeletal remains of at least 486 people.
Mutilations were observed on most of the skeletal remains from Crow 
Creek. Skulls and mandibles showed signs of violence, including cuts, frac-
tures, and avulsion fractures (Willey and Emerson 1993). Cuts were observed 
on arms and legs that indicated the removal of hands and feet as trophies of 
war (Willey and Emerson 1993). The most prevalent manifestation of inter-
group conflict, however, was the presence of cuts on the crania of victims 
indicative of scalping.
Scalping is most often performed during the perimortem interval, either 
at the time of death or minutes before the onset of death ( Jacobi 2007:312). 
Therefore, while it may be argued that scalping is not a direct index of inter-
personal violence, as the person is already dead in many cases, this chapter 
suggests that scalping is in fact a direct measure of brutality. Given the context 
of Crow Creek, a massacre site with a minimum of 486 people slaughtered and 
then buried in a mass grave, scalping must be considered in conjunction with 
all other evidence of violence at this location. Furthermore, two individuals at 
the Crow Creek site show evidence of healed scalping injuries, suggesting that 
scalping during the Crow Creek massacre was not a unique experience.
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MaterIals
Excavation of the Crow Creek site was performed by Larry Zimmerman 
acting as the principal investigator, Thomas Emerson as field director, and 
P. Willey and John B. Gregg acting as consulting osteologists (Willey and 
Emerson 1993). The skeletal collection was curated at the University of South 
Dakota, where data collection and skeletal analyses were performed. In May 
1979, remains were repatriated to the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and reburied in 
August 1981 (Willey 1990).
In all, this study consists of 77 aged and sexed crania excavated from the Crow 
Creek site. The dataset is composed of adult skeletal material only. The crania 
included in this study are those complete enough for an analysis of scalping 
manifestations to be performed. The author did not perform any original obser-
vations for this study because all skeletal material had been repatriated. Therefore, 
all data used in this study are drawn from the age and sex forms recorded by 
Mark Swegle in 1979 along with scalping mutilation datasheets recorded by 
P. Willey and an anonymous investigator at the University of South Dakota.
Of the 77 crania used in this study, 38 (49.4%) were male and 39 (50.6%) were 
female. No systematic bias is detected in the sample, as there are roughly equal 
numbers of male and female individuals. Of the 38 males, 7 individuals were 
classified as young adults (20–25 years), 19 as middle adults (27.5–37.5 years), 
and 12 as old adults (40+). For the 39 female crania, 12 were young adults, 20 
were middle adults, and 7 were old adults. The sample size of each age category 
was balanced because age categorization was based on an interquartile split.
Methods
This study evaluates the hypothesis that sexes, as well as members of dif-
ferent adult age groups, experienced differential treatment during the Crow 
Creek massacre. The study focuses on scalping cuts as an indicator of brutality 
against Crow Creek massacre victims. Three independent variables were used 
to indicate the level of brutality against the scalping victim: total number of 
cut marks per cranium, number of cut marks on the frontal bone, and breadth 
of cut marks across the frontal bone (this variable is based upon a measure 
of length from the most lateral extent of cuts on one side of the cranium to 
the most lateral extent of cuts on the contralateral side of the cranium). The 
study assesses whether or not there is a statistically significant difference in 
the aforementioned variables when comparing men and women and members 
of different adult age groups. All statistical analyses were performed using 
SPSS 16.0 (2007). The following statistical tests were applied to the Crow 
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Creek dataset: independent sample t-tests, ANOVA, factorial ANOVA, and 
regression and correlation analyses.
results
From the scalping datasheets, the total number of cuts could be determined 
for 70 crania. From this sample, the mean number of cuts per cranium was 
18.67, standard deviation was 19.42 cuts, and variance of total cuts was 377.27. 
The sample had a minimum of one cut mark and a maximum of 94 cut marks 
with a range of 93 cuts.
Sixty-seven crania had cut marks on the frontal. Of these 67 crania, the 
mean number of cuts on the frontal was 11.49, standard deviation was 10.29 
cuts, and the variance was 105.83. The sample had a minimum of one cut mark 
and a maximum of 43 cut marks with a range of 42 cuts.
Breadth of cuts across the frontal could be calculated for a total of 62 crania. 
Of these 62 crania, the mean breadth of cuts on the frontal was 103.90, standard 
deviation was 36.24 mm, and variance was 131.42. The minimum cut distance was 
3.40 mm and the maximum was 157.58 mm with a range of 154.18 mm.
Inferential statistical comparisons assessed whether there were differences 
between male and female victims of the Crow Creek massacre. First, inde-
pendent sample t-tests examined differences in male and female total number 
of cuts, number of cuts on the frontal, and the breadth of cuts on the fron-
tal. There was a statistically significant difference between the total number 
of cuts on male and female crania (table 13.1; t = –2.390, df = 68, p = 0.020, 
Levene’s Test assuming equal variance). The mean total number of cuts on 
female crania was nearly twice the total number of cuts on male crania.
Independent sample t-tests assessed the relationship between sex and num-
ber of cuts on the frontal and breadth of cuts on the frontal. No statistically 
significant difference between the number of cuts on the frontal bone of male 
and female victims existed (table 13.2; t = –1.189, df = 65, p = 0.239 Levene’s Test 
not assuming equal variance). There was, however, a statistically significant dif-
ference in the breadth of cuts on the frontal bone of male and female scalping 
victims (table 13.3; t = –2.382, df = 60, p = 0.020 Levene’s Test assuming equal 
variances). The mean frontal cut breadth was greater in females than males.
Inferential statistical comparisons also assessed if different adult age groups 
were subject to different scalping treatment during the Crow Creek massacre. 
To test the relationship between age groups (young adult, middle adult, and 
old adult) and number of cuts, ANOVA tests were applied. The first ANOVA 
evaluated the relationship between age and total number of cuts by cranium. 
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The test results showed no statistically significant relationship between age 
and total cuts (table 13.4; F = 1.502, df = 2,67, p = 0.230).
The second ANOVA assessed the relationship between age and number of 
cuts on the frontal. The test results showed no statistically significant relation-
ship between age and the number of cuts on the frontal bone (table 13.5; F = 
1.095, df = 2, 67, p = 0.340).
The third ANOVA assessed the relationship between age and breadth of 
cuts on the frontal. The test showed that there was a statistically significant 
relationship between age and the breadth of frontal cuts (table 13.6; F = 4.362, 
df = 2,61, p = 0.017). A post hoc Bonferroni test specified that there was a sta-
tistically significant difference in the frontal breadth between young and old 
adults (p = 0.032), and also between middle and old adults (p = 0.036). There 
was, however, no significant difference in the breadth of frontal cuts between 
individuals classified as young adults and middle adults.
The next statistical test applied to the Crow Creek database was a Factorial 
ANOVA. Factorial ANOVA simultaneously evaluated the relationship 
Table 13.1. Independent samples t-test results for total number of cuts on male and female 
crania.
Sex N x- T-Value Degrees of Freedom P-Value
Total 70 –2.390 68 0.020
Male 34 13.15
Female 36 23.89
Table 13.2. Independent samples t-test results for number of cuts on male and female 
frontals.
Sex N x- T-Value Degrees of Freedom P-Value
Total 67 –1.189 65 0.239
Male 32 9.94
Female 35 12.91
Table 13.3. Independent samples t-test results for breadth of cuts on male and female frontals.
Sex N x- T-Value Degrees of Freedom P-Value
Total 62 –2.382 60 0.020
Male 30 92.99
Female 32 114.13
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Table 13.4. ANOVA results for total number of cuts by age.
Age (years) N F P-Value
Young (20–25) 18 1.502 0.230
Middle (27.5–37.5) 34
Old (40+) 18
Table 13.5. ANOVA results for frontal cuts by age.
Age (years) N F P-Value
Young (20–25) 18 1.095 0.340
Middle (27.5–37.5) 34
Old (40+) 18
Table 13.6. ANOVA results for frontal breadth by age.
Age (years) N F P-Value
Young (20–25) 16 4.362 0.017
Middle (27.5–37.5) 30
Old (40+) 16
between the two independent variables (age and sex) and each dependent 
variable (total number of cuts, number of cuts on the frontal bone, and breadth 
of cuts on the frontal bone). The first Factorial ANOVA examined age and 
sex interaction for the total number of cuts on the cranium (table 13.7). The 
test showed that the relationship between the total number of cuts and sex 
was approaching significance (F = 3.972, p = 0.051). The difference in the total 
number of cuts among age groups (F = 0.949, p = 0.393) was not statistically 
significant and the sex and age interaction was also not statistically significant 
(F = 0.025, p = 0.975).
The second Factorial ANOVA assessed sex, age, and their interaction for the 
number of frontal cuts (table 13.8). The test showed the relationship between 
the number of cuts on the frontal of males and females is not statistically 
significant (F = 0.759, p = 0.387), no difference in the number of cuts on the 
frontal among age groups (F = 0.884, p = 0.418), and no interaction between 
age, sex, and the number of cuts on the frontal (F = 0.114, p = 0.892).
The third Factorial ANOVA assessed sex, age, and their interaction for 
the breadth of cuts on the frontal (table 13.9). The test showed a statistically 
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significant difference in the breadth of cuts on the frontal by sex (F = 5.374, 
p = 0.024), among age groups (F = 3.954, p = 0.025), and the interaction between 
sex and age (F = 3.433, p = 0.039). Test results indicated that sex differences in 
the breadth of the frontal cut depended on the age of the victim. For example, 
when comparing old adult males to old adult females, females had a longer 
breadth of cuts on the frontal than males, but when comparing young adult 
and middle adult females to young adult and middle adult males, no sig-
nificant difference in the breadth of cuts on the frontal occurred between the 
sexes (figure 13.1).
Factorial ANOVA suggested that a relationship existed between age and 
sex in relation to frontal cut breadth. Regression and correlation analysis clari-
fied this relationship. Regression and correlation analyses were performed on 
frontal cut breadth alone because this variable was the only one with a signifi-
cant interaction between age and sex, and analyses were calculated separately 
for each sex. Frontal cut breadth was the dependent variable and age was 
the independent variable. There was a moderate negative relationship between 
frontal cut breadth and age in males (table 13.10, r = –0.498, p = 0.004). This 
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Figure 13.1. Factorial ANOVA plot of age and sex by Crow Creek frontal cut breadths. 
Table 13.10. Regression and correlation of frontal breadth and age in Crow Creek massacre 
victims.
Sex R r2 P-Value Linear Regression
Male –0.498 0.248 0.004 Significant
Female 0.075 0.006 0.673 Not Significant
relationship indicated that 24.8 percent of the variability in male frontal cut 
breadths was explained by age (figure 13.2, r2 = 0.248). This relationship was 
statistically significant and the breadth of the frontal cut was influenced by the 
age of the male scalping victims.
The opposite relationship existed between frontal cut breadth and female 
age. A weak positive relationship was observed between frontal breadth and 
age in females (table 13.10, r = 0.075, p = 0.673). This relationship was not sta-
tistically significant (figure 13.3, r2 = 0.006), so the breadth of the frontal cuts 
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Figure 13.2. Scatter plot of frontal cut breadths by midpoint of age intervals for male 
Crow Creek massacre victims. 
was not explained by female age. The relationship between frontal cut breadth 
and age was only significant in male victims, and age was not related to the 
breadth of the frontal cut in female victims of the Crow Creek massacre.
Summary
The findings presented in this section suggested that statistically significant 
relationships did exist between the total number of cuts on male and female 
crania, and age and breadth of the frontal cuts. Factorial ANOVA results indi-
cated the interaction between age and sex by frontal cut breadth was signifi-
cant (p = 0.039), and from this test result it was determined that sex differences 
in the breadth of cuts on the frontal were affected by the age of the victim. 
Regression and correlation were performed on the frontal cut breadth to 
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clarify the relationship between sex and age, and it was determined that there 
was a moderate negative relationship between frontal cut breadth and age in 
males, and a non-significant relationship between frontal cut breadth and age 
in females. The implications of these results are discussed and explained in the 
following section.
dIsCussIon
Although there was not a statistically significant difference in the number 
of cuts on the frontal of males and females, a statistically significant difference 
in the total number of cuts and breadth of cuts on male and female crania did 
Figure 13.3. Scatter plot of frontal cut breadths by midpoint of age intervals for female 
Crow Creek massacre victims. 
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occur. There are five possible explanations for the differences observed in the 
total number of cuts and breadth of frontal cuts on male and female victims of 
the Crow Creek massacre.
The first explanation for female crania having a higher number and breadth 
of cuts was that female scalping victims experienced higher levels of brutality 
during the Crow Creek massacre. Historically, gender appears to have been 
an important organizing principle in the social stratification of early Arikara 
societies (Hollimon 2000:27). According to the ethnographic literature, sta-
tus-climbing in protohistoric Arikara societies was observed primarily among 
male members of the community (Holder 1958:214). This social climbing was 
most often achieved by way of the war hierarchy or through a series of near-
sacred associations and secular fraternities (Holder 1958:214). The highest-
ranking male acted as the war chief of the community (Holder 1958:215). While 
social climbing was predominantly achieved by males elevating themselves 
through the war hierarchy, Arikara village life was constructed on a series 
of age-grade societies through which both men and women passed (Peters 
1981:49). Age-grade societies were composed of members of the same sex and 
relative age (Peters 1981:49). Social-climbing, therefore, was also achieved by 
Arikara women.
Social stratification in Arikara societies was similarly recognized in the 
division of labor, which was documented in the ethnographic, linguistic, and 
archaeological record. The ethnographic record describes social stratification 
in Arikara myths as a gender-based division of labor (Gilmore 1933:74–75). 
Anthropological studies have also examined Arikara social structure reflected 
in material culture, mortuary practices, and skeletal biology (Hollimon 
2000:27). Men were depicted in the ethnographic literature as smokers and 
gamblers with a rampant distaste for physical labor (Hollimon 2000:27). In 
contrast, numerous references indicated that women led extremely diffi-
cult lives, filled with hardship, privation, and backbreaking labor (Hollimon 
2000:27). Authors, such as Boller, De Land, and de Trobriand, referred to 
Arikara women as beasts of burden, as they served the function of laborer 
in early Arikara society (Hollimon 2000:27). Historic accounts of Europeans 
reported that women were old beyond their years from working in the corn-
fields, carrying heavy loads, procuring and preparing food, and bearing and 
caring for children. These normative gender roles were most likely observable 
in other areas of the archaeological record, such as in the dehumanization and 
brutalization of women in times of war.
The intensity of trophy-taking, including scalping, can be related to the 
dehumanization of one’s victim (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 2007:37). 
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According to ethnographic references to gender roles in Arikara communities 
during the early Historic period, women were viewed as lesser members of 
society. As lesser members of society, women would have been further dehu-
manized by their attackers, and their death and mutilation would have been 
more likely to mimic the pattern of an animal being slaughtered than the 
conquering of an enemy warrior. The slaughtering of devalued female victims 
may be hypothesized to be more representative of a butchering than a ritual 
practice, leaving female scalping victims with a significantly greater number 
of cut marks than male scalping victims. While evidence for status differentia-
tion within Arikara society was derived from ethnographic accounts during 
the Historic period, this pattern could be projected into the prehistoric past 
to gain insight into the social interactions of earlier societies (Holder 1958:213).
The second explanation for females having a higher number of total cuts 
and a greater breadth of cuts across the frontal was that the attacker was able 
to perform the task unhurriedly on female victims (Bridges 1996:71). If there 
was no danger of retaliation by an opposing warrior, the scalper was able to 
complete the task in a more thorough manner (Bridges 1996:71). A greater 
number of cuts signified that the attacker had more time to perform the scalp-
ing and was not forced to tear the skin from the bone and risk ripping the 
scalp, but instead had time to cut the scalp from the bone (Bridges 1996:72). 
Fear of immediate retaliation would most likely arise when a warrior was in 
hand-to-hand combat with a fellow warrior. Most warriors were male and 
when scalping a male victim, the attacker was often in close proximity to other 
vital enemy warriors (Bridges et al. 2000:56). With other warriors in close 
proximity, the threat of being attacked was greater and the scalper was rushed 
in the task of obtaining his trophy of war.
In contrast, when an attacker was scalping a female victim, the attacker was 
likely to have already penetrated the defensive forces surrounding the village 
and disabled defending males (Bridges 1996:72). Therefore, the attacker almost 
certainly had more time to scalp his victim because villagers would tend to 
be females and children. With sufficient time to perform the scalping, the 
attacker took time to obtain a larger piece of the enemy’s scalp, making more 
cuts on the victim’s cranium instead of rushing and tearing the scalp from the 
bone (Bridges et al. 2000:71). In a similar vein, it is also plausible that the dif-
ference in the total number of cuts observed on males and females is a measure 
of the experience of the person performing the scalping. If women or elderly 
members of the population were more likely to be captured than a young, 
agile warrior, it is possible that only inexperienced warriors were capturing 
this particular subset of the population. An inexperienced warrior may leave 
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more cut marks on the female crania than would an experienced scalper who 
was performing the act on another male warrior. Therefore, the difference in 
the total number of cuts represented on each of the sexes would simply be a 
reflection of the level of experience of the individual performing the scalping.
The third explanation for a greater number and breadth of cuts on female 
crania was that female scalps were more valuable, and more time was spent 
removing a larger piece of scalp from female victims (Bridges 1996:72). 
Historically, men gained honor and prestige by killing not only their male 
enemy, but also their enemy’s wives and children. In some ways, the humilia-
tion and killing of another man’s close relatives, such as his wife or daughter, 
conferred a higher status upon the attacker than killing the warrior himself 
(Bridges 1996:72). Greater honor was associated with sneaking into an enemy 
village. Infiltration of an enemy village required greater bravery on the part of 
the warrior than killing an enemy warrior on the battlefield. When women 
and children were killed, the victor’s actions were often based on the concepts 
of social substitution and collective liability (Kelly 2000:5). The concept of 
social substitution was based on the principle that an individual’s murder was 
perceived as an injury to his or her group. Therefore, the murder of any group 
member was substitutable for another (Kelly 2000:5).
Similarly, it has been suggested that women and children were scalped for 
the trophy itself and death of the victim was only a secondary motive behind 
the attack (Bridges 1996:72). Scalping victims in prehistory included children 
and adults of both sexes, supporting the inference that warriors and war par-
ties acted on the principles of social substitution (Kelly 2000:5).
The fourth explanation for the greater total number of cuts and breadth 
of cut marks across the frontal on female crania contradicts the hypotheses 
previously presented in this study and claims that females were highly valued 
members of Arikara society. It has been suggested that the few European and 
American accounts of early Historic-period Arikara societies represent biased 
views of women (Sundstrom 2015). As stated previously, the ethnographic lit-
erature reports that women were viewed as beasts of burden, and served the 
function of laborer (Hollimon 2000:27). However, there is ample evidence 
in the literature that Arikara societies were matrifocal and the importance 
of women in these societies is evident in every major aspect of village life, 
including hunting, warfare, and religion (Peters 1981:158; Sundstrom 2015). 
While social prestige and economic status depended on the reputation of the 
husband as a warrior, men and women in early Arikara society understood 
that the husband ascended and remained in good social circumstances only 
if the wife did her part (Peters 1981:86). Authors have suggested that the 
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misconception in early European and American accounts of Arikara women 
were based on preconceived notions of leadership and a misunderstanding of 
Native American culture (Peters 1981:63). Therefore, it is possible that females 
experienced higher levels of brutality than males during the Crow Creek 
massacre because they were recognized as the more valuable members of pre-
historic Arikara society.
The final explanation for the greater number of cut marks on female cra-
nia was hairstyle. Some prehistoric Native American warriors wore their 
hair in a scalplock, a braid or lock of hair on the crown of the head ( Jacobi 
2007:314–315). In war, the scalplock taunted other warriors. At a number of 
prehistoric sites, male scalping victims show the oval/circular defect associ-
ated with scalping located on the most superior portion of the skull. This 
defect was hypothesized to represent the removal of the scalplock, rather 
than the entire scalp ( Jacobi 2007:314–315). Scalping defects created by the 
removal of the scalplock, rather than the entire scalp, began higher on the 
frontal, closer to bregma ( Jacobi 2007:314). The hairstyle explanation could 
not be adequately explored in this study. The exact location of cuts could not 
be determined from the scalping data recorded in 1979. However, it could 
be concluded that if only male scalplocks were removed at the Crow Creek 
site, the size of the scalp should be smaller among male victims. A smaller 
piece of scalp would require the attacker to make fewer cuts. If the exact 
location could be determined, it might have been possible to determine 
whether hairstyle caused the difference in number of cuts observed on male 
and female victims.
While a greater number of cuts were observed on female crania, the breadth 
of cuts across the frontal appears to have been influenced by age in male scalp-
ing victims only. According to regression and correlation analyses, a negative 
relationship between frontal cut breadth and age occurred in males (table 13.10, 
r = –0.498, p = 0.004). This relationship indicated that 24.8 percent of the vari-
ability in frontal cut breadths in males was explained by age (figure 13.2, r2 = 
0.248). These results could be explained by the fact that warfare was primarily 
a male activity (Walker 2001). Because warriors were typically young males, a 
distinction was made between age groups for men; warrior scalps would have 
been considered more valuable than the scalps of older males. This hypothesis 
finds support in ethnographic references to male warriors in the early Historic 
period. Because the life expectancy during the Prehistoric period was probably 
much shorter than the life expectancy observed in modern Arikara, male war-
riors were most likely young adults and possibly middle-aged adults (20–25 
and 27.5–37.5 years, respectively). Because scalp-taking indicated bravery and 
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prowess in battle, a higher value would be placed upon the scalp of a young, 
virile individual than the scalp of an older victim.
Contrasted with male results, regression and correlation analyses performed 
on female scalping victims yielded different results. Because the acquisition of a 
scalp indicated bravery and prowess in battle, no distinction was made between 
females of different ages, as neither young nor old adult females were typically 
participating in battle. Therefore, removal of the scalp from female members 
of different age groups would not be an indication of greater war prowess. The 
relationship between female age and frontal cut breadth was not significant.
ConClusIon
The Crow Creek site is “arguably the most famous archaeological site on 
the Northern Plains” (Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry 2007a:153). The site 
has played a major role in the reconstruction of Native American history, par-
ticularly historic violence on the Plains (Willey 1990). Crow Creek is unusual 
because it offers an extremely rare opportunity to study the skeletal remains 
of a population at a particular point in time: namely, the time of the massacre 
(Zimmerman and Alex 1981:26).
Mutilations were observed on many of the skeletal remains recovered from 
the human bone bed at Crow Creek. Skulls and mandibles showed signs of 
violence, including cuts, blunt-force trauma, and fractures (Willey 1990:95–
105). Scalping was examined in this study for three reasons. First, scalping is 
the most easily recognizable expression of intergroup violence. Second, over 
90 percent of the crania from Crow Creek showed evidence of scalping. Third, 
equal numbers of male and female skulls showed evidence of scalping. Because 
of the large sample of both male and female scalping victims, the Crow Creek 
site provides an opportunity to analyze whether or not there was a relation-
ship between an individual’s sex and/or age and scalping practices.
The following statistically significant results were found. There was a differ-
ence between the total number of cuts on male and female crania. The total 
number of cuts on female crania was greater than the total number of cuts 
on male crania. There was a statistically significant relationship between the 
three age groups and the breadth of frontal cuts. A post hoc test indicated 
that the difference in breadth of cuts between young adults (20–25 years) and 
old adults (40+) approached significance. Regression and correlation analyses 
were performed separately for each sex and distance of cuts across the frontal. 
Differences among age groups and breadth of the frontal cut were observed 
only in male scalping victims.
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In conclusion, the Crow Creek bone bed represents one of the largest 
skeletal massacre series ever recovered. The importance of the Crow Creek 
skeletons is indisputable and the site has played a major role in understand-
ing Native American life in prehistory. Crow Creek is important for studying 
not only warfare, but also prehistoric social relations and gender roles in war. 
Although the remains have been repatriated, the caliber and quantity of data 
recorded following the bone bed’s excavation hold potential for future studies 




Conceptual Tools for 
Interpreting Archaeological 
Reflections of the North Platte 




War is a significant human activity. It molds the lives 
of individuals and communities. It impacted human 
affairs and has unquestionably shaped human history. 
It is also associated with distinctive material culture 
that easily attracts the attention of modern audi-
ences. Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that 
warfare and conflict have emerged in recent years 
as a focus of modern archaeological research (Scott 
and McFeaters 2011). But the archaeological study of 
warfare is not easy. Whether it occurs in the North 
American Great Plains or anywhere else, war is com-
plex. It involves the actions of individuals who use 
weapons and training to engage in combat with oth-
ers. Combatants always draw on the knowledge and 
resources of others. They usually operate in groups 
and use cooperation and organization to amplify indi-
vidual efforts. Such martial groups leave their traces 
in distributions that reflect their organization and 
patterned practice. They may operate from specially 
prepared facilities or in open country. In either case, 
those contexts influence their actions. Their activities 
are marked by distinctive assemblages that include 
intentionally assembled arsenals. Such traces are to 
be seen where combat occurred, but they are more 
widely distributed because they take preparation and 
investment that has to begin before combat. At the 
highest level, war is also guided by broadly shared 
objectives that transcend individual goals. Laying the 
groundwork for war, undertaking the training, the 
CONTEXTS FOR CONFLICT 337
arming, and the organization it requires, and deciding how to proceed are all 
societal undertakings.
Archaeologists see war at all of these scales and a synthetic understand-
ing of war requires that they all be investigated. But because they manifest 
themselves in very different kinds of materials records, the scale differences 
at which war operates present archaeologists with technical and interpretive 
challenges. To help archaeologists recognize combat and interpret evidence 
of the diverse activities that contribute to warfare, we (Bleed and Scott 2011) 
drew on modern military doctrine to develop a conceptual model that archae-
ologists can use to organize and interpret the warfare’s material record. The 
goal of this chapter is to present that model to Plains archaeologists and to 
encourage the conceptual investigation of warfare and conflict on the Plains. 
War certainly had major impacts on the history and distribution of communi-
ties of the Great Plains. The Plains also present a rich body of information 
that illustrates how battlefield behavior observed in archaeological assem-
blages can be interpreted at higher social and political levels. In this as in so 
many other areas, the Great Plains provide a stimulating context for broad 
anthropological investigation.
battles of the north Platte CaMPaIgn
Fighting in the North Platte valley in 1865 followed the November 29, 1864, 
destruction of Black Kettle’s village of Cheyenne (McDermott 1996, 2003; 
Greene and Scott 2004) by a regiment of Colorado Volunteers. In the wake of 
that assault, a large community of Cheyenne, Lakota, and Arapaho coalesced 
and moved toward the security of the isolated Sandhills and the Black 
Hills. With limited opposition, this group attacked Julesburg, Colorado, and 
ranches and other facilities to avenge the massacre and to gather resources. 
The mobile community numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. They reached the 
North Platte in early February, 1865, with a substantial store of captured arms 
and resources. By no later than February 5, they established a camp at the 
headwaters of the spring-fed Rush Creek, now known Cedar Creek. For a 
couple of days the Rush Creek camp appears to have been the operational 
base from which fighters attacked Mud Springs, a telegraph station and 
watering stop some eight miles to the east. The small US volunteer military 
force at Mud Springs grew as units arrived from Fort Mitchell (Nebraska) 
and Fort Laramie (Wyoming). By February 8 Indian warriors broke off their 
attack and the Native community left their secure camp to continue a north-
ward journey. On February 8 and 9, warriors covering their community’s 
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move north met US volunteer troops who had moved on from Mud Springs. 
This engagement, where Rush Creek meets the North Platte, has come to be 
called the Battle of Rush Creek (figure 14.1).
Published results of archaeological investigations at both Mud Springs 
(Bleed and Scott 2009) and Rush Creek (Scott et al. 2011) need only to be 
summarized here to show that although these engagement involved the same 
forces and were separated by only a short distance and a mere few days, they 
offer very different archaeological appearances.
The Mud Springs Station presented Cheyenne warriors with an attrac-
tive target. On February 4, 1865, it was occupied by nine troopers from the 
Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, telegrapher Richard Ellsworth, and four 
civilian cowboys ensconced in a log structure built between a hill and the low 
ground of a spring. Their corral was full of horses and cattle. Indian fighters 
were well armed and from the outset there was considerable shooting. The 
station defenders shot from loopholes made in the station wall but Indian 
fighters were able to use the terrain to approach their position. Early in the 
fight, the defenders loosed their stock, hoping that would redirect the atten-
tion of the Indian attackers. This plan worked. When the corralled stock was 
free, most Indian attackers left the station in a melee aimed at capturing 
horses and cattle. Relief forces, composed of elements of the Eleventh Ohio 
Volunteer Cavalry and Seventh Iowa Volunteer Cavalry, arrived on February 
5, first from the short-lived base known as Fort Mitchell and a few hours 
latter from Fort Laramie. By the 6th more than 200 troopers were holed 
Figure 14.1. Overland trails and military posts along the trail in 1865. Map by the authors. 
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up in and around the station. Initially, the two sides engaged in essentially 
individual contests between fighters who crept close and shot at one another 
in “bo-peep” fighting, springing up for a quick shot before quickly retreating. 
The two sides were within 100 yards of one another and fought over the same 
ground. After US forces charged and secured the hill south of the station, 
they excavated a rifle pit that gave them a broad view of the approach to the 
surrounding area.
Archaeological residues of the Mud Springs fight were recovered in 2006 
by systematic metal detection along with individual discoveries recorded with 
GPS technology. The battlefield has been frequently visited by relic collec-
tors, but the 1865 fight was reflected by an assemblage of some 34 cartridges, 
cases, and bullets from seven different gun types, indicating both Indian and 
volunteer actions. These materials were found near the station and intermixed 
on and around the hill to its south, reflecting the fact that the two sides had 
crossed back and forth across the same ground.
The cavalry column that moved out of Mud Springs on February 8 included 
some 180 mounted soldiers, several wagons, and a single 12-pounder moun-
tain howitzer. They located the abandoned site of the Rush Creek camp 
and followed the trail of the Indian community toward the north. As they 
approached the North Platte, warriors from the Indian party, which had 
been temporarily halted on the north side of the river, crossed the frozen 
surface and the battle was begun.
Historic accounts suggest that the two sides exchanged gunfire until late on 
the ninth of February, but archaeological evidence indicates that the two sides 
were not closely engaged. In fact, recovered materials, including 136 cartridges, 
cases, and bullets, as well as evidence of at least two cannon shots, indicate that 
the two sides held positions that were largely stationary and separated from 
one another, although not completely fixed. For most of the conflict the sides 
maintained a healthy distance, ranging from 200 to 1,000 m. The fight ended 
when Indian fighters disengaged and rejoined their home community on the 
north side of the river and the troopers took the opportunity to march back 
to their home bases.
Mud Springs and Rush Creek illustrate the potential of modern battlefield 
archaeology to expose the details of past conflicts. We know that they, as his-
toric events, were closely related. That information is supported by the archae-
ological observation of cartridge cases from the two battle sites that were fired 
by the same three Spencer rifles and Ballard carbines. Archaeological distribu-
tions at the two battle sites, however, show that they were fought very differ-
ently. The challenge they present is explaining their differences.
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leVels of War
In the Plains as in other regions of the world conflict archaeologists have 
been drawn to both “battlefields” and other facilities that appear have been 
shaped by martial activities. Fortified communities and historical “forts,” 
bases, and depots fall into these categories. At these sites, conflict archaeolo-
gists have developed techniques and methods to address how combat occurs. 
Archaeological consideration of the organization and management of war 
is beginning to be investigated, but using archaeology to assess contextual 
aspects of conflict and warfare are challenging, since their link to material 
evidence is at best indirect. Beyond that, archaeologists have not yet developed 
a refined vocabulary or conceptual inventory for the synthetic study of warfare.
By contrast, military leaders have carefully conceptualized the range of 
actions involved in undertaking combat. Military science, the discipline devel-
oped to guide military conduct, rests on long history and has deep intellec-
tual roots. The rich and complex literature on military operations certainly 
should not be used simplistically, but concepts and terms army theoreticians 
have developed to prepare for and conduct military operations are applicable 
to archaeological analysis of battlefields and other military sites. The US Army 
maintains a regular series of training publications designed to make the con-
ceptual basis of military activities available to new personnel. These publica-
tions describe the range of actions involved in preparing for and conducting 
combat in clearly defined, concrete terms. Since they are intended to guide the 
planning and execution of military activities, these manuals treat combat at all 
levels, from the specifics of individual and small-group actions to the general 
formation of military policy. They offer clear conceptualization of the range of 
activities involved in organizing and conducting combat. Since they treat both 
concrete realities and conceptual constructs, these manuals can address observ-
able features and support inferential interpretations of archaeological materials.
Levels of War: Strategy, Operations, and Tactics
As laid out in Field Manual FM 3-0, Operations (Department of Army, 
February 2008), any action undertaken in support of a military mission can 
be described as an “operation.” Obviously, this is a generic term. To help 
commanders visualize the wide range of operations involved in the military 
mission, current doctrine presents war in terms of three levels: the strategic, 
operational, and tactical. To emphasize that military actions are interconnected, 
FM 3-0 presents these levels and the range of activities undertaken by the mil-
itary as tiers in a graphic model composed of three hierarchical layers (figure 
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14.2).This arrangement emphasizes the conceptual relationship of the range of 
activities undertaken by the military, but differentiates actions by their contri-
bution to achieving objectives.
The Strategic Level
“Strategy” refers to prudently developed ideas for using power to achieve 
communal objectives. In military terms, the highest strategic level is formed 
when political groups determine objectives and develop plans for employing 
the power available to them to achieve those objectives. Drawing on those 
ideas as policy, military leaders develop strategic plans for military actions in 
general and, with specific adjustments, and to operations in specific times and 
places. In scale, then, strategy ranges continuously from the lofty goals and 
intentions to regionally bounded applications of those same objectives.
Figure 14.2. Levels of War model adapted from US Army Field 
Manual (FM) 3-0. Authors’ redrawing. 
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The Operational Level
Turning strategic policy into specific action is the operational level of war. 
This is the sphere of conceptual and practical work, where field activities are 
planned, conducted, and sustained. It is directly relevant to archaeological 
investigations because activities at this level are bound to specific times and 
spaces. Many of the terms and concepts developed to address those temporal 
and regional frames have potential archaeological applications.
The Tactical Level
Tactics are the employment of force in combat and the tactical level of war 
is the realm of direct, close fighting. This level of war deals with how opposing 
forces use the resources, information, and locations available to them to defeat 
or destroy their enemies.
The resources of modern armies are vastly different from those of past mili-
tary forces, but the issues identified by the Levels of War model are general. 
Since they are at least implicitly part of all conflict, sensitive assessment of 
historical, ethnographic, and archaeological sources should bring them into 
focus. Doing so allows the residues of tactical actions to be viewed in opera-
tional and strategic terms.
leVels of War aMong the Cheyenne and allIed trIbes
Warfare and military traditions of Plains Indian culture have been carefully 
recorded and much discussed (Secoy 1953; Smith 1938, Grinnell 1910, 1956; 
Mishkin 1940; McGinnis 1990; McDermott 2003) because they were histori-
cally and culturally very important. In fact, a Levels of War model is rather 
easy to develop for Plains tribes and is interesting because it shows that mili-
tary strategy and operational organization served as basic structural principles 
for these groups.
Unlike village-based agricultural tribes, the Cheyenne, Lakota, Arapaho, 
and related societies depended on mobility to hunt buffalo, trade, and make 
use of other widely distributed resources. Mobility, which was an essential 
pattern of life for groups like the Cheyenne, gave operation support to security, 
since communities had the wherewithal to move in directions and to areas 
that were removed from conflict. Their “home stations” were tent camps that 
could move and reorganize themselves in various forms and sizes throughout 
the year. A well-positioned camp would be set up to be secure. Its exposures 
and resources could be assessed so that threats could be understood. An orga-
nized security perimeter would also be a standard feature so a well-established 
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camp was hardly a precarious target. Still, security had to be a major goal for 
the Cheyenne and related Plains tribes, and serving as security for wives, fami-
lies, and communities was a central value for warriors.
Most of the combat involved raids conducted by small groups intent on steal-
ing horses, taking trophies, or revenging a previous affront such as the killing 
of a friend or kinsman. Even such small engagements could be very costly, not 
to mention lethal. They would be particularly threatening to mobile hunting 
groups like the Cheyenne, who spent much of the year in small, isolated units.
In traditional Cheyenne society, military prowess was the primary source 
of male achievement. Personal valor, energy, and boldness were the basis of 
social standing so that combat offered men opportunities to demonstrate or 
gain recognition. For that reason, individual gallantry that could be observed 
and socially celebrated in the retelling of war-honor events was a major basis 
for Plains Indian warfare. Trophies such as stolen horses, scalps, or captured 
weapons offered particularly strong demonstration of valor and ability. They 
also, of course, carried practical value. Dramatic individual action was, itself, 
a desirable military goal for Plains Native societies. Valor could be a strategy, 
but it would be wrong to assume that Plains warfare was foolhardy or care-
less. Traditionally, raiding parties that lost a member could not return home 
as victors, even if they had gained honors and booty. Suicidal fighting became 
a feature of some Plains groups such as a Cheyenne Dog Soldier Society, but 
it was a late development and a feature of the extremes that developed late in 
the Indian Wars (figure 14.3).
Beyond the search for individual valor and boldness, Cheyenne social orga-
nization provided strong and certain support for military operations. The tribe 
was identified and unified by language and a core of religious beliefs and prac-
tices, but practically residential groups were loosely organized and fluid. The 
major institutions that bound the tribe together socially were six prominent 
military societies. As organized groups, these societies were called on to serve 
a variety of social functions. Since they maintained their own discipline and 
internal hierarchy, members of military societies could organize activities and 
enforce either secular or spiritual affairs. Their social assignments meant that 
societies were quite used to dealing with a range of activities and “operations” 
in the strict military definition of that term. Raiding, intelligence, scouting, 
communications, and picket actions were all activities that members of war-
rior societies were used to undertaking in the normal course of the mobile 
Plains lifestyle. All of these actions were easily applied in combat situations.
Practically, the societies were groups of men organized for military opera-
tions. They recruited energetic, fearless young men from across the tribe 
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Figure 14.3. Levels of War model presenting strategic goals, 
operational objectives, and tactics for the Cheyenne in 1865. Authors’ 
original. 
and provided them with operational support. Through mock battles, small 
raids, other organized actions like target practice and regular recounting of 
laudable battle exploits, societies trained young warriors. They also placed 
them in a hierarchy of respect and responsibility through which a man 
could mature. By providing means for identifying skilled leaders at various 
levels, societies could organize either very small actions—raids or scouting 
expeditions—or large military undertakings like frontal attacks or strategic 
withdrawal. Composed of groups of men who knew one another well and 
were used to operating together, military societies supported small-group 
cohesion during raids and tactical engagements. By carefully maintaining 
residual alliances with other societies, members of military societies could 
rapidly coalesce into groups that could undertake large cooperative actions. 
The hierarchy within societies provided an equivalent to the modern military 
in structure for staff function and disciplined action. Once tribal leaders had 
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assigned a task, or key society members had accepted a responsibility, societ-
ies provided clear means for disseminating information. Individual mem-
bers could be sanctioned, even seriously disciplined, if they did not follow 
the orders of established society leaders. This let the community as a whole 
expect that plans would be carried out. Finally, men’s societies provided 
logistical support for warfare. Society members wore distinctive devices and 
heraldry that could support tactical activities. They also provided networks 
within which arms could be shared and rationally distributed among men 
of different abilities and social standing. Sharing a captured weapon was an 
important means of establishing a close relationship. In all of these senses, 
then, Plains tribes had strategic and operations organizations that guided 
their combat.
Tactically, Plains Indian warriors usually functioned as light cavalry. Virtu-
ally all men could ride well and were expert in archery and the use of other 
close-combat weapons like the lance or club. But demonstration of combat 
valor did not, however, require lethal force. Touching an enemy could count 
as a significant achievement. Such tactics favored individual charge and other 
small-group engagements. By the 1860s, however, firearms were common and 
familiar to Plains warriors (Secoy 1953:66ff ). When they arrived in the North 
Platte valley, the Cheyenne and their allies were very well armed with both 
traditional weapons and breech- and muzzle-loading guns. Guns had been 
obtained through trade (Halaas and Masich 2004:162) and captured in attacks 
on Julesburg, Colorado, in January 1865 and in raids on civilian and military 
posts as the Cheyenne moved north from Sand Creek (Grinnell 1956:174ff ). 
Modern firearms made the Plains warriors truly formidable and changed 
their military tactics. Guns allowed for effective ambushing and long-distance 
fusillades. They did not prevent the individual engagements of traditional 
combat, the valiant charges and daring presentations, but they had two other 
impacts (Secoy 1953:68). First, they encouraged warriors to work most closely 
with their terrain and the defensive potential it provided. In place of frontal 
attack in open country, warriors with guns preferred to attack from terrain that 
allowed safer approaches. Second, where traditional “shock” weapons favored 
fighting either individually or in small-group formations, warriors with guns 
found success in larger, scattered formations.
leVels of War for the CIVIl War frontIer arMy
During the Civil War, the western frontier was a minor arena. Forces 
assigned to the frontier were guided by ideas that were not well formed. Still, 
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the strategic, operational, and tactical activities of the Civil War Army can be 
reconstructed (figure 14.4).
The Army posted units between Omaha and Denver, and Omaha and 
Washington state, who were there to keep peace and prevent “depredations.” 
One strategy for dealing with Indian conflict involved establishing, enforc-
ing, or renegotiating treaties with Native groups. The Army supported these 
negotiations by either offering security to Indian Agents or by having Army 
officers take part in the discussions.
As a more direct means of preventing conflict with Indian communities, the 
Army also developed a number of bases on the western frontier during the 
Civil War. These included existing bases, like Fort Laramie and Fort Kearney, 
and relatively smaller new posts, like Fort Mitchell, Cottonwood (later Fort 
McPherson), and Alkali Station (Barnes 2008; Hart 1967). Whatever their 
origins, during the war, these posts served as “home stations” where troops 
could be based, horses provisioned, and supplies maintained. They ensured an 
Army presence on the frontier and were set up to allow military forces to be 
deployed as needed on short notice. Their distribution was intended to allow 
forces to arrive quickly at any scene of trouble.
In addition to keeping the peace generally and “preventing depredations,” 
the Army carried the special charge of ensuring communication across the 
Plains. Immigration across the Plains continued throughout the war. The 
eastern foothills of the Rockies were a focus of settlement at this time and 
there was growing interest in mining in Colorado and Montana. Denver was 
a rising urban center that needed to be supplied. All of these developments 
created traffic along the network of trails that formed the “Great Platte River 
Road.” Mail that was vital to the US national interest also flowed up and down 
the road. By 1862 telegraph lines, supported by regularly placed relay stations, 
replaced the Pony Express system. Maintaining this communication net and 
ensuring the uninterrupted flow of people, supplies, and information was the 
special responsibility of the frontier Army (McChristian 2009:127–135).
Addressing these strategic goals in the West carried distinctive operational 
constraints for the frontier Army. The Army was supported by a series of posts 
that served as home stations. Some of these antedated the war and some 
survived into the Indian Wars era. Operationally, wartime Army posts had 
rather narrow goals, since they were less involved in regional administration, 
training, or logistics than home bases were to become during the postwar 
period. Major bases such as Fort Laramie did, however, serve as intelligence-
gathering centers, since they tended to offer residual points of contact between 
the Army and Native groups. Indian communities nucleated around major 
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bases because they afforded security and access to goods (McChristian 2009). 
Sensitive archaeological investigation should recognize a distinctive signature 
for this strategic focus.
In addition to posts that served as home stations, the Army also stationed 
very small groups of soldiers for very short periods at facilities that required 
special security. These included telegraph stations where groups of 5–10 sol-
diers could be stationed either alone or in company with civilians. Such sta-
tions functioned as “force projection bases.” Most could be temporary and it 
appears that none of them was constructed by the Army.
Even with a network of dispersed posts and stations, the huge area served by 
the frontier Army made mobility a priority. The frontier Army was composed 
overwhelmingly of cavalry units, essentially all of them formed as volunteer 
regiments. In theory, a cavalry regiment was composed of 10 companies of up 
to 80 men each. That organization could afford considerable flexibility. In the 
east, companies could be amalgamated into squadrons or battalions. Certainly 
Figure 14.4. A Levels of War model presenting strategic goals, 
operational objectives, and tactics for the Frontier US Army in 1865. 
Authors’ original. 
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cavalry officers knew how to organize and manage multicompany groups, 
but on the broad Plains of the frontier, regimental organization allowed for 
smaller units to be formed. Few bases housed more than two companies and 
many small posts were home to a single or even a partial company. Whatever 
their size, cavalry units were permanently stationed at a base so that their 
mounts were stabled or held in corrals, fed on forage and grain, and generally 
well maintained. For that reason, when a crisis occurred up or down the trail, 
a cavalry unit could respond quickly and with vigor by going on “detached 
service.” Cavalry men were trained to ride intensively, but as organized units 
so that they could arrive fit and prepared for action. They were equipped to 
operate for several days without resupply. Cavalry horses were stressed when 
they had to survive on wild feed. Thus in addition to provisions and ammuni-
tions carried by individual troopers, a unit on detached service had to travel 
with pack horses or more likely wagons carrying additional food and ammu-
nition and stock forage. With that much capacity, the traveling kit could also 
include such bivouac equipment as axes, shovels, and ropes that might be 
needed along the way or at an engagement.
The array of arms carried by Western cavalrymen was diverse, but by 1865 
most cavalry units had been equipped with revolvers and breech-loading long 
arms, including even modern seven-shot Spencers. Cavalry units could also 
travel with 12-pounder mountain howitzers. These small, brass-barreled weap-
ons could be either drawn by a team or packed on two or three horses. The 
cannons traveled with an ammunition chest or limber of case shot, shell, and 
canister rounds. Following the recommendations of the 1861 cavalry manual 
of Philip Cooke, Western cavalry units traveled in a single rank with each 
mounted rider or horse occupying at least 20 feet (Cooke 2004; Griffith 
1986:42, 1989). In gross terms, then, a moving single company could be about 
one-fifth of a mile long. Standard procedure also called for a scouting party 
to ride ahead of the main force and for flankers to be in positions of up to a 
quarter mile from either side of the column. A cavalry column on detached 
service was, in other words, a large undertaking.
Tactically, American cavalry units made use of their mobility to move toward 
engagement, but they usually fought on foot. That is they usually functioned 
as “mounted infantry” or “foot cavalry” (Griffith 1989:184ff; 1986:42). Mounted 
charges were part of the Civil War–era cavalry tactical repertoire, but even in 
eastern campaigns, mounted charges were used very selectively. Instead, once 
a cavalry detachment arrived at an operational area, they usually dismounted 
and engaged the enemy on foot. Once on foot, cavalrymen might assault 
an enemy, firing as they did (Griffith 1986:42). Alternatively, a dismounted 
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cavalry unit might begin an engagement by establishing a defensive position. 
This seems to have been an especially common tactic on the frontier where 
small, outnumbered units patrolled huge areas with incomplete intelligence. 
Making effective use of artillery required, if not a defensive posture, at least 
creation of a fixed position. Since bivouac equipment was carried by units on 
detached service, it would be easy to prepare a defensive position with simple 
earthworks or other constructions. Whichever tactic a cavalry unit adopted, 
dismounting meant that one rider in four had to be detailed as a horse holder. 
Together with wagon crews and others detailed to managing stock, something 
like a quarter of a cavalry detachment would not be available for combat.
Archaeological Consideration of Tactics, 
Operations, and Strategy
The fights at Mud Springs and Rush Creek present different archaeologi-
cal appearances even though they happened within days of one another and 
involved the same individuals and groups. The differences between these two 
battles should not, perhaps, be surprising. As a complex phenomenon, combat 
can be expected to involve differences. Both Cheyenne warriors and the Civil 
War cavalrymen had diverse military skills and the ability to adjust and inno-
vate. Still, expecting diversity does not explain the observed differences. Viewing 
the archaeological differences apparent at these battles in terms of the strategic, 
operational, and tactical issues exposed by the Levels of War model, however, 
offers a context for assessing the differences of these two battle records. It offers 
a means of linking the material evidence of battle to higher levels of war.
From the Cheyenne perspectives, Mud Springs presented a positive strate-
gic opportunity. With their home community well provided for and securely 
ensconced away from threat, Mud Springs could be a fight that offered oppor-
tunities for valorous display and attractive booty shown in the archaeologi-
cal record as artifact distributions (figure 14.5). The warriors’ material culture, 
represented by artifacts found on the ground, indicate that firearms initially 
favored the Indians, allowing them to fire almost unimpeded into the sta-
tion buildings with little fear of subsequent return fire. The small body of 
enemy soldiers was concentrated in one building with a herd of stock nearby. 
Operationally, then, this battle could be undertaken with minimal coordi-
nation by small groups or even individuals. When cavalry reinforcements 
arrived those strategies and operations became inoperative. The addition of 
over 200 new guns would have greatly increased the cost of plunder and bra-
vado. Expanding the cavalry perimeters, demonstrated in the archaeological 
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record by expended cartridge cases found near the station, along the base of 
the southern hill, and over its top, as well as by posting troopers in the rifle pit 
above the telegraph station, made attack difficult. More seriously, that appar-
ently minor operational expansion by the cavalry may have exposed the loca-
tion, or at least the direction, of the Cheyenne camp.
Figure 14.5. Distribution of artifacts found at Mud Springs Station site during the 
metal detector inventory. Authors’ image. 
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Mud Springs presented a tactical challenge for soldiers at the station, but 
the battle that opened there conformed to the strategies followed by the fron-
tier Army. The station was an important transportation and communication 
hub and the mission of the small detachment based there was to protect the 
transportation network. When fighting started, they spread the necessary 
information and held their ground until other troops could be detached for 
their support. As new forces arrived, the tactic of simply holding a defensive 
position was replaced, but at this time the frontier Army did not have a well-
formed offensive strategy for dealing with the Indian forces. In that light it 
may not be surprising that the major action taken by the newly arrived rein-
forcements to Mud Springs was a slight expansion of the defensive perimeter. 
While that was being done, the last of the reinforcements were arriving at 
Mud Springs—with a cannon!
By February 7, the strategic situation in the North Platte valley had changed 
for both sides. A large and well-armed cavalry detachment less than 15 miles 
from their community created a challenge for the Cheyenne. In terms of the 
Level of War model, it shifted their strategic priority from plunder and valor-
ous action to community security. In that case, the appropriate “operation” was 
a community movement toward security. That move started February 7, but to 
move on from the camp at the head of Rush Creek, the Native community 
had to cross the relatively secure margins of the Platte valley and enter the flat 
central portion of the valley. This brought them to the route of the Overland 
trail and into territory that was that was familiar and accessible to the cavalry. 
They continued on across the frozen Platte to establish a short-term camp in 
the bluffs on the north side of the river. 
The cavalry force that had assembled at Mud Spring left there on February 
8 to “me(e)t and repulse . . . and drive of[f ] into the Sand Hills north of the 
North Platte the combined forces of all the hostile bands of Cheyennes, Sioux 
and other tribes” (Lt. Colonel William O. Collins report, Official Records of the 
War of the Rebellion, in Hewett 1997:203–233). Moving faster than the Native 
community, they reached the south side of the Platte where they were discov-
ered by Indian sentinels. The Indian community’s warriors organized to halt 
the attack by surrounding the soldiers. Archaeological evidence indicates that 
Indian fighters did not closely engage the cavalry force. Indian forces that had 
operated in small groups and even individual actions at Mud Springs seem to 
have been able to organize and maintain a large defensive perimeter at Rush 
Creek (figure 14.6).
When they were stopped, the cavalry found itself on the Overland trail, ter-
rain that was strategically and operationally very comfortable. Their mountain 
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howitzer meant that the soldiers had a somewhat expanded operational capa-
bility, but when they were met by Native forces, they reacted as they had at Mud 
Springs. They formed a defensive position. This strategy was probably ideal for 
the Indian side. With several wagons the cavalry may have been able to prepare 
a rather substantial base and keep their adversaries at a distance. Archaeological 
and historical evidence indicate that the cavalry did move against the Indian 
attackers. When Indian forces broke off to continue their northward move-
ment, the cavalry did not follow them. The troopers may have halted their pur-
suit because they were at the limits of their capabilities. It might also be the 
Figure 14.6. The distribution of conflict artifacts from Rush Creek is overlain on a high-
resolution LiDAR image. Note how they tend to cluster in association with small hills. 
Authors’ original reconstruction. 
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case that by seeing the Native community move into the Sand Hills, they had 
achieved their strategic goal of keeping the Overland trail open.
The forces that met in the North Platte valley in 1865 were certainly ready 
for war. The two sides were familiar with one another and they carried many 
of the same arms. The reasons behind their combat, the processes that brought 
them to their engagements, and the organizations that directed their efforts 
were all quite different and those organizations are clearly reflected in the 
archaeological record of the Mud Springs and Rush Creek fights. Strategically, 
Indian and Army forces were very different, but at this point neither side seems 
to have aimed at total destruction of the other. Native communities sought 
security, materials, and war honors, while the mission of the frontier Army 
was occupation and protection of transportation and communication routes. 
Combat with neighboring societies was a standard part of life for Native com-
munities of the Plains. Operationally, both sides of the North Platte campaign 
depended on mobility, but they managed their movements is different ways. 
Army units operated out of fixed bases, from which units were dispatched to 
areas of operation. They traveled as units carrying the equipment and supplies 
they needed to project force and protect themselves. Native communities were 
themselves mobile, either moving to where resources were available or carry-
ing their supports as they moved. Community security depended on avoiding 
hostile forces and maintaining a security buffer. Force projection was managed 
by social units—primarily “military societies”—or small self-selected groups 
organized by capable leaders who pursued specific tactical objectives. Those 
objectives might be identified by community leaders for the general good or 
they might focus on gaining booty or war honors that would increase a meri-
torious individual’s social standing.
Army units had small cannons they could carry to their engagements, also 
clearly reflected in the Rush Creek–site archaeological record. Aside from that, 
by 1865, and especially after the series of small raids that followed the Sand 
Creek massacre, Indian fighters carried weapons that were comparable to the 
Army’s arms, again clearly reflected in the Mud Springs archaeological record. 
Both the Army and Indian fighters were quite capable of organized frontal 
attacks on opposing forces, but that does not seem to have been the pre-
ferred tactic for either side. The archaeological and historic records show that 
the Army units preferred to begin an engagement by establishing a defensive 
perimeter from which artillery fire, enfilades, or charges could be organized. 
An individual warrior or small group of Native fighters might make a bold 
charge to demonstrate valor or to rush toward valuable property. Bold indi-
vidual actions could be demonstrated in other ways, such as by creeping close 
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to an opposing position and making a sudden attack. Groups of society mem-
bers could join in organized combat, including either defense of a perimeter 
or a mass charge toward an opposing force.
The Levels of Warfare model presented here was developed from the cur-
rent US military’s operations manual and was tested and refined using the 
archaeological investigations at Mud Springs and Rush Creek. The model 
appears to hold significant promise as a middle-range model to test in other 
archaeological warfare and conflict sites. The model should work well with 
sites that have historic documentation and well-preserved archaeological evi-
dence of conflict. The model requires rigorous testing in a variety of conflict 
situations to ascertain its full validity and applicability to a range of site types. 
The model is eminently suited to the study of historic conflict, and it appears 
suited for earlier warfare sites, but it requires application and testing to con-
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There is a story, believed to be of Cherokee origin, 
in which a girl is troubled by a recurring dream 
in which two wolves fight viciously. Seeking an 
explanation, she goes to her grandfather, highly 
regarded for his wisdom, who explains that there 
are two forces within each of us, struggling for 
supremacy, one embodying peace and the other, 
war. At this, the girl is even more distressed, and 
asks her grandfather who wins. His answer: “The 
one you feed.” (Barash 2013:SR12)
We have focused here on war. Social violence waxed 
and waned on the Plains, taking different forms in dif-
ferent regions and over time. Plains communities wove 
war into the social and ideological aspects of their lives 
and altered important material aspects of their lives in 
response to it. Warfare mattered in the long-term his-
tory of the Great Plains.
So did peace. Some aspects of the anthropological 
debate over the prevalence and significance of war seem 
to depend as much on semantic tricks as on the real 
conditions of life faced by real groups of people in the 
present or the past, and they depend particularly on the 
way we define war and peace. We see only one useful 
definition of warfare—socially sanctioned group-level 
violence—with the specific form that war takes vary-
ing with many factors, including the nature of the com-
munity sanctioning it. This definition distinguishes 
war from individual conflicts that result in individual 
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violence and underscores the importance of community validation. In so doing, 
though, it also highlights the importance of peace. Documenting long-term 
patterns in the presence of violence also means documenting long-term pat-
terns in its absence, and these patterns are essential. To take only one example, 
Bamforth and Nepstad-Thornberry (2007b) document patterns in ceramic 
variability in the Middle Missouri region that suggest dramatic differences in 
patterns of intercommunity, perhaps interethnic, social interaction over time, 
with interaction notably higher in times when people built unfortified commu-
nities and notably lower when they lived within ditch-and-palisade defenses. 
Any effort to understand the processes of change operating on the Plains over 
time has to actively address the importance of both war and peace—of times 
when the prospect of violence could not be ignored, and of times when this 
prospect was not an issue. Our emphasis here on the first of these should not 
minimize the second.
Warfare varied on the Plains in time and space, and it did so in distinctly 
patterned ways. From a bird’s-eye view, Plains warfare’s slow development 
over time parallels the long, slow increase in indigenous population in North 
America in general (Peros et al. 2010), and its long-term geographic and tem-
poral variation tracks fairly closely with long-term geographic and temporal 
patterns of subsistence intensification that likely derive from that increase. 
Looking more closely, violence seems at least sometimes to have ebbed and 
flowed with local circumstances like drought and population movements, 
and to have concentrated at times along boundaries between social groups—
Puebloan and Plains, Apachean and Caddoan, and others. Written records 
from the late 1800s tell us clearly that individual people on the Plains chose 
war and peace consciously and strategically, evaluating circumstances and pos-
sibilities. Red Cloud, raised as a traditional Lakota warrior and the leader 
of the indigenous resistance to American expansion on the northwestern 
Plains that actually drove the frontier back for a decade, chose peace when he 
decided his people could not win in the long term (Drury and Clavin 2013). 
Comanche leader Quanah Parker led his people’s resistance on the southern 
Plains, surrendered at Palo Duro Canyon in 1872, and ended his days as a 
rancher in Oklahoma (Neeley 1995). Other warriors on the Plains made other 
choices, but the transformation of men like these from truly terrifying fight-
ers to citizens shows us unambiguously how situational collective violence is. 
They chose peace in a situation of military defeat, but they chose it neverthe-
less, and people can choose peace under other situations as well.
The debate over war and peace is also entwined with debates over many 
other issues, and we think that this kind of evidence from the Great Plains 
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bears on a number of these. Most concretely, war and peace have entered into 
discussions over the notion of the “fundamental” character of humanity, often 
conceived in evolutionary terms. On one hand, we do not lack for scholars who 
argue that selective pressures on humans to be warlike go far back in our evo-
lutionary history: violence may have fitness links among at least some human 
groups and collective homicide among chimpanzees looks eerily like some 
forms of tribal war (Chagnon 1988; Macfarlan et al. 2014; Wrangham 1999). 
In contrast, other scholars have argued that evidence for violence in the deep 
past and in simple, mobile hunter-gatherer societies has been exaggerated and 
that both tribal and primate violence result from conditions imposed by set-
tling down, by the effects of contact with more complex groups (in the case 
of primates, with humans), or by both of these (e.g., Ferguson 1992; Wilson 
et al. 2014). In this view, war grows from circumstances that, in effect, violate 
the conditions under which we evolved, which might suggest that humans are 
intrinsically, perhaps evolutionarily, peaceful.
However, we have trouble seeing the data from the Plains as evidence 
for either war or peace being wired into human beings in some kind of 
evolutionary sense. Like Barash (2013; also see Roscoe 2007; Thorpe 2003) 
it seems to us that human beings have the capacity to be either peaceful or 
warlike according to circumstance and, as we have seen, circumstances are 
often complicated. Instead of being innately warlike or inherently peaceful, 
human nature is rooted in interaction, and conflict and/or cooperation are 
simply choices people make.
Even the small-scale foraging societies that Fry and Söderberg (2013) view 
as “peaceful” document this. Viewing “history” writ very, very small, these 
authors consider the specific killings documented for such groups by ethnog-
raphers, including the Bushmen of southern Africa. Taking the Bushmen as a 
single and telling example, the list of killings that Lee (2003:116) compiles does 
look more like individual homicides than like the kind of collective violence 
that most of us label as “war.” The rate of violent death among the Bushmen, 
though, is remarkably high, as their incidence of gendered and other violence 
in general have also been (see, for example, Shostak 1981, 2000). Despite the 
anthropological celebration of traditional Bushman mechanisms of dispute 
resolution, under actual “traditional”—that is, early twentieth century—cir-
cumstances, these often failed to control Bushman behavior: male Bushmen 
stopped killing each other to resolve their disputes only when they began 
to go to prison for doing so. Early to mid-twentieth-century Bushmen may 
not have gone to war, but, whatever their ideology, it is difficult to call them 
“peaceful” in any meaningful sense of the word.
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But taking Southern African history written longer than just a few decades 
shows us a different side of these groups: “the Bushmen once waged war, 
and they lost” (Otterbein 1999: 798). The communities encountered by mid- 
twentieth-century anthropologists were the survivors of a systematic program 
of genocide carried out from 1912 to 1915 as a response to armed resistance 
to white appropriation of Bushman land (Gordon 2009; Guenther 2014; 
Hitchcock et al. 2014). This is a textbook example of Ferguson and Whitehead’s 
(1992) “war in the tribal zone.” However, unless we want to argue that white 
colonists provided military training to the indigenous people they were dis-
placing, we have to acknowledge collective violence—warfare—as an inher-
ent human capacity. Southern African hunter-gatherers organized themselves 
for war when they believed that they had to, and their poisoned arrows ter-
rorized southern African whites, at least for a short time. And like all other 
human beings, the hunter-gatherer people of southern Africa have a history 
that extends long before European contact. We do not know this history in 
detail, but osteological evidence indicates that, while interpersonal violence 
was rare overall, some 2,500 years ago people on the southwest South African 
coast—especially women and children—often died violently (Pfeiffer 2016).
This means that understanding what we mean by “peace” is worth as much 
attention as defining “war.” One simple, perhaps minimal, definition is the 
absence of social violence, but this masks a variety of circumstances with dif-
ferent implications for people present and past. Peace is not the passive result 
of lack of violence, but an active part of society (Ferguson 2013:193). Surely we 
want “peace” in this sense to reflect positive, friendly relations among neigh-
boring social groups, relations that foster the free and willing flow of people, 
ideas, and goods and that make it possible to devote individual and com-
munity efforts to tasks other than the myriad of activities required by defense.
Peace can come about in different forms, including through diplomacy 
and ally making. This can be achieved through the mechanisms such as the 
Making of Relatives rite of the Oglala or the calumet ceremony (Albers 1993; 
Brown and Steltenkamp 1993; Hall 1997). It is possible to see the latter in the 
archaeological record (Blakeslee 1981). But the absence of social violence may 
also reflect the existence of offensive and defensive military capabilities suffi-
ciently well developed to discourage attack, whether neighbors like each other 
or not. From the day-to-day perspective of a farmer hoping to travel safely to 
and from the fields, there may not be much distance between these different 
kinds of “peace.” However, from the perspective of an archaeologist hoping to 
understand the long-term history of a region like the Great Plains, distinc-
tions like this matter greatly.
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The early fifteenth century along the Middle Missouri may be an example 
of the first of these. In that time and place, communities were relatively small, 
dispersed, and unfortified, and ceramic and other data suggest substantial 
geographic overlap of settlement locations among different social groups as 
well as movements of potters between these groups (Bamforth and Nepstad-
Thornberry 2007b). Identifying examples of ancient peace enforced by a 
recognized balance of power, though, is more difficult, and leads directly to 
important domains for future archaeological research. Documenting war can 
be difficult, as the ambiguity of the Central Plains–tradition case illustrates 
(see Bamforth, chapter 1, this volume); LeBeau’s chapter 6 here underscores 
how uneven and incomplete the evidence for warfare on the Plains is even 
in the Middle Missouri region, where violence is so spectacularly visible. No 
one line of evidence will suffice to sort out the details either of the nature of 
social violence when it existed or the nature and causes of different kinds of 
peacefulness when it does not exist. Fortifications by themselves tell us about 
the possibility of attack, but fortifications that are imposing enough may 
deter actual attacks, although they may not deter small-scale raiding away 
from fortified localities and, as Vehik’s chapter 7 here shows, even endangered 
communities do not always build fortifications.
This has important implications for the ways in which we approach archae-
ological sites on the Plains, particularly sites dated to periods in which war-
fare was clearly important. The chapters here have discussed a wider variety 
of fortification styles than most of the Plains literature considers, and this is 
important. But documenting better-known kinds of fortifications in detail is 
also important. For example, people entered some recent palisaded sites on 
the Plains using ladders to climb up the inner face of the fortification ditch, 
ladders that people could pull up into the community to prevent access. Other 
Plains sites, though, have causeways across their ditches, which offer a very 
different kind of access and require a different approach to defense. Plains 
archaeologists have examined very few entrances to fortified sites: there is 
a simple baffle gate at Helb (Kay 1995) and at least one of the causewayed 
entrances to the Wittrock site appears to have a more complex and carefully 
designed and guarded baffled design (Anderson 1985). Documenting these 
aspects of fortifications along with the presence or absence of features like 
bastions and possible guard stations (e.g., the hearth within a corner bastion 
at Huff, perhaps to keep warm during winter sentry duty; Wood 1967) will 
open doors to questions we are only beginning to ask. It may be possible to 
gather data on topics like these with limited, or perhaps no, excavation, using 
geophysical techniques focused on very fine-scale subsurface patterns. More 
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focused attention on the details of site chronologies also matters: knowing 
at what point in the history of a community its members decided to fortify 
themselves is important, and this is often impossible to assess on the Plains 
because of an overwhelming emphasis in chronological work on placing sites 
in a culture-historical sequence rather than on understanding their individual 
occupation histories in detail.
Distinguishing clearly between evidence telling us that people were wor-
ried about attacks and evidence telling us that people actually were attacked 
is also essential. Osteological data are one obvious critical line of evidence in 
this context, and the Plains offers some of the most spectacular evidence of 
attacks known anywhere in the world, as we have discussed. However, partial 
publication of completed analyses addressing direct evidence for interpersonal 
violence on the Plains, not to mention the all-too-common total failure to 
publish for years after such analyses are completed, limits what we know in 
very serious ways. In a post-NAGPRA world, this is simply inexcusable.
But attacks are visible in archaeological data beyond human skeletons, and 
we need to design field strategies with this in mind. For example, we often 
take systematic evidence for burning of residential structures as possible evi-
dence for war (e.g., Lintz 1986), although we all recognize that people may 
burn their houses for more than one reason. But careful documentation of 
detailed patterns of structure burning may help to distinguish between house-
hold accidents, destruction for ritual or safety reasons, and violence: setting 
houses with thatched roofs on fire from the outside, for example, may leave a 
distinctive signature (Bleed et al. 2009). Alternatively, Keeley (1996:19) illus-
trates point-plotted projectile points scattered along the outer face of a British 
Neolithic site’s palisade, along with a swarm of points into the site’s interior 
at the location of a gate. It is difficult to interpret a pattern like this except in 
terms of sustained arrow fire at defenders along the palisade along with a burst 
of fire through an opening in the palisade into the site’s interior: this site was 
attacked. Lacking detailed provenience data, this pattern would be invisible.
Gathering field data like these might also let us look beyond the simple 
fact of massed attacks (in the cases where those occurred) to at least some 
of the tactics of these attacks. Both osteological data (most spectacularly at 
Crow Creek) and western Plains hunter-gatherer rock art underscore the cen-
tral role of shock weapons in Plains warfare, and evidence for initial assaults 
by archers might document particular kinds of attacks or different stages in 
attacks. And well-fortified sites with no evidence for any kind of violence 
might document at least local peace that was enforced not by warm social 
bonds but by military prowess.
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Finally, even the most detailed analyses of the most spectacular archaeologi-
cal sites matter only because they tell us something meaningful about what 
ancient people did and why they did it: description for its own sake, no matter 
how sophisticated, is not worth the time and effort it consumes. War matters, 
and peace matters, because they affected the ways in which people have lived 
their lives, in the present and in the past. This means that understanding how 
war is related to human lifeways, and how and why it appears and disappears, 
is among the fundamental issues archaeologists should address. As for other 
fundamental issues, though, we will find no simple explanations of either war 
or peace: no single factors, material or otherwise, “cause” people to go to war 
or to make peace, and we should not expect to find one single universal set of 
causes for war or peace throughout the Plains or anywhere else.
This does not mean that it is not useful for specific analyses to target specific 
aspects of social violence, but, rather, that we will need many different analyses 
targeting many different topics to be able to outline the place of war in human 
history on the Plains.
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hide/bison robe paintings [bison hide paint-
ings], 93, 120, 121–22, 123
High Rise Village, 251
Hilej site, 67, 69
Historia (Obregon), on Pecos, 16–17
Historic period, 76, 84, 85, 92, 99; biographic 
art, 116–17; combat scenes, 110, 113, 114; 
warfare, 101–2, 119(n12)
history, 32; Lakota, 123–24. See also oral 
histories/narratives
Hiwassee Island site, 173
Ho-Chunk, 130





Horned Headgear site (24ML508), 52, 63
horse bonnet, 52
horses: armored, 17, 38, 47–48, 50, 51, 52–54, 
56, 63, 64, 103, 110–14, 128, 287, 290, 348; 
in battle scenes, 45, 46; introduction of, 
260–61; rock-art depictions, 12, 37, 43, 45, 84, 
126–27; on southern Plains, 204, 234
horse stealing/raiding, 17, 46, 54, 55, 120, 135, 
137; depictions of, 42, 114, 132
horticultural villages, 13, 14, 120; Middle 
Missouri, 27, 34, 169–71





Hueco (Waco) subdivision, 212, 213
Huff site, 15, 182, 282, 359
human remains, 14, 159
hunter-gatherers, 3, 6, 24, 163, 190, 237, 284, 
360; fortified villages, 16, 26–27, 168, 170, 
208–9; small-scale, 357–58; subsistence 
production, 21–22; violence, 238–40
hunting, 40, 47; bison, 22, 126, 132–33, 197, 203, 
233, 234, 235, 261





IC. See Initial Coalescent sites
identity, 5, 65, 149, 299
Illinois (people), 203
Illinois (state), Oneota, 273
Illinois River valley, Oneota, 269–70, 271
IMM. See Initial Middle Missouri sites
immigration, immigrants. See migration
Indiana, Oneota in, 271
Initial Coalescent (IC) sites, 279, 296, 297; 
Crow Creek village at, 206–7; fortifications, 
154, 169, 170; in Middle Missouri, 309, 315; 
Oneota expansion, 270–71; warfare, 280, 
316
Initial Middle Missouri (IMM) sites, 32, 
168–69, 279, 280, 293, 295, 296, 297; settle-
ment pattern in, 307, 315; trade network, 
283–84, 285–86, 292
injuries, 6, 8, 10, 19, 46; in Late Prehistoric 
skeletons, 240–41; traumatic, 159, 321
intimidation, fortifications as, 192
Inuit, 6, 26
Iowa, 9, 11, 15, 279, 296; Oneota in, 270, 271, 
273; Plains Village groups on, 13, 14; trade 
networks, 32, 283–84
Ioway Tribe, 273
Iroquois, Iroquois League, 146, 148, 273, 278; 
fortification systems, 149, 163–67
Iscani subdivision, 206, 212
Itskari/Loup River phase, 259–60
James River (SD), 14, 15, 301
Jamestown mound, 11
Jebel Sahaba cemetery, 239
Jiggs Thompson site, 281
Joliet site (24CB402), 41
Julesburg, attack on, 337, 345
Juniperus virginiana, 174
Kansas, 12, 14, 16, 211, 216, 270; Contact period 
conflict in, 197–98; Late Prehistoric period, 
232–33
KDEs. See kernel density estimates
Kelley, William Fitch, 121
Kelly, Yellowstone, 49–50, 58, 60
Kennewick man, 10
INDEX 432
kernel density estimates (KDEs), 305; Middle 
Missouri, 306–13, 314; univariate and 
bivariate, 303–4
Ketchen Village, 315
kinship systems, 288, 299, 300
Kiowa, 61, 123, 260
Knife River, 291
Knife River flint, trade networks for, 283–84





La Barge Bluffs site (48LN1640), 41, 42, 69, 
110, 113
labor, 5, 22; fortifications, 193, 280; palisade 
construction, 173–74
La Crosse terrace, 273
Lakota, 24, 27, 28, 118–19(n7), 127, 337, 342, 356; 
history, 123–24; Pawnee attacks on, 134–35; 
winter counts, 120, 128, 130, 131, 132–33, 
135–40
lances: depictions of, 29, 40, 47, 48, 52, 72, 90, 
97, 98, 127
Landergin Mesa, 19, 31
landforms, 5; defensible, 6, 155, 200–201; forti-
fied, 151–52, 246–50, 257
Larson site, 18, 120, 269; massacre at, 133, 135, 
139
Late Prehistoric I period, 9, 14
Late Prehistoric period, 15, 104, 117, 190, 232; 
accoutrements, 85–91; battle depictions, 
91–96, 100–101, 106; ceramics, 259–60; 
conflict during, 262–63; counting coup in, 
105–6; headdresses and hairstyles, 82–85; 
offensive weapons, 71–79; projectile points, 
250–51; rock art, 67, 69–70, 115; shields, 
79–82; skeletal trauma, 240–41; war party 
sizes, 109–10; in Wyoming region, 240, 
258–59
Late Woodland period, 10, 12, 13, 14, 22, 26, 
269, 284; interpersonal violence, 11, 157; 
Middle Missouri and, 296, 297, 316
Lawson village, 166
Leary site, 272
Leavenworth site, 120, 133
ledger-book drawings, 98, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 
132, 135, 276
Lee, C. W., 50, 56–57, 64
Leonard, Zenas, 6, 62, 64; on Pierre’s Hole 
battle, 257–58; on war and social status, 
57–58
Le Raye, 291
Levels of War model, 340–41, 354; for 
Cheyenne and other tribes, 342–45, 351; for 
US frontier army, 345–49
Lewis and Clark, 289
Like-a-Fishhook Village, 291
Lipan Apache, 235
Little Big Horn battlefield, 19
Little River focus, 232
Little Sioux River, 14
Lodge Boy, 61
Loeve-Fox site, 11–12
Lone Man, 184, 189
Longest site (34JF1), 201, 202, 204, 218, 235; 
fortifications at, 213, 219, 220–21, 223, 224, 
228, 230; subterranean structures, 214, 
226–27
longhouses, Oneota, 272, 273
Longwoods village, 166
lookouts, women as, 57
Louisiana, fortifications in, 153
Loup River/Itskari phase, 259–60
Lower Mississippi Valley, 153
Lower St. Francis Basin, 161
Lower Walnut focus, 199, 209, 232




Paddock site, 218, 220, 227–28, 229, 230, 231
maize agriculture, 22
Making of Relations/Relatives rites, 300, 358
males: scalping patterns, 322–30, 333–34; 
status, 24, 25
malnutrition: at Crow Creek site, 23, 28, 186; 
at fortified sites, 146–47
Mandan, 28, 85, 90, 118–19(n7), 123, 139, 170, 
184, 287, 299; trade networks, 289, 291
mandibles, 10, 12, 26; traumatic injuries on, 
321, 334
Manitoba, burial in, 10
Manuel Lisa site (24YL82), decapitations 
depicted at, 61–62
manuports, at Alcova Redoubt, 256
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Massacre Canyon (Nebraska), 17
massacres, 17, 133–34, 135, 270; Crow Creek, 
16, 22–23, 145–46, 169, 206, 271, 295–96, 
315, 316, 321, 334; in winter counts, 139–40; 
Wounded Knee, 121, 122
mass graves, 28. See also massacres
MAUP. See Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
maxillas, worked, 10
Maximilian, Prince, 37, 100, 291
Mbuti, 239
McCoy, Ron, winter counts, 123–24
McCutchan-McLaughlin site, 12, 28
McKee Spring site, 69, 92
measles, 202
medicine bundles, 100; rock-art depictions 
of, 88–89
Medicine Creek Cave (48CK48), 61
Medicine Lodge Creek site, 260
Medieval Maximum, 163, 167
memories, 149
men: and Cheyenne military societies, 343–45; 
Crow Creek scalping patterns, 322–30
Menoken site, 26
Metis, 133
Michigan, Oneota in, 273
Michigan, Lake, Oneota tradition and, 272, 
273
middens, at Mississippian sites, 160–61
Middle Archaic sites, 10
Middle Mississippian period, 269
Middle Missouri-Coalescent, 149
Middle Missouri region, 9, 19, 21, 22, 23, 34, 
275, 317, 359; alliances on, 27–28; attacks 
in, 129, 206–8; chronology and interaction, 
297–98; climate changes on, 179–80; collec-
tive violence in, 276–77; ditches on, 180–85; 
ethnic warfare, 295–96; fortified sites, 15, 18, 
20, 26–27, 66, 154, 167–72, 277–78, 280–83; 
intervillage alliances, 314–15; Plains Village 
settlements, 13–14; population move-
ments in, 187–88, 296; settlement clusters, 
293, 298–300, 301, 304–13; skeletal trauma 
in, 185–87; trade networks, 32, 179, 283–84, 
287–88; undefended settlements, 278–79; 
unoccupied zones in, 315–16
Middle Woodland period, 10–11, 153
migration, 24, 218, 233; Middle Missouri 
region, 188, 280, 287–88, 295, 296, 297, 315
military power, and fortifications, 152–53
military science, 340
military societies: Cheyenne, 343–45; tactics, 
353–54
military tactics/operations, 103, 158, 287; 
force levels, 194–96; Plains Indian, 342–45, 
353–54; US cavalry, 340–42; 348–49, 351–52
militias, chiefly, 154
Mill Creek site, 14, 24–25
Minnesota, 296; Oneota tradition in, 269, 271, 
272
Mississippian culture, 25, 149, 269; defensive 
systems, 157–63; fortified towns, 153, 154, 
283; St. Francis type sites, 160–61
Mississippi River valley, buffer zones in, 272
Missouri, Oneota in, 270
Missouria, 273
Missouri River, 10, 14, 289; farmers on, 13, 
15–16; settlement distribution, 23–24
Missouri Trench, 242. See also Middle 
Missouri region
Mitu’tahato’s (Fort Clark), 291
mnemonics, winter counts as, 124
moats, 157
mobility, 234, 240, 253; camp logistics, 342–43
moccasin tails, 99; rock-art depictions of, 
89–90
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), 
302
Mohawk/Mohican villages, 165
Molstad Village (39DW234), 184–85
Montana, 38, 259; decapitation depictions in, 
61–62; rock art sites in, 46–48, 64, 65. See 
also various regions, sites by name
Mooney, James, 121
Moorehead phase, 270
Morning Star Ceremony, 134–35
mortality rates, Mississippian, 159
motives, for warfare, 131–35
Mound Bottom site, 158
mounds, 10, 153
Moundville, 159, 174
Mud Springs Station, as battlefield site, 337, 
338, 339, 349–51, 353
Mummy Cave, 251
muskets, 12, 148
Musselshell River, 38, 39; armored horses 
depicted on, 47–48; environment, 48–50; 
rock art on, 51–54, 63–64; tribal interac-
tions on, 54–62; tribes on, 50–51
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Musselshell site (24ML1049), 52
mutilations, 8; evidence of, 15, 24–25, 32, 271, 
319, 334. See also by type
mythology, 61
Nagle site, 28
Names Hill site, 69, 113
narratives, recorded, 122–23
Nearest neighbor (NN) analysis, 302–3, 304, 
305(table), 314
Nebraska, 14, 17, 32; Oneota groups, 15, 270, 
272
Nebraska phase, 15, 32, 270
Neeley’s Ferry site, 161, 162
Neodesha Fort (14WN1), 216–17, 232, 234
Newark site, 153
New Mexico, and Wichita villages, 202
New York, Iroquoian sites, 165
New Zealand, pa fortifications in, 194
Nez Perce, 50, 60, 260
NN. See nearest neighbor analysis
nomadic groups, refuges and, 242–43
Nordstrom Bowen site (24 YL419), 47, 69, 
92
Norris Farms site, 269
North Cave Hill site, 69, 74, 81, 112, 115, 127, 
128, 129, 132, 134
North Dakota, 279, 312. See also Middle 
Missouri region
Northern Plains, 154, 190. See also Middle 
Missouri region
Northern Shoshone, 41
North Platte River Valley, 132, 262; Indian-US 
military fights in, 337–39
North West Company, 289





Obregon, Baltasar de, Historia, 16–17
Oglala (Ogallala) Lakota, 17; Making of 
Relations/Relatives rites, 300, 358; winter 
counts, 123, 128, 135–40
Ojibwa, 290
Oklahoma, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 25, 208, 233; forti-
fied sites, 211, 212, 213–14, 231; Wichita 
villages in, 215–16
Omaha, fur trade, 289
Oñate expedition, 197, 198, 199, 232
Oneota tradition, 26, 208, 269; consolidation 
of, 271–73; expansion of, 31, 270–71; migra-
tions of, 15, 24, 27, 169
operations, military, 342
oral histories/narratives, 120, 122–23, 124, 125, 
232; on earthworks, 184, 189; of warfare, 
101–3
Orendorf site, 269
Ortiz Parilla, Diego, 206
Osage, 202, 203, 234
ossuaries, 10, 15
osteological evidence, 7–8, 10, 22, 30, 320, 360; 
analysis of diet, 18, 23; of conflict, 185–87; 
of trauma, 239, 240–41, 277, 319, 322–30, 
331–33, 334
Other, 25; fear of, 179, 187
Otoe, 273
Overland trail, US cavalry protection of, 
351–52, 353
Owasco villages, palisaded, 154
Oyarzún, Juan Ángel de, 213
pa, 194
Pacaha, 161
paleoenvironmental data, 22, 23
Paleoindian/Archaic period, 9
Paleoindian period, burials, 10
palisades, 8, 9, 20, 30, 146, 148, 149, 154, 176, 
179, 244, 246, 269, 270, 272; construction 
and maintenance of, 147, 156, 173–74; at 
Iroquois sites, 163–67; at Middle Missouri 
sites, 169, 171, 172, 181, 183, 277, 282, 309; at 
Mississippian sites, 158–59, 160, 162–63; use 
lives, 157–58, 160; wind speeds and, 150–51; 
wood used in, 174–75
Palo Duro Canyon, Comanches at, 356
pandemics, 273. See also disease; epidemics
Parker, Quanah, 356
Parkin site, 161, 162
parrying fractures, 241, 319
parties, on Musselshell, 54, 63
Pawnees, 17, 34, 132; Morning Star Ceremony, 
134–35
Pax La Roche, 273
Pax Oneota, 273
peace, 197, 291, 355–56; human cultures and, 
357–58; identifying, 358–59
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Pecos Pueblo, 16, 17
Pend d’Oreille, 46, 115; on Musselshell River, 
50, 54, 55
phalanxes, depictions of, 91–92, 100–101, 
106–10
pictographic records, 120. See also hide/bison 
robe paintings; ledger-book drawings
pictographs, 38, 70. See also rock art
Piegan/Peigan, 56, 103, 128; fortifications, 257, 
258; on Musselshell River, 50, 54, 55
Pierre’s Hole battle, 257–58
pikes. See maces
Pine Canyon site, 69, 113
Piney Creek site, 260
Pinson site, 153
pipes, steatite, 252, 253
pipestone, 133
Plains Village period, 9, 11, 26, 33, 301, 316; 
fortified villages, 167–72; rock-art depic-
tions, 12–13
plunder, of Arikara corn caches, 133
point pattern analysis, 302
political relations: antagonistic, 148–49; forti-
fications and, 152–53
Ponca, trade networks, 289
population movements, 15, 24, 240, 273; 
Middle Missouri region, 296, 297, 306–16
populations: Middle Missouri villages, 206–7, 
208; Southern Plains groups, 197–99, 202
Populus deltoides, in Middle Missouri villages, 
171–72, 174
Post-Contact Coalescent (PCC), 296, 297, 312
pottery. See ceramics
Powder River Basin, 132
power, 359; fortifications and, 194–96; shields 
and, 13, 41, 116
projectile points: at Alcova Redoubt, 250–51, 
253; and ditches, 184, 185; embedded, 7, 8, 10, 
11–12, 15, 28, 159, 186, 241; Late Prehistoric, 
258–59
proto-Arikara, 145, 169, 170
proto-Crow, 260
Protohistoric period, 99, 117; accoutrements, 
85–91; Alcova Redoubt at, 250–51, 252, 264; 
battle depictions, 91–96, 109–10, 113–14; 
counting coup in, 105–6; headdresses 
and hairstyles, 82–85; horses in, 110–13; 
rock art, 67, 69–70, 115; offensive weapons, 
71–79; shields, 79–82; violent deaths during, 





Puebloans, 15, 18, 19, 28
radiocarbon dates, 70; Avonlea site, 259; 
Bryson-Paddock site, 218; Crow Creek 
site, 22–23
raiding, raids, 4, 11, 17, 19, 120, 133, 157, 168, 
285, 343, 345; Iroquoian, 163, 164; steal-
ing women, 55–57. See also horse stealing/
raiding
rampart ditches, 282; at Bryson-Paddock site, 
219–24
ranked men, rock-art depictions of, 71, 91–92, 
100–101, 106–10
reciprocity, failed, 291
Recognition Rock (24RB165), 44, 69, 113
records, 120. See also hide/bison robe paint-
ings; ledger-book drawings; rock art; 
winter counts
Red Canyon site, 69, 74, 105, 115
Red Cloud, 356
Red River, Wichita sites on, 201, 206, 211, 
213–14
Red Wing (Minn.), Oneota tradition, 269, 
272
refuge sites, 19; Alcova Redoubt, 237, 246–57; 
nomadic groups, 242–43
relationship-building practices, 300
relocation, Iroquois villages, 166
repatriation, of Crow Creek skeletons, 322
resources, 5; competition for, 22, 169; for 
fortification construction and maintenance, 
30–31, 147–48, 156, 280; trade networks and, 
179, 289–90
“Retreat up the Hill,” depiction of, 58
revenge, 64, 163, 203, 294
Ridge, John, on Tawakoni village, 214–15
Ripley’s K statistic, 303, 304–5, 306, 314
rituals/ceremonies, 47; battle reenactments, 
40; depictions of, 41–42
River Bend site, 251
roaches, depictions of, 82, 84, 101
robes, stealing, 56
rock art, 7, 17, 121, 122, 129, 132, 133, 240, 276, 
360; battles on, 91–96, 115; bow-spears on, 
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77–79; captives on, 134, 135; ceremonial 
tradition, 12, 67–68; coup sticks/staffs on, 
59–60; ethnographic interpretation and, 
37–38, 104–6; feather bustles on, 85–87; 
headdresses and hairstyles on, 82, 84–85; 
horses on, 126–27, 128; ideology/iconogra-
phy of, 24, 29, 41–46; interpreting, 64–65; 
medicine bundles on, 88–89; moccasin 
tails on, 89–90; on Musselshell River, 
51–54, 55–58, 63–64; scalps and severed 
heads on, 60–62; shields on, 79–82; tipis 
and war lodges on, 58–59; V-neck warriors 
on, 98–99; warriors on, 12–13, 19, 66, 68–70, 
100–101, 106–10; weapons on, 46–48, 71–82, 
96–98
Rockshelter Shield site (24ML507), 52
Rosegate (Rose Springs) culture, 258, 259
Rosegate points, 259
Rose Mound, 161, 162
Rose Springs (Rosegate) culture, 258, 259
Rose Springs points, 258
Rush Creek (Nebr.), 337; battlefield, 338, 
349–51, 352, 353
Rush Creek (Okla.), 215
sacred precincts, demarcation of, 150
sacred structures, 154
Sahkomaupee (Saukamapee), 12, 66, 106, 258; 
on bow and arrow, 71, 72; on warfare, 101–2, 
110, 115–16
St. Francis River, 161, 162
St. Francis-type sites, 160–61, 162
St. Helena sites, 15
St. Ignace (Taenhatentaron), 146
St. Louis (Huron village), 146
Salish, 132, 246
Salix spp., in Middle Missouri villages, 171–72, 
174
Sand Creek massacre, 337
Sand Hills, 337, 353
Sandoval, Felipe de, 201, 202, 205
Sand Prairie phase, 270





scaffolds, Iroquoian villages, 167
scalplocks, as hairstyle, 333
scalp-taking, scalps, 8, 10–11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 46, 
116, 120, 126, 187, 319–20; at Crow Creek 
site, 32, 186, 271, 320–21, 322–30, 331–32; 
display of, 25, 127; rock-art depictions of, 52, 
60, 84–85, 101; of warriors, 333–34; in winter 
counts, 131–32
scar-face motif, at West Rygate site, 52
scurvy, at Fort Frontenac, 146–47
seasonal camps, fortified, 208–9
security, 353; of Cheyenne camps, 342–43
sedentary groups, and fortifications, 245
self-bows, 5, 158–59
self-portraits, in rock art, 63
self-representation, in rock art, 29
Semai, 238–39
settlement/site clusters, 293; analysis of, 
302–4; Middle Missouri, 298–300, 301, 
304–13
settlement patterns, 293; Middle Missouri, 
23–24, 276, 293, 301, 306–16
settlements, 24; defensive, 6, 15; Plains Village, 
13–14; undefended, 278–79
Seventh Iowa Volunteer Cavalry, 338
severed heads, rock-art depictions of, 46, 
60–62
sex, and scalping patterns, 322–30
Shea site, 170, 208
shield-bearing warriors: depictions of, 12, 
13, 66, 67, 68–69, 80, 81, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 
100–101, 109, 118(n2), 125; headdresses and 
hairstyles on, 82, 84–85; weapons carried by, 
71–76, 96–98, 118(n4)
shields, 5, 46, 85, 99, 102, 119(nn11, 14), 148; 
depictions of, 12, 13, 37, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 
64, 67, 69, 77, 79–82, 87; supernatural power 
and, 100, 116
Shoshone, 63, 258, 259, 260, 261–62
shrines, protection of, 154
Sicanju Lakota, winter counts, 128, 135–40
sieges, of fortified sites, 146–47, 257–58
Siouan speakers, 27, 145, 149, 169, 170, 273
Sioux, 57, 60; on Musselshell River, 50, 64; 
trade, 290–91
skeletons: Crow Creek village, 271, 321, 334–35; 
traumatic injuries on, 6, 7–8, 159, 167, 185–87, 
239, 240–41, 269, 277, 319




skulls, 26; scalping patterns on, 323–28, 331–32; 
traumatic injuries on, 8, 11, 321, 334; trophy, 
14, 15, 24–25
slaves, slave trade, 18, 99, 135, 234
smallpox epidemics, 202, 299; and captives, 
116, 134–35





social stratification, in Arikara societies, 330
social structure: Arikara society, 331, 332–33; 
and fortifications, 149–50




Soto, Hernando de, 159, 161
South Carolina, 146
South Dakota, 9, 24, 271, 279, 280, 301, 312, 314; 
Arikara in, 18, 27; Initial Middle Missouri 
sites in, 32, 296; Plains Village sites on, 14, 
15–16. See also Middle Missouri region; 
various sites by name
Southern Plains, 209; fortified villages on, 
211–16, 231–32; group interactions, 200–206; 
trade networks, 234–35
South Piney site, 69, 112
Southwest, Plains trade with, 232, 233–34
Spanish, 103; attacks on Taovaya Wichita, 211, 
213; on southern Plains, 197, 198, 199, 200, 
212; in Southwest, 16–17




spiritual symbols, shields as, 46
Spiro Mounds, falcon-warrior imagery, 25
Spokane, on Musselshell River, 50, 55
Spring, Otto, 218
Spring Boy, 61
staffs, rock art depictions of, 59–60, 79
Standing Bear motifs, 80
Star Village, 290
status, 54; in Arikara society, 332–33; male, 24, 
25, 169; warfare and, 57–58, 64
Steed-Kisker site, 32
Stirling phase, 270
stone structures, in Protohistoric sites, 240
Stony Point village, 315, 317
strategic plans, military, 341




at Bryson-Paddock site, 224–27, 228–30; in 





supply routes, across Plains, 346
Sweetgrass Hills, 133
swords, depictions of, 40
symbolism, Oneota, 273
synecdoche, in Plains Biographic rock art, 
106, 110
tabs/tassels, depictions of, 91, 92, 93
tactics, military, 342
Taenhatentaron (St. Ignace), 146
Talking Crow site (39BF3), 207, 208
tally scenes, tallies, 55, 79, 99, 119(n13)
Tancoa, 199
Taovaya (Tahuaisses) subdivision, 201, 204, 
205, 206, 212, 213, 216
Tascaluça, 159
tattoos, 88
Tawakoni (Tahuacano) subdivision, 212, 213; 
attacks on, 214–15
tear-streak motif, 88
telegraph system/stations, 346, 347
Terminal Middle Missouri (TMM), 296, 298
territory, 103; defending, 132–33
Teton Sioux, 50, 289–90, 292
Texas, 16, 18, 26; fortified sites, 211, 214–15, 231; 
Late Prehistoric period, 232, 233; Late 
Woodland-Plains Village sites, 11–12, 15
Thin Elk-Steamboat Winter Count, 124
Thoburn, Joseph, 218
Thompson, David, 102
3:1 Rule, 195, 196, 206–7
Thuja occidentalis, 174
timber. See wood
tipis, rock art depictions of, 58–59
Tobias site (14RC8), 232
Toltec sites, 153
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Tony Glas site, 14
tooth evulsion, Crow Creek village, 271
Toqua site, 174
Torus beads, 252
towers, Mississippian sites, 158
trade, trade networks, 5, 38, 54, 55, 116, 212, 272; 
conflict and, 289–92; Middle Missouri, 
32, 179, 283–84, 285–86, 287–88; Plains-
Southwest, 233–34; Southern Plains, 232, 
234–35
trading events/fairs, 289, 291
trappers, traders, 38, 54
trenches, 191–92; at Wichita villages, 201, 204, 
215. See also ditches
Treviño, Antonio, 202, 214; on Longest site 
fortifications, 220–21, 226, 228, 230
tribes, 65, 299
triggers, for attacks, 28–29
trophy-taking, trophies, 8, 12, 24, 106, 159, 269, 
319, 332, 343; body parts as, 10, 11, 14, 15, 
25, 276; as dehumanizing, 330–31; head as, 
60–62; Middle Missouri, 169, 186, 187. See 
also scalp-taking, scalps
Truman Mounds, 10
Truteau, Jean Baptiste, 172, 289, 291
Tuscarora, 146
Twenty-one Guns site (24ML398), 53–54
Tyronza River, 161, 162
Uncompahgre Brown Ware, 253, 262
unoccupied zones, on Middle Missouri, 306, 
307, 309, 312, 315–16
Upper Republican phase, 259
Upper Yazoo Basin, 161
US Army/Cavalry: attacks by, 120, 133, 215; 
expeditions of, 337, 338–39; Indian battles 
with, 32–33; military tactics, 353–54; at 
Mud Springs battle, 349–51; operations, 
340–42, 345–49




Utz site complex, 272
Verdigris Coulee site, 69, 104, 105, 112, 113, 115
Verdigris River, Wichita sites on, 216
Verendrye, 66
Vernon Paul site, 161
Victory Dance, 127
Villasur fight, 129
violence, 4, 17, 151, 169, 357, 361; causes of, 
20–21; collective, 276–77, 288–89, 292–93, 
358; hunter-gatherer, 238–40; increased, 
318–19; trade networks and, 32, 289–91; vis-
ibility of, 6–7; Woodland period, 10–11
Virginia, warriors in, 159
visibility, of social violence, 6–7
V-neck warriors: depictions of, 66, 67, 68–69, 
94, 96, 98–99, 117, 119(n10); hairstyles and 
headdresses on, 82, 84–85
Waco (Hueco) subdivision, 212, 213
wall-and-trench system, 191–92
Walnut River (Kansas), Etzanoa on, 197–98, 
199
walls, wall systems, 192, 242, 243–44; at Alcova 
Redoubt, 246–50; curtain, 155–56; defensive, 
148, 150
war booty, 99, 114
warfare, 3, 17, 103, 268, 275; defining, 4, 40; 
ethnic, 295–96, 315–16; Sahkomaupee’s 
descriptions of, 101–2
war honor events, 343
war lodges/houses, rock art depictions of, 58–59
war parties: range of, 130–31; sizes of, 106–10; 
in winter counts, 128, 136–37
Warring States period, 194
Warrior-art tradition, 122–23, 125–26, 133
warriors, 25, 159, 202; mounted, 45, 46, 103; 
ranks of, 91–92, 100–101, 106, 109–10, 
115–16; in rock-art, 12–13, 19, 49, 51, 64, 66, 
68–69, 125–26; scalping of, 333–34; scalp-
taking, by 331–32. See also shield-bearing 
warriors; V-neck warriors
warrior societies, 13. See also military societies
Washita River people, 26
Watson Brake site, 153
weapons, 17, 33, 40, 148, 277, 339, 345; at Alcova 
Redoubt, 255–57; decorations on, 90–91; 
defensive, 79–82; depictions of, 12, 29, 37, 
42, 44–45, 46–48, 63–64, 66, 69, 71–79, 94, 
95, 105, 118(n5), 125; efficacy of, 96–98; on 
southern Plains, 203–4
West Rygate site (24GV191), 52–53
Wheeler phase, 231
whiskey, trading for, 55
Whistling Elk site (39HU242), 207, 315
INDEX 439
White Mountain Petroglyphs (48SW302), 45
Wichita, 16, 198, 209, 210, 211, 232, 233; forti-
fied villages, 212–16; interactions with other 
tribes, 200–206; trade networks, 234–35
Wichita subdivision, 201, 205, 212, 216
Williams Coulee site, 69, 109
willow (Salix spp.), in Middle Missouri vil-
lages, 171–72, 174
Wilson, Gilbert L., 290
Wilson Creek site, 128
wind, and wooden palisades, 150–51
Winnebago, 273
Winnebago, Lake, Oneota at, 272
winter counts, 120, 123–25, 126, 133; combat/
conflicts recounted in, 128–32, 135–40
wintering areas, Musselshell River as, 50–51
Wisconsin, Oneota in, 269, 272, 273
Wittrock site, 9, 281, 359
Wolf Chief, 290–91
wolf-hat headdresses, 84, 100
wolf pelts, depictions of, 88
women, 60, 126, 127, 145; in Arikara society, 
332–33; captives, 41, 42, 43, 55–57, 86, 99, 103, 
105, 116, 135; in massacres, 133–34, 322–30; 
rock art depictions, 37, 85; scalping patterns, 
331–32
wood, 193; decay rates of, 174–75; in Iroquois 
palisades, 166–67; in Middle Missouri vil-
lages, 171–72, 277; in palisades, 156, 157–58
Woodland/Late Prehistoric period, 9
Woodland period, 9, 10–11, 33, 153, 168
woodworking tools, at Mississippian sites, 
158
Wounded Knee, 121, 122
wounds, wounding: arrow, 7, 8, 10, 11–12, 13, 15, 
28, 29, 159, 186, 241, 271; combat, 6, 94, 95, 96, 
241, 319. See also scalp-taking, scalps
Writing-on-Stone site, 69, 79, 104; battle 
scenes at, 52, 58, 109, 110, 112, 113; warriors 
depicted at, 67, 84; weapons’ decorations 
depicted at, 90, 92; weapons depicted at, 
115, 119(n14)
Wyoming, 11, 38, 237, 240; clubs used in, 
76, 79; Late Prehistoric period, 258–60; 
Protohistoric period, 260–62; rock art sites 
in, 41–42, 46–48, 55, 60–62, 64, 65. See also 
various regions; sites by name
Yamassees, 146
Yanktonai Dakota (Yankton Sioux), 50, 291; 
winter counts, 123, 128, 133, 135–40

